G.R. No. 224946 CHRISTIAN PANTONIAL ACHARON, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT. November 09, 2021

PERLAS-BERNABE,J.:

I concur in the result to acquit petitioner XXX (petitioner) of violation of Section 5 (i) of Republic Act No. (RA) 9262,^[1]otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004." As aptly observed by theponencia, the prosecution failed to show, beyond reasonable doubt, that petitioner's failure to provide financial support to his wife, AAA, was made with the specific intent ofcausing the latter mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule, or humiliation. Rather, it was shown that his failure to do so was due to justifiable reasons,i.e., his apartment in Brunei was razed by fire and he met a vehicular accident, which incidents required him to spend a significant amount of money. Moreover, it was also shown that despite petitioner's failure to remit the full amount of P85,000.00 with three percent (3%) monthly interest, he was able to send to his wife a total of P71,000.00 as payment for their loan.

Likewise, I concur in theponencia's proposal to abandon the rulings inMelgar v. People^[2](Melgar) andReyes v. People^[3](Reyes) wherein it was held that a person charged with violation of Section 5 (i) of RA 9262 may also be convicted of violation of Section 5 (e) of the same law pursuant to the variance doctrine. These provisions have different elements since on the one hand, a violation of Section 5 (i) is premised on the accused's specific intent to cause mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, while a violation of Section 5 (e) is premised on the specific intent to control or restrict the woman's or her child's movement or conduct. Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provide for the rule on variance:

Section 4.Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. — When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.

Section 5.When an offense includes or is included in another. — An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.

As earlier intimated, it cannot be said that a violation of Section 5 (i) of RA 9262 includes or is necessarily included in a violation of Section 5 (e) of the same law because the specific intent required to be proven in the two (2) violations are fundamentally different from each other. As such, the accused cannot be charged under Section 5 (i) and eventually be convicted under Section 5 (e), or vice-versa.

Nonetheless, I take this opportunity to elaborate on the proper treatment of acts constituting "violence against women and their children." As will be discussed below, for doctrinal accuracy, the types of violence stated in the subsections of Section 3 (a) of RA 9262 should not be treated as means/punishable offenses, but rather, as resulting effect/s of the acts committed by the accused under Section 5 of RA 9262. Further, considering the multi-faceted nature of a case of violence against women and their children, it is possible that several types of violence under Section 3 (a) may be experienced by the woman or her child as a result of an act punished under Section 5. Hence, one type of violence under Section 3 (a) is not restrictively associated to a Section 5 offense, and thus negates any exclusive correspondence. Ultimately, the types of violence are enumerated in the law if only to provide for a comprehensive definition of violence in light of RA 9262's animating policy to ensure full protection to abused women and their children.

I.

Violence against women, otherwise known as "intimate partner violence," is a significant problem recognized on a global scale.^[4]As defined by relevant literature, "intimate partner violence" is "any act of physical, sexual, psychological or economic violence that occurs between former or current spouses or partners, whether or not the perpetrator shares or has shared the same residence with the victim."^[5]Ordinarily, four main types of "intimate partner violence" are identified, to wit: (a) physical violence, or the intentional use of physical force with the potential for causing death, disability, injury, or harm; (b) sexual violence, which includes rape, as well as unwanted sexual contact and experiences; (c) stalking, or the pattern of repeated, unwanted, attention and contact that causes fear or concern for one's own safety or the safety of someone else, such as a family member or friend; and (d) psychological aggression, or the use of verbal and non-verbal communication with the intent to harm another person mentally or emotionally, and/or to exert control over another person.^[6]

In our jurisdiction, RA 9262, or the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004," was passed in order to address the prevalence of violence against women and children committed by their intimate partners.^[7]This law, enacted "in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child[,] and other international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party,"^[8]explicitly "recognizes the need to protect the family and its members[,] particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security."^[9]

Under Section 3 (a) of RA 9262, "violence against women and their children" is defined as "any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode,which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuseincluding threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty."The same provision further contains subsections which provide for the types of "violence against women and their children," namely, physical, sexual, and psychological violence and economic abuse.Notably, despite its four subsections on the types of violence, Section 3 (a) recognizes that these arenot exclusiveas evinced by the phrase "it includes,but is not limited to, the following x x x." For reference, Section 3 (a) of RA 9262 reads:

Section 3.Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act, (a)"Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of actscommitted by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode,which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuseincluding threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:

A. "Physical violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;

B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her child. It includes, but is not limited to:

a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to watch obscene publications and indecent shows or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with the abuser;

b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by force, threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion;

c) Prostituting the woman or her child.

C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common children.

D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent which includes, but is not limited to the following:

1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;

2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in common;

3. destroying household property;

4. controlling the victim's own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money or properties.

x x x x

As worded, the term"violence against women and their children"is characterized under Section 3 (a) as "an act or a series of acts"; similarly, the listed four types of violence against women and their children are referred to as "acts." The subsections of Section 3 (a), in fact, further enumerate specific instances that would fall under a particular violence type. Thus, a literal reading of these provisions would lead one to believe that these types of violence are punishable offenses constitutive of the crime violence against women and their children.

However, Section 5 of the same law list downs certain punishable acts which are explicitly classified as "the crime of violence against women and their children":

Section 5.Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. —Thecrime of violence against women and their childrenis committed through any of the following acts:

(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;

(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm;

(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm;

(d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm;

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or to desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:

(1) Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her child of custody or access to her/his family;

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support;

(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right;

(4) Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity or controlling the victim's own money or properties, or solely controlling the conjugal or common money, or properties;

(f) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the purpose of controlling her actions or decisions;

(g) Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to engage in any sexual activity which does not constitute rape, by force or threat of force, physical harm, or through intimidation directed against the woman or her child or her/his immediate family;

(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:

(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;

(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child;

(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child against her/his will;

(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets of the woman or her child; and

(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children or denial of access to the woman's child/children.

Given the phraseology of these separate provisions in the same law, confusion arises as to what RA 9262 deems as the punishable offense and related thereto, the specific criminal intent that must be proven. As earlier intimated, the language of Section 3 (a) and its subsections creates an impression that what RA 9262 criminalizes is the type of violence,i.e., physical, sexual, and psychological violence and economic abuse. In fact, in some earlier cases,^[10]the Court has held that the type of violence under Section 3 (a) is the means employed by the perpetrator and that it is the violence under the circumstances in RA 9262 that the law seeks to outlaw.In my view, this perception that the types of violence are the means of commission is not completely accurate. Rather, as will be expounded below, the types of violence should be deemed as the resulting effect/s to the victim, while the acts enumerated under Section 5 of the same law should be considered as the punishable offenses themselves.

II.

A meticulous scrutiny of the entire law would show that while RA 9262 mentions the different types of violence against the woman and their children under Section 3 (a) and refers to them as "acts," what it ultimately criminalizes is the"violence against women and their children"committed through the enumerated acts under Section 5.In particular, Section 5 of RA 9262 should be read in relation toSection 6 of RA 9262 which provides for the penalties relative to the acts stated in Section 5 (and not Section 3 [a]),viz.:

Section 6.Penalties. —The crime of violence against women and their children, under Section 5 hereof shall be punished according to the following rules:

(a) Acts falling under Section 5(a) constituting attempted, frustrated or consummated parricide or murder or homicide shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.

If these acts resulted in mutilation, it shall be punishable in accordance with the Revised Penal Code; those constituting serious physical injuries shall have the penalty of prison mayor; those constituting less serious physical injuries shall be punished byprision correccional; and those constituting slight physical injuries shall be punished byarresto mayor.

Acts falling under Section 5(b) shall be punished by imprisonment of two degrees lower than the prescribed penalty for the consummated crime as specified in the preceding paragraph but shall in no case be lower thanarresto mayor.

(b) Acts falling under Section 5(c) and 5(d) shall be punished byarresto mayor;

(c) Acts falling under Section 5(e) shall be punished byprision correccional;

(d) Acts falling under Section 5(f) shall be punished byarresto mayor;

(e) Acts falling under Section 5(g) shall be punished byprision mayor;

(f) Acts falling under Section 5(h) and Section 5(i) shall be punished byprision mayor.

If the acts are committed while the woman or child is pregnant or committed in the presence of her child, the penalty to be applied shall be the maximum period of penalty prescribed in the section.

In addition to imprisonment, the perpetrator shall (a) pay a fine in the amount of not less than One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) but not more than three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00); (b) undergo mandatory psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment and shall report compliance to the court.

To my mind, the fact that(1)penalties are made relative to the acts listed in Section 5 and not to the types of violence under Section 3 (a) of RA 9262; and the fact that(2)Section 5 explicitly states that "[t]he crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts" confirms the position that the types of violence stated in Section 3 (a) are not the means by which the crime is committed nor the acts that are penalized.

This therefore begs the question –what now is the significance of the types of violence listed in Section 3 (a) of RA 9262 when it comes to the prosecution of the crime of violence against women and their children?

The way that the law is framed, and the placement of the provisions provide us guidance on how to treat Section 3 (a) in relation to Section 5 of RA 9262. As designed, the law first provides for the definition of"violence against women and their children"; this term is then classified in types of violence,i.e., physical, sexual, psychological, and economic, which are found in Section 3 (a)'s foursubsections,i.e., "physical violence" in subsection A, "sexual violence" in subsection B, "psychological violence" in subsection C, and "economic abuse" in subsection D. While it is odd that the types of violence are referred to in said subsections as "acts," Section 3 (a) itself states that the term"violence against women and their children" are acts "which result in or is likely toresult in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse."

The defined term"violence against women and their children"in Section 3 (a) would then appear in Section 5, which states in its preliminary sentence that "SECTION 5.Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. —Thecrime of violence against women and their childrenis committed through any of the following acts: x x x." As earlier discussed, the usage of the word "crime" in Section 5 vis-a-vis the term "violence against women and their children" in Section 3 (a), among others, leads to the conclusion that the specific acts listed in Section 5 are the punishable offenses; on the other hand, "violence against women and children" under Section 3 (a) is more of a general characterization of the underlying nature of the crime; in turn, the four types of violence are further variations of the nature of violence that the woman or her child experiences.By virtue of an act committed under Section 5, the woman or her child is indeed violated, and the violence experienced by her and/or her child may either (albeit not exclusively) be physical, sexual, psychological, or economic.Thus, to reconcile and to avoid confusion between Section 3 (a) and Section 5, it is therefore submitted thatthe types of violence under the former provision should be deemed as the resulting effect/s on the woman and her child, which spring from the acts committed in Section 5.

This treatment of the types of violence as resulting effect/s (rather than means/punishable offenses) equally finds basis in the first paragraph of Section 3 (a) which states that violence against women and children refers to an act or series of acts "which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuseincluding threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty."

Overall, I reckon that Section 3 (a) and its four subsections only provide for a comprehensive definition of violence against women and children, which is aby-product of the specific acts mentioned in Section 5.Ostensibly, the intent of the law in providing for the four (4) types of violence against women and their children is not to establish them as the actual offenses per se but rather to create a comprehensive concept of violence that sweeps across physical, sexual, psychological or economic facets, which the women or her child may experience.This intent squares with the animating policy of the law which is to protect women and their children from all forms of discrimination and abuse in line with the State's international commitments.

Accordingly, I submit that the Court's perception in some earlier cases wherein the types of violence under Section 3 (a) of RA 9262 were deemed as the means or even the punishable offenses is conceptually inaccurate. At the risk of belaboring the point, these types of violence are only descriptive of the effects on the woman and her child which result from the specific acts committed by the accused listed in Section 5 of RA 9262. Simply put, the acts enumerated in Section 5 are the means/punishable offenses, while the types of violence in Section 3 (a) – physical, sexual, and psychological violence and economic abuse – are the ends/resulting effects.

III.

The above-discussed conceptual nuances are relevant since it affects the determination on where to situate criminal intent. In my opinion, considering that(1)the punishable acts are those provided under Section 5 of RA 9262; and(2)the types of violence under Section 3 (a) are the resultant effects on the part of the woman or her child, it is thus imprecise to say that the prosecution must show, by proof beyond reasonable doubt, that the accused had the intent to inflict for example psychological violence to the woman. Psychological violence, as well as the other forms of violence under Section 3 (a), are descriptive of the violence experienced by the woman or her child;the type of violence is more on the effect to the recipient of violence, rather than the underlying intent of the criminal actor. The accused may perform one Section 5 act, but the resulting violence on the part of the woman may be multi-faceted; the accused may also perform a series of Section 5 acts, and the interplay between these acts, may result into several forms of violence.

For instance, when an accused deprives a woman and her child of financial support, the woman may either experience economic abuse or psychological violence. Economic abuse is experienced when the woman or her child becomes financially dependent; meanwhile, that same act may also cause psychological violence, considering that deprivation of financial support may be the chosen avenue for intimidation, harassment, or even ridicule which thereby causes mental or emotional suffering. It is also common that in a scenario where there is deprivation of support, other acts of abuse may occur. Verbal and physical abuse are unfortunate occurrences in situations of domestic violence. The complexity and even cyclical nature of domestic violence may permeate into various tragic experiences in the household and thus, result into different effects on the part of the woman and her child. This is also probably why Section 3 (a), while listing four types of violence, recognizes that these types are not exclusive as evinced by the qualifier "it includes,but is not limited to, the following x x x." The phrase "includes, but is not limited to" recurs even in other portions of the law. This therefore shows that while RA 9262 attempts to characterize certain forms of violence, ultimately these types are mere estimations of the common forms of violence;what remains important is to understand that the law is comprehensive enough to cover all forms of abuse against the woman and her child.

Notably, theponenciaproperly recognizes the multi-faceted definition of violence against women and their children by stating that "there is no one-to-one correspondence between the classifications of violence against women under Section 3(a), on the one hand, and the specific punishable acts under Section 5, on the other":

A plain reading of Section 5 reveals that it is meant to specify the punishable acts based upon the classifications of violence against women already identified and defined under Section 3(a). Whilethere is no one-to-one correspondence between the classifications of violence against women under Section 3(a), on the one hand, and the specific punishable acts under Section 5, on the other, it can still be reasonably gleaned that the punishable acts spring from the multifaceted definition of violence against women which the law aims to protect women from. For example, Sections 5(a) to 5(d) appear to protect women and their children from physical violence, 5(f), 5(h) and 5(i) from psychological violence, and 5(g) from physical and sexual violence. Meanwhile, Section 5(e), as previously discussed, protects the woman from acts of violence that are committed for the purpose of attempting to control her conduct or actions, or make her lose her agency, with most of the enumerated examples of acts having a connection with the use of finances as the primary mode of controlling the woman. Thus, Section 5(e) could be viewed as protecting the woman from economic abuse, as defined in Section 3(a), in some cases.^[11](Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, an exclusive correspondence between a type of violence and a specific Section 5 act runs the danger of glossing over more complex domestic violence scenarios, and therefore may tie the Courts hands in deciding future cases where a certain Section 5 act may be considered as producing multiple types of violence based on what the woman or her child may actually experience in a given case.

Therefore, since the types of violence are neither exclusive to a Section 5 act nor are the means/punishable offenses themselves, it is but properto situate intent on the acts mentioned in Section 5 of RA 9262. These acts relate to purposes that are in the nature of specific intent, and due to themala in senature of the offense, must underlie the commission of the act sough to be punished. As case law instructs, "in actsmala in se, the intent governs; but in actsmala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated?"^[12]"[T]here may bemala in secrimes under special laws, [as in this case]."^[13]"The [prevailing] approach to distinguish betweenmala in seandmala prohibitacrimes is the determination of the inherent immorality or vileness of the penalized act. If the punishable act or omission is immoral in itself, then it is a crimemala in sex x x."^[14]

Going back to Section 5, it bears to stress that, "[s]pecific intent is used to describe a state of mind which exists where circumstances indicate that an offender actively desired certain criminal consequences or objectively desired a specific result to follow his act or failure to act. Specific intent involves a state of the mind. It is the particular purpose or specific intention in doing the prohibited act. Specific intent must be alleged in the Information and proved by the state in a prosecution for a crime requiring specific intent."^[15]This may be shown by the nature of the act, the circumstances under which it was committed, the means employed, and the motive of the accused.^[16]

In this case, petitioner was charged for deprivation of financial support to his wife, AAA, in violation of Section 5 (i) of RA 9262, which reads:

Section 5.Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. – x x x.

x x x x

(i)Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children or denial of access to the woman's child/children.

Thus,the prosecution must prove that the accused, by depriving AAA, his wife, of financial support,intended to cause her mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation, which therebyresulted into psychological violence.

Theponenciaadopts thisessential distinctionbetween the result,i.e., the type of violence under Section 3 (a), and the acts with the specific intent mentioned under Section 5 of RA 9262, by stating that "to be convicted under Section 5(i) [for instance], the evidence must establish beyond reasonable doubt that theaccusedintended to causethe victim mental or emotional anguish, or public ridicule or humiliation through the denial of – not the mere failure or inability to provide – financial support, whichthereby resulted into psychological violence."^[17]With this, it correctly frames the specific intent not relative to the form of violence alleged to have resulted, but rather to the acts stated in Section 5.

The foregoing approach also has an impact on the application of the variance doctrine. The acts found in Section 5 – and not the types of violence under Section 3 (a) – should be determinative of variance,i.e., what offense is charged and what offense could the accused be convicted. The type of violence under Section 3 (a) should not be applied in determining variance since the same is not, after all, the punishable offense, which as mentioned, is found in Section 5.

IV.

The foregoing notwithstanding, I deem it apt to point out that theponenciastill cites the old formulation of the elements of violation of Section 5 (i) of RA 9262 found inDinamling v. People^[18](Dinamling). However, in my view,Dinamlinginaccurately phrases the third element of said violation as follows:

From the aforequoted Section 5(i), in relation to other sections of RA No. 9262, the elements of the crime are derived as follows:

(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;

(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a common child. As for the woman's child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;

(3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and

(4) The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the children or similar such acts or omissions.^[19]

As above-discussed,the specific intent must be situated on the acts sought to be punished under Section 5 of RA 9262, and that the types of violence under Section 3 (a) thereof should be treated as the resulting effect of said acts. However, the formulation of theDinamlingelements fails to reflect this viewsince "mental or emotional anguish" is treated therein as a result, rather than the specific intent of the accused in relation to its corresponding Section 5 offense,i.e., Section 5 (i).Thus, to avoid confusion and preserve the essential distinction between the Section 5 and Section 3 (a), I submit that the elements for violation of Section 5 RA 9262 should instead be:

(1)The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;

(2)The woman is either the wife or former wife of the accused, or is a woman with whom the accused has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such accused has a common child. As for the woman's child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;

(3)The accused commits any of the acts listed under Section 5 of RA 9262;

(4)The said act was committed with the specific intent relative to the offense listed under Section 5 of RA 9262 for which the accused is duly charged; and

(5)The commission of the said act results into physical, sexual, or psychological violence, or economic abuse or other form of violence against women and their children as described under Section 3 (a) of RA 9262 on the part of the victim/s.

Applying the foregoing, petitioner should be acquitted of the crime charged,i.e., violation of Section 5 (i) of RA 9262, since, as preliminarily mentioned, the prosecution was not able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner's failure to provide financial support to AAA was made with the specific intent of causing the latter mental emotional anguish, public ridicule, or humiliation – the fourth element.

ACCORDINGLY, petitioner should beACQUITTED, and the petition perforceGRANTED.

^[2]826 Phil. 177 (2018).

^[3]See G.R. No. 232678, July 3, 2019.

^[4]See <https://www.who.int/health-topics/violence-against-women#tab=tab_1> (November 9, 2021).

^[5]See "The psychological subtype of intimate partner violence and its effect on mental health: protocol for a systematic review and meta-analysis," Sarah Dokkedahl, Robin Niels Kok, Siobhan Murphy,et al.<https://systematicreviewsjournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13643-019-1118-1> (last accessed November 9, 2021), citing "Glossary of definitions of rape, femicide and intimate partner violence," the European Institute for Gender Equality, p. 44.

^[6]Seehttps://www.atrainceu.com/content/3-types-intimate-partner-violence(last accessed November 9, 2021).

^[7]https://pcw.gov.ph/vaw-faqs/(last accessed November 9, 2021 ).

^[8]Section 2, RA 9262.

^[9]Id.

^[10]SeeAraza v. People, G.R. No. 247429, September 8, 2020;AAA v. BBB, 823 Phil. 607 (2018); andDinamling v. People, 761 Phil. 356 (2015).

^[11]Ponencia, p. 16.

^[12]Dungo v. People, 762 Phil. 630, 658 (2015).

^[13]Id.

^[14]Id. at 659.

^[15]People v. Delim, 444 Phil. 430, 448 (2003).

^[16]Recuerdo v. People, 526 Phil. 460, 475 (2006).

^[17]Ponencia, pp. 8-9.

^[18]761 Phil. 356 (2015).

^[19]Id. at 373.

LEONEN,J.:

I concur with theponenciaas regards the acquittal of petitioner Christian Pantonial Acharon.

Further, I concur with theponencia's clarification of the distinction between Sections 5(e) and 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, along with the necessary abandonment of the application of the variance doctrine to these provisions inMelgar v. People^[1]andReyes v. People.^[2]

Indeed, the mere failure or inability of a man to provide financial support is not a crime. Treating it as such would perpetuate the stereotype that women are always incapable of supporting themselves or their families. On the contrary, this Court has noted that "[i]n this day and age, women have taken on increasingly important roles in the financial and material support of their families."^[3]Moreover, I wish to emphasize theponencia's statement that "while [Republic Act No. 9262] was indeed enacted to protect women, it was not meant to discount women's ability to provide for themselves, especially when they are able-bodied."^[4]

Article II, Section 14 of the Constitution affirmed the State's commitment to ensure the fundamental equality of women and men before the law.^[5]This Court discussed this constitutional provision inAlanis III v. Court of Appeals:^[6]

Article II, Section 14 of the Constitution requires that the State be active in ensuring gender equality. This provision is even more noticeably proactive than the more widely-invoked equal protection and due process clauses under the Bill of Rights. InRacho v. Tanaka, this Court observed:

This constitutional provision provides a more active application than the passive orientation of Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution does, which simply states that no person shall "be denied the equal protection of the laws." Equal protection, within the context of Article III, Section 1 only provides that any legal burden or benefit that is given to men must also be given to women. It does not require the State to actively pursue "affirmative ways and means to battle the patriarchy — that complex of political, cultural, and economic factors that ensure women's disempowerment."

Article II, Section 14 implies the State's positive duty to actively dismantle the existing patriarchy by addressing the culture that supports it.^[7](Citations omitted)

Republic Act No. 9262 is an expression of this commitment. The law protects women with the goal of restoring equality, rather than reinforcing harmful gender roles that have long pervaded our society.

Men have traditionally been portrayed as stronger and more superior, while women are depicted as weak and subordinate:

Societal norms and traditions dictate people to think men are the leaders, pursuers, providers, and take on dominant roles in society while women are nurturers, men's companions and supporters, and take on subordinate roles in society. This perception leads to men gaining more power over women. With power comes the need to control to retain that power. And [violence against women] is a form of men's expression of controlling women to retain power.^[8](Citation omitted)

In Filipino culture, the husband is called "haligi ng tahanan," or the strong pillar who establishes the home. Men are culturally expected to provide for their families. Meanwhile, the wife is referred to as "ilaw ng tahanan," because she is expected to be the warm, guiding light of the home who must take on the role of bearing and raising the children.

In the past, women were forced to stay home and were not allowed to pursue education and employment. However, recent statistics show that society appears to have improved in this regard:

On the labor front, the Philippine labor force (15 years old and above) numbered 40,426,000 in 2012 (64.2% of the population), 61% of whom were males and 39% of whom were females. The labor force participation rate ("LFPR") of females increased significantly from 30.6% in 1970 to 50% in 2012. While the LFPR took a downward trend in 2013, from 64.2% to 63.9%, the decrease was more pronounced among the male labor workforce.

In 1974, 36.6% of the women in the labor force were engaged in agriculture and related work. Over the years, however, the number of workers employed in the service sector has overtaken the number of workers employed in the agricultural sector, such that employment has been driven by the service sector. In 2012, when the number of women employed stood at 14,751,000, 28% were in the service sector, particularly wholesale and retail trade; 20% in the agricultural sector; 10.3% in other service activities; and lastly, 9% in the industry sector, mainly in manufacturing industry. Thus, women in the industry and service sectors combined to outnumber women in agricultural sector. Nevertheless, the agricultural sector continues to play an important role in employment and in job creation.

Statistics show that women's share in professional and managerial positions is steadily increasing, although the rate of progress is slow. In 2012, 14,751 of 37,600 or 39.2% of employed persons in major occupation groups were women. Of the 14,751 women employed, only 11.6% of these were employed as professionals, technicians, and associate professionals, while 18% were women employed as corporate executives, managers, and supervisors. These data show that women are still markedly under­ represented in managerial jobs compared to the overall share of their employment.^[9]

Yet even though women make up a large portion of the work force, they are still somehow expected to take primary responsibility for childcare and the management of the home. Professor E. (Leo) D. Battad observed:

In a society that expects women to take care of the children and do household chores, working women confront the problem of a double-burden, or even multiple burdens in terms of longer hours of work and a wider breadth of responsibility.^[10]

There is also the idea that only certain professions are suitable for women and vice versa:

Then there is also the pre-employment practice of sex-based preferences in the hiring phase. Women and men continue to experience discriminatory practices in advertisements through sex-based preferences, thereby reinforcing the traditional stereotypes of "women's work" and "men's work." This practice, in effect, limits the worker's choices and access to employment opportunities.

The lack of protection in the pre-employment phase contributes to the phenomenon of occupation segregation. The equality of pay between men and women is compromised due to existing practices of exclusion or preference for either worker for particular work or occupation. Also, there is an absence of affirmative actions to combat occupation segregation, such as introducing schemes that would encourage women and men to enter in nontraditional skills or occupation.^[11]

Even the courts are not immune to prejudices and biases against women.^[12]InMaxey v. Court of Appeals,^[13]this Court, despite its intent to uphold a woman's property rights, perpetuated the traditional gender role of wives as the spouse who manages the affairs of the household.^[14]This Court stated that "[t]he major, if not the full[,] responsibility of running the household remains with the woman. She is the administrator of the household."^[15]

Further, the conduct and language of some judges towards women reveals their prejudices and lack of gender sensitivity.^[16]This Court has only recently revisited the "woman's honor" doctrine where it says that "no young Filipina of decent repute would publicly admit that she has been sexually abused, unless that is the truth, for it is her natural instinct to protect her honor."^[17]We advocated against the Maria Clara stereotype of a demure and reserved Filipino woman and in favor of the evaluation of the testimony of a private complainant of rape without gender bias or cultural misconception.^[18]The credibility of a private complainant's testimony should not be affected just because they are not the fictitious and generalized demure girl, or the epitome of the Maria Clara Stereotype, especially when their testimony is supported by the other pieces of evidence presented in the case.^[19]

InKane v. Roggenkamp,^[20]this Court called out a Regional Trial Court judge's apparent severe lack of gender sensitivity. The trial court judge acquitted the husband who was charged with physically abusing his wife under Republic Act No. 9262. Primarily, the trial court judge asserted that the woman chose to conceal her lover's abuse.^[21]According to him, "the hesitation of the woman to immediately leave her lover is an unnatural act and, hence, unbelievable."^[22]This Court then noted that "[a] more enlightened interpretation of the evidence" requires "a less caricaturized, less patriarchal set of assumptions."^[23]

Republic Act No. 9262 was enacted to recognize the systemic presence of patriarchy in our society, and how this contributes to the abuse of women. The law acknowledges that women are more often the victims of domestic abuse not because they are inherently weaker, but because of the unequal power relationship between women and men.^[24]As a result, the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women have historically hampered their growth, forcing them into subordination to men.^[25]

This Court discussed the deep historical roots of unequal power relations between women and men inEstacio v. Estacio:^[26]

Hence, Republic Act No. 9262 has been upheld as a valid law meant to address this historical and societal problem.

This unequal power relation is better understood when one considers its deep historical roots:

The perspective portraying women as victims with a heritage of victimization results in the unintended consequence of permanently perceiving all women as weak. This has not always been accepted by many other strands in the Feminist Movement.

As early as the 70s, the nationalist movement raised questions on the wisdom of a women's movement and its possible divisive effects, as "class problems deserve unified and concentrated attention [while] the women question is vague, abstract, and does not have material base."

In the early 80s, self-identifying feminist groups were formed. The "emancipation theory" posits that female crime has increased and has become more masculine in character as a result of the women's liberation movement.

Feminism also has its variants among Muslims. In 2009, Musawah ("equality" in Arabic) was launched as a global movement for equity and justice in the Muslim family. It brought together activists, scholars, legal practitioners, policy makers, and grassroots women and men from all over the world. Their belief is that there cannot be justice without equality, and its holistic framework integrates Islamic teachings, universal human rights, national constitutional guarantees of equality, and the lived realities of women and men.^[27](Citations omitted)

This historical inequality between women and men leads to women being abused and the abuse going unpunished, even subjecting them to "double victimization" — first by the offender and then, by the legal system.^[28]

Patriarchy becomes encoded in our culture when it is normalized.^[29]The more it pervades our culture, the greater its chances of infecting the current and the future generation.^[30]InPeople v. Jumawan,^[31]this Court said:

The Philippines, as State Party to the [Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women], recognized that a change in the traditional role of men as well as the role of women in society and in the family is needed to achieve full equality between them. Accordingly, the country vowed to take all appropriate measures to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices, customs and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.^[32](Citation omitted)

Courts, like all other government departments and agencies, must ensure the fundamental equality of women and men before the law.^[33]In our pursuit of equality, we need to acknowledge and dismantle the "obstacle[s] to the full realization of the potentialities of women."^[34]

Nevertheless, it is also improper to think that women are always victims.^[35]This will only reinforce their already disadvantaged position.^[36]The perspective that portrays women as victims with a history of victimization results in the unintended consequence of permanently perceiving all women as weak.^[37]Indisputably, to consider women as the weaker sex is discriminatory.^[38]

Laws such as Republic Act No. 9262 are intended to negate the patriarchy in our culture,^[39]not to bolster it. In safeguarding the interests of women as a discriminated class, we must be careful not to perpetuate the very prejudices and biases that contribute to their discrimination.

There is now more space to believe that portraying only women as victims will not always promote gender equality before the law.^[40]It sometimes aggravates the gap by conceding that women have always been dominated by men.^[41]

Societal norms and traditions dictate people to think that men are leaders, pursuers, providers, and take on dominant roles in society while women are nurturers, men's companions and supporters, and take on subordinate roles in society.^[42]If Sections 5(e) and 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 are interpreted to mean that the accused man's failure or inability to provide financial automatically entails criminal liability, then this depiction will be reinforced rather than corrected. This confirms the false idea that women are incapable of supporting themselves and their families. Applied correctly, Sections 5(e) and 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 should not result in the over-patronage of women.

The Constitution requires the State to recognize the role of women in nation building.^[43]This role is not confined to child-rearing, honorable as motherhood may be. It is entirely possible that the woman in the sexual or dating relationship is more financially capable than the man. Consistent with the spouses' mutual obligation to provide support under the Family Code,^[44]the duty to provide financial support should not fall on the man alone. His mere failure or inability to provide financial support should not be penalized as a crime, especially when the woman is more financially capable.

We should not, however, go as far as denying the existence of patriarchal dominance in many social relationships.^[45]Courts must continue to be sensitive to the power relations that come clothed in gender roles.^[46]Gender roles in patriarchy may be detrimental to men as well. For instance:

Social and cultural expectations on masculinity and male dominance urge men to keep quiet about being a victim, adding to the unique experience of male victims of domestic abuse. This leads to latent depression among boys and men. In a sense, patriarchy while privileging men also victimizes them.^[47]

Persons who do not conform to traditional gender roles find themselves excluded from the hegemony and underrepresented in society:

Those with sexual orientations other than the heteronormative, gender identities that are transgender or fluid, or gender expressions that are not the usual manifestations of the dominant and expected cultural binaries — the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, intersex, and other gender and sexual minorities (LGBTQI+) community — have suffered enough marginalization and discrimination within our society.^[48]

Truth be told, our law cruelly defines the normal.^[49]This Court has started to take steps to address this where possible. In a concurring opinion fromRepublic v. Manalo,^[50]we have acknowledged that couples of all genders may constitute loving families:

The restrictive nature of our marriage laws tends to reify the concept of a family which is already far from the living realities of many couples and children. For instance, orthodox insistence on heteronormativity may not compare with the various types of care that various other "non-traditional" arrangements present in many loving households.

The worst thing we do in a human relationship is to regard the commitment of the other formulaic. That is, that it is shaped alone by legal duty or what those who are dominant in government regard as romantic. In truth, each commitment is unique, borne of its own personal history, ennobled by the sacrifices it has gone through, and defined by the intimacy which only the autonomy of the parties creates.

In other words, words that describe when we love or are loved will always be different for each couple. It is that which we should understand: intimacies that form the core of our beings should be as free as possible, bound not by social expectations but by the care and love each person can bring.^[51]

InRepublic v. Cagandagan,^[52]this Court upheld the trial court's allowance of the respondent's change of name and recognized the situation of intersex individuals:

In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a matter so innately private as one's sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an "incompetent" and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondent's position and his personal judgment of being a male.

In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect respondent's congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus help make his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case.^[53](Citation omitted)

Recently, this Court promulgated the Rules on the Use of Gender-Fair Language in the Judiciary and Gender-Fair Courtroom Etiquette^[54]in an effort not to "perpetuate gender stereotypes, which rest on unfounded generalizations regarding the characteristics and roles of binary and non-binary genders, but indisputably influence the perspectives of the judges and litigants alike."^[55]

We continue to fight toward genuine and meaningful equality for men and women, as well as those who are non-binary. It is vital to this movement that we take apart the structures that perpetuate the abuse of women. The doctrines inMelgarandReyesnow abandoned by this Court are among these harmful structures.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote toGRANTthe Petition.

^[2]G.R. No. 232678, July 3, 2019, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65240> [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].

^[3]Azcueta v. Republic, 606 Phil. 177, 199 (2009) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division].

^[4]Ponencia, p. 21.

^[5]CONST., art. II, sec. 14.

^[6]G.R. No. 216425, November 11, 2020, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66846> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

^[7]Id.

^[8]Garcia v. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44, 91-92 (2013) (Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].

^[9]E. (Leo) D. Battad, Review,The Continuing Narrative of the Economic Emancipation of Filipino Working Women, 88 PHIL. L. J. 601, 601-602 (2014).

^[10]Id. at 614-615.

^[11]Id. at 618.

^[12]Id.

^[13]214 Phil. 160 (1984) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., First Division].

^[14]Id.

^[15]Id.

^[16]See Garcia v. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc] citingBenancillo v. Amila, 660 Phil. 286 (2011) [Per J. Del Castillo, First Division).

^[17]People v. Amarela, G.R. Nos. 225642-43, January 17, 2018, 852 SCRA 54 [Per J. Martires, Third Division), citingPeople v. Gan, 150-B Phil. 593 (1972) [Per J. Antonio, First Division);People v. Sarmiento, 183 Phil. 499 (1979) [Per CJ. Fernando, Second Division);People v. Gamez, 209 Phil. 209 (1983) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., First Division];People v. Quidilla, 248 Phil. 1005 (1988) [Per Regalado, Second Division];People v. Fabro, 269 Phil. 409 (1990) (Per J. Melencio-Herrera, Second Division), citingPeople v. Sambangan, 211 Phil. 72 (1983) [Per J. Concepcion, Second Division];People v. Patilan, 274 Phil. 634 (1991) [Per J. Davide, Jr., Third Division), citingPeople v. Ramilo, 230 Phil. 342 (1986) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., Second Division);People v. Esquila, 324 Phil. 366 (1996) [Per J. Melo, Third Division);People v. Manahan, 374 Phil. 77 (1999) [Per J. Bellosillo, En Banc];People v. Dreu, 389 Phil. 429 (2000) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division), citingPeople v. Barcelona, 382 Phil. 46 (2000) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division);People v. Durano, 548 Phil. 383 (2007) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, Third Division], citingPeople v. Domingo, 297 Phil. 167 (1993) (Per J. Regalado, Second Division]; andPeople v. Madsali, 625 Phil. 431 (2010) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division], citingPeople v. Loyola, 404 Phil. 71 (2001) [Per J. Pardo, First Division).

^[18]Id.

^[19]Perez v. People, 830 Phil. 162 (2018) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

^[20]G.R. No. 214326, July 6, 2020, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66520> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

^[21]Id.

^[22]Id.

^[23]Id.

^[24]Estacio v. Estacio, G.R. No. 211851, September 16, 2020 [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

^[25]Id. citingGarcia v. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44, 85 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].

^[26]G.R. No. 211851, September 16, 2020, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66987> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

^[27]Id.

^[28]Garcia v. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].

^[29]Alanis III v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 216425, November 11, 2020, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66846> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division], citing J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion inRe: Untian, Jr., A.C. No. 5900 (Resolution), April 10, 2019, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65162> [Per J. A. Reyes, Jr., En Banc].

^[30]Id.

^[31]733 Phil. 102 (2014) [Per J. Reyes, First Division].

^[32]Id.

^[33]Alanis III v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 216425, November 11, 2020, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66846> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

^[34]United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.

^[35]Estacio y Salvosa v. Estacio y Santos, G.R. No. 211851, September 16, 2020, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66987> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

^[36]Id.

^[37]J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion inGarcia v. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].

^[38]Toliongco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 231748, July 8, 2020, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66544> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

^[39]J. Leonen, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion inAnonymous Complaint v. Dagala, 814 Phil. 103 (2017) [Per Curiam, En Banc].

^[40]J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion inGarcia v. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].

^[41]Id.

^[42]Garcia v. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].

^[43]CONST., art. II, sec. 14.Seealso Republic Act No. 9710 (2009), sec. 2.

^[44]FAMILY CODE, art. 68.

^[45]Perez v. People, 830 Phil. 162 (2018) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

^[46]Id.

^[47]J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion inGarcia v. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].

^[48]Falcis III v. Civil Registrar General, G.R. No. 217910, September 3, 2019 <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65744> [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

^[49]J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion inRepublic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018, 862 SCRA 580 (2018) [Per C.J. Peralta, En Banc].

^[50]Id.

^[51]Id. at 632.

^[52]Republic v. Cagandahan, 586 Phil. 637 (2008) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].

^[53]Id. at 651-652.

^[54]A.M. No. 21-11-25-SC, February 15, 2022, <https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/24882/>.

^[55]Id.

LAZARO-JAVIER,J.:

I agree for the most part with theponenciaof the learned Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa. I also thank him for graciously accommodating some of my views in this case, especially the relevance of the civil law on support in determining liability for violation of Section 5 (i) of Republic Act No. 9262 (RA 9262). I, nonetheless, advance the following viewpoints with the hope ofproviding an analytical frameworkfor the judges of theFamily Courtsand designatedFamily Courtsto work with.

The analytical framework I most respectfully suggest isnot an originalone. It is basically areiterationof what first year law students have been taught when analyzing acriminalfact-pattern or case for that matter.

We start every analysis with thebasic elementsof the subject crime. Weorganizeour thought process according to the establishedcategoriesofactus reusand where applicablemens rea. Here, both are applicable and will be discussed to arrive at areasoned disposition.

Why is this frameworkextremely important? This is because at times the statutory definition of a crime could beconfusing. The analysis often begins with theelementsof the crime. There isnothingwrong with thatifthe analysis takes full account of thelegal requirementthat theelementsmust correspond to acriminal act, conduct and/or circumstances(theactus reus)andacriminal state of mind(themens rea). This framework is consistent with thevery definitionofwhat a crime is–actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. That is, except forstrict liability crimes, evil intentmust unite with anunlawful actfor acrime to exist.

Theextreme importanceof this reference to theelementsof a crime is illustrated in theconsideredview of the esteemed Senior Associate Justice Estella M. Perlas-Bernabe that themental or emotional suffering of the victimisnotaresultof the criminal actbutanelementof theintentin thedoing of such criminal act. Senior Associate Justice Perlas-Bernabe thusrejectedthe formulation inDinamling v. People^[1]that thethirdelement of the offense of Section 5 (i) of RA 9262 is that the "offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish."

Her point of view isdoubtless correct. With due respect, however, her formulation isnottheentiretyof the elements of Section 5 (i). She iscorrectthatmental or emotional anguishis anintegral partof thecriminal state of mind(i.e., themens rea) in the definition of Section 5 (i).

Still,Dinamlingiscorrect toothatmental or emotional anguishis also anintegral partof thecriminal act,conductand/orcircumstances(i.e., theactus reus) penalized by Section 5 (i).Ifthere wasno mental or emotional anguish, or if there wasbutit wasnot causedby any of the mentionedpredicate criminal acts, there isno violation of Section 5 (i). So it is notentirely fruitfultoeliminate, as the good Senior Associate Justice recommends, thethirdelement of Section 5 (i) as identified inDinamlingbecausemental or emotional anguishisboth integral partsof themens rea(as the good Senior Associate Justice correctly observes) and theactus reus(asDinamlingrightly mentions).

Of course, the enumeration of the elements of Section 5 (i) inDinamlingisdeficientbecause itfails to accountfor themens reacomponent ofmental or emotional anguishas properly commented by Senior Associate Justice Perlas-Bernabe.NowhereinDinamlingwas it mentioned that there must bethat specific criminal intenttocause mental or emotional anguish. While Section 5 (i) is aspecial law, andgenerallycrimes under a special law areerroneously lumped togetherasmala prohibita, itdoes not meanthat Section 5 (i) requires no mental element. The reason is simply that thetextof this provisioncallsfor a mental element. Indeed, if the definition of a crime is not broken into itselements, and by elements, we mean theactus reusand themens rea, we would fall into thesame deficienciesas the listing of elements inDinamlingillustrates.

Hence, it isextremely importantthat theanalytical frameworkin determining whether acrime has been committed by an accusedand whether theprosecution has proven this crime and its commission by the accusedbeyond reasonable doubt, we must examine the facts if they fit into theelementsof the crime charged, that is, if the facts demonstrate the commission of theactus reusand the presence of themens rea.

The Elements of a Crime

The crimes defined in Section 5 (e) and Section 5 (i) of RA 9262 are crimes punished by aspecial law. But these crimes arenotmalum prohibitumjust because they are offenses defined and punished by a special law. These crimes require as an element the presence ofmens rea.

I digress a bit to quote the renowned Justice Regalado who abhorred this classification of crimes intomala in seandmalum prohibitum, which I passionately shared in one^[2]of my opinions:

4. Nor should we hold a "judicial prejudice" from the fact that the two forms of illegal possession of firearms in Presidential Decree No. 1866 aremala prohibita. On this score,I believe it is time to disabuse our minds of some superannuated concepts of the difference betweenmala in seandmala prohibita. I find in these cases afelicitous occasion to point out this misperception thereon since even now there are instances of incorrect assumptions creeping into some of our decisions that if the crime is punished by the Revised Penal Code, it is necessarily amalum in seand, if provided for by a special law, it is amalum prohibitum.

It was from hornbook lore that we absorbed the distinctions given by text writers, claiming that: (1)mala in serequire criminal intent on the part of the offender; inmala prohibita, the mere commission of the prohibited act, regardless of intent, is sufficient; and (2)mala in serefer to felonies in the Revised Penal Code, whilemala prohibitaare offenses punished under special laws.

The first distinction is still substantially correct, but the second is not accurate.In fact, even in the Revised Penal Code there are felonies which are actually and essentiallymala prohibita. To illustrate, in time of war, and regardless of his intent, a person who shall have correspondence with a hostile country or territory occupied by enemy troops shall be punished therefor. An accountable public officer who voluntarily fails to issue the required receipt for any sum of money officially collected by him, regardless of his intent, is liable for illegal exaction. Unauthorized possession of picklocks or similar tools, regardless of the possessor's intent, is punishable as such illegal possession.These are felonies under the Revised Penal Code but criminal intent is not required therein.

On the other hand, I need not mention anymore thatthere are now in our statutes so many offenses punished under special laws but wherein criminal intent is required as an element, and which offenses are accordinglymala in sealthough they are not felonies provided for in the Code.^[3]

Originally, acrimewas considered to be thecommission of a physical actwhich wasspecifically prohibited by law. It was theact itselfwhich was thesole elementof the crime. If it was established that theact was committedby an accused, then afinding of guiltwould ensue.

As early as the twelfth century, however, in large part through the influence of the canon law, it was established that there mustalsobe amental element combined withtheprohibited acttoconstitute a crime. That is to say that an accusedmust have meant or intendedto commit the prohibited act. Thephysical actandthemental elementwhich together constitute a crime came to be known as theactus reusdenoting the act, and themens reafor the mental element.

Violations of Section 5 (e) and Section 5 (i) have the requisiteactus reusandmens reaelements.In deciding the meritsof a criminal case, theanalysisshouldalways startfrom andreferto theseelementsand not from anywhere or to anything else.

The following excerpt fromValenzuela v. People, G.R. No. 160188, June 21, 2007, supplies therationalefor thisstartingpoint of every criminal caseanalysis:

The long-standing Latin maxim "actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea" supplies animportant characteristic of a crime, that "ordinarily,evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a crime," and accordingly, there can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting. Accepted in this jurisdiction asmaterial in crimesmala in se,mens reahas been defined before as "a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent," and "essential for criminal liability." It follows thatthe statutory definition of ourmala in secrimes must be able to supply what themens reaof the crime is, and indeed the U.S. Supreme Court has comfortably held that "a criminal law that contains nomens rearequirement infringes on constitutionally protected rights." Thecriminal statute must also provide for the overt acts that constitute the crime. For acrime to exist in our legal law, it isnot enough thatmens reabe shown;theremust also be anactus reus.

It isfrom theactus reusand themens rea, as they find expression in the criminal statute, that the felony is produced. As a postulate in thecraftsmanship of constitutionally sound laws, it isextremely preferable that the language of the law expressly provide when the felony is produced. Without such provision, disputes would inevitably ensue on the elemental question whether or not a crime was committed, thereby presaging the undesirable and legally dubious set-up under which the judiciary is assigned the legislative role of defining crimes. Fortunately, our Revised Penal Code does not suffer from such infirmity.From the statutory definition of any felony, a decisive passage or term is embedded which attests when the felony is produced by the acts of execution.For example, the statutory definition of murder or homicide expressly uses the phrase "shall kill another," thus making it clear that the felony is produced by the death of the victim, and conversely, it is not produced if the victim survives.

Actus reusis theact(or sometimes anomissionorstate of affairs) indicated in thedefinition of the offense chargedtogether with (1) anyconsequencesof that conduct which are indicated by that definition; and (2) anysurrounding circumstances so indicated(other than references to themens reaor element of negligence required on the part of the defendant, or to any defense).^[4]

In addition to a physical element consisting of committing aprohibited act, creating aprohibited state of affairs, oromitting to dothat which is required by the law, theactus reusrequires theconductin question to bewilled; this is usually referred to asvoluntariness. Thedoingof theprohibited actorconductmust involve amental element. It is thismental element, that is theact of will, which makes the act or conduct willed orvoluntary.

On the other hand,mens reais thesubjectiveormentalelement of an accused'sintentionto commit a crime, orknowledgethat an accused's action or lack of action would cause a crime to be committed, orwillful blindnessorrecklessnessthat an accused'sactus reuswouldcauseacrimeto be perpetrated.

Butmens rea, properly understood, doesnot encompass all of the mental elementsof a crime. As stated, theactus reushasits own mental element; the act must be thevoluntary actof an accused for theactus reusto exist.

Mens rea, on the other hand, refers to theguilty mind, thewrongful intention, of an accused. Itsfunctionin criminal law is toprevent the conviction of the morally innocent– those whodo not understandorintend the consequences of their acts.

Mens reais a contemporaneous mental element comprising anintention to carry out the prohibited physical actoromission to act; that is to say aparticular state of mindsuch as theintent to cause, or someforesight of, theresultsof the act or the state of affairs.

Thus, typically,mens reais concerned with themental elementaccompanying theconsequencesof theprohibitedactus reus.

The prosecution always bears the burden of proving theactus reus, themental elementofvoluntarinessof theactus reus, and themens reamental element. Therefore, in certain situations, a person whocommitted a prohibited physical actstill couldnotbe foundguilty. A number of examples come to mind.

For instance, if aperson in a state of automatismas a result of a blow on the head committed a prohibited act that this person wasnot consciously aware of committing, the latter couldnotbe foundguilty. Themental elementinvolved incommitting a willed voluntary actandthemental elementofintending to commit the actwereabsent. Thus neither the requisiteactus reusormens reafor the offense was present.

The result would be the same in the case of an accused who had an unexpected reaction to medication which rendered this persontotally unaware of the latter's actions. Similarly, if an accused, during an epileptic seizure, withno knowledge of what this person was doing, shot and killed a victim, this accused couldnotbe foundguiltyof killing since both theability to act voluntarilyandthemental element of the intention to killwereabsent.

In all these instances, though the accused committed theactus reus, the latter simplycould not have formedthe requisitemental elementsofvoluntarinessin theperformance of the prohibited actoromissionandintention to commit the prohibited act.

Thestatutory definitiongenerallyfurnishes the elementsof each crime and theelementsin turnunraveltheparticular requisite actsof execution and accompanyingcriminal intent.^[5]

The Elements of Section 5 (i) in relation to Section 3 (a) (C)

i. Actus Reus of Violation of Section 5 (i)

Thestarting pointis thestatutory definitionin Section 5(i) of RA 9262:

SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. — The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts....

(i)Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, anddenial of financial supportor custody of minor children or denial of access to the woman's child/children.

In relation to Section 5 (i) is Section 3 (a) (C) of RA 9262:

SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act,

(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed byany person against a womanwho is his wife, former wife, oragainst a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode,which result in or is likely to result inphysical, sexual,psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts...

C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissionscausing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victimsuch as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse andmarital infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common children.

From this definition, theactus reusof this offense consists of the –

(i)	relationship between an accused and offended parties, that is, a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode.
(ii)	denial of financial supportto those entitled to receive financial support and to whom an accused is obliged to give financial support.
	a.	Theactis thedeliberatewithholding of the provision of financial support.
	b.	Theconsequenceof theactis theabsenceorinadequacy of financial supportasdefined by lawfor those entitled to be supported by the accused, since the complainantcannot compensatefor thesupport deniedto the complainant and/or their children by the accused.
(iii)	Legal entitlementto support andlegal obligation(i.e., concurrenceofcapacityandneed)to providesupport.
(iv)	Mentaloremotional anguishorlikelihoodorprobabilityofmentaloremotional anguishon the part ofthose entitled to receive financial supportandto whom an accused is obliged to give financial support.
(v)	causationorlikely causationof the mental or emotional anguish by the accused'sdenial of financial support.

Let me expound on each of these components of theactus reus.

(i)	relationship between an accused and offended parties, that is, a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode.

This is anobjectiveelement.

The presence of this element isnotdetermined from asubjective(an accused's or a complainant's) perspectivebutfrom theseobjectiveor real world circumstances: (a) having acommon child; (b) having engaged in asingle sexual actwhich may or may not result in the bearing of a common child (sexual relations); or (c) havinglived togetherwithout the benefit of marriageas if spousesor having beeninvolved romantically over timeandon a continuing basisduring the course of their relationship, but excluding casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two individuals in a business or social context (dating relationship).

For purposes of establishing theactus reus,noothermental element thanvoluntarinesshas to be proved.

To clarify, it isnot requiredthat an accused or a complainantintendedorwas purposely involved, orknew that they were, in any of these types ofrelationship. It isenoughthat the prosecution established that theyvoluntarilyhad a child, engaged in a single sexual act, lived together as if spouses, or bonded themselves romantically continuously over a period of time.

(ii)	denial of financial supportto those entitled to receive financial support and to whom an accused is obliged to give financial support.

Thisactus reushastwo components: (a) anactand (b) aconsequence.

Theact, as correctly defined by Justice Caguioa, is thedeliberatewithholding of the provision of financial support.

Theconsequencethereof is theabsenceorinadequacy of financial supportasdefined by law(i.e., Article 194,Family Code: "Supportcompriseseverything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with thefinancial capacityof the family") for those entitled to be supported by the accused, since the complainantcannot compensatefor thesupport deniedto the complainant and/or their children by the accused.

The test in establishing thisactus reusisobjective.

The presence of this element isnotdetermined from asubjective(an accused's or a complainant's) perspectivebutfromobjectiveor real world circumstances.

The relevantobjectivecircumstances to establish thisactus reusinclude:

• subject-matter of theneededsustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation;
• amountsrequiredto pay forthe foregoing support items;
• the claimed support itemsvis-à-visthefinancial capacityof the familyprior tothe withholding of the provision of financial support;
• demand to an accused to payfinancial support;
• capacityof an accused to give support;
• non-provisionorpartial provisionof financial support; and
• absentorinadequatefinancial support on the part of the obligees of the support since the woman isunable to compensate for the denied supportby the accused.

Notably, there is alegal obligationto provide support only if there is aconcurrence betweenthecapacityto give support and theneedto be supported. If there isno such legal obligation, there can benoactus reusof deliberately withholding financial support because there isreally nothing to withhold. Also, if there isno legal obligationto give support, the act ofdenyingfinancial supportcannotbe a criminal act since there isno legal mandate to do so.

There aretwo legitimate issueson thisactus reus:

(a)	whether theact componentof theactus reusofdenial of financial supportrefers to thedenialoffullorpartialfinancial support.

Hence, if an accused, during the period alleged in the Information,provided some supportfor a portion or the entirety of this period, would hestill be liablefor violation of Section 5 (i)?

Myshort answerto this issue is that thequantumof supportdeniedby an accused isnot material. This isbecausethelanguage of the statutedoesnotmake such distinction.

Further, thepurpose of the lawis toredressacomplainant's mental or emotional anguishanddeter othersfrom causing it. The proposeddistinctionshouldnot be allowedbecause adenialof either afullorpartialsupport could still potentially result in such prejudice.

(b)

whether theactus reusofdenial of financial supporthas really aconsequence component, that is, theactof denial of support should result in theabsenceorinadequacyoffinancial supportto those entitled to be supported, that is, the financial support to the woman and/or the children would beabsentor at leastinsufficientas a result oftheaccused's denial of support.

Or, whether it isenoughthat anaccused denied supportregardless of theconsequenceorimpactof the denial of support.

As already mentioned above, thisactus reushas both anactandconsequence components. Theactof denial of supportmust havetheconsequenceofdeprivingthe woman and/or their children inwholeor inpartof theneeded supportas the woman isunable to compensatefor the accused's denied support.

Therefore, if the woman isable to providetheneeded supportfor herself and/or their children, and the accused'sdenial of supporthasno prejudicial impactupon the obligees' support, then there isno violationof Section 5 (i) of RA 9262,even ifthe woman ismentallyoremotionally anguishedby the accused's apparent finagling of the woman in terms ofnot sharingin the support obligations.

Therationalefor theconsequencecomponent of thisactus reusis thepolicybehind RA 9262.

Section 2 states that the statute isdesigned to value the dignityof women and children,to guarantee full respect for their human rights, to recognize the need to protectwomen and children fromviolenceandthreats totheirpersonal safetyandsecurity.

If the woman isable to provide adequate financial supportto herself and/or the childrensansthe accused's financial support, thepolicybehind RA 9262 isnot at all implicated.

This isbecause, if the woman and the children arefinancially securedespite the accused's denial of financial support, there isno impairmentof theirdignityorviolationof theirhuman rightsor theirpersonal security. The woman'sremedyin this instance isnot under RA 9262but under thecivil lawsonsupportas well as heraccessto andliquidationanddissolutionoftheir property relationsif any.

Anotherrationaleis that thelegal obligationto give financial support entails theconcurrenceof thecapacity to provide financial supportand theneed to be supported. If there isno legal obligationto give financial support, the act ofdenyingfinancial supportcannotbe a criminal act because there isno legal compulsion to extend financial support.

Thisactus reusofdenial of supporthastwo mental elements– thevoluntarymental element of theactus reusand themens reamental element.

Themens reaelement will be discussed below.

As regards thevoluntarinessof the act, this means the prosecution has to establish that the accused wasnot forcedtodenyfinancial support due to lack of resources, other legal obligations and othercircumstances beyondthe accused's control or discretion preventing the accused from providing financial support.

(iii)

Legal entitlementto support andlegal obligation (i.e., concurrence of capacity and need) to providesupport

Thisactus reusis anobjectiveelement. This isdeterminedby thecivil lawsonsupport.Neitheran accusednora complainant can determine for themselveswho is entitled to supportandwho is obliged to give support. Thecivil lawsprovide the answer. Accordingly, thelegal obligationto provide support requires theconcurrenceof an accused'scapacityto provide support and an obligee's need for support.

(iv)	Mentaloremotional anguishorlikelihoodorprobabilityofmentaloremotional anguishitself, on the part ofthose entitled to receive financial supportandto whom an accused is obliged to give financial support.

Thisactus reushasboth subjectiveandobjectivecomponents.

Mentaloremotional anguishissubjectiveif the woman and/or her children with the accused has/haveattestedto itsexistence, that is, they testify that they arein fact sufferingfrommentaloremotional anguish.

As held inDinamling v. People, 761 Phil. 356 (2015), this is element is proven by thetestimoniesof thecomplainant womanand/orchildrensince thementaloremotional anguishis personal to them.

If the complainantstestify to this effect, they haveestablished halfwaythisactus reus. The other half isdeterminedby thecredibilityof this claim that must then beexaminedon thetotality of the evidencein the case.

Mentaloremotional anguishisobjectiveif the claim islimitedto thelikelihoodorprobabilityof mental or emotional anguish of the woman and/or her children with the accused. To be liable for violation of Section 5 (i), among other requisites, thementaloremotionalanguish neednotexist as a factbutthere must at least be thelikelihoodorprobabilityof its occurrence according to the perspective of reasonable persons in the situation of the woman and/or her children.

Note that thisactus reusof thelikelihoodorprobabilityof mental or emotional anguish is foundtextuallyin Section 3 (a) (C) of RA 9262 andnotin thetextof Section 5 (i). Nonetheless, since Section 5 (i)must be read in relation toSection 3 (a) (C), this particular component of theactus reusisdeemed writteninto the statutory definition of the crime under Section 5 (i).

(v)	causationorlikely causationof the mental or emotional anguish by the accused'sdenial of financial support.

Thisactus reushasboth subjectiveandobjectivecomponents.

Thecausationof mental or emotional anguishbythe accused'sdenial of financial supportissubjectiveif the woman and/or her children with the accused has/haveattestedto theexistenceof thiscausation, that is, they testify that they arein fact sufferingfrom mental or emotional anguishas a result ofthe accused'sdenial of financial support.

If the complainantstestify to this effect, they haveestablished halfwaythisactus reus. The other half isdeterminedby thecredibilityof this claim that must then beexaminedon thetotality of the evidencein the case.

Thiscausationof thementaloremotional anguishisobjectiveif the claim islimitedto thelikelihoodorprobabilityof thecausationof mental or emotional anguish by the accused'sdenial of financial support.

Causationneednotexist as a factbutthere must at least be thelikelihoodorprobabilityof thiscausationaccording to the perspective of reasonable persons in the situation of the woman and/or her children.

Thecausal relationshiprequired by the law is that thementaloremotional anguishneednot onlybefactualorconsummatedby the accused'sdenial of supportbut alsobelikelyorprobable to happenas a result of thedenialof financial support.

Thisactus reusof thelikelihoodorprobabilityof thecausationof mental or emotional anguish is foundtextuallyin Section 3 (a) (C) of RA 9262 andnotin thetextof Section 5 (i). Nonetheless, since Section 5 (i)must be read in relation toSection 3 (a) (C), this specificactus reusisdeemed writteninto the statutory definition of the crime under Section 5 (i).

Notably, theactus reusofdenial of financial supporthas bothactandconsequencecomponents. The emotional or mental anguishmust be causedby the ultimateconsequenceof thedenialof financial support, which is theabsenceorinadequacy of supportthatcannot be compensatedby the woman's own resources. Thisconnectionamong these components of theactus reusmay be illustrated as follows:

(image should be here)

Conversely, if thementaloremotional anguishis not due to orlikely to be due totheabsenceorinadequacyof support, since the woman isable to provide ample supportor since the woman isbothered by something else, then Section 5 (i) isnottheproper remedyfor the woman and/or their children.

There is amental elementto thisactus reusbut this is found in themens reaelement of Section 5 (i) – the accused'sintentionandpurposetoinflictsuchmentaloremotional anguishupon the woman and/or their childrenorthewillful blindnessorrecklessnessof the accused's conduct innotrecognizing that the act ofdenying financial supportwouldprobablyorlikely causesuch mental or emotional anguish on their part.

ii. Mens rea of Violation of Section 5 (i)

WhileRA 9262defines anoffensepunishable by aspecial law, violation of Section 5 (i) in relation to Section 3 (a) (C) nonetheless requires amens reaelement.

Themens reahasthree components:

(i)	thespecific intentof an accusedto deny financial supportto the obligees of support, which requires as stated themental elementofvoluntary performanceof this actandtheintention, purposeandknowledgeto do so.
(ii)	thespecific intentof an accused tocausetheabsenceorinadequacy of financial supporton the part of the obligees of support, which requiresnot onlythemental elementofvoluntary performanceof the act of denying financial supportbut alsotheintention, purposeandknowledgeto accomplish suchconsequenceof the act of denying support; theabsenceorinadequacy of financial supporton the part of the obligees of support must be afact– they must in fact bein need of the accused's financial support,
(iii)	thespecific intenttocauseor tolikely causetheobligees' mentaloremotional anguishdue to theaccused's denialof financial supportandits consequenceof absence or inadequacy of financial support.

Note that thethird specific intent requirementof tocause likelyis foundtextuallyin Section 3 (a) (C) of RA 9262 andnotin thetextof Section 5 (i). But since Section 5 (i)must be read in relation toSection 3 (a) (C), thisspecific intentisdeemed writteninto the statutory definition of the crime under Section 5 (i).

Thismental elementconsists of the accused'sintentionandpurposetocauseorinflictsuchmentaloremotional anguishupon the woman and/or their children bydenying them financial support. This is themental elementrequired wherementaloremotional anguishisactually sufferedby them.

Alternatively, themental elementmay also be the accused'swillful blindnessorrecklessnessinpursuingthe act ofdenying financial supportandnot recognizingthat this act wouldprobablyorlikely causesuch mental or emotional anguish on the woman and/or their children.

Application of the Elements of Section 5 (i) in relation to Section 3 (a) (C)

i. Facts of the Case

Accused-petitioner was charged with violation of Section 5 (i) of RA 9262 in an Information alleging thus:

That sometime in (sic) January 25, 2012, up to the present, in Valenzuela City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and therewillfully, unlawfully and feloniously cause mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation tohis wifeAAA,by denying financial support to the said complainant.

He pleaded not guilty to the charge and trial ensued. According to the trial court, after he left for Brunei to work as an overseas worker, he maintained another romantic non-marital relationship while not being emotionally separated from his spouse. The latter is the sole complainant in this criminal case as she and accused had no children. In Brunei, he lived together with the woman. He alsofailed to pay the amount he and his spouse had borrowedto settle his placement fee. As recounted by the trial court:

However, theaccused did not send money on a regular basis. All in all,he was able to send money in the total amount of P71,500.00 only, leaving the balancein the amount ofP13,500.00. For which reason,she felt so embarrassed with [their creditor]becauseshe could not pay the balance. She evenpleaded to [their creditor]not to lodge a complaint to the barangay.[Their creditor]communicated to the employer of the accused in Bruneiabout their debt to her.
....
On cross, she stated that when the accused left in December 2011, she [was] jobless.Presently, she is gainfully employed.She lost communication with the accused since January 2012. According to the employer and friends ofthe accused, the latteris living with his paramourin Brunei. She filed this case becauseshe was extremely hurt and she experience emotional agony by the neglect and utter insensitivitythat the accused made her endure and suffer.

Accused-petitioner explained thathe really wanted to send and bring money backfrom Brunei. Unfortunately, while he was in Brunei, hisrented place was razed by fireand hemet a vehicular accidentwhichrequired him to spend a significant sumof money. He and his spouse had an on and off communication from October 2011 until April 2013. He admitted though thatcomplainant demanded that he pay the entire amount of the debt.

He further recalled:

He used to send money to the private complainant. But it was the latter who told him not to send money anymore.He also claimed that he was able to send the total amount of P71,000.00 to the private complainant in payment of their loan. He agreed that the same is not enough to fully pay their loan in the total amount of P85,000.00.

ii.	Application of the Analytical Test to the Facts of the Case

I agree with theponenciathat accused-petitioner is entitled to an acquittal.

The prosecutionfailed to prove at allthe requisiteactus reusand necessarilymens reaof Section 5 (i).

The following components of theactus reusarenot disputed:

(i)	relationship between an accused and offended parties, that is, a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode.
(ii)	Legal entitlementto support andlegal obligation (i.e., concurrence of capacity and need) to providesupport
(iii)	Mentaloremotional anguishorlikelihoodorprobabilityofmentaloremotional anguishon the part ofthose entitled to receive financial supportandto whom an accused is obliged to give financial support.

At issue are these components ofactus reus:

(i)	denial of financial supportto those entitled to receive financial support and to whom an accused is obliged to give financial support.
	a.	Theactis thedeliberatewithholding of the provision of financial support.
	b.	Theconsequenceof theactis theabsenceorinadequacy of financial supportasdefined by lawfor those entitled to be supported by the accused, since the complainantcannot compensatefor thesupport deniedto the complainant and/or their children by the accused.
(ii)	Theconsequenceorlikely consequenceofmental or emotional anguishas aresultof the accused'sdenial of financial support

There wasno deliberate withholdingof financial support because –

(a) theunfortunate eventsin accused-petitioner's life in Bruneiprevented himfrom saving money that he could have remitted to the Philippines; withno money to remit, there wasnothing he was withholdingmuch lessdeliberately withholding; and

(b) there wasno demandfrom his spouse to provide support; if there was no demand to give support, it cannot be said that he wasdeliberately withholdingor in shortdenyingfinancial support.

His spouse alsodid not suffer absentorinadequate support. She wasgainfully employedas she had admitted. She alsodid not demand support at all. All she wanted was for him to pay his debt to their godmother.

Thus, theconsequenceof theactcomponent –absentorinadequate supportis also missing.

While complainant sufferedemotionalormental anguish, this wasnot the resultof anydenialof financial support (which did not happen anyway) or theabsenceorinadequacyof financial support (which did not occur too).

Rather, the emotional or mental anguish wasdue tothe allegedother relationshipof accused-petitioner. Thiscauseof thementaloremotional anguish, however, wasnotthemode of psychological violencealleged in the Information. Itshould notandcould nothave been, therefore, theproof-focusof the prosecution evidence against him. This allegation, though harrowing to complainant, isnot the cause of the accusation, hence, it isirrelevantandinadmissiblein this case.

Since theactus reusof the crime charged wasnot proved at all, any discussion on itsmens reaelement is totallyunnecessary. The reason is that there isno prohibited act, state of affairs, andconsequenceto which the relevantmens reacould attach.

iii.	Criminalization of Non-Provision of Support and the Variance Doctrine

RA 9262does not criminalizethemere omission to pay supportorsolely the non-provision of support. The matter of support as an item of theactus reusappears only in Section 5 (i) in relation to Section 3 (a) (C) and Section 5 (e) (2). In both these provisions,lack of supportorprovision of inadequate supportis criminalonly iftheother componentsof the statutorily definedactus reusandmens reaarepresent.

Neitherdoes RA 9262criminalizethemere denial of financial support.

In particular, I agree with Justice Caguioa thatMelgar v. People, G.R. No. 223477, February 14, 2018, imprecisely held that Section 5 (i)necessarily includesSection 5 (e) (2) and that thisactus reuscan be thesolebasis for aconvictionunderSection 5 (e) (2).

Justice Caguioa also correctly recommended abandoning this case law andReyes v. People, G.R. No. 232678, July 3, 2019, which affirmedMelgar.

Section 5 (e) (2) isnot necessarily includedin Section 5 (i) because theelementof the former isnot only denial of financial support.

But forthe element ofdeprivingorthreatening to deprivethe woman or her childrenof financial supportlegally due her or her family, ordeliberately providingthe woman's childreninsufficient financial support, which is acommonelement with Section 5 (i), thestatutory definitionof Section 5 (e) (2) requiresdifferentactus reusandmens rea.

Without exhaustively canvassing the elements of Section 5 (e) (2), theactus reusincludes theoverarching prohibited consequenceofcontrolling or restricting, attempting to control or restrict, orthreatening to control or restrict, the woman's or her child's movement or conduct. This isnot an elementof Section 5 (i)andis adistinctive elementof the crime loosely termedeconomic abuse.

Further, themens reaof Section 5 (e) (2) includes thespecific intenttobring aboutorcause– theintentional, purposefulandknowingbringing about or causing of – theoverarching prohibited consequence. Thisspecific intentisnot presentin Section 5 (i) and is adistinctive elementof Section 5 (e) (2).

Thecause of accusationfor Section 5 (e) (2) crime isdifferent fromthecause of accusationunder Section 5 (i). Each of these elements must beallegedin the Information andprovenbeyond a reasonable doubt to obtain a conviction.

Allegations for Section 5 (i)do not encompassallegations under Section 5 (e) (2) because the former aredifferent fromthe latter.

Thevarianceprinciplewas therefore inaccurately applied inMelgarandReyes. The good Senior Associate Justice graciously conceded this point in herReflectionsand, for this and other reasons, I admire and respect superbly her wisdom, graciousness, and humility.

iv.	Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Perlas-Bernabe

I agree with the good Senior Associate Justice that Section 3 (a) has abearing upon the meaningof the particular criminal provision in RA 9262, Section 5. I myself refer to Section 3 (a) to identify theactandconsequenceand themental elementsofSection 5. The Supreme Court has in fact done so countless times prior.

I respectfully suggest, however, that Section 3 (a) isnot just abouttheeffects of the actsmentioned in Section 5 upon the woman and/or her children.^[6]

Section 3 (a) isfar more comprehensivethan what the good Senior Associate Justice proffers. Please consider the following:

Section 5 (i)punishesthe infliction ofmentaloremotional anguishby means of theactssome of which arementioned in Section 5 (i)while others arestated in Section 3 (a) (C).

An example ismarital infidelitywhich appears in the latterbut notin Section 5 (i).Denial of financial supportis mentioned in Section 5 (i)but notin Section 3 (a) (C).

Section 5 (i) requires themens reaof thespecific intent to cause mentaloremotional anguish. It is aspecific intentbecause the merevoluntary performanceoromissionofdenial of financial supportdoes not automatically result intheactus reusof mental or emotional anguish. The latter effect must bespecifically willedorintended.

But Section 3 (a) (C)addsanotherdimensionofactus reusandmens rea–likely to causemental or emotional anguish.

Denialof financial support that islikely to causeemotional or mental anguish is anactus reusthat isdifferentandapartfromdenialof financial support thatcausesmental or emotional anguish. Thisactus reushas adifferent mental componentasmens rea.Likely to causecalls for thementalstates ofwillful blindnessorrecklessnessandnotintent, purpose or knowledge.

I also humbly opine that thementalelement inmens reaisnottheintent to commit psychological violenceoreconomic abuse.^[7]I think, as the good Senior Associate Justice does, that this is animprecise wayof identifying themens reaof Section 5 (i) in relation to Section 3 (a) (C).

Thementalelement inmens reamust becorrelatedto thespecificactus reuscomponent to which thementalelement attaches.

The termspsychological violenceandeconomic abuse, for instance, are abundleof components of theactus reusand themens rea, some of whichintersectbetween thesetypes of violence, some aresharedbetween them, and some aredistinctive. So we have to bemore specificandprecisewhen identifying theactus reusandmens reainvolved.

Thus, I agree with the view of Senior Associate Justice Perlas-Bernabe that

Therefore, since it has been established that the types of violence are neither exclusive to a Section 5 act nor are the means/punishable offense,it is but proper to situate intent on the actual purposes mentioned in Section 5 of RA 9262. These purposes are in the nature of specific intent, which must underlie the commission of the act sought to be punished.

Still, Ido not thinkit waserrorfor Justice Caguioa tocategorizethe provisions of Section 5 into thetypes of violenceidentified and defined or illustrated in Section 3 (a). Iagreewith the following approach of Justice Caguioa to which Senior Justice Perlas-Bernabe disagreed –

A simple reading of Section 5 reveals that it is meant to classify the acts of violence against women already identified and defined under Section 3. Sections 5 (a) to 5 (d) seek to protect women and their children from physical violence, 5 (f), 5 (h) and 5 (i) from psychological violence, and 5 (g) from physical and sexual violence. Meanwhile, Section 5 (e), as previously discussed, protects the woman from acts of violence that are committed for the purpose of attempting to control her conduct or actions, or make her lose her agency. To the mind of the Court, Section 5 (e) enumerates the act of "economic abuse" defined under Section 3.

Thisapproachcommends itself to amore organizedandsimplifiedunderstanding of theelementsof the Section 5 offenses in relation to the types of offenses classified in Section 3 (a) (C). While theremight be some divergencebetween thetypes of offense categorizedin Section 3 (a)andthedefinition of the offensesin Section 5, there is ageneral correspondencein the coupling or pairing made by Justice Caguioa. The approach may not be perfect but it is ashorthandreference to what is relevant in Section 3 (a)vis-à-visSection 5. But of course Senior Associate Justice Perlas-Bernabe iscorrectin advisingcautionin using these pairings when they arenot on-all-fourswith thespecificsof an actual case.

I appreciate her opinion that here, thespecific intentrequirement is as follows:

Instead ofstating that the prosecution must show that theaccused intended to commit psychological violence, it is submitted that themore accurate phrasingis that theprosecution must provethat the accused,by deprivingAAA,his wife, offinancial support,intended to cause her mental or emotional anguish,public ridicule or humiliation,which thereby resulted into psychological violence.

She also mentions that –

Overall, I respectfully submit that it is necessary to frame the specific intent not relative to the form of violence alleged to have resulted, but rather to the actual purposes mentioned in the acts stated in Section 5 itself.

I believe that her formulation isin synchwith my discussion above on thespecific intentmens rea, to wit:

(iv)	thespecific intentof an accusedto deny financial supportto the obligees of support, which requires as stated themental elementofvoluntary performanceof this actandtheintention, purposeandknowledgeto do so.
(v)	thespecific intentof an accused tocausetheabsenceorinadequacy of financial supporton the part of the obligees of support, which requiresnot onlythemental elementofvoluntary performanceof the act of denying financial supportbut alsotheintention, purposeandknowledgeto accomplish suchconsequenceof the act of denying support; theabsenceorinadequacy of financial supporton the part of the obligees of support must be afact– they must in fact bein need of the accused's financial support,
(vi)	thespecific intenttocauseor tolikely causetheobligees' mentaloremotional anguishdue to theaccused's denialof financial supportandits consequenceof absence or inadequacy of financial support.

To be sure, thekeyto analyzing criminal statutes and cases is –

(1) toexaminetheelementsof the crime byusingthe categories ofactus reusandmens rea, and then,

(2) todeterminethe actual components of these elements from thestatutory definitionof the crime itself and thepurposefor theenactmentof the criminal provision.

This analysis could be a painstaking onebutit shouldable to account for the policiesbehind the criminal statute.

Conclusion

ALL TOLD, Iconcurin the result andvoteto grant the petition andacquitaccused-petitioner of violation of Section 5 (i) of RA 9262 or of any other crime necessarily included therein if any.

^[2]Sama v. People, G.R. No. 224469, January 5, 2021.

^[3]Concurring Opinion,People v. Quejada, 328 Phil. 505 (1996).

^[4]Criminal Law (Volume 25 (2020), paras 1-552; Volume 26 (2020), paras 553-1014) Commentary athttps://www.lexisnexis.co.uk/legal/commentary/halsburys-laws-of-england/criminal-law/the-actus-reus.

^[5]Valenzuela v. People, supra.

^[6]The learned Senior Associate Justice opined during the deliberation that "[a]ccordingly, the Court would do well to clarify the perception in some earlier cases wherein the types of violence under Section 3 (a) of RA 9262 as means/punishable offenses. At the risk of belaboring the point,these types of violence are only descriptive of the effects on the woman and her child which result from the specific acts committed by the accused listed in Section 5of RA 9262. Simply put,the acts enumerated in Section 5 are the means/punishable offenses, whilethe types of violence in Section 3 (a)-physical, sexual, and psychological violence and economic abuse - are theends/resulting effects.

^[7]The good Senior Associate Justice mentioned that "[t]he above-discussed conceptual nuances are relevant since it affects the determination on where to situate criminal intent. In my opinion, considering that(1)the punishable acts are those provided under Section 5 of RA 9262; and(2)that the types of violence under Section 3 (a) are the resultant effects on the part of the woman or her child,it is thus inaccurate to say that the prosecution must show, by proof beyond reasonable doubt, that "the accused had the intent to inflict [for example] psychological violence to the womanx x x".

ZALAMEDA,J.:

Upon meticulous study of the pertinent laws and jurisprudence, I concur with theponenciaas regards the clarification of the construction of Sections 5(e) and 5(i) of Republic Act No. (RA) 9262.

To stress, the instant case establishes that the mere failure or inability of an accused to provide financial support to a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, does not amount to criminal liability punishable under the above-mentioned provisions of law.

At this juncture, it must be underlined that it is the duty of this Court to abandon any doctrine or rule found to be in violation of the law in force.^[1]In line with the purpose of our judicial system to discover the truth and see that justice is done,^[2]We must not condone the perpetuation of an inaccurate interpretation of the law merely on the basis of a mechanical application of the doctrine ofstare decisis. Thus, this Court must not be shackled by precedents, more so when altering the same promotes judicious dispensation of justice.

In this regard, the present interpretation laid down by theponenciais more faithful to the text of RA 9262; not to mention, more in consonant with the current cultural and societal norms of the country.

It is well settled that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning or applied according to its express terms, without any attempted interpretation, and leaving the court no room for any extended ratiocination or rationalization.^[3]

On this note, Section 5(e) of RA 9262 unequivocally provides that "[A]ttempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect ofcontrolling or restrictingthe woman's or her child's movement or conduct:" through "[D]epriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support" is the act of violence punishable by law.

Corollary to this, Section 3 (D) of RA 9262 defines economic abuse as "acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent", which includes withdrawal of financial support, deprivation of financial resources, and control of the woman's own and conjugal money or properties. Without a doubt, Section 5(e) must be read in conjunction with Section 3(D) of RA 9262 since a statute must be read or construed as a whole or in its entirety. All parts, provisions, or sections, must be read, considered or construed together, and each must be considered with respect to all others, and in harmony with the whole.^[4]To be sure, Section 5 (e) of RA 9262 fleshes out Section 3 (D) of said law; thus, acts punishable under Section 5(e) of RA 9262 may also amount to economic abuse defined by Section 3 (D).

However, I agree with theponencia's clarification that Section 5(e) must not necessarily be limited by Section 3 (D) such that the acts specifically enumerated under Section 5(e) need not always equate to economic abuse in order to be punishable.

Verily, theponenciais correct in that non-payment of financial support, to be punishable, must be done to control or attempt to control the woman - compelling her to do something unwillingly or preventing her from doing something which is within her right to do. For the denial of financial support to rise to the level of violence that would make a person criminally liable under Section 5(e), RA 9262, there must be allegation and proof that it was made with the intent to control or restrict the woman's actions. Moreover, when said act amounts to economic abuse, the same is necessarily punishable under Section 5(e) of RA 9262.

It is worthy to note that in the different versions of the bills consolidated and amended to craft the present RA 9262, the same qualification as to controlling the woman was stipulated for acts pertaining or amounting to economic abuse.^[5]Moreover, economic abuse was explicitly and consistently defined as either "willful neglect" or "denial" to provide support to the woman, which includes the "withdrawal" thereof.^[6]Significantly, it was also highlighted in the Senate Deliberations that in the glossary approved by the National Statistical Coordination Board for its use, economic abuse is defined as the denial of access of control of the woman over economic resources.^[7]

In the same vein, Section 5(i) of RA 9262 is clear as to the act prohibited.

To reiterate, words used in law must be given their plain meaning.^[8]In this regard, Section 5(i) of RA 9262 is unmistakable that to be punishable, the mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation is inflicted on the woman through thedenialof financial support. Indeed, Black's Law dictionary defines "denial" as a refusal or rejection, a disavowal^[9]- which confirms theponenciathat willfulness must be proven for a conviction under the provision in issue. Verily, to be punishable under the law, there must be a deliberate intent to inflict psychological violence on the woman through the willful denial of financial support.

Additionally, it bears noting that in the different versions of the bills consolidated and amended to arrive at RA 9262, the same word - denial - was used as regards financial support in relation to psychological violence.^[10]

Articles 68, 70 and 195 of the Family Code provide that the husband and wife have the mutual obligation to financially support the family. To be sure, it is not only the husband who has the responsibility to economically support the family. This obligation is also qualified by the resources and necessities of both parties.^[11]

The above discussion on the wording of Sections 5(e) and 5(i) of RA 9262, coupled with the mutual obligation of support prescribed by the Family Code, inevitably results to and supports the interpretation that the mere failure to provide financial support to a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, does not constitute violence criminally punishable under the law.

Here, as articulately explained by theponencia, private complainant cannot simply wait for financial support from petitioner Acharon. This, especially since Acharon was able to pay more than half of the debt and his failure to continue providing financial support is not deliberate or malicious as he had justifiable explanations for the same.

This construction is likewise more in keeping with the present times. Without a doubt, women are currently more capable of supporting themselves and their families. Further, given the state of our economy, it is to be expected that furnishing financial support consistently is a challenge.

As embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, the variance doctrine allows the conviction of an accused for a crime proved which is different from, but necessarily included, in the crime charged.^[12]

Prevailing jurisprudence allows for the conviction of an accused charged with violation of Section 5(i) of RA 9262 and for the violation of Section 5(e) of RA 9262 due to the variance doctrine.^[13]However, considering the clarification as regards the modes of violence against women under Sections 5(e) and 5(i) of RA 9262, theponenciaestablishes that the variance doctrine may not be applied anymore for the provisions in issue.

Given the material distinctions between the acts punishable and the specific intent behind said acts specified in Sections 5(e) and 5(i) of RA 9262, theponenciais correct that the former offense cannot be considered subsumed in the latter.^[14]This, notwithstanding the common factor of denial or deprivation of financial support.

In sum, mere failure to provide financial support to a woman as qualified by RA 9262 does not amount to violence punishable under said law. In order to amount to criminal liability punishable under Section 5(e) of RA 9262, the deprivation of financial support must be done to control or restrict the woman. On the other hand, in order to be punishable as psychological violence in violation of Section 5(i) of RA 9262, there must be a deliberate intent to cause the victim mental or emotional anguish, or public ridicule or humiliation through the willful denial of financial support. Considering the stark difference between the offenses, especially as regards the additional elements of control for Section 5(e) and mental and emotional anguish for Section 5(i), the variance doctrine does not apply.

Accordingly, I concur in the result and vote toGRANTthe petition andACQUITpetitioner Christian Pantonial Acharon of violation of Section 5(i) of RA 9262.

^[2]See Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. Nos. 115455, 115525, 115543, 115544, 115754, 115781, 115852, 115873 & 115931, 25 August 1994 [Per J. Mendoza].

^[3]Ocampo v. Rear Admiral Enriquez, 798 Phil. 227 (2017) [Per J. Peralta].

^[4]Valera v. Office of the Ombudsman, 570 Phil. 368 (2008) [Per CJ Puno].

^[5]Senate Bill No. (SB) 2723. Section 3 (D), Section 5(d); House Bill No. (HB) 6054, Section 4 (A) (3); and HB 5516, Section 3 (e).

^[6]SB 2723, Section 3 (D) (1); HB 5516, Section 3 (e); HB 6054, Section 4 (A)(3);See alsoHB 2858, Section 3 (3); HB 1320, Section 3(3)(a); HB 2753, Section 4(3).

^[7]SB 2723, TCM, 06 May 2002, pp. 6-8.

^[8]People v. Sandiganbayan, 504 Phil. 407, 429 (2005) [Per J. Panganiban].

^[9]Black's Law Dictionary, p. 521.

^[10]SB 2723, Section 5(h); HB 5516, Section 3(i);See alsoHB 1308, Section 2(a) (2); HB 2753, Section 4(3).

^[11]FAMILY CODE, Art. 194 and 201.

^[12]People v. Caoili, 815 Phil. 839 (2017) [Per J. Tijam].

^[13]See Melgar v. People, G.R. No. 223477, 14 February 2018 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe]

^[14]See People v. Caoili, 815 Phil. (2017) [Per J. Tijam].

LOPEZ, M.J.:

I commend theponente's astute discussion on the interpretation of Sections 5(e)^[1]and 5(i)^[2]of Republic Act (RA) No. 9262 or the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004." Similarly, I wish to offer this separate opinion to guide the bench and the bar in the prosecution of crimes under this special law.

The present case arose from a criminal charge against Christian Pantonial Acharon (Acharon) for violation of Section 5(i) of RA 9262 or psychological violence resulting from willful refusal to provide financial support, to wit:

That sometime in [sic] January 25, 2012, up to the present, in Valenzuela City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniouslycause mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliationto hiswifeAAA,by denying financial supportto the said complainant. (Emphases supplied.)^[3]

The decision acquitted Acharon and ruled that Section 5(i) does not punish mere failure or inability to provide financial support. Neither could Acharon be held guilty under Section 5(e) applying the variance doctrine. This is because Sections 5(e) and 5(i) deal with different matters and penalize distinct acts. Accordingly, theponenciaabandoned the rulings inMelgar v. People^[4]andReyes v. People^[5]where the Court held that a person charged under Section 5(i) may be convicted of Section S(e) andvice versa.

To begin, the study of Criminal Law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in themselves called actsmala in se; and acts which would not be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them, called actsmala prohibita. This distinction is important with reference to the intent with which a wrongful act is done. The rule is that in actsmala in se, the intent governs; but in actsmala prohibita, the only inquiry is whether the law was violated. A common misconception is that allmala in secrimes are found in the Revised Penal Code (RPC), while allmala prohibitacrimes are provided by special penal laws. In reality, however, there may bemala in secrimes under special laws,^[6]andmala prohibitacrimes defined in the RPC.^[7]InDungo v. People,^[8]the Court explained that the better approach to distinguish betweenmala in seandmala prohibitacrimes is the determination of the inherent immorality or vileness of the penalized act. If the punishable act or omission is immoral in itself, then it is a crimemala in se; on the contrary, if it is not immoral in itself, but there is a statute prohibiting its commission by reasons of public policy, then it ismala prohibita.

Applying this approach, it becomes clear that Section 5(e) or "acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct" and Section 5(i) or acts "causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child", are inherently depraved and immoral, hence, proof of the accused's criminal intent is required. On this note, I suggest to adopt a framework in better understanding the anatomy of RA 9262's penal provisions.

Foremost, proof ofcorpus delictiis indispensable in the prosecution of crimes.^[9]The termcorpus delictirefers to the body or substance of the crime, or the fact of its commission.^[10]It consists of the criminal act and the defendant's agency in the commission of the act. In homicide, for instance, the prosecution must prove: (a) the death of the victim; (b) that the death was produced by the criminal act of person/s other than the deceased and was not the result of accident, natural cause or suicide; and (c) that accused committed the criminal act or was in some way criminally responsible for the act which produced the death.^[11]In arson, thecorpus delictirule is satisfied by proof of the bare fact of the fire and of it having been intentionally caused.^[12]In other words,corpus delictiprimarily describes the act (objective) and the agent (subjective) in relation to theactus reus(AR) and themens rea(MR) of a crime.Actus reuspertains to the external or overt acts or omissions included in a crime's definition whilemens rearefers to the accused's guilty state of mind or criminal intent accompanying theactus reus. Hence, the formula is "Corpus Delicti = Actus Reus + Mens Rea."

ACTUS REUS

Actus reusmay have a varied formulation depending on the definition of the crime.Foremost, the crime may or may not consist of a singleactus reus. An example is a complex crime when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (compound crime), or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other (complex crime proper).^[13]In the eyes of the law and in the conscience of the offender they constitute only one crime, thus, only one penalty is imposed.^[14]Also, in special complex crimes like robbery with rape, there is only one specific crime but the prosecution must prove the commission of external criminal acts of robbery and rape. In offenses that require predicate crimes like a violation of the Anti-Money Laundering Act, the component crimes must be identified to prove the more serious crime of money laundering.

Moreover, the component circumstances may be considered in ascertaining theactus reus. To prove treason under Article 114 of the RPC, for instance, the prosecution must prove that the accused is either a Filipino citizen or a resident alien. On the other hand, to prove murder under Article 248 of the RPC, the qualifying circumstance of treachery, abuse of superior strength, etc., must be established. When it comes to special laws, we need to look for the specific circumstances intended by the legislators for the application of the law. In RA 7610 or theSpecial Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, the law takes into account the age of the victim who must be below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves.^[15]In RA 9475 or theAnti-Torture Act of 2009,^[16]the physical or mental torture must be inflicted by a person in authority or agent of a person in authority. In RA 7877 or theAnti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995,^[17]the offender must be a person who has authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in an education, training, or work environment.

Lastly, theactus reusmay include the result or the consequences of the crime. In other jurisdictions, criminal offenses are classified as "conduct crimes" or "resulting crimes." In conduct crimes, proof of the commission of the prohibited conduct only is required. On the other hand, resulting crimes necessitate proof that the harmful act leads to a specified consequence.^[18]In Philippine Criminal Law, physical injuries under Articles 263, 265, and 266 of the RPC is considered a resulting crime. The determination of whether "physical injuries” is serious, less serious, or slight depends upon the extent of the resulting injuries arising from the infliction of harm to the victim. In Article 263, for example, the crime is always serious physical injuries when it resulted in the insanity, imbecility, impotency, or blindness of the victim.

Taken together, the comprehensive anatomy ofactus reuscan be summarized as:"Actus Reus = act/omission + circumstances + results/consequences.^[19]Corollarily, theactus reusof RA 9262's penal provisions may be analyzed using this framework as follows:

RA 9262's ACTUS REUS =

Acts/Omissions (Section 5 of RA 9262)

+

Circumstances (Section 3 of RA 9262)

+

Results/Consequences (Section 3 in relation to Section 6 of RA 9262)

Section 5 of RA 9262 refers to thespecific acts of violencecommitted against women and children, to wit:

SEC 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. — The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

(a)	Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;
(b)	Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
(c)	Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
(d)	Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm;
(e)	Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman her child has the right to desist from or to desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman’s or her child's movement or conduct:
	(1)	Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her child of custody or access to her/his family;
	(2)	Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support;
	(3)	Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right;
	(4)	Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity or controlling the victim's own money or properties, or solely controlling the conjugal or common money, or properties;
(f)	Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the purpose of controlling her actions or decisions;
(g)	Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to engage in any sexual activity which does not constitute rape, by force or threat of force, physical harm, or through intimidation directed against the woman or her child or her/his immediate family;
(h)	Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally, or through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:
	(1)	Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;
	(2)	Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child;
	(3)	Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child against her/his will;
	(4)	Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets of the woman or her child; and
	(5)	Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
(i)	Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children or denial of access to the woman's child/children. (Emphases supplied.)

Section 3 of RA 9262 illustrates the different forms of violence, and enumerates thecircumstances surrounding the criminal acts. Likewise, Section 3 necessitates thatthe commission of the specific acts results in some form of violence, whether physical, sexual, psychological or economic suffering, making RA 9262 a"resulting crime."

SEC 3. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act, (a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of actscommitted by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode,which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuseincluding threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, bur is not limited to, the following acts: x x x (Emphases supplied.)

In relation to Section 3, the provisions of Section 6 impose the penalties according to the crime committed, thus:

SECTION 6. Penalties. — The crime of violence against women and their children, under Section 5 hereof shall be punished according to the following rules:

(a) Acts falling under Section 5(a) constituting attempted, frustrated or consummated parricide or murder or homicide shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Penal Code. If these acts resulted in mutilation, it shall be punishable in accordance with the Revised Penal Code; those constituting serious physical injuries shall have the penalty ofprision mayor; those constituting less serious physical injuries shall be punished byprision correccional; and those constituting slight physical injuries shall be punished byarresto mayor.

Acts falling under Section 5(b) shall be punished by imprisonment of two (2) degrees lower than the prescribed penalty for the consummated crime as specified in the preceding paragraph but shall in no case be lower thenarresto mayor.

(b)	Acts falling under Section 5(c) and 5(d) shall be punished byarresto mayor;
(c)	Acts falling under Section 5(e) shall be punished byprision correccional;
(d)	Acts falling under Section 5(f) shall be punished byarresto mayor;
(e)	Acts falling under Section 5(g) shall be punished byprision mayor;
(f)	Acts falling under Section 5(h) and Section 5(i) shall be punished byprision mayor.

If the acts are committed while the woman or child is pregnant or committed in the presence of her child, the penalty to be applied shall be the maximum period of penalty prescribed in the section.

In addition to imprisonment, the perpetrator shall (a) pay a fine in the amount of not less than One Hundred Thousand pesos (P100,000.00) but not more than Three Hundred Thousand pesos (P300,000.00); (b) undergo mandatory psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment and shall report compliance to the court.

MENS REA

Anent the "mens rea" of a crime, a distinction must be made between general intent and specific intent. General criminal intent pertains to thedolorequired under Article 4^[20]of the RPC. It means the accused purpose to do an act prohibited by law regardless of the result. On the other hand, specific criminal intent refers to the particular intent comprising the definition of the crime, as for instance, the specific criminal intent to kill oranimus interficendiin homicide or murder.^[21]In robbery, the specific intent is "gain", in illegal detention the "deprivation of liberty", in mutilation the deprivation of "essential organ of reproduction" is involved. In this regard, I agree with Senior Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe that the specific intent of the crime of violence against women and children must be framed to the actual purposes mentioned in Section 5 of RA 9262.

InDinamling v. People,^[22]the Court laid down the elements of a violation of Section 5(i) of RA 9262, to wit:

(1)	The offended party is a womanand/orher child or children;
(2)	The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a common child. As for the woman's child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;
(3)	The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and
(4)	The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the children or similar such acts or omissions. (Emphases supplied.)

The first and second elements refer to the "circumstances" described in Section 3 of RA 9262. The third and fourth elements pertain to the specific "acts" that the accused committed corresponding to those enumerated in Section 5 of the law. Also, the third element evinces themens reathat is the specific intent to cause "mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation" resulting from the infliction of some form of violence to the woman or her child. To reiterate, a violation of Section 5(i) of RA 9262 requires a causal connection between theactus reusand themens rea. Otherwise, no crime of violence against a woman or her children under this provision is committed.

Here, thecorpus delictifor violation of Section 5(i) of RA 9262 was not fully established. As regards theactus reus, the surrounding"circumstances"that the offended party is a woman and that the accused and the victim are husband and wife were undisputed. Yet, the evidence of the prosecution fell short to prove the specific"act","results/consequences", and"mens rea"constituting the crime. As theponenciaaptly observed, the charge against Acharon alleged the act of "denying financial support" which connotes "willful refusal" to give support. Further, "from the plain meaning of the words used, the act punished by Section 5(i) is, therefore, dolo in nature – there must be a concurrence between intent, freedom, and intelligence, in order to consummate the crime." As such, mere failure or inability to provide financial support is not punishable. The records reveal that Acharon "successfully did for a time, to provide financial support." Acharon "failed to continue providing support only when his apartment in Brunei was razed by fire, and when he met a vehicular accident." At the trial, the complainant even admitted that Acharon "already paid P71,000.00 out of the P85,000.000" of their debt. Differently stated, there was no willful refusal on the part of Acharon to give financial support. Similarly, the Information against Acharon alleged that he "cause mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to his wife." Under the proposed framework, this pertains to the "results/consequences" of the supposed denial of financial support as well as themens reaof the crime. Nevertheless, the prosecution failed to substantiate this allegation.

VARIANCE DOCTRINE

I agree with theponenciathat the variance doctrine is inapplicable since Sections 5(e) and 5(i) of RA 9262 deal with different matters and penalize distinct acts. However, I wish to point out that the application of the variance doctrine inReyes v. People^[23]where the Court held that a person charged under Section 5(i) may be convicted of Section 5(e) andvice versa, is a mereobiter dictum. In that case, the accused was originally charged under Section 5(e) of RA 9262. Later, the accused moved to quash the information because its allegations do not constitute the offense. However, the trial court ruled that the contents of the information sufficiently charged a violation of Section 5(i) and not Section 5(e). Consequently prior to the accused's arraignment, the trial court directed the prosecutor's office to amend the Information by designating the crime as under Section 5(i). After trial, the accused was convicted with a violation of Section 5(i). Obviously, the trial court did not rely on the variance doctrine because the information itself sufficiently alleged the elements of Section 5(i). Moreover, the prosecution established that the accused deliberately refused to provide financial support after admitting that he was disappointed to find out that his wife filed a bigamy case against him. The Court's statement in Reyes that it "agrees with the observation of the CA that if properly indicted, Reyes can also be convicted of violation of Section 5 (e), par. 2 for having committed economic abuse against AAA" is merely anobiter dictumand not the controlling doctrine. Strictly speaking, there is nothing to abandon.

Lastly, the variance doctrine is inapplicable only to some violations of RA 9262 like Sections 5(e) and 5(i), andvice versa. The variance doctrine may still be possibly applied to other punishable acts that are relatively included or necessarily included and defined in Section 5 of RA 9262. For instance, a person charged under Section 5(a) or "causing physical harm to the woman or her child" can be convicted of violation of Section 5(c) or "attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm," – Section 5(c) is necessarily included in Section 5(a). This is on the assumption that the greater offense of consummated crime includes the lesser offense of an attempted crime.

FOR THESE REASONS, I vote toGRANTthe petition.

x x x x

(e)	Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct: xxx
	xxxx
(2)	Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support;

^[3]Rollo, p. 34. Penned by Presiding Judge Evangeline M. Francisco.

^[4]Melgar v. People, 826 Phil. 177, 187-188 (2018).

^[5]G.R. No. 232678, July 3, 2019.

^[6]An example is Plunder under R.A. No. 7080, as amended.

^[7]An example is Technical Malversation.

^[8]762 Phil. 630, 659 (2015).

^[9]People v. Oliva, 395 Phil 265, 275 (2000).

^[10]Rimorin, Sr. v. People, 450 Phil 465, 474 (2003).

^[11]Quinto v. Andres, 493 Phil 643, 654 (2005).

^[12]People v. Murcia, 628 Phil. 648, 657 (2010).

^[13]Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.

^[14]People v. Nelmida, 694 Phil. 529, 569 (2012).

^[15]Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, Republic Act No. 7610, June 17, 1992.

^[16]Anti-Torture Act of 2009, Republic Act No. 9745, November 10, 2009.

^[17]Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, Republic Act No. 7877, February 14, 1995.

^[18]https://www.lexisnexis.co.uk/legal/guidance/causation-intervening-acts-in-criminal-cases.

^[19]Criminal Law (Fifth Edition), Janet Loveless, p. 38.

^[20]RPC, Article 4 provides that "[c]riminal liability shall be incurred: (1) by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended; and (2) by any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or an account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.

^[21]People v. Malinao, 467 Phil. 432, 446-447 (2004).

^[22]761 Phil. 356, 373 (2015).

^[23]G.R. No. 232678, July 3, 2019.