Disini v. Sec. of Justice

Consolidated petitions sought to declare several provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional. The petitioners claimed that the law's means of regulating cyberspace violated their constitutional rights. The government maintained that the law reasonably put order into cyberspace activities and punished wrongdoing. The challenged provisions included the offenses of illegal access, data interference, cyber-squatting, identity theft, cybersex, child pornography, unsolicited commercial communications and online libel (Section 4). Also challenged were aiding or abetting (Section 5), the one-degree-higher penalty (Section 6), prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code and R.A. 10175 (Section 7), and real-time collection of traffic data (Section 12). The petitions further attacked the penalties (Section 8), data preservation, disclosure, search and destruction (Sections 13, 14, 15 and 17), DOJ blocking of computer data (Section 19), obstruction of justice (Section 20), and the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC) (Sections 24 and 26(a)). Some petitioners also attacked Articles 353, 354, 361 and 362 of the RPC on libel. Pending adjudication, the Court extended its original 120-day TRO against the law's implementation on February 5, 2013.

1. 1Whether Section 4(c)(4) on online libel and Section 5 on aiding, abetting or attempt violate the freedom of expression.
2. 2Whether Section 12, authorizing law enforcement to collect or record traffic data in real time 'with due cause', violates the rights to privacy and against unreasonable searches and seizures.
3. 3Whether Section 19, authorizing the DOJ to restrict or block access to computer data, and Section 7, allowing prosecution under both the RPC and R.A. 10175, are valid.

The Court declared three provisions void: Section 4(c)(3) on unsolicited commercial communications, Section 12, and Section 19. Online libel under Section 4(c)(4) is valid as applied to the original author of a post. It is void as to others who simply receive the post and react to it. Section 5 is vague when applied to libel, commercial communications and child pornography, and its fuzzy reach chills free expression. It stands only for offenses that do not border on expression. On Section 12, the State has a compelling interest in fighting cybercrime. However, traffic data gathered in bulk can reveal protected private information. 'Due cause' neither ties collection to the probable commission of a particular crime nor states its purpose, so it justifies a general gathering of data. That is "akin to the use of a general search warrant that the Constitution prohibits"; the power must be narrowly drawn. Section 19 lets the DOJ seize and block data without a warrant or judicial intervention. It therefore violates freedom of expression and Section 2, Article III. Charging the same online libel under both Section 4(c)(4) and Article 353 of the RPC violates the proscription against double jeopardy, and the same holds for online child pornography under R.A. 9775. Other applications of Section 7 were left to actual cases. Section 6 was upheld on the ground of a substantial distinction between ICT-based and conventional crimes. The CICC provisions passed the completeness and sufficient-standard tests. Disposition: Sections 4(c)(3), 12 and 19 were declared void, the other provisions were upheld or partly invalidated as stated, and the RPC libel articles were declared valid.