Belgica v. Ochoa

After a Commission on Audit report on the 2007-2009 Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and the Napoles controversy over funds diverted to dummy NGOs, three Rule 65 petitions were filed by Samson Alcantara of the Social Justice Society, by Greco Belgica and others, and by Pedrito Nepomuceno. They asked the Court to declare the "Pork Barrel System" unconstitutional. That system covered the Congressional Pork Barrel, meaning the 2013 PDAF Article of the General Appropriations Act and similar laws, and the Presidential Pork Barrel, meaning the Malampaya Funds under Section 8 of PD 910 and the Presidential Social Fund under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993. On September 10, 2013 the Court consolidated the petitions and issued a TRO stopping the release of the remaining 2013 PDAF and of Malampaya Funds under the phrase "for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President". Oral arguments were held on October 8 and 10, 2013. The OSG sought dismissal and the lifting of the TRO, arguing among other things that budget reforms had mooted the PDAF issue and that reform should be left to the political branches.

1. 1Whether the petitions satisfied the requisites of judicial review, and whether Philconsa and LAMP barred them under res judicata or stare decisis
2. 2Whether the 2013 PDAF Article and similar Congressional Pork Barrel laws are unconstitutional
3. 3Whether the phrases in Section 8 of PD 910 and Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended, that let the President direct the use of the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund are undue delegations of legislative power

The petitions were partly granted. There was an actual, ripe controversy, which the planned 2014 budget reforms did not moot. The issues were legal, not political, since Section 1, Article VIII narrowed the political question doctrine. Petitioners had standing as taxpayers and, given the transcendental importance of the issues, as citizens. Res judicata did not apply because Philconsa and LAMP involved only the 1994 CDF and 2004 PDAF Articles. Stare decisis yielded because Philconsa was a limited ruling with inherent inconsistencies, and LAMP was dismissed on a technicality. On the merits, the PDAF let individual legislators identify projects, release funds and realign them after enactment. That is budget execution, which belongs to the Executive and is not congressional oversight, so it violated separation of powers. The system also (1) let individual legislators in effect appropriate, a power Section 29(1), Article VI reserves to Congress acting "by law"; (2) left items to be fixed after enactment, beyond the President's item veto; (3) diluted congressional oversight, contrary to Section 14, Article VI; and (4) let legislators displace local development councils, subverting local autonomy. Applying the completeness and sufficient-standard tests, the Court struck down "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" (Section 8, PD 910) and "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" (Section 12, PD 1869, as amended) as undue delegations. Disposition: the 2013 PDAF Article, similar provisions and informal practices, and the two phrases were declared unconstitutional. The TRO was made permanent, and remaining PDAF funds covered only by SAROs, without Notices of Cash Allocation, reverted to the general fund. Prosecutors were directed to investigate. The decision is "immediately executory but prospective in effect."