Bellis v. Bellis

Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of Texas and of the United States. He had five legitimate children by his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced; three legitimate children by his second wife, Violet Kennedy; and three illegitimate children. In 1952 he executed a will in the Philippines giving $240,000 to Mary E. Mallen and P120,000 (P40,000 each) to his three illegitimate children, with the residue going in equal shares to his seven surviving legitimate children. He died in 1958 as a resident of San Antonio, Texas, and the will was probated in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila. The executor, People's Bank and Trust Company, paid the legacies and filed a project of partition dividing the residue among the seven legitimate children. Two illegitimate children, Maria Cristina and Miriam Palma Bellis, opposed it, arguing that they had been deprived of their legitimes as compulsory heirs. Relying on Art. 16 of the Civil Code, the CFI applied Texas law, which does not provide for legitimes, and approved the partition. The oppositors appealed directly to the Supreme Court on a pure question of law.

1. 1Whether Texas law, as the decedent's national law, and not Philippine law governs the amount of successional rights and the intrinsic validity of the will, so that the illegitimate children cannot claim legitimes.
2. 2Whether Art. 17, par. 3 of the Civil Code, on prohibitive laws and public policy, is an exception to Art. 16, par. 2.

Texas law governs, and the illegitimate children have no claim to legitimes. Under Art. 16, par. 2 and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, the decedent's national law governs four matters in testate and intestate succession: the order of succession, the amount of successional rights, the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, and the capacity to succeed. This applies whatever the nature of the property and wherever it is located. The Court found renvoi inapplicable. The appellants never invoked it, and the decedent was both a national and a domiciliary of Texas. In any case, Texas's conflict-of-law rule was not proven, so it could not be presumed to differ from ours. Art. 17, par. 3 is not an exception to Art. 16. When Congress carried old Art. 11 into the new Art. 17, it deleted the phrase "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article." It also added Art. 1039. The Court read this as showing that Art. 16, par. 2 is a specific provision meant to govern succession. "[W]hatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals." Specific provisions prevail over general ones. The fact that the decedent made a separate Philippine will did not change the result. Under Miciano v. Brimo, a provision in a foreigner's will requiring that his estate be distributed under Philippine law instead of his national law is void. The parties admitted that Texas law has no forced heirs or legitimes, so Philippine law on legitimes could not be applied. The probate court's order was affirmed in toto, with costs against the appellants.