G.R. No. L-72644 - Alfredo F. Primero vs Intermediate Appellate Court

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-72644 December 14, 1987

ALFREDO F. PRIMERO,petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and DM TRANSIT,respondents.

NARVASA,J.:

The question on which the petitioner's success in the instant appeal depends, and to which he would have us give an affirmative answer, is whether or not,having recovered separation pay by judgment of the Labor Arbiter — which held that he had been fired by respondent DM Transit Corporation without just cause — he may subsequently recover moral damages by action in a regular court, upon the theory that the manner of his dismissal from employment was tortious and therefore his cause of action was intrinsically civil in nature.

Petitioner Primero was discharged from his employment as bus driver of DM Transit Corporation (hereafter, simply DM) in August, 1974 after having been employed therein for over 6 years. The circumstances attendant upon that dismissal are recounted by the Court of Appeals1as follows:

Primero instituted proceedings against DM with the Labor Arbiters of the Department of Labor, for illegal dismissal, and for recovery of back wages and reinstatement. It is not clear from the record whether these proceedings consisted of one or two actions separately filed. What is certain is that he withdrew his claims for back wages and reinstatement,"with the end in view of filing a damage suit" "in a civil court which has exclusive jurisdiction over his complaint for damages on causes of action founded on tortious acts, breach of employment contract ... and consequent effects (thereof ).2

In any case, after due investigation, the Labor Arbiter rendered judgment dated January 24, 1977 ordering DM to pay complainant Primero P2,000.00 as separation pay in accordance with the Termination Pay Law.3The judgment was affirmed by the National Labor Relations Commission and later by the Secretary of Labor, the case having been concluded at this level on March 3, 1978.4

Under the provisions of the Labor Code in force at that time, Labor Arbiters had jurisdictioninter aliaover —

And we have since held that under these "broad and comprehensive" terms of the law, Labor Arbiters possessed original jurisdiction over claims for moral and other forms of damages in labor disputes.6

The jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters over such claims was however removed by PD 1367, effective May 1, 1978, which explicitly provided that "Regional Directors shall not indorse andLabor Arbiters shall not entertain claims for moral or other forms of damages."7

Some three months afterwards, Primero brought suit against DM in the Court of First Instance of Rizal seeking recovery of damages caused not only by the breach of his employment contract, but also by the oppressive and inhuman, and consequently tortious, acts of his employer and its officers antecedent and subsequent to his dismissal from employment without just cause.8

While this action was pending in the CFI, the law governing the Labor Arbiters' jurisdiction was once again revised. The amending act was PD 1691, effective May 1, 1980. It eliminated the restrictive clause placed by PD 1367, that Regional Directors shall not indorse and Labor Arbiters entertain claims for moral or other forms of damages. And, as we have had occasion to declare in several cases, it restored the principle that "exclusive and original jurisdiction for damages would once again be vested in labor arbiters;" eliminated "the rather thorny question as to where in labor matters the dividing line is to be drawn between the power lodged in an administrative body and a court;' " and, "in the interest of greater promptness in the disposition of labor matters, ... spared (courts of) the often onerous task of determining what essentially is a factual matter, namely, the damages that may be incurred by either labor or management as a result of disputes or controversies arising from employer-employee relations."9Parenthetically, there was still another amendment of the provision in question which, however, has no application to the case at bar. The amendment was embodied in B.P. Blg. 227, effective June 1, 1982.10

On August 11, 1980 the Trial Court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, for the reason that at the time that the complaint was filed. on August 17, 1978, the law — the Labor Code as amended by PD 1367, eff. May 1, 1978 — conferred exclusive, original jurisdiction over claims for moral or other damages, not on ordinary courts, but on Labor Arbiters.

This judgment was affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court, by Decision rendered on June 29, 1984.ℒαwρhi৷This is the judgment now subject of the present petition for review oncertiorari.The decision was reached by a vote of 3 to 2. The dissenters, placing reliance on certain of our pronouncements, opined that Primero's causes of action were cognizable by the courts, that existence of employment relations was not alone decisive of the issue of jurisdiction, and that such relations may indeed give rise to "civil" as distinguished frompurely labor disputes,as where an employer's right to dismiss his employee is exercised tortiously, in a manner oppressive to labor, contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.11

Primero has appealed to us from this judgment of the IAC praying that we overturn the majority view and sustain the dissent.

Going by the literal terms of the law, it would seem clear that at the time that Primero filed his complaints for illegal dismissal and recovery of backwages, etc. with the Labor Arbiter, the latter possessed original and exclusive jurisdictionalso over claims for moral and other forms of damages; this, in virtue of Article 26512of PD 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code, effective from May 1, 1974.In other words, in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, Primero plainly had the right to plead and prosecute a claim not only for the reliefs specified by the Labor Codeitself for unlawful termination of employment, but also for moral or other damages under theCivil Codearising from or connected with that termination of employment. And this was the state of the law when he moved for the dismissal of his claims before the Labor Arbiter, for reinstatement and recovery of back wages, so that he might later file a damage suit "in a civil court which has exclusive jurisdiction over his complaint ... founded on tortious acts, breach of employment contract ... and consequent effects (thereof)."13

The legislative intent appears clear to allow recovery in proceedings before Labor Arbiters of moral and other forms of damages, in all cases or matters arising from employer-employee relations. This would no doubt include, particularly, instances where an employee has been unlawfully dismissed. In such a case the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to award to the dismissed employee not only the reliefs specifically provided bylabor laws,but also moral and other forms of damages governed by theCivil Code.Moral damages would be recoverable, for example, where the dismissal of the employee was not only effected without authorized cause and/or due process for which relief is granted by theLabor Code —but was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy14— for which the obtainable relief is determined by theCivil Code15(not the Labor Code). Stated otherwise, if the evidence adduced by the employee before the Labor Arbiter should establish that the employer did indeed terminate the employee's services without just cause or without according him due process, the Labor Arbiter's judgment shall be for the employer to reinstate the employee and pay him his back wages or, exceptionally, for the employee simply to receive separation pay. These are reliefs explicitly prescribed by theLabor Code.16But any award of moral damages by the Labor Arbiter obviously cannot be based on theLabor Codebut should be grounded on theCivil Code.Such an award cannot be justified solely upon the premise (otherwise sufficient for redress under the Labor Code) that the employer fired his employee without just cause or due process. Additional facts must be pleaded and proven to warrant the grant of moral damages under the Civil Code, these being, to repeat, that the act of dismissal was attended by bad faith or fraud, or was oppressive to labor, or done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy; and, of course, that social humiliation, wounded feelings, grave anxiety, etc., resulted therefrom.17

It is clear that the question of the legality of theact of dismissalis intimately related to the issue of the legality ofthe manner by which that act of dismissal was performed.But while the Labor Code treats of the nature of, and the remedy available as regards the first — the employee's separation from employment — it does not at all deal with the second — the manner of that separation — which is governed exclusively by the Civil Code. In addressing the first issue, the Labor Arbiter applies the Labor Code; in addressing the second, the Civil Code. And this appears to be the plain and patent intendment of the law. For apart from the reliefs expressly set out in the Labor Code flowing from illegal dismissal from employment, no otherdamagesmay be awarded to an illegally dismissed employee other than those specified by the Civil Code. Hence, the fact that the issue-of whether or not moral or other damages were suffered by an employee and in the affirmative, the amount that should properly be awarded to him in the circumstances-is determined under the provisions of the Civil Code and not the Labor Code, obviously was not meant to create a cause of action independent of that for illegal dismissal and thus place the matter beyond the Labor Arbiter's jurisdiction.

Thus, an employee who has been illegally dismissed (i.e., discharged without just cause or being accorded due process), in such a manner as to cause him to suffer moral damages (as determined by the Civil Code), has a cause of action for reinstatement and recovery of back wagesand damages.When he institutes proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, he should make a claim for all said reliefs. He cannot, to be sure, be permitted to prosecute his claims piecemeal. He cannot institute proceedings separately and contemporaneously in a court of justice upon the same cause of action or a part thereof. He cannot and should not be allowed to sue in two forums: one, before the Labor Arbiter for reinstatement and recovery of back wages, or for separation pay, upon the theory that his dismissal was illegal; and two, before a court of justice for recovery of moral and other damages, upon the theory that the manner of his dismissal was unduly injurious, or tortious. This is what in procedural law is known as splitting causes of action, engendering multiplicity of actions. It is against such mischiefs that the Labor Code amendments just discussed are evidently directed, and it is such duplicity which the Rules of Court regard as ground for abatement or dismissal of actions, constituting eitherlitis pendentia (auter action pendant)orres adjudicata,as the case may be.18But this was precisely what Primero's counsel did. He split Primero's cause of action; and he made one of the split parts the subject of a cause of action before a court of justice. Consequently, the judgment of the Labor Arbiter granting Primero separation pay operated as a bar to his subsequent action for the recovery of damages before the Court of First Instance under the doctrine ofres judicata,The rule is that the prior "judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as toany other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto,conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity.19

We are not unmindful of our previous rulings on the matter cited in the dissent to the decision of the Court of Appeals subject of the instant petition,20notably,Quisaba v. Sta Ines-Melale Veneer & Plywood Inc.,where a distinction was drawn between the right of the employer to dismiss an employee, which was declared to be within the competence of labor agencies to pass upon, and the "manner in which the right was exercised and the effects flowing therefrom," declared to be a matter cognizable only by the regular courts because "intrinsically civil."21We opine that it is this very distinction which the law has sought to eradicate as being so tenuous and so difficult to observe,22and, of course, as herein pointed out, as giving rise to split jurisdiction, or to multiplicity of actions, "a situation obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice.23Actually we merely reiterate in this decision the doctrine already laid down in other cases (Garcia v. Martinez, 84 SCRA 577; Ebon v. de Guzman, 13 SCRA 52; Bengzon v. Inciong, 91 SCRA 248; Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Martinez, 112 SCRA 578; Aguda v. Vallejos, 113 SCRA 69; Getz v. C.A., 116 SCRA 86; Cardinal Industries v. Vallejos, 114 SCRA 471; Sagmit v. Sibulo, 133 SCRA 359) to the effect that the grant of jurisdiction to the Labor Arbiter by Article 217 of the Labor Code is sufficiently comprehensive to include claims for moral and exemplary damages sought to be recovered from an employer by an employee upon the theory of his illegal dismissal. Rulings to the contrary are deemed abandoned or modified accordingly.

WHEREFORE,the petition isDISMISSED,without pronouncement as to costs.

Teehankee, C.J., Cruz, Paras,*and Gancayco, JJ., concur.

Footnotes