Van Dorn v. Romillo

Alice Reyes, a Filipino citizen, married Richard Upton, a United States citizen, in Hong Kong in 1972. They lived in the Philippines and had two children. In 1982 they were divorced in Nevada, and Alice later remarried there, to Theodore Van Dorn. In the Nevada case, Upton, acting through lawyers he had authorized by a power of attorney, agreed to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility, on the understanding that there was no community property and there were no community obligations to be adjudicated. In 1983 Upton sued Alice in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. He alleged that her business in Ermita, Manila (the Galleon Shop) was conjugal property and asked for an accounting and to be declared entitled to manage it. Alice moved to dismiss on the ground that the claim was barred by the Nevada judgment, where Upton had acknowledged that they had no community property. Respondent Judge Romillo denied the motion on the ground that the property was located in the Philippines, so the divorce decree had no bearing on it. He also denied reconsideration. Alice then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court.

1. 1Whether certiorari and prohibition lie against the denial of the motion to dismiss, an interlocutory order.
2. 2Whether the Nevada divorce, valid under the American husband's national law, bars him from claiming rights as husband over alleged conjugal property in the Philippines.

Yes on both. A denial of a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and ordinarily not reviewable by certiorari. However, the Court may correct it where grave abuse of discretion was patently committed, and prohibition lies where going ahead with the proceedings would be useless. This case fell within the exception. The Court found it unnecessary to determine the parties' property regime; the pivotal fact was the Nevada divorce. The Nevada court had jurisdiction over both parties: Alice appeared in person, and Upton appeared through the attorneys he had authorized. The divorce was valid in the United States and binding on Upton as an American citizen. Under the nationality principle of Art. 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorce. "[A]liens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law." Under his national law, Upton was no longer Alice's husband. He therefore had no standing to sue as a husband entitled to control conjugal assets. Being bound by the decision of his own country's court, he was also estopped by his representation there from asserting a right over the alleged conjugal property. It would not be just to hold Alice still bound by a wife's obligations under Art. 109 et seq. of the Civil Code to live with him, observe respect and fidelity, and support him, or to keep him among her heirs. The petition was granted, and the trial judge was ordered to dismiss Upton's complaint. The Court did not squarely rule on Alice's capacity to remarry under Philippine law.