G.R. No. L-31566 & L-31847 - Rogelio O. Tiglao vs. Comission on ElectionsConcurring & Dissenting OpinionJustice Dizon Concurring OpinionJustice Fernando Concurring & Dissenting OpinionJustice Zaldivar

Manila

EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. L-31566 & L-31847. August 31, 1970]

ROGELIO O. TIGLAO, Petitioner, v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CORNELIO SANGA and THE BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF PAMPANGA, Respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N *

TEEHANKEE,J.:

The present proceedings are the sequel of our judgment of February 18, 1970 in Case L-31566 wherein inter alia we set aside the resolution of January 26, 1970 of respondent Comelec and directed that the proclamation of the winning candidate for the position of Congressman for the second district of Pampanga be held in abeyance until after the questions affecting the same, as discussed in the decision, pending in the Pampanga Court of First Instance, are determined with finality.

Foremost among these incidents pending in the Pampanga court, as recounted in our decision of February 18, 1970, were sevenex-partepetitions for Judicial correction of election returns under Section 151 of the Revised Election Code filed on January 27, 1970 by the corresponding boards of election inspectors.1In its "decision" of February 7, 1970, the Pampanga court had therein authorized the correction of the election returns from six precincts of San Luis, Pampanga,2crediting petitioner Tiglao with 292 additional votes therein that would overcome respondent Sanga’s over-all margin of 247 votes. After our decision of February 18, 1970, the Pampanga court eventual]y maintained its said decision of February 7, 1970, per its resolution of March 10, 1970, denying therein intervenor Sanga’s motion for reconsideration of February 25, 1970 and its resolution of March 25, 1970 denying therein intervenor Sanga’s motion of March 13, 1970 for retrial and recall of petitioners-inspectors and witnesses for cross-examination.

In this court, after several incidents resolved in our resolutions of March 19, March 20, March 23, March 25, and March 30, 1970, we directed respondent Comelec, through the last resolution of March 30, 1970 "to immediately convene the board of canvassers with instructions to conclude its canvass and to proclaim forthwith the winning candidate for the second congressional district of Pampanga."

The corresponding members of the boards of inspectors of the six San Luis precincts concerned thereafter convened at the session hall of the Comelec before the three-man supervisory committee appointed by Comelec at proceedings attended by the counsels of the contending parties and the provincial board of canvassers of Pampanga and made the authorized corrections, duly initialed by them, on the corresponding returns, crediting petitioner Tiglao with 292 additional votes therein in the following manner

Upon termination of the act of correction, respondent Sanga’s counsel objected to the correctness of the corrections made in four precincts,3principally on questions of identity, raised as to whether the persons, who appeared and were questioned by the committee and by counsels for both parties and made the corrections on the corresponding returns, were the same persons who accomplished the said returns in the elections. The committee so found affirmatively in its report of April 3, 1970 to respondent Comelec, which, in its resolution of the same date, approved the report of the committee, overruled respondent Sanga’s objections and "consider(ed) said corrections to have been regularly made."

Upon the provincial canvassing board reconvening on April 6, 1970 to discharge its function, respondent Sanga’s counsel verbally moved that the six corrected returns "be disregarded on the ground that said returns on their face are mathematically improbable and were obviously manufactured as it clearly appears that the votes cast for the congressional candidate(s) are very much in excess of the registered voters in the respective precincts." The board thereupon, by unanimous vote, resolved to refer the issue to the Comelec for resolution.

Respondent Comelec, after hearing the parties, promulgated its split 2 to 1 resolution of April 7, 1970, wherein resolving the referral, it ordered the board "not to include in the canvass the election returns for Precincts Nos. 9, 15, 16, 19, 20 and 21 of San Luis, Pampanga, for being mathematically improbable as shown by the great excess of votes appearing thereon for congressional candidates" and to thus complete the canvass and make the corresponding proclamation of the winner on April 13, 1970 at 5:00 p.m., unless restrained by this Court.

Upon petitioner Tiglao’s filing on April 9, 1970 of his "Motion to Enforce Judgment (alternatively) Petition forCertiorari," challenging this last resolution of respondent Comelec on the ground that Comelec had no authority to review and vacate the Pampanga court’s correction "decision," the Court issued a restraining order as prayed for and required respondents to file their answer thereto. Respondents, in their answers, joined issue, asserting that the Pampanga court’s ruling in the judicial correction proceedings is notres judicataand binding on Comelec insofar as the genuineness of the corrected returns is concerned if in Comelec’s judgment the use thereof would tend to foist a fraud on the electorate. Respondent Sanga further contended that petitioner Tiglao had instigated the boards of inspectors of the precincts concerned to petition for correction of the returns to offset the former’s (Sanga’s) majority as shown in Comelec’s first resolution of January 26, 1970 (set aside in our judgment of February 18, 1970), against said board’s previous representations to Comelec that they had been forced to prepare said returns at gunpoint.

The Court heard the parties in oral argument on April 23, 1970 and held a re-hearing on July 16, 1970, wherein, pursuant to its resolution of June 29, 1970, it heard Hon. Honorio Romero, presiding judge of Branch III of the Pampanga court who heard and decided the correction proceedings and received from his clerk of court the records, exhibits and transcripts of the proceedings.

The questioned Comelec majority resolution itemized the following excess votes found upon examination of the corrected returns:

The Comelec majority, holding that "where, as in this case, the excess votes were the result of judicial correction made one day after the Commission has promulgated its decision (Case No. RR-695), and the winner al ready known, based solely on sworn petitions of the corresponding boards of inspectors, and the returns as corrected contained excess votes materially affecting the re suit of the election, then the only explanation that could be derived therefrom is that said boards had submitted false or inaccurate data to the Court," that it "cannot countenance the use of election returns that are ‘obviously’ invalid" and that "the court merely sustained the sworn petitions of said board without considering other factors on the probable consequences thereof," ordered the exclusion for being "mathematically improbable" of the six corrected returns from the canvassing, "adhering to the sound policy that abhors ‘mere pyrrhic victory of candidates and that the holding of elections must, at all times and at any cost, be free, orderly and honest."

The parties assail each other for their respective incongruous postures: respondents,’ for upholding the Comelec’s ruling sustaining Sanga’s contention that the returns which were concededly genuine and authentic are now to be excluded as "obviously manufactured" and invalid after and because of the corrections thereon judicially authorized by the Pampanga court, which very corrections Comelec had itself ruled to have been "regularly made;" and petitioner’s, for maintaining that the six returns were properly corrected only to reflect the true and correct total votes of Tiglao (313, increased by 292 from 21), ignoring the 273 excess votes appearing on the very face of the returns as a result of the corrections made, as against the lesser "number of voters who actually voted" with the corresponding "ballots found in the compartment for valid ballots recorded thereon (897 votes cast as corrected v. 624 voters, who actually voted = excess of 273 votes)5and for seeking to explain them away now by affidavits of the inspectors submitted at the first hearing held on April 23, 1970 to the effect that the votes credited now to Tiglao per the correction were wrongly credited originally to another candidate, Federico Taruc and should therefore be deducted from the votes credited to Taruc in the returns, when they had testified at the correction proceedings that aside from their mistake in the number of votes credited to petitioner Tiglao, no other mistake had been committed by there in the preparation of the returns.6

The Court, on the strength of prevailing jurisprudence cited in the preceding paragraph No. 1, had issued in Case L-31566 its resolution of March 23, 1970, denying respondent Sanga’s urgent motion of March 19, 1970 for reconsideration of the Court’s resolution of the same date declaring its decision of February 18, 1970 to be executory and authorizing the canvassing board to reconvene and complete its canvass. The Court, thereafter, acting upon respondent Sanga’s urgent motion for reconsideration of March 24, 1970 (wherein Sanga for the first time adverted to the excess votes that would result from the judicial correction), issued its resolution of March 30, 1970 denying Sanga’s motion and declaring that "the electoral administrative processes which are mandated by law to be summary in nature in order to determine expeditiously the outcome of the elections . . . must come to an end" and that "no further motion to hold in abeyance the effectivity of the Court’s resolutions of March 19 and 23 (for the canvass to proceed) will be entertained."

In our decision of February 18, 1970, we had directed that the proclamation of the winning candidate between the contending rivals be held in abeyance until after the questions affecting the same, pending in the Pampanga court, are determined with finality. The challenged COMELEC resolution now before us has perforce laid open the question of finality of the Pampanga court’s correction ruling — not because of Comelec’s resolution beyond its jurisdiction to exclude the corrected returns and thus review and act aside the Pampanga court’s ruling — but because of the grave question of due process by virtue of lack of notice of the proceedings on the parties affected, asmotu proprionoted by the Court, and which bears heavily on the validity or nullity of the correction proceedings, as hereinafter discussed. Besides, prescinding from the fact that the Pampanga court’s ruling was not directly elevated to the Court, it is a settled principle in the administration of justice that "it is always in the power of the Court to suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operation whenever the purposes of justice require it."10

Since the Court’s pronouncement in Gumpal v. Court of First Instance of Isabela10athat section 154 of the Revised Election Code does not require notice of the judicial correction proceedings upon the candidates affected, in contrast with section 163 thereof which specifically directs that notice of the judicial recount proceedings be "given to all candidates affected," the Court has had occasion to amplify on its ruling and the rationale therefor. As restated in Estrada v. Navarro,11the Court has invariably required unanimity of the inspectors in petitioning for correction for the reason "that the proceeding for correction is a summary one, is not supposed to raise controversial issues, and does not call for a recount or re vision of the ballots themselves, either of which contemplates a different remedy."

Experience has shown us the contrary, however. Invariably, the correction petition itself, although by unanimous consent of the inspectors, hasipso factogiven rise to grave controversial issues and doubts since the correction sought to be made would materially affect the result of the election. Witness Dizon,12where by judicial correction of the election return of one precinct in Birian, Laguna, reducing candidate Benitez’ votes therein from 148 to 129, Benitez lost out to his opponent Dizon in the gubernatorial race in the 1928 elections by 10 votes, when without the correction, he would have won by 9 votes; Gumpal,supra,where by judicial correction of the returns from two precincts in Santiago, Isabela, Leocadio Ignacio. Gumpal’s opponent for the position of provincial board member in the 1959 elections was credited in one precinct with 174 votes "not included in (the) election return due to inadvertence" and 140 instead of 114 votes in the other precinct, or a total of 200 additional votes, sufficient for Ignacio to nose out Gumpal by 10 votes; and the latest case of Cuenco v. Laya,13where by judicial correction of the return from one precinct in Carcar, Cebu, upheld by the Court by a six-to three vote, Eduardo Gullas was credited with 67 votes to supply the complete omission from the return of his name and votes received, which votes were decisive in his being proclaimed winner over Antonio V. Cuenco by 16 votes in the last elections for the third congressional district of Cebu. And controversies have also arisen even as to unanimity of the petition itself, e.g. as to whether the adverse party’s inspector understood the petition or was the person actually appointed as such or was compelled to sign the petition under duress, or whether the unanimous petition may still be acted upon by the court or be properly considered when the adverse party’s inspector recants or disowns the petition or whether such unanimity need only exist upon the filing of the petition or before the court issues the order of correction.

In the above-cited cases, the Court, reflecting on the desirability of requiring that due notice of the correction proceedings be given to all candidates affected, did concede in Gumpal that "it would be a good practice to require such notice in appropriate cases, particularly when there is sufficient time therefor and there are circumstances indicating that the allegations of the petition for correction may not be entirely truthful," and in Cuenco, that "due process, the community’s sense of fairness, would seem to indicate the need of hearing the petitioner Cuenco, consistently with the summary character of the proceedings. Indeed the respondent judge might have accommodated the petitioner’s request, considering that the latings. Indeed the respondent judge might have accomhouse." But the Court therein, after satisfying itself that all indications pointed to the veracity of the petitions unanimously filed by the inspectors, upheld the judicial corrections thus authorized, despite the lack of notice to the affected parties, on broad perspectives of public policy in the light of the law’s mandate requiring the prompt ascertainment in summary proceedings of the winning candidate entitled to proclamation.

Considering that the difference in votes between the rival candidates in the cited cases, as in the case at bar, is marginal, such that the judicial correction by unanimous petition of the inspectors of one or a few precincts would materially affect the results of the election and spell victory or defeat, the Court has felt constrained to re-examine thoroughly the question and after due deliberation has arrived at the conclusion that due process, as guaranteed by the Constitution, requires in order that jurisdiction may be properly acquired over the parties affected and exercised by courts of first instance in correction proceedings under section 154 of the Revised Election Code that (1) notice of the correction proceedings be given to all candidates affected just as it is required under section 163 thereof governing recount proceedings and (2) copy of the return sought to be corrected must be ordered by the court to be duly submitted to it by the provincial or municipal treasurer, as the case may be, or by the chairman of the board of canvassers concerned who had received the same for the canvassing, without prejudice to availing of other official copies of the return such as the Comelec’s copy and that deposited in the ballot box.

The demands of procedural due process that a party affected must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard must be fulfilled together with the law’s policy for the prompt proclamation of the true winner in the elections. The summary character of the proceedings, if implemented with a firm hand so as to rule out impertinent and irrelevant questions and dilatory tactics, would normally not cause any undue delay in the ensuing proclamation. And if some measure of delay were entailed, nevertheless the due process requirement may not be dispensed with.14Lack of notice to a party adversely affected has invariably held to mean the nullity of the decisions rendered in ordinary civil cases, since they "suffer from a fatal infirmity for want of due process."15stated by the now Chief Justice in Cuaycong v. Sengbengco,16"Acts of Congress, as well as those of the Executive, can deny due process only under pain of nullity, and judicial proceedings suffering from the same flaw are subject to the same sanction, any statutory provision to the contrary notwithstanding."

This doctrine of due process should equally be applied to correction proceedings under section 154 of the Revised Election Code, for they are in law and in fact judicial proceedings. As pointed out by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes speaking for the Court in Binging Ho v. Municipal Board of Canvassers,17wherein we upheld the constitutionality o the legislative grant of authority on courts of first instance to recount the ballots in case of conflicting election returns,18" (T)he ascertaining that such basic facts do exist according to the evidence submitted by the parties is essentially a judicial function, and it is only after the court decides that the recount is legally justified that the actual recount takes place." Correction proceedings constitute the only other instance of such legislative grant of authority on the courts to intervene in the pre-proclamation electoral process, and the Court’s ruling in Binging Ho is equally applicable. In paraphrase thereof, the prerequisite finding or determination by the courts as to the veracity or non-veracity of the inspectors’ petition and of the error alleged, to warrant the granting or denial of judicial authority to make the correction, "is an exercise of the judicial power to ascertain the facts, pass upon their sufficiency, and apply the law to the controversy."

With due notice of the proceeding, the fate of a candidate adversely affected would not be adjudgedex-parteand without due process, and he would have the opportunity of confronting the inspectors seeking the correction and cross-examining them to assist the court in appraising the veracity of the petition, and the paramount public interest which calls for the proclamation of the actual winner in the election would be subserved. The spectacle of excess votes resulting from the correction authorized by the court would not arise, since the same would be readily perceived by the court and the parties affected from the face of the return, which states the number of registered voters in the precinct, the number who actually voted, with the corresponding number of valid and spoiled ballots.

There really exists no valid reason compatible with due process why such notice of the proceedings and submittal of the return should be required only in recount proceedings and not in correction proceedings.ℒαwρhi৷

For the foregoing reasons, the Court accordingly expressly overrules the previous doctrine enunciated by it in the cited cases of Gumpal v. Court of First Instance of Isabela and Cuenco v. Lava,supra,and all other cases inconsistent with the doctrine now enunciated that notice of the correction proceedings must be given to all candidates affected and that copy of the election return sought to be corrected should be ordered by the court to be duly submitted to it by the custodian thereof. The Court therefore declares the correction proceedings in the Pampanga court null and void.

3. With the Court’s declaration of nullity of the Pampanga court’s decision in the correction proceedings for lack of notice to the candidates affected, specifically petitioner Tiglao, respondent Sanga and candidate Federico Taruc (to whom the additional 292 votes now sought to be credited to Tiglao per the correction were erroneously credited, according to the April, 1970 affidavits of the inspectors,supra), said court will have to hear anew the inspectors’ petitions for correction, with due notice to the candidates affected, and render anew its resolution on the basis of the evidence that may be submitted to it.

The Court therein expressly discards the previous doctrine of Benitez v. Paredes19and Dizon v. Provincial Board of Canvassers20and all subsequent cases uniformly ruling that in correction proceedings, where the court after hearing the inspectors is satisfied as to the veracity of their petition or affidavits and of the error alleged to have been committed, it shall, without any need of opening the ballot boxes, order the corresponding correction of such error in the election return. In lieu thereof, the Court now sets the procedure that in all such correction proceedings, the court of first instance upon being satisfied at the hearing that aprima faciecase has been made out, must furthermore, — unless the correction sought is indubitable or unopposed and may therefore be summarily ordered — in all cases where it finds that the integrity of the ballot box and its contents has been duly preserved, go to the real evidence, open the ballot box and conduct a summary recount of the ballots themselves as in judicial recount proceedings under section 168 of the code.

In resolving now to establish the procedure for a summary recount of the ballots in disputed correction proceedings where the ballot box and its contents have not been tampered with, the Court is impelled by its constitutional prerogative and duty to lay down the guidelines and fix uniform procedures for the observance of trial courts and the parties affected.

Under its constitutional rule-making power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts,"21it is conceded that "procedure" is "generally accepted as embracing both ‘pleading’ and ‘practice’ and it also includes ‘evidence.’ What evidence should be admitted and what rejected in each case, and how to weigh it under particular circumstances is fundamentally a judicial function and essentially a procedural matter."22Related thereto is the injunction in Rule 135, section 6 of the Rules of Court that

Sec. 6.Means to carry jurisdiction into effect.— When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer; and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable to the spirit of said law or rules. (italics furnished.)

This rule was incorporated in the pre-war Rules of Court on the basis of the Court’s assertion, in connection with its rule-making power in the early case of Shioji v. Harvey,23that" (I)ndependent of any statutory provision . . . every court has inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction." In Villalon v. Arrieta,supra,passing on the more specific provisions of section 163 on recount proceedings (as compared to the broad and general provisions of section 154 on correction proceedings), the Court observed that "the law evidently leaves it to the court to devise the means for the exercise of its powers and the performance of its assigned role in the manner which may appear to it to be most consistent with the fundamental purpose of the proceeding."

The Court, therefore, declares that the suitable process or mode of proceeding in disputed correction proceedings that would enable trial courts to effectively exercise their fundamentally judicial function of receiving and weighing the evidence is to avail of the real evidence24of the ballot box and of its contents and to conduct an arithmetical count of the ballots themselves, as in recount proceedings under section 163 of the code. Neither appreciation of the ballots nor determination of their validity is called for, since the only purpose of the recount, as is well settled by jurisprudence,25is merely to count the number of votes received by each candidate as they appear on the face of the valid ballots previously counted by the board of inspectors. The recount conducted as part of the correction proceedings would serve best the overriding spirit of the election code — in entrusting to courts of first instance exclusive jurisdiction over summary recount proceedings under sections 163 and 168 and correction proceedings under section 154 — of restoring public tranquillity by dispelling all doubts as to true number of votes cast for the rival candidates in a given precinct.26

The Court is further sustained in its conclusion by the following compelling reasons and consideration:

ACCORDINGLY,the Court has resolved: (a) to annul and set aside respondent Comelec’s resolution of April 7, 1970, and (b) to likewise annul and set aside all proceedings, as well as the "decision" of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga dated February 7, 1970 and its resolutions of February 25, 1970 and March 25, 1970 affirming its said "decision," in the correction proceedings, Election Cases Nos. 3653, 3654, 3655, 3656, 3657 and 3659 thereof, with instructions as discussed above particularly in paragraphs 2 and 3 hereof, to hear the same anew with due notice to the candidates affected; to have before it the copies of the election returns sought to be corrected; upon satisfiedprima facieof the errors alleged to have been committed by the boards of inspectors concerned and upon its preliminary finding that the identity and integrity of the ballot boxes have been duly preserved, order the opening thereof and after likewise satisfying itself that the integrity of the ballots therein has been also duly preserved, conduct a summary and arithmetical recount of the ballots themselves; and thereafter to render anew the appropriate resolution on the basis of the evidence before it.

Let a copy hereof be served upon the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch III, presided by Judge Honorio Romero, for its compliance herewith.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Castro, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

Footnotes