Lim v. Gamosa

The Tagbanua Indigenous Cultural Community of Barangay Buenavista, Coron, Palawan, through ten named members, filed a petition before the NCIP. It accused Engr. Ben Y. Lim and three corporations of violating the community's right to free and prior informed consent and of unlawfully intruding into its ancestral domain. The NCIP Regional Hearing Office ordered summons and set hearings. Although a motion to dismiss is prohibited under the NCIP rules, the petitioners moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction because they are not ICCs/IPs. They also raised lack of jurisdiction over their persons, lack of cause of action and forum shopping. On November 30, 2006, the NCIP denied the motion, and it later denied reconsideration. The Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No. 98268) denied the petitioners' certiorari petition. It held that Section 66 of the IPRA grants the NCIP all-encompassing jurisdiction over disputes involving ICC/IP rights, even against non-IPs. The NCIP had also cited its own rules exempting cases involving non-IPs and juridical persons from exhausting customary remedies. The petitioners appealed by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

1. 1Whether the NCIP has jurisdiction under Section 66 of the IPRA over a dispute involving rights of ICCs/IPs where the opposing parties are not ICCs/IPs.
2. 2Whether the NCIP may, by administrative circular, classify its Regional Hearing Office's jurisdiction as original and exclusive.

The appeal was granted. Following Unduran v. Aberasturi, NCIP jurisdiction under Section 66 has two elements: (1) the claim or dispute involves rights of ICCs/IPs, and (2) the parties have exhausted all remedies under their customary laws, as certified by the Council of Elders/Leaders. Section 66 does not use the words 'primary' or 'original and exclusive'. Its proviso restricts the general grant and contemplates disputes between ICCs/IPs. Primary jurisdiction does not necessarily mean exclusive jurisdiction. Drawing a parallel to Union Glass v. SEC, the Court held that the NCIP's competence covers the implementation of the IPRA and customary law. It does not extend to the rights and duties of non-ICCs/IPs under other laws. The NCIP's administrative circulars classifying the Regional Hearing Office's jurisdiction as original and exclusive supplanted the trial courts' general jurisdiction under B.P. 129 and broadened the IPRA. Rules may only fill in details and cannot expand the law. The IPRA's repealing clause did not impliedly repeal B.P. 129, and at best the NCIP's limited jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the regular courts. The Court also found that the petition pleaded only conclusions, not ultimate facts, on the respondents' status as Tagbanuas and their authority to represent the community. Regular courts hearing such disputes must still apply the IPRA. Disposition: the CA decision and NCIP resolution were reversed, the NCIP petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and Section 1 of NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1, series of 2014, was declared void, without prejudice to refiling in a court of general jurisdiction.