In Re: Santillon

Pedro Santillon died intestate on November 21, 1953 in Tayug, Pangasinan. He was survived by his wife, Perfecta Miranda, and one son, Claro Santillon, and had acquired several parcels of land during the marriage. About four years later, Claro petitioned for letters of administration. Perfecta and the spouses Benito U. Miranda and Rosario Corrales opposed. They claimed that most of the properties were conjugal, that Perfecta owned three parcels exclusively, and that Perfecta had conveyed three-fourths of her undivided share in most of the properties to the Miranda spouses. Perfecta was eventually appointed administratrix, and commissioners were appointed to draft a project of partition. Claro moved to declare the heirs' shares. He argued that after Perfecta's conjugal half was deducted, Art. 892 of the Civil Code gave her only one-fourth of Pedro's estate and him three-fourths. Perfecta invoked Art. 996, which gives the surviving spouse the same share as each child, and claimed one-half. The CFI of Pangasinan ruled that, after deducting the widow's conjugal share, the estate would be divided one-half to Perfecta and one-half to Claro. Claro appealed to the Supreme Court, and Perfecta moved to dismiss the appeal.

1. 1Whether the order fixing the heirs' shares is appealable.
2. 2Whether, in intestate succession, a surviving spouse who concurs with a single legitimate child inherits one-half of the estate under Art. 996 or only one-fourth under Art. 892 of the Civil Code.

Yes to the first. The order is final and appealable, since Rule 109, sec. 1 allows an appeal in special proceedings from an order that "determines ... the distributive share of the estate to which such person is entitled." On the second issue, the spouse and the child share equally. Art. 892 falls under testamentary succession and merely fixes the legitime of the surviving spouse, as Art. 888 fixes that of children. It may show what the law considers ideal shares, but it does not fix the shares in intestacy. In intestacy the applicable provision is Art. 996: "If a widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as that of each of the children." The argument that "children" excludes a single "child" fails because words in the plural include the singular. Otherwise "children" in Arts. 887, 888 and 896 would also exclude an only child, and Claro's own premise that an only child gets one-half as legitime under Art. 888 would collapse. Nor is the result unfair on the premise that the widow gets only one-fourth in testate succession. One-fourth is only her legitime, and the testator may leave her one-half. The Court also noted that Art. 834 of the Spanish Civil Code, the source of Art. 996, had a separate paragraph for a spouse concurring with only one child, and that Art. 996 omitted it, showing an intent to lay down a single rule. The Court cited the views of Justice J.B.L. Reyes and Tolentino. Any unfairness is for the legislature; the statute's mandate is clear. The appealed order was affirmed.