Begnaen v. Sps. Caligtan

Thomas Begnaen sued Spouses Leo and Elma Caligtan before the NCIP Regional Hearing Office (RHO) in La Trinidad, Benguet for "Land Dispute and Enforcement of Rights." The RHO dismissed the complaint because the dispute should first have gone to the council of elders, as the IPRA requires. Instead of complying, Begnaen filed a forcible entry complaint before the MCTC of Bauko-Sabangan, Mt. Province over a 125-square-meter lot. He alleged that the spouses had fenced a portion and built a shack on it. The spouses claimed the area was part of land they bought in 1959 under age-old customs, with the boundary marked by a buried "GIKAD" or old pine lumber. Both parties admitted that they were Kankanaey tribe members and that the land was ancestral land. The MCTC dismissed the case, holding that the NCIP had jurisdiction. The RTC reversed, holding that the MCTC had jurisdiction over ejectment under B.P. Blg. 129. The CA reinstated the MCTC, holding that the IPRA had divested regular courts of jurisdiction. Begnaen then filed a petition for review.

1. 1Whether the NCIP has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute, to the exclusion of regular courts
2. 2Whether the MCTC's dismissal of the forcible entry case was nonetheless proper

The petition was denied. The CA erred in holding that the NCIP had original and exclusive, or primary, jurisdiction. Section 66 of the IPRA confers jurisdiction over "all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs" without making it exclusive. Lim v. Gamosa declared void, for expanding the law, the NCIP rule (Section 1, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1, Series of 2014) calling the RHO's jurisdiction original and exclusive. The NCIP's limited jurisdiction is concurrent with the general jurisdiction of the regular courts. The dismissal was still correct. The NCIP had jurisdiction over the parties, who were members of the same ICC, and over the land, which both admitted to be ancestral land. The Court rejected the claim that purchased land cannot be ancestral land, citing Sections 3(a)-(b) and 8(a) of the IPRA. Under concurrent jurisdiction, the body that first takes cognizance of a complaint exercises jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others (Department of Justice v. Liwag; Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodriguez). The RHO's dismissal for failure to exhaust customary remedies did not divest it of jurisdiction but only required compliance with a condition precedent. Section 65 of the IPRA also gives primacy to customary law. Begnaen was estopped from attacking the jurisdiction he had invoked. He was also guilty of forum shopping, because his MCTC certification did not disclose the NCIP case, in violation of Section 5, Rule 7. Disposition: the CA decision was affirmed and the MCTC resolution reinstated.