People v. Bayotas

Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was convicted of rape by the RTC of Roxas City on June 19, 1991. While his appeal was pending, he died on February 4, 1992 at the National Bilibid Hospital of cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy. In a May 20, 1992 resolution, the Supreme Court dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal but required the Solicitor General to comment on his civil liability. The Solicitor General, relying on People v. Sendaydiego, argued that civil liability survived and the appeal should still be resolved to review the conviction on which it rested. Counsel for the accused, invoking the Court of Appeals' ruling in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia, argued that death pending appeal extinguished both criminal and civil liability.

1. 1Whether the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil liability.

Appeal dismissed without qualification (Romero, J., en banc). Under Article 89(1), criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the convict as to personal penalties, and as to pecuniary penalties only when death occurs before final judgment. People v. Castillo read “final judgment” as judgment beyond recall. Until then there is legally no culprit and no crime, and civil liability based solely on the felony cannot be imposed when its source no longer exists. The Supreme Court adopted this in Alison, Jose and Satorre. Belamala v. Polinar and Torrijos v. Court of Appeals refined it: civil liability survives where it also rests on another source, such as Article 33 of the Civil Code or a contract. Sendaydiego departed from this by keeping appellate jurisdiction over civil liability ex delicto after the accused died. The Court re-examined Sendaydiego and reverted to the old rule. Article 30 of the Civil Code does not support Sendaydiego. It governs a separate civil action brought independently of any criminal proceeding and does not convert the civil action impliedly instituted with the criminal action into an independent one. Civil liability ex delicto is determined in the criminal action, rooted as it is in the pronouncement of guilt (Article 100), so its extinction follows the criminal action's. In the Court's words, death dissolves all things. Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court is a rule of civil procedure for ordinary money claims. Following Justice Regalado, it cannot justify continuing the appeal, and claims ex delicto are not among the claims against the estate listed in Section 5, Rule 86. The Court summarized its rules. First, death pending appeal extinguishes criminal liability and civil liability based solely on the offense. Second, the claim survives if it can also be predicated on another source of obligation under Article 1157: law, contracts, quasi-contracts or quasi-delicts. Third, a surviving claim may be pursued only by a separate civil action, subject to Section 1, Rule 111. It is filed against the executor or administrator where it is for injury to person or property (Section 1, Rule 87), or against the estate where it arises from contract (Section 5, Rule 86). Fourth, where the civil action was instituted with the criminal action, prescription is deemed interrupted while the criminal case was pending, under Article 1155. Bayotas's death extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the rape.