Disini v. Secretary of Justice

Several consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition asked the Court to declare provisions of Republic Act 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional. The Court issued a temporary restraining order on October 9, 2012 and extended it on February 5, 2013, barring government agencies from implementing the law. The petitioners challenged three groups of provisions. The first defined offenses: illegal access, data interference, cyber-squatting, identity theft, cybersex, child pornography, unsolicited commercial communications and libel. The second governed liability and penalties: Section 5 on aiding or abetting and attempt, Section 6 (penalties one degree higher for crimes committed through information and communications technologies), Section 7 (prosecution under both the RPC and RA 10175) and Section 8. The third gave enforcement powers: Sections 12 to 15, 17, 19, 20, 24 and 26(a), including real-time collection of traffic data and DOJ blocking of computer data. Some petitioners also attacked Articles 353, 354, 361 and 362 of the Revised Penal Code on libel. They argued that these provisions violated freedom of expression, privacy, and the rights against unreasonable searches and double jeopardy. The government defended the law as reasonable regulation of cyberspace.

1. 1Whether Section 4(c)(4) on cyber libel and the RPC libel provisions are constitutional, and against whom
2. 2Whether Section 5 on aiding or abetting and attempt, and Sections 6 and 7 on higher penalties and dual prosecution, are valid
3. 3Whether Section 12 (real-time traffic data) and Section 19 (DOJ blocking of computer data) are valid

The petitions were partly granted. Libel is not constitutionally protected speech, and cyber libel is not a new crime: Section 4(c)(4) "merely affirms that online defamation constitutes “similar means” for committing libel" under Article 353 in relation to Article 355. The libel provisions imply a stricter standard of malice (actual malice) where the offended party is a public official or public figure. Section 4(c)(4) is valid only as to the original author of a post. It is void as to others who simply receive the post and react to it. Section 5 is void in relation to libel, unsolicited commercial communications and child pornography. Applied to likes, comments and shares, "aiding or abetting" is vague and chilling. Section 5 remains valid for the other offenses, such as illegal access, computer-related fraud and cybersex, which do not involve expression. Section 6 is valid because it merely makes the use of information and communications technology a qualifying circumstance. On Section 7, charging the same online libel under both Section 4(c)(4) and Article 353 violates double jeopardy, as does charging the same online child pornography under both Section 4(c)(2) and RA 9775. Other applications of Section 7 are left to actual cases. Section 4(c)(3) on unsolicited commercial communications was struck down. So was Section 12, because real-time collection of traffic data upon mere "due cause" allowed fishing expeditions that threaten privacy, and Section 19, because a DOJ blocking order based on a prima facie finding is a seizure without a judicial warrant and a restraint on speech that applies none of the recognized tests. The rest, including RPC Articles 353, 354, 361 and 362, were upheld.