People v. Lamahang
G.R. No. 43530August 3, 1935
Study material, not legal advice. Written and checked by the PhilippineLaws team to the best of our knowledge; not reviewed by a lawyer. A digest is a summary — the full decision is the authority, so read it before you cite it.
Cited for
An attempt must be an attempt at a specific crime. Overt acts that do not clearly show which felony was intended cannot be punished as an attempt at the graver one
Why it matters
The classic case on overt acts under Article 6. A man caught at dawn prying boards off a store wall with an iron bar was convicted of attempted robbery below. The Supreme Court held that nothing showed he meant to rob rather than do something else once inside. His acts proved only an intent to enter by force, so he was guilty of attempted trespass to dwelling. Acts open to two readings cannot ground an attempt at the more serious crime.
Digest
At early dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose Tomambing, patrolling in Iloilo City, caught Aurelio Lamahang making an opening with an iron bar in the wall of a store of cheap goods on C.R. Fuentes Street. The owner, Tan Yu, was asleep inside with another man. Lamahang had broken one board and unfastened another when the policeman arrested him. The provincial fiscal, the trial judge and the Solicitor-General all treated the act as attempted robbery. The Court of First Instance of Iloilo convicted him of attempted robbery and sentenced him to two years and four months of prision correccional, plus an additional ten years and one day of prision mayor as a habitual delinquent.
- 1Whether breaking open the wall of a store, without more, constitutes attempted robbery.
- 2If not, what offense the acts constitute and the proper penalty.
Not attempted robbery, but attempted trespass to dwelling (Recto, J.). A punishable attempt must have a logical relation to a particular, concrete offense. It is the beginning of execution by overt acts that lead directly to that offense's consummation. The attempt to commit an indeterminate offense is not a juridical fact under the Code. It must be shown that the beginning of execution, if carried to completion without external obstacle or voluntary desistance, would logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. For forcible entry to be attempted robbery, the offender must clearly have intended to take personal property for gain. Here the record supported only the inference that Lamahang meant to enter the store by force. Whether he then meant to rob, to injure the inmates or to commit some other offense could not be concretely found. In unconsummated offenses, the intended act (accion fin) must be inferred from the acts executed (accion medio). Acts susceptible of double interpretation, innocent as well as punishable, cannot by themselves ground attempted or frustrated crimes. The acts must be such that, without the intent to commit an offense, they would be meaningless. The facts alleged in the information supported attempted trespass to dwelling committed by force under Article 280, and the owner's prohibition is presumed. The aggravating circumstances were nighttime and former convictions (several final judgments for robbery and theft), offset by the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction. Breaking the wall was not aggravating, because it was the very act constituting the offense. The penalty two degrees lower under Article 51 is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, imposed in its maximum period. He was sentenced to three months and one day of arresto mayor, without credit for half of his preventive imprisonment under Article 29.
Checked against the full decision by the PhilippineLaws team on September 21, 2026. Not reviewed by a lawyer.