G.R. No. L-1431 - Pablo Indico vs. Natividad Parcon, et al.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-1431             May 27, 1948

PABLO INDICO,petitioner,
vs.
NATIVIDAD PARCON as Justice of the Peace of Janiuay, F. IMPERIAL REYES, Judge of the First Instance of Iloilo, and BASILISA TIRADOR,respondents.

Venancio C. Bañares for petitioner.
Jose M. Celo for respondent judge.
Nicolas Lutero for the other respondents.

TUASON,J.:

Pablo Indico, the present petitioner, filed an application forcertiorariin the Court of First Instance of Iloilo seeking, on the ground of alleged lack or excess of jurisdiction, the setting aside of the decision and an order of execution handed down and issued by the justice of the peace of Janiuay, Iloilo, in an action for forcible entry and detainer. That petition having been denied, he comes to this Court setting forth the same facts as his cause of action and praying for the same relief. The present petition is a substantial reproduction of the dismissed petition with the sole difference that now, the Judge of First Instance, Honorable F. Imperial Reyes, is made defendant and his decision is added to the justice of the peace's decisions and order sought to be brought up for examination.

It is evident that the decision and order of execution of the justice of the peace can not be reviewed bycertiorariafter the first petition to obtain the same relief has been thrown away. This question isres judicata. It is likewise evident thatcertioraridoes not lie against Judge Reyes' decision. Appeal would be the appropriate redress against the latter decision.Certiorariis not substitute for appeal unless it appears that appeal does not afford adequate and complete remedy. Countenance of the step taken by the petitioner would result in the anomaly that a petition for the writ ofcertioraricould be repeated as many times as there were courts of different grades, in the order of their rank. An unsuccessful attempt, say, in the Court of Appeals, if a petition could be filed in that court, could be reiterated in the Supreme Court.

Such procedure would have to rest on the theory that the court which took cognizance of the first petition had no jurisdiction to entertain it, when in fact the petitioner himself invoked such jurisdiction and set the court in motion. The subsequent petition of petitions become doubly incongruous when account is taken of the fact that, as in this case, the original petition having been dismissed and no affirmative action having been taken, the proceeding of the latter court cannot, in the nature of things, suffer from the infirmity of being wholly or partly outside that court's jurisdiction.

The petition is dismissed with costs.

Paras, Feria, Perfecto and Bengzon, JJ.,concur.