G.R. No. 271701 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, PETITIONER, VS. NIPPON EXPRESS PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, RESPONDENT. May 06, 2025

DISSENT

LAZARO-JAVIER,J.:

The core issue: which court has jurisdiction to issue writs ofcertiorariover interlocutory orders of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) Division?^[1]Theponenciarules that this Court has primary jurisdiction to resolve petitions forcertiorarifiled assailing the interlocutory orders issued by the CTA Division and not the CTAEn Banc.^[2]

To recall, the CTAEn Bancdismissed the Commission on Internal Revenue's (CIR) petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 for lack of jurisdiction. The said petition was directed against the resolutions of the CTA Division declaring the CIR in default for its failure to file a hard copy of its Answer and allowing respondent Nippon Express Philippines Corporation to present its evidenceex parte. In the draft Decision, theponenciaagrees and holds that the CTAEn Banccannot take cognizance of a petition forcertiorariassailing interlocutory orders of the CTA Division.

Theponenciaratiocinates that from a reading of Republic Act No. 1125,^[3]as amended by Republic Act No. 9282^[4]and Republic Act No. 9503,^[5]the CTAEn Bancexercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions rendered by the CTA Division, whether in the exercise of its original and appellate jurisdiction in both civil and criminal actions. This is supported by A.M. No. 05-11-07-CTA, or the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals (RRCTA). However, the laws creating the CTA do not expressly grant the CTA En Banc original jurisdiction over interlocutory orders issued by the CTA Division. Too, the RRCTA is silent as to the CTAEn Banc's original jurisdiction over such interlocutory orders.^[6]

Theponenciafurther affirms that the CTA is a collegial body where no hierarchy exists between the CTAEn Bancand the CTA Division. Pursuant thereto, the ponencia thus holds that the CTAEn Banccannot issue a writ ofcertiorariover decisions and resolutions issued by the CTA Division. With this ratiocination vis a vis the definition and nature ofcertiorari, "for a writ ofcertiorarito issue, the court granting the writ must be superior to the tribunal, board, or officer against whom the writ is directed." There being no hierarchy between the CTAEn Bancand the CTA Division, the former has no jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders of the latter through a petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.^[7]

Too, the authority of the CTAEn Banc"to review final decisions, resolutions, or orders of a CTA Division does not make it a separate or higher court, nor does it give supervisory power to issue a writ ofcertiorariagainst its Divisions." Theponenciastresses that "the CTA En Banc's appellate jurisdiction is limited to decision or resolutions resolving motions for reconsideration or new trial filed before the CTA Division, which presupposes that the case subject to appellate review involves a judgment on the merits or a final disposition."

I respectfully disagree.

First.True, Republic Act No. 9282 does not explicitly provide that the CTAEn Banchas jurisdiction over petitions forcertiorariagainst interlocutory orders of a CTA Division. Likewise, nowhere in the RRCTA provides that the CTAEn Bancmay take cognizance of petitions forcertiorariagainst judgments, orders, or resolutions of a CTA Division. But the Rules of Court, which has suppletory application to the RRCTA, provides thatwhen by law, jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes, and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer; and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable to the spirit of the said law or rules.^[8]

More, as ruled by the Court inCity of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo,^[9]for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must have the authority to issue, among others, a writ ofcertiorari. When the law vests exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax cases upon the CTAEn Banc, it carries such other power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, to the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction,^[10]including the authority to issue writs ofcertiorari. Otherwise, there would be split-jurisdiction between two tribunals over basically the same subject matter.^[11]

Here, it is undisputed that the questioned resolutions of the CTA Division are interlocutory in nature. The CTA Division declared petitioner in default for its failure to file a hard copy of its Answer to the petition filed by respondent; and allowed respondent to present its evidenceex parte.^[12]The Court has previously explained that the word interlocutory refers to something intervening between the commencement and the end of the suit which decides some point or matter but is not a final decision of the whole controversy. An interlocutory order is an order that does not finally dispose of the case and does not end the Court's task of adjudicating the parties' contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court.^[13]An interlocutory order may only be questioned through a petition forcertiorarias it is not a proper subject of appeal.^[14]

Second. Although a petition forcertiorariis an original and independent action and is not a part of the proceedings in the main case, the subject matter of a petition forcertiorarimust be directly and intimately connected to the subject matter of the main case, i.e., the resolution of the petition forcertiorariassailing the interlocutory order would greatly affect the resolution of the main case. In other words, the disposition of the issue raised in the main case here is dependent on the disposition of the issue raised in the assailed interlocutory orders. In such a case, the CTAEn Bancshould take cognizance thereof instead of the Supreme Court.

Third. Notably, the petition forcertiorariinGrecia-Cuerdo^[15]was directed against an RTC disposition concerning a local tax, whilePeople v. Ligot^[16]was a petition forcertioraridirected against a verdict of acquittal rendered by the CTA Division in a criminal case. In the aforementioned cases, the Court recognized that the CTAEn Banchad the authority to resolve petitions forcertiorariagainst the decisions, resolutions, or orders of the CTA Division. There is no cogent reason why the other cases falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CTAEn Bancunder Section 2 of the RRCTA,^[17]should be excluded from thecertiorarijurisdiction of the CTAEn Bancwhenever grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction taints the dispositions of the CTA Division, as in this case.

Finally. Recognizing the authority of the CTAEn Bancto resolve petitions forcertiorariagainst interlocutory orders of CTA Divisions would be more in keeping with the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Under this doctrine, direct recourse to this Court is limited to questions of law, notwithstanding the invocation of paramount or transcendental importance of the action. This doctrine is not a mere policy, rather, it is a constitutional filtering mechanism designed to enable the Court to focus on the more fundamental and essential tasks assigned to it by the highest law of the land.^[18]The Court's strict adherence to the doctrine on hierarchy of courts is not merely due to judicial economy but also to ensure that every level of the Judiciary performs its designated roles in an efficient and effective manner. The Court is one of last resort, and direct recourse to it is not proper unless it is shown that there are special and important reasons.^[19]It cannot and should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where serious and important reasons exist therefor.^[20]

Indeed, resolution of the assailed interlocutory orders issued by the CTA Division, being directly and intimately related to the issues raised in the main case, should be resolved by the CTAEn Bancitself, and no other. This not only allows the CTA itself to exhaustively study the cases before it but also pass judgments on issues within its specialized competence over tax and tariff matters.

^[2]Ponencia, p. 29.

^[3]An Act Creating the Court of Tax Appeals, June 16, 1954.

^[4]An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals, Elevating its Rank to the level of a Collegiate Court with Special Jurisdiction and Enlarging its Membership, amending for the purpose certain sections of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended, March 30, 2004.

^[5]An Act Enlarging the Organizational Structure of the Court of Tax Appeals, amending for the purpose certain sections of the law creating the Court of Tax Appeals, June 12, 2008.

^[6]Ponencia, pp. 6-12.

^[7]Ponencia, pp. 12-16.

^[8]Rule 135, Section 6, Rules of Court.

^[9]726 Phil. 9 (2014) [Per J. Peralta,En Banc].

^[10]Id.at 24.

^[11]Id.at 25.

^[12]Ponencia, p. 5.

^[13]Integrated Credit and Corporate Services, Co. v. Labrador, G.R. No. 233127, July 10, 2023 [Per CJ Gesmundo, First Division),citingSpousesLimso v. PNB, 779 Phil. 287(2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

^[14]Rule 41, Section 1, Rules of Court.

^[15]726 Phil. 9 (2014) [Per J. Peralta,En Banc].

^[16]932 Phil. 139 (2022) [Per J. Inting, Third Division].

^[17]SECTION 2. Cases Within the Jurisdiction of the Court En Banc. — The Court en banc shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal the following:

(a) Decisions or resolutions on motions for reconsideration or new trial of the Court in Divisions in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction over:

(1) Cases arising from administrative agencies — Bureau of Internal Revenue, Bureau of Customs, Department of Finance, Department of Trade and Industry, Department of Agriculture;
(2) Local tax cases decided by the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their original jurisdiction; and
(3) Tax collection cases decided by the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their original jurisdiction involving final and executory assessments for taxes, fees, charges and penalties, where the principal amount of taxes and penalties claimed is less than one million pesos;

(b) Decisions, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction;
(c) Decisions, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in tax collection cases decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction;
(d) Decisions, resolutions or orders on motions for reconsideration or new trial of the Court in Division in the exercise of its exclusive original jurisdiction over tax collection cases;
(e) Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals (CBAA) in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment and taxation of real property originally decided by the provincial or city board of assessment appeals;
(f) Decisions, resolutions or orders on motions for reconsideration or new trial of the Court in Division in the exercise of its exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving criminal offenses arising from violations of the National Internal Revenue Code or the Tariff and Customs Code and other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue or Bureau of Customs;
(g) Decisions, resolutions or orders on motions for reconsideration or new trial of the Court in Division in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction over criminal offenses mentioned in the preceding subparagraph; and
(h) Decisions, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over criminal offenses mentioned in subparagraph (f).

^[18]GIOS-SAMAR, Inc. v. DOTC, 849 Phil. 120, 131-132 (2019) [Per J. Jardaleza,En Banc].

^[19]Guiao v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 223845, May 28, 2024 [Per J. Leonen,En Banc],citingLihayhay v. Tan, 836 Phil. 400 (2018) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

^[20]Id.

INTING,J.:

I agree with the finding that the present petition for review oncertiorari^[1]is already moot.^[2]The records bear out that the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) Division promulgated its Decision on September 28, 2023, which denied the petition for review filed by respondent Nippon Express, Inc.^[3]Subsequently, in a Resolution dated January 29, 2024, the CTA Division denied the respondent's motion for reconsideration.^[4]With the final resolution of the main case before the CTA Division, the present petition, which assails an interlocutory order, has indeed been rendered moot.

However, I must respectfully register my dissent from the majority's core ruling: that the jurisdiction of the CTAEn Bancis strictly appellate, that it cannot issue a writ ofcertiorariagainst an interlocutory order of a CTA Division, and that the exercise of such power is precluded by the absence of a hierarchical relationship.

With due respect, the majority's reasoning is built on an untenable legal premise, misconstrues the very nature of the CTA's judicial power, and creates a procedural framework that is both inefficient and contrary to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

It is undisputed that the CTAEn Banchas appellate jurisdiction over decisions, resolutions, or orders of its Divisions under Section 2, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals (RRCTA):

SEC. 2. Cases within the jurisdiction of the Courten banc.- The Court en banc shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal the following:

(a) Decisions or resolutions on motions for reconsideration or new trial of the Court in Divisions in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction over:

(1)	Cases arising from administrative agencies - Bureau of Internal Revenue, Bureau of Customs, Department of Finance, Department of Trade and Industry, Department of Agriculture;
(2)	Local tax cases decided by the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their original jurisdiction; and
(3)	Tax collection cases decided by the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their original jurisdiction involving final and executory assessments for taxes, fees, charges and penalties, where the principal amount of taxes and penalties claimed is less than one million pesos;

(d) Decisions, resolutions or orders on motions for reconsideration or new trial of the Court in Division in the exercise of its exclusive original jurisdiction over tax collection cases;

. . .

(f) Decisions, resolutions or orders on motions for reconsideration or new trial of the Court in Division in the exercise of its exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving criminal offenses arising from violations of the National Internal Revenue Code or the Tariff and Customs Code and other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue or Bureau of Customs;

(g) Decisions, resolutions or orders on motions for reconsideration or new trial of the Court in Division in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction over criminal offenses mentioned in the preceding subparagraph; ...

It is equally settled that interlocutory orders are not subject to appeal. However, Section 1,^[5]Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. Given that Rule 65 is the exclusive remedy for challenging a non-appealable interlocutory order, the inquiry necessarily shifts to jurisdiction. The critical question is: which court has jurisdiction over such a petition against an interlocutory order of a CTA Division?

Despite the CTAEn Banc's clear appellate jurisdiction over decisions, resolutions, or orders of its divisions, theponenciaopined that it does not havecertiorarijurisdiction over the interlocutory orders of its divisions. Theponenciaposits that because the law creating the CTA does not expressly grant the CTAEn Banccertiorarijurisdiction over interlocutory orders of a CTA Division, such power does not exist.^[6]This interpretation, with respect, is unduly narrow.

The power to issue a writ ofcertiorariis not a mere statutory creation; it is a constitutional grant. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution unequivocally vests courts with judicial power not only to settle actual controversies but also "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."

Stated differently, the power to review for grave abuse of discretion—the very essence ofcertiorari—is inherent in judicial power itself. As the CTAEn Bancis a court of law established by statute, it is vested with this fundamental power. To deny the CTAEn Bancthe power to correct a grave abuse of discretion by one of its Divisions simply because the words "certiorarijurisdiction" are absent from its enabling act and the RRCTA is to deny it a fundamental judicial power that emanates not from the statute, but from the Constitution itself.

Moreover, as aptly pointed out by Our esteemed colleague, Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, a court or judicial officer vested with appellate jurisdiction may employ all auxiliary writs, processes, and other means necessary to carry it into effect. Thus, it can be reasonably inferred that the vesture of exclusive jurisdiction to the CTAEn Bancover decisions, resolutions, or orders of its divisions "carries with it such other power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, to the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, including the authority to issue writs ofcertiorari."^[7]

Compelling jurisprudence already recognizes and affirms the CTAEn Banc'scertiorarijurisdiction over its Divisions' actions, whether interlocutory or final, particularly when such jurisdiction is in aid of its appellate power.

The landmark case ofCity of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo^[8]specifically recognized the CTAEn Banc's inherent power to issue writs ofcertiorariagainst interlocutory orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in aid of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions of RTCs in local tax cases:

[W]hile there is no express grant of such power, with respect to the CTA, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law and that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly interpreted that the power of the CTA includes that of determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these cases.

Indeed, in order for any appellate court, to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must have the authority to issue, among others, a writ ofcertiorari. In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law intended to transfer also such power as is deemed necessary, (f not indispensable, in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason why the transfer should only be considered as partial, not total.^[9](Emphasis supplied)

Considering that aggrieved parties have a right to appeal final orders or judgments of the CTA Divisions to the CTAEn Banc, thecertioraripower over interlocutory orders of the divisions logically follows.

Indeed, inGarcia v. De Jesus^[10]andDept. of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Lubrica,^[11]the Court held that the grant of appellate jurisdiction does not immediately carry with it the grant ofcertiorarijurisdiction; however, this doctrine finds no application to a judicial body such as the CTAEn Banc.

InGarcia, the Court held that the COMELEC does not have the power to issue writs ofcertiorariover interlocutory orders of the RTCs despite its appellate jurisdiction over electoral contests concerning municipal and barangay officials.^[12]It must be noted, however, that the pivotal reason for this ruling is that while the COMELEC exercises quasi-judicial powers, it is neither a judicial tribunal^[13]nor a "superior court"vis-à-visthe RTC, considering that RTCs have jurisdiction to review the actions taken by the COMELEC in criminal prosecutions for violations of election laws.^[14]

Similarly, inLubrica, the Court held that the grant of original jurisdiction to issue a writ ofcertiorarito the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), a quasi-judicial agency, is not implied,viz.:

In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency.The grant of original jurisdiction on a quasi-judicial agency is not implied.There is no question that the legislative grant of adjudicatory powers upon the DAR, as in all other quasi-judicial agencies, bodies and tribunals, is in the nature of a limited and special jurisdiction, that is, the authority to hear and determine a class of cases within the DAR's competence and field of expertise.In conferring adjudicatory powers and functions on the DAR, the legislature could not have intended to create a regular court of justice out of the DARAB, equipped with all the vast powers inherent in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The DARAB is only a quasi-judicial body, whose limited jurisdiction does not include authority over petitions for certiorari, in the absence of an express grant in R.A. No. 6657, E.O. No. 229 and E.O. No. 129-A.^[15](Emphasis supplied; citation omitted)

Evidently, the power to review grave abuse of discretion—the very essence ofcertiorarijurisdiction—is strictly a judicial power. The 1987 Constitution vests this power exclusively in the Court and the lower courts established by law. Consequently, this power cannot be wielded by quasi-judicial agencies such as the COMELEC and the DARAB, which belong to the Executive branch.

In sharp contrast to the COMELEC and the DARAB, the CTAEn Bancis a judicial tribunal vested with inherent judicial powers. Therefore, its power to issue writs ofcertiorariis undeniable, rendering the established doctrine inGarciaandLubricainapplicable to the case at bar.

The Supreme Court's ruling inPeople of the Philippines v. Court of Tax Appeals – Third Division(Ligot)^[16]unequivocally establishes that the CTAEn Banchas jurisdiction to issue a writ ofcertiorariagainst a judgment of acquittal issued by its Division.^[17]If the CTAEn Banccan review a final and unappealable judgment of acquittalvia certiorari(an extraordinary remedy for jurisdictional error), there is no logical or principled reason why it cannot review interlocutory orders of its Divisions which, as Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court expressly states, are subject to a Rule 65 petition. The distinction drawn by the majority is arbitrary and lacks basis in the consistent application of the Rules of Court and established jurisprudence.

The stance of the majority of the Court leads to an illogical splitting ofcertiorarijurisdiction over non-appealable orders or judgments of the CTA Divisions: final judgments of CTA Divisions alleged to be tainted by grave abuse would be brought to the CTAEn Banc, while interlocutory orders also alleged to be attended by grave abuse would bypass the CTAEn Bancand proceed directly to the Court.

As held inGrecia-Cuerdo, the splitting of jurisdiction between two judicial bodies over basically the same subject matter is anathema to the orderly administration of justice, to wit:

If this Court were to sustain petitioners' contention that jurisdiction over theircertioraripetition lies with the CA, this Court would be confirming the exercise by two judicial bodies, the CA and the CTA, of jurisdiction over basically the same subject matter — precisely the split-jurisdiction situation which is anathema to the orderly administration of justice. The Court cannot accept that such was the legislative motive, especially considering that the law expressly confers on the CTA, the tribunal with the specialized competence over tax and tariff matters, the role of judicial review over local tax cases without mention of any other court that may exercise such power. Thus, the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA thatsince appellate jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint for tax refund is vested in the CTA, it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the same court. To rule otherwise would lead to an absurd situation where one court decides an appeal in the main case while another court rules on an incident in the very same case.^[18](Emphasis supplied; citation omitted)

To deprive the CTAEn Bancof itscertioraripowers with respect to interlocutory orders of its Divisions is not only procedurally inefficient but also violative of the well-established doctrine of hierarchy of courts. The principle of judicial hierarchy dictates that recourse must be had to the CTAEn Bancfirst before allowing the invocation of the Court'scertiorarijurisdiction.^[19]

The CTAEn Banc, as the immediate reviewing body for its Divisions, is the proper forum for addressing jurisdictional errors and grave abuses of discretion, regardless of whether they arise from an interlocutory order or a final judgment. To mandate direct recourse to the Court for interlocutory matters would unduly burden the Court and disregard the CTA's own internal appellate mechanism.

A closer examination of the cases cited by theponencia, i.e.,Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Kepco Ilijan Corp.^[20]andCommissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals and CBK Power Company Limited,^[21]suggests that these precedents may not be squarely applicable to the precise issue at hand.^[22]

The statement inKepcothat there is "no hierarchy within a collegial court"^[23]was anobiter dictum.

TheKepcoruling hinged on the silence of the laws creating the CTA and expanding its jurisdiction (Republic Act Nos. 1125 and 9282), as well as the RRCTA, regarding the CTAEn Banc's power to set aside a final and executory judgment of its division via Rule 47 of the Rules of Court on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, an extraordinary remedy that carves an exception to the doctrine of immutability of judgment, should be strictly construed.

The Court's statement inKepcothat "there can be no hierarchy within a collegial court between its divisions and theen banc,"^[24]was, respectfully, anobiter dictumas it is not essential to the core ruling on the unavailability of a Rule 47 petition. As such, it lacks the binding force ofstare decisis.^[25]

Furthermore, a key point of distinction inKepcois its analogy between the CTAEn Banc, the CourtEn Banc, and the CAEn Banc. This comparison is not precise as the Court and the CAEn Bancdo exercise appellate jurisdiction over their respective divisions, whereas the CTAEn Bancwas granted an adjudicatory function^[26]and appellate jurisdiction over resolutions of its divisions on a motion for reconsideration or new trial.^[27]The CTAEn Banc's appellate jurisdiction establishes a clear hierarchy of review within the CTA itself, where the CTA sittingen bancacts as a reviewing body for its Divisions. This fundamental difference renders the comparison made inKepcountenable.

Similarly, theponencia's reliance onCBK Powermay warrant a more nuanced interpretation.

The statement inCBK Power, that "the CTAen banchas jurisdiction over final order or judgment but not over interlocutory orders issued by the CTA in division"^[28]is based on an incomplete interpretation of Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

For context, the private respondent inCBK Powerargued that the proper remedy to assail the order declaring petitioner in default issued by the CTA division is a petition for review to the CTAen banc. Ruling in the negative, the Court explained that a petition for review under the RRCTA is akin to appeals in courts of general jurisdiction; thus:

[T]he petition for review to be filed with the CTA en banc as the mode for appealing a decision, resolution, or order of the CTA Division, under Section 18 of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended, is not a totally new remedy, unique to the CTA, with a special application or use therein. To the contrary, the CTA merely adopts the procedure for petitions for review and appeals long established and practiced in other Philippine courts. Accordingly, doctrines, principles, rules, and precedents laid down in jurisprudence by this Court as regards petitions for review and appeals in courts of general jurisdiction should likewise bind the CTA, and it cannot depart therefrom.

According to Section 1, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court, governing appeals from the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) to the Court of Appeals, an appeal may be taken only from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case or of a matter therein when declared by the Rules to be appealable. Said provision, thus, explicitly states that no appeal may be taken from an interlocutory order.

It is, therefore, clear that the CTAen banc has jurisdiction over final order or judgment but not over interlocutory orders issued by the CTA in division.^[29](Emphasis supplied)

While the Court correctly held inCBK Powerthat a petition for review is unavailable for interlocutory orders, its reasoning did not fully account for the explicit qualifying clause in the last paragraph of the same rule: "[i]n all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65." This crucial last paragraph demonstrates thatnon-appealability is not synonymous with being unreviewable. Instead, the Rules of Court provides a distinct and specific remedy for such non-appealable orders—a special civil action forcertiorariunder Rule 65.

Given that subsequent rulings have been built upon these precedents, it is imperative for the Court to re-examine them now to prevent the perpetuation of a procedural framework that is at odds with the constitutional grant of judicial power. To continue down this path is to disregard the clear import ofGrecia-Cuerdo, which affirmed that the grant of appellate jurisdiction carries with it the power to issue a writ ofcertiorariwhen necessary in aid of such jurisdiction. The logic is inescapable: if the CTAEn Banchas appellate jurisdiction over the final orders of its Divisions, it must also have thecertioraripower over their interlocutory orders to make its appellate jurisdiction effective.

Theponenciainsists that there can be no hierarchy within a collegial court, and thus, the CTAEn Banccannot exercise supervisory correction over its Divisions.^[30]This view is overly simplistic and ignores the functional reality of the CTA's structure as intended by the legislature.

While the CTA Divisions and theEn Bancconstitute a single judicial entity, they are organized to facilitate a clear division of labor and an internal process of review. The veryraison d'êtreof the CTAEn Bancis to act as a reviewing body for the decisions or resolutions of the Divisions. As then Senate President Franklin M. Drilon articulated during the deliberations for Republic Act No. 9282, the CTAEn Bancwas created to ensure "less divisive rulings on tax matters"; thus:

Mr. President, another important feature of this measure is that appeals from decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals are no longer appealable to the Court of Appeals. Under the modified appeal procedure, the decision of a division of the Court of Tax Appeals may be appealed to the Court of Tax Appealsen banc. The decision of the Court of Tax Appealsen bancmay in turn be directly appealed to the Supreme Court only on a question of law.This is expected to facilitate court proceedings in tax cases since the Court of Tax Appeals has admittedly the necessary expertise in tax matters. Moreover, there will be less divisive rulings on tax matterssince appeal shall be made only to the Court of Tax Appealsen bancinstead of the Court of Appeals with its many divisions.^[31]

Evidently, an internal review structure was created within the CTA to allow the CTAEn Bancto review the rulings of its Divisions, specifically to ensure "less divisive rulings on tax matters." In other words, the CTAEn Bancwas established precisely to maintain consistency in court rulings on tax matters. Surely, this consistency was not solely aimed at final orders but logically extends to interim rulings, such as denials of motions to dismiss, motions to lift default orders, or demurrers to evidence. This legislative intent establishes afunctional hierarchywhere theEn Bancis designed to oversee and correct the rulings of the Divisions to ensure consistency and correctness.

The power of theEn Bancto review and reverse final judgments of the Divisions is the ultimate exercise of this functional superiority. It is therefore illogical in the extreme to suggest that a body empowered to overturn the final outcome of a case is somehow incapable of addressing and correcting a grave procedural error in an interlocutory order that could lead to a fundamentally flawed process. To deny the CTAEn Bancthis power is akin to arguing that the Court can reverse a final, erroneous judgment from a lower court on appeal but cannot issue a writ ofcertiorarito correct a grave abuse of discretion in an interlocutory order that deprived a party of due process. An unchecked interlocutory order, such as one improperly denying a motion to lift an order of default, can cause irreparable harm that cannot be remedied on final appeal.

Theponenciaexpresses concern with justices sitting in review of their own actions, a situation contrary to the principle ofnemo debet esse judex in propria causa(thenemo judexprinciple).^[32]This concern, while valid in principle, is misplaced here.

The very structure of the CTA, as amended by Republic Act No. 9282, was deliberately designed by Congress for theCTA En Bancto perform a review function over its divisions. Section 2^[33]of Republic Act No. 9282, first establishes the court's dual structure, allowing it to siten bancor in divisions. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9282, amending Section 18 of Republic Act No. 1125, then defines the relationship between them, granting theEn Bancthe specific power to act on petitions for review filed against a Division's resolution on a motion for reconsideration or new trial, to wit:

Section 11. Section 18 of the same Act is hereby amended as follows:

SEC. 18.Appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc. - No civil proceeding involving matter arising under the National Internal Revenue Code, the Tariff and Customs Code or the Local Government Code shall be maintained, except as herein provided, until and unless an appeal has been previously filed with the CTA and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

A party adversely affected by a resolution of a Division of the CTA on a motion for reconsideration or new trial, may file a petition for review with the CTA en banc.

. . .

This clear statutory path confirms that Congress intentionally designed the CTAEn Bancto perform a vital check on the actions of its Divisions. Notably, the phrase "resolution of a Division of the CTA on a motion for reconsideration or new trial" makes no distinction whatsoever between final orders that completely dispose of a case and interlocutory orders that resolve incidental matters. This broad, unqualified grant of jurisdiction signifies the legislative intent for the CTAEn Bancto act as a comprehensive review mechanism. By empowering the CTAEn Bancto review all decisions or resolutions of a Division (upon the filing of a motion for reconsideration), the legislature has institutionalized a seamless, two-tiered adjudicative process within a single court. This structure is fundamentally at odds with the premise of the principle ofnemo judex.

This two-tiered adjudicative process is determinative. The legislative intent was not to create three separate and independent courts but a single, collegial CTA that operates in two tiers: the Division level for initial adjudication and theEn Banclevel for appellate review. The "cause" before the CTAEn Bancis not the Division's "own cause" in the sense contemplated by the maxim. Rather, it is the exercise of an appellate mandate conferred by law upon the Court as a single, unified judicial body. Applying thenemo judexprinciple in this context would not only contravene the plain language of Republic Act No. 9282 but would also paralyze the CTA and render its prescribed judicial structure meaningless.

The position thatEn Bancreview by fellow Justices would "erode the principle of collegiality"^[34]and turn "judicial dialogue into judicial surveillance"^[35]is, with all due respect, a fundamental mischaracterization of the nature of a collegial court.

Collegiality is not synonymous with passive unanimity or an absence of disagreement. On the contrary, the strength of a multi-member court lies precisely in the crucible of intellectual debate, mutual scrutiny, and the challenging of judicial reasoning among its members. This internal dynamic is what refines legal arguments, uncovers overlooked facts, and ensures that the final decision is robust, well-reasoned, and legally sound. It is the very engine of judicial excellence.

Far from fostering a "climate of internal scrutiny and distrust,"^[36]this process embodies true judicial dialogue. It is a testament to the institutional maturity and intellectual humility of the Justices, who accept that their reasoning at the Division level is subject to further review and refinement by the court as a whole. This is not "surveillance"; it is collaboration. It is not "distrust;" it is a shared commitment to the administration of justice. The ultimate loyalty of every Justice is not to their own previously-held opinion, but to the law and to justice itself. TheEn Bancreview process is the ultimate expression of that collective loyalty.

To conclude, applying thenemo judexmaxim would dismantle the very legal structure the legislature created for the CTA. The legislative mandate is clear and its jurisdictional grant is broad; the internal procedural safeguards are effective; and the philosophical foundation of collegiality supports, rather than condemns, this form of internal review. When the CTAEn Bancreviews a ruling from one of its Divisions—whether final or interlocutory—it is not a separate entity judging another. Rather, it is the court in its highest form, employing a statutorily designed, two-tiered process to refine and perfect its own work. This is not an act of self-interest, which thenemo judexprinciple prohibits; it is an act of institutional integrity, which the law demands. The system is designed to promote the highest standards of judicial review within a specialized field, and it should be allowed to function as the legislature intended.

Theponencia's ultimate conclusion—that petitions forcertiorariagainst interlocutory orders of a CTA Division must be filed directly with this Court^[37]—is a direct assault on the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

As the Court emphatically declared inGIOS-SAMAR, Inc. vs. Dept. of Transportation and Communications, et al.,^[38]this doctrine is "not mere policy[;] rather, it is aconstitutional filtering mechanismdesigned to enable the Court to focus on the more fundamental and essential tasks assigned to it by the highest law of the land."^[39]Its purpose is to prevent the inundation of the Court's dockets and to allow the Court to focus on the essential tasks of resolving novel constitutional questions and settling significant issues of law.

Mandating that all petitions assailing interlocutory orders of the CTA Divisions be brought directly to the Court would create the very evil the doctrine seeks to avoid. It would force the Court to micromanage the trial proceedings of a specialized court, opening our docket to a flood of petitions questioning every interlocutory order by the Divisions of the CTA. This leads to the absurd and inefficient splitting of jurisdiction, where the CTAEn Bancreviews final judgments while this Court reviews the interlocutory incidents of the very same case—precisely the "split-jurisdiction situation which is anathema to the orderly administration of justice" that the Court condemned inGrecia-Cuerdo.

This is not the first time the Court has been called upon to clarify a procedural pathway to prevent such jurisdictional confusion. In the landmark case ofSt. Martin Funeral Home v. National Labor Relations Commission,^[40]the Court was confronted with a similar procedural gaffe in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which created an illogical and impracticable appellate route from the NLRC. Recognizing the imperative need for expeditious action and the fact that the Court is not a trier of facts, the Court decisively intervened:

As earlier explained, our mode of judicial review over decisions of the NLRC has for some time now been understood to be by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This is, of course, a special original action limited to the resolution of jurisdictional issues, that is, lack or excess of jurisdiction and, in almost all cases that have been brought to us, grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

It will, however, be noted that paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 now grants exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals over all final adjudications of the Regional Trial Courts and the quasi-judicial agencies generally or specifically referred to therein except, among others, "those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with . . . the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, . . ." This would necessarily contradict what has been ruled and said all along that appeal does not lie from decisions of the NLRC. Yet, under such excepting clause literally construed, the appeal from the NLRC cannot be brought to the Court of Appeals, but to this Court by necessary implication.

The same exceptive clause further confuses the situation by declaring that the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of B. P. No. 129, and those specified cases in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. These cases can, of course, be properly excluded from the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. However, because of the aforementioned amendment by transposition, also supposedly excluded are cases falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Labor Code. This is illogical and impracticable, and Congress could not have intended that procedural gaffe, since there are no cases in the Labor Code the decisions, resolutions, orders or awards wherein are within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of any other court for that matter.

. . .

While we do not wish to intrude into the Congressional sphere on the matter of the wisdom of a law, on this score we add the further observations that there is a growing number of labor cases being elevated to this Court which, not being a trier of fact, has at times been constrained to remand the case to the NLRC for resolution of unclear or ambiguous factual findings; that the Court of Appeals is procedurally equipped for that purpose, aside from the increased number of its component divisions; and that there is undeniably an imperative need for expeditious action on labor cases as a major aspect of constitutional protection to labor.

Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired.^[41](Citations omitted)

The instant case presents a perfect parallel. Theponencia, in effect, creates a procedural anomaly as disruptive as the one corrected inSt. Martin. Instead of an unsound jurisdictional leap to this Court, the Court should follow the wisdom ofSt. Martin.

The judicial policy is clear: the Court will not entertain direct resort to it when redress can be obtained in the appropriate courts, both to preserve our precious time and to avoid the delays inherent in remanding cases. The CTAEn Banc, as the immediate reviewing body for its Divisions, is the proper and most efficient forum for addressing jurisdictional errors. It is the constitutional filter that stands between the Divisions of the CTA and the Court. To bypass it is to violate a fundamental principle of our judicial structure. This case is an opportunity to provide clear, prospective guidance and definitively declare that the proper recourse against an interlocutory order of a CTA Division is a petition forcertiorariwith the CTAEn Banc.

For the foregoing reasons, while I concur that the petition must be dismissed for being moot, I dissent from theponencia's restrictive reasoning that, in my view, unduly limits the CTAEn Bancand undermines the orderly administration of justice and the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

^[2]Ponencia, p. 5.

^[3]The dispositive portion of the Decision in CTA Case No. 10450 dated September 28, 2023, reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition for Review filed by Nippon Express Philippines Corporation on 15 January 2021 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

^[4]The dispositive portion of the Resolution in CTA Case No. 10450 dated January 29, 2024, reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, petitioner's "Motion for Reconsideration" filed on 03 November 2023 is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

^[5]RULES OF COURT, Rule 41, sec. 1 states:

Section 1. Subject of appeal. — An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable. No appeal may be taken from:

. . .

(c) An interlocutory order;

. . .

In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.

^[6]Ponencia, p. 11.

^[7]Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, Dissenting Opinion, p. 1.

^[8]726 Phil. 9 (2014).

^[9]Id.at 24.

^[10]283 Phil. 735 (1992).

^[11]497 Phil. 313 (2005).

^[12]Garcia v. De Jesus,supraat 751.

^[13]Id.at 752.

^[14]Id.at 752-753,citingPeople v. Delgado, 267 Phil. 758 (1990).

^[15]Dept. of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Lubrica,supraat 324.

^[16]932 Phil. 139 (2022).

^[17]Id.at 154.See alsoPeople v. Court of Tax Appeals, Second Division and Joselito B. Yap, G.R. Nos. 254591 & 254675, January 30, 2023.

^[18]City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo,supranote 8, at 25-26.

^[19]SeePeople of the Philippines v. Court of Tax Appeals - Third Division,supranote 16, at 154.

^[20]787 Phil. 698 (2016).

^[21]765 Phil. 140 (2015).

^[22]Ponencia, pp. 14-16, 28.

^[23]Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Kepco Ilijan Corp.,supraat 707.

^[24]Id.

^[25]SeeVillanueva, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 429 Phil. 194, 202 (2002).

^[26]SeeRepublic Act No. 1125, as amended, sec. 2:

SEC. 2. Sitting En Banc or Division; Quorum; Proceedings. - The CTA may sit en banc or in two (2) Divisions, each Division consisting of three (3) Justices.
. . . .
The affirmative votes of four (4) members of the Court en bancor two (2) members of a Division, as the case may be,shall be necessary for the rendition of a decision or resolution. (Emphasis supplied)

^[27]SeeRepublic Act No. 1125, as amended, sec. 18:

SEC. 18. Appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc. - No civil proceeding involving matter arising under the National Internal Revenue Code, the Tariff and Customs Code or the Local Government Code shall be maintained, except as herein provided, until and unless an appeal has been previously filed with the CTA and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
A party adversely affected by a resolution of a Division of the CTA on a motion for reconsideration or new trial, may file a petition for review with the CTA en banc. (Emphasis supplied)

^[28]765 Phil. 140, 151 (2015).

^[29]Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals and CBK Power Company Limited,supraat 151.

^[30]Ponencia, pp. 16-19.

^[31]Sponsorship Speech of Senate President Franklin M. Drilon, December 1, 2003, Record of the Senate, Volume III, No. 41, Twelfth Congress, Third Regular Session, p. 53.

^[32]Ponencia, p. 20.

^[33]SEC. 2.Sitting En Banc or Division; Quorum; Proceedings. - The CTA may sit en banc or in two (2) Divisions, each Division consisting of three (3) Justices.
Four (4) Justices shall constitute a quorum for sessions en banc and two (2) Justices for sessions of a Division: Provided, That when the required quorum cannot be constituted due to any vacancy, disqualification, inhibition, disability, or any other lawful cause, the Presiding Justice shall designate any Justice of other Divisions of the Court to sit temporarily therein.
The affirmative votes of four (4) members of the Court en banc or two (2) members of a Division, as the case may be, shall be necessary for the rendition of a decision or resolution.

^[34]Ponencia, p. 22.

^[35]Id.

^[36]Id.

^[37]Id.at 27-28.

^[38]849 Phil 120 (2019).

^[39]Id.at 131-132.

^[40]356 Phil. 811 (1998).

^[41]Id.at 819-824.

LOPEZ, M.,J.:

The majority concluded that this Court has the exclusive jurisdiction over petitions forcertiorariagainst interlocutory orders of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) acting in divisions.

I strongly disagree.

The CTA is a highly specialized body created specifically to review tax cases. It exercises its adjudicative powers, functions, and dutiesen bancor in Divisions.^[1]The tax court acts as an appellate court in reviewing by appeal decisions, resolutions, or orders of any of its divisions, among other things.^[2]To effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, therefore, the CTA sittingen bancmust have the authority to take cognizance of petitions forcertiorariimputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any of its divisions in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. To rule otherwise would lead to an absurd situation where one court decides an appeal in the main case while another court rules on an incident in the very same case.^[3]

I will explain.

Briefly, the petition for review oncertiorari^[4]filed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) challenges the August 29, 2023 Decision^[5]and January 26, 2024 Resolution^[6]of the CTAEn Bancin CTA EB Case No. 2580 that dismissed the CIR's petition for lack of jurisdiction. The CIR questioned the interlocutory rulings of the CTA Division before the CTAEn Banc, which declared the CIR in default for its failure to file a hard copy of the Answer to the petition filed by Nippon Express Philippines Corporation (Nippon Express) and allowed Nippon Express to present its evidenceex parte.

I.

At the onset, the case is already moot, considering the developments on the main case and the subject matter of the present petition forcertiorari. The records of the CTA would show that the CTA Division promulgated a Decision on September 28, 2023, denying Nippon Express's petition for lack of merit, and a Resolution on January 29, 2024 that denied Nippon Express' motion for reconsideration on the main case.^[7]

A case becomes moot when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by supervening events so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use.^[8]In such an instance, there is no actual substantial relief to which a petitioner would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.^[9]Accordingly, courts generally decline jurisdiction over such a case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness since the judgment will not serve any useful purpose or have any practical legal effect because, in the nature of things, it cannot be enforced.^[10]

Consequently, there is no more justiciable controversy on the propriety of allowing the presentation of Nippon Express's evidenceex parte. The CTA Division already decided on the main case.

In any case, the Court may decide cases otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition yet evading review and to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public,^[11]as in this case.

II.

There is no question, the July 21, 2021 and November 17, 2021 Resolutions of the CTA Division are interlocutory orders since they did not finally dispose of the case on the merits.^[12]The CTA Division merely declared the CIR in default for its failure to file a hard copy of the Answer to the petition filed by Nippon Express and allowed Nippon Express to present its evidenceex parte.

The issue now is this: which court has jurisdiction over interlocutory orders of the CTA Division?

Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear, try, and decide a case.^[13]It is never presumed but is conferred by law.^[14]As early as inKer & Co., Ltd. v. Court of Tax Appeals,^[15]the Court emphasized that "the Tax Court is a court of special jurisdiction. As such, it can only take cognizance of such matters as are clearly within its jurisdiction."

Section 2, Rule 4 of A.M. No. 05-11-07-CTA^[16]or the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals (RRCTA) enumerates cases cognizable by the CTAEn Banc, to wit:

SECTION 2.Cases Within the Jurisdiction of the Court En Banc. — The Courten bancshall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal the following:

(a)Decisions or resolutions on motions for reconsideration or new trial of the Court in Divisions in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdictionover:

(1) Cases arising from administrative agencies — Bureau of Internal Revenue, Bureau of Customs, Department of Finance, Department of Trade and Industry, Department of Agriculture;

(2) Local tax cases decided by the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their original jurisdiction; and

(3) Tax collection cases decided by the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their original jurisdiction involving final and executory assessments for taxes, fees, charges and penalties, where the principal amount of taxes and penalties claimed is less than one million pesos;

(b) Decisions, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction;

(c) Decisions, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in tax collection cases decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction;

(d)Decisions, resolutions or orders on motions for reconsideration or new trial of the Court in Division in the exercise of its exclusive original jurisdiction over tax collection cases;

(e) Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals (CBAA) in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment and taxation of real property originally decided by the provincial or city board of assessment appeals;

(f)Decisions, resolutions or orders on motions for reconsideration or new trial of the Court in Division in the exercise of its exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving criminal offenses arising from violations of the National Internal Revenue Code or the Tariff and Customs Code and other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue or Bureau of Customs;

(g)Decisions, resolutions or orders on motions for reconsideration or new trial of the Court in Division in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction over criminal offenses mentioned in the preceding subparagraph; and

(h) Decisions, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over criminal offenses mentioned in subparagraph (f).

Interestingly, the RRCTA merely provides for the appellate jurisdiction of the CTAEn Bancover decisions, resolutions, or orders of the CTA Division, whether in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction. On the other hand, Section 2, Rule 2 of the RRCTA provides for the tax courten banc's original jurisdiction:

SECTION 2.Exercise of Powers and Functions. — xxx

The Court shall siten bancin the exercise of its administrative, ceremonial and non-adjudicative functions.

Indeed, the RRCTA is silent on whether the CTAEn Bancalso exercises original jurisdiction over interlocutory orders or judgments of one of its divisions. Surely, the proper remedy to question an interlocutory order on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is not an appeal, but a special civil action forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1.Subject of appeal.— An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.

No appeal may be taken from:

xxx

(c) An interlocutory order;

xxx

In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.

The Court has previously ruled against the power of the CTAEn Bancto issue writs ofcertiorarioninterlocutory ordersof the CTA Division.

InCommissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals and CBK Power Company Limited,^[17]the Court ruled that an order of the CTA Division declaring a party in default is an interlocutory order properly cognizable by the Supreme Court under Rule 65. Thus, inCommissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals (First Division) and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation,^[18]we held that the CTAEn Banchas no jurisdiction over the CTA Second Division's denial of the Omnibus Motion, being an interlocutory order. Further, inCommissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals-Third Division and City Super, Incorporated,^[19]the questioned CTA Division Resolutions partially disposed of the issue in the main case. These are interlocutory orders that are properly subject to a Rule 65 petition before the Supreme Court. The Court reiterated this rule in the recent case ofMT Alpine Magnolia v. Commissioner of Bureau of Customs.^[20]

In all these cases, the Court ruled against the authority of the CTAEn Bancto take cognizance ofcertioraripetitions on interlocutory orders of the CTA Division for two reasons. First, Republic Act (RA) No. 9282^[21]and the RRCTA do not provide for suchcertiorarijurisdiction of the CTAEn Banc. Second, a petition forcertiorariis a special civil action raising issues of lack or excess of jurisdiction; thus, it cannot be filed in the same tribunal whose actions are being assailed. Instead, it is cognizable by a higher tribunal, which, in the case of the CTA, is the Supreme Court.^[22]This is because, like this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Sandiganbayan, the CTA is a collegial court. There can be no hierarchy in a collegial court between its divisions anden banc. We explained thereason d'etreof the prohibition inCommissioner of Internal Revenue v. Kepco Ilijan Corp. (Kepco):^[23]

It is the same situation among other collegial courts. To illustrate,the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals may sit and adjudicate cases in divisions consisting of only a number of members, and such adjudication is already regarded as the decision of the Court itself.It is provided for in the Constitution, Article VIII, Section 4 (1) and BP Blg. 129, Section 4, respectively.The divisions are not considered separate and distinct courts but are divisions of one and the same court; there is no hierarchy of courts within the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, for they each remain as one court notwithstanding that they also work in divisions. The Supreme Court sittingen bancis not an appellate courtvis-a-visits divisions, and it exercises no appellate jurisdiction over the latter. As for the Court of Appealsen banc, it sits as such only for the purpose of exercising administrative, ceremonial, or other non-adjudicatory functions.

In turn, the CTA Division'sfinal judgments, resolutions, or ordersare cognizable by the CTAEn Bancby appeal or petition forcertiorari. Thus, inCommissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals Second Division and QL Development Inc.,^[24]we held that the CIR erroneously filed acertioraripetition with the Court since the CTA Division Resolutions being questioned were final judgments on the deficiency assessment. The CIR should have filed an appeal through a petition for review with the CTAEn Banc. InPeople v. Court of Tax Appeals-Third Division, Jacinto C Ligot and Erlinda Y Ligot,^[25]the Court declared that the CTAEn Banchas jurisdiction over a Rule 65 petition assailing the CTA Division's judgment of acquittal. Similarly, inPeople v. Court of Tax Appeals, Second Division and Joselito B. Rap,^[26]we ruled that it is the CTAEn Bancthat has thecertioraripower over the Decision and Resolution of the CTA Division acquitting the accused:

Whilecertiorariis generally a proper remedy in questioning an order of acquittal, the BIR erred when it filed the present petition directly before the Court. The correct recourse in this case would have been to initiatecertiorariproceedings before the CTAEn Banc.

It is basic that the CTAEn Banchas appellate jurisdiction over decisions, resolutions, or orders on motions for reconsideration or new trial rendered by a CTA Division in cases involving tax crimes. Consequently, the CTAEn Bancis also vested with the power to issue writs ofcertiorariwhen necessary, in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. In other words, the Court has no power to take cognizance of the present petition taken that jurisdiction overcertioraripetitions assailing a CTA Division ruling is vested with the CTAEn Banc.

On the other hand, inKepco, the issue was whether the CTAEn Bancmay annul thefinal and executorydecision of one of its divisions. We ruled in the negative, applying the rule on the immutability of judgments and stating that there is no hierarchy between theen bancand any of its divisions. Thus:

it appears contrary to these features that a collegial court, sittingen banc, may be called upon to annul a decision of one of its divisions which had become final and executory, forit is tantamount to allowing a court to annul its own judgment and acknowledging that a hierarchy exists within such court. In the process, it also betrays the principle that judgments must, at some point, attain finality.A court that can revisit its own final judgments leaves the door open to possible endless reversals or modifications which is anathema to a stable legal system.

Thus,the Revised Rules of the CTA and even the Rules of Court which apply suppletorily thereto provide for no instance in which theen bancmay reverse, annul or void afinaldecision of a division. Verily, the Revised Rules of the CTA provide for no instance of an annulment of judgment at all. On the other hand, the Rules of Court, through Rule 47, provides, with certain conditions, for annulment of judgment done by a superior court, like the Court of Appeals, against the final judgment, decision or ruling of an inferior court, which is the Regional Trial Court, based on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. The Regional Trial Court, in turn, also is empowered to, upon a similar action, annul a judgment or ruling of the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts within its territorial jurisdiction. But, again, the said Rules are silent as to whether a collegial court sittingen bancmay annul a final judgment of its own division.

As earlier explained,the silence of the Rules may be attributed to the need to preserve the principles that there can be no hierarchy within a collegial court between its divisions and theen banc, and that a court's judgment, once final, is immutable.

Meanwhile, the Court recognized the CTAEn Banc's inherent power to issue writs ofcertiorariagainstinterlocutory orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in a local tax casein aid of its exclusive appellate jurisdictionfor the first time inCity of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo^[27](Grecia-Cuerdo),viz.:

The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs ofcertiorariinvolves the exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from the mere existence of appellate jurisdiction... In the same manner, Section 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution grants power to the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, to issue writs ofcertiorari, prohibition and mandamus. With respect to the Court of Appeals, Section 9 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129) gives the appellate court, also in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the power to issue, among others, a writ ofcertiorari, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. As to Regional Trial Courts, the power to issue a writ ofcertiorari, in the exercise of their original jurisdiction, is provided under Section 21 of BP 129.

The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no express grant of such power, with respect to the CTA, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law and thatjudicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly interpreted thatthe power of the CTA includes that of determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs ofcertiorariin these cases.

Indeed, in order for any appellate court, to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must have the authority to issue, among others, a writ ofcertiorari.In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law intended to transfer also such power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason why the transfer should only be considered as partial, not total.

Our ruling inGrecia-Cuerdofinds its basis in the judicial power of the Supreme Court to determine grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government^[28]as well as the exclusive jurisdiction of the CTA to resolve all tax problems. We emphasized, however, that the CTA's power to issue writs ofcertiorarimust bein aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

InBreslin v. Luzon Stevedoring Co.,^[29]the Court ruled that the remedy is in aid of the court's appellate jurisdiction when it "has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of error, the final orders or decisions" of the particular court or tribunal. We reiterated this principle inBulilis v. Nuez^[30]andGalang, Jr. v. Geronimo.^[31]InJ.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo,^[32]we clarified that "only in those cases where the parties have a right to appeal to that Court" that the writ ofcertiorarimay be issued for the "said court could not validly entertain the petitions filed in these cases unless the judgments and orders of execution complained of could have been appealed" to them.Grecia-Cuerdocontinues:

A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power necessary to exercise it effectively, to make all orders that will preserve the subject of the action, and to give effect to the final determination of the appeal. It carries with it the power to protect that jurisdiction and to make the decisions of the court thereunder effective. The court, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, has authority to control all auxiliary and incidental matters necessary to the efficient and proper exercise of that jurisdiction.For this purpose, it may, when necessary, prohibit or restrain the performance of any act which might interfere with the proper exercise of its rightful jurisdiction in cases pending before it.

Lastly, it would not be amiss to point out thata court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction should have powers which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within such jurisdiction. These should be regarded as powers which are inherent in its jurisdiction and the court must possess them in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of its process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of such process.

In this regard, Section 1 of RA 9282 states that the CTA shall be of the same level as the CA and shall possess all the inherent powers of a court of justice.

Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly conferred on them. These inherent powers are such powers as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or are essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as well as to the clue administration of justice; or are directly appropriate, convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted powers; and include the power to maintain the court's jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the litigants.

Thus, this Court has held that "while a court may be expressly granted the incidental powers necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and, subject to existing laws and constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court has power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction and for the enforcement of its judgments and mandates." Hence,demands, matters or questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of, the main action, and coming within the above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal matter, even though the court may thus be called on to consider and decide matters which, as original causes of action, would not be within its cognizance.

Elsewise stated, if the subject matter of the principal action falls within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CTA, whether actingen bancor any of its divisions, then the CTA can issue writs ofcertiorariin aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

III.

A writ ofcertiorariis an extraordinary remedy to correct errors of jurisdiction of judicial and quasi-judicial bodies as well as grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court reads:

Section 1.Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of its or his jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.

Certiorari, as a special civil action, is an original action invoking the original jurisdiction of a court to annul or modify the proceedings of a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. It is an original and independent action not part of the trial or the proceedings on the original case.^[33]Simply stated, acertioraripetition is not a continuation of the appellate process borne out of the original case but a separate action focused on actions in excess or wanting of jurisdiction.^[34]

The writ has been characterized as a "supervisory writ" used by superior courts to keep lower courts within the bounds of their jurisdictions, thereby ensuring orderliness in lower courts' rulings.^[35]It is issued by a higher court against the proceedings of the lower courts under its control and supervision.^[36]Thus, inGarcia v. De Jesus,^[37]the Court held that the COMELEC does not havecertioraripower over the Regional Trial Court, although exercising appellate jurisdiction since the COMELEC is not a judicial tribunal and merely exercises administrative and quasi-judicial powers. Likewise, inDepartment of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Lubrica,^[38]we ruled that the DARAB does not have the power to correct errors of jurisdiction over the RARAD since its supervisory authority is only limited to administrative supervision and/or control.

On the other hand, the CTAEn Bancmay be considered a "higher" or "superior" court than its Divisions in view of the express grant of jurisdiction to review by appeal decisions, orders, or resolutions of the Divisions. Under the CTA's present set-up, the Division's decision, order, or resolution in a civil or criminal case isalwaysappealable to theen banc.^[39]Unlike the Court of Appeals, or the Supreme Court, the CTA sittingen bancexercises appellate jurisdiction over any of its divisions. It may revisit facts and re-examine evidence already determined by the division in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. The CTAEn Bancmay reverse or modify the division's judgment, except those that had become final and executory. Consequently, a decision rendered by any of the divisions is not a final decision of the court. Under the current structure of the CTA, therefore, the CTAEn Bancis considered a separate and distinct court – a "higher court" than any of its divisions. This is not true for the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. The Court of Appealsen bancand the Supreme Courten bancdo not have appellate jurisdiction over their divisions.^[40]Accordingly, a ruling of any of their division is the court's final decision on the matter, regardless of whether it was rendered by the division oren banc.

During the deliberations of this case, Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa posits that RA No. 9282 merely "established an appellate structure that allows the full court to collectively review rulings of its division." "R.A. No. 9282 did not create a hierarchy between the CTAEn Bancand its divisions." "The legislative intent was to establish a clear appellate process within the CTA, but not to turn the CTAEn Bancinto a supervisory body withcertiorarijurisdiction over its own divisions." Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao further opined that "[r]ather than introducing the CTAEn Bancas a 'superior' court to the CTA in Division, it is merely a secondary check on the Division's factual conclusion." But then, "introducing this second check could not have been intended to grant the CTAEn Bancgreater authority or supervision over the CTA in Division. Simply put, it is not a 'higher tribunal'per se."

These arguments are specious.

Senate President Franklin M. Drilon emphasized in his sponsorship speech the conversion of the CTA into an appellate court that specializes in tax cases so that decisions of the CTA sitting in Division shall now be appealed to theen banc,insteadof the Court of Appeals.

Mr. President, another important feature of this measure is that appeals from decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals are no longer appealable to the Court of Appeals. Under the modified appeal procedure, the decision of a division of the Court of Tax Appeals may be appealed to the Court of Tax Appealsen banc. The decision of the Court of Tax Appealsen bancmay in turn be directly appealed to the Supreme Court only on a question of law.This is expected to facilitate court proceedings in tax cases since the Court of Tax Appeals has admittedly the necessary expertise in tax matters. Moreover,there will be less divisive rulings on tax matters since appeal shall be made only to the Court of Tax Appealsen bancinstead of the Court of Appeals with its many divisions.^[41]

The foregoing is aligned with the intent of the House of Representatives when it tackled House Bill Nos. 854, 2862, and 5044, which elevated the rank of the CTA to the level of a collegiate court. One of the co-authors of the bill, Representative Exequiel B. Javier, explained the effect of converting the CTA as a collegiate court, as follows:

... Under my bill, of course, once the Court of Tax Appeals is constituted as a collegiate court with 9 divisions, the appeal will go to the Court of Appeals on questions of fact, questions of law and so forth. Of course, only questions of law will be elevated to the Supreme Court. But I understand that, according to Judge Acosta, who is the presiding judge of the Court of Tax Appeals, we may have to eliminate the appeal to the Court of Appeals because it's quite illogical that a collegiate court with an expertise on tax matters... tax matters so they appealed to the Court of Appeals and no offense to Justice Agcaoili. The Court of Appeals is a court of general appellate jurisdiction under all cases.So it not also help de-clog the dockets of the Court of Appeals. So the appeal would be from the division of the Court of Tax Appeals to the Court of [Tax] Appeals en banc and whatever decision en banc reaches then it goes to the Supreme Court for appeal on certiorari only on three grounds. Abuse of discretion, serious errors of facts and question of law.^[42]

Then Presiding Judge of the CTA, Ernesto Acosta, added:

... Now, this, as observed by Congressman Danilo Suarez, this bill was vetoed because the last Congress failed to get the concurrence of the Supreme Court on the matters of direct appeal from the Court of Tax Appeals to the Supreme Court because that, they say, will increase the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court without its consent. Now, this pertains to Section 18 and Section 19 of our Charter which is also a subject of the various proposals of the Honorable Congressmen and Congresswoman.

And I would like to inform the Body that this particular issue on the appeal to the Supreme Court is now being heard by the Supreme Court through its Committee on Legal Education headed by Justice Jose Vitug. The matter is being heard by them after the Senate version of this bill was referred by the Senate President to the Supreme Court.

So right now, it is being heard and, in fact, on Friday we are also requested by the Supreme Court to give our proposal on that appeal procedure from the Court Division up to the Supreme Court. And as Congressman Danilo Suarez was correctly informed that the Honorable Justice Carpio have made a proposal during the committee hearingthat the appeal would be coursed through the Court of Tax Appeals en banc on limited matters like abuse of discretion, question of law where serious error in the findings of fact.^[43]

Congress relieved the Court of Appeals of jurisdiction to decide on appeal, decisions or rulings of the CTA (which now sits in Division). The appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals was transferred to anew body– the CTAEn Banc, while the former CTA (composed of a presiding judge and two judges) became the CTA Division. The present framework of the CTA created, in essence, two courts with unique and distinct jurisdictions.

Associate Justice Caguioa insisted thatcertioraripetition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a remedy available only against lower courts and "not within the same judicial entity." Associate Justice Dimaampao explained that "the CTAEn Bancis not a superior tribunal to the CTA in Division." However, the Court already recognized the authority of the CTAEn Bancto review oncertiorarifinal dispositions of its divisions inPeople v. Court of Tax Appeals-Third Division, Jacinto C. Ligot and Erlinda Y. Ligot^[44]andPeople v. Court of Tax Appeals, Second Division and Joselito B. Rap.^[45]We allowed resort to Rule 65within the same collegiate court. The reason is obvious – when Congress transferred exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the CTA, it also transferred such power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of such appellate jurisdiction.

Accordingly, I respectfully submit that there is no reason to limit our ruling inGrecia-Cuerdoto interlocutory orders of the RTC in a local tax case^[46]or to adverse rulings of the CIR or the Secretary of Finance,^[47]the Commissioner of Customs, or the Secretary of Trade and Industry on tax-related problems.^[48]Thecertioraripower of the CTA extends to the authority of the CTAen bancto determine grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any of its divisions, when necessary, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. How can the CTAen banceffectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction over decisions, resolutions, or orders of the CTA Division if it cannot issue auxiliary writs necessary in aid of its appellate jurisdiction? To rule otherwise would be to sanction split jurisdiction, an absurd situation where one court decides an appeal in the main case, e.g., the CTAEn Banc, while another court rules on an incident in the very same case, e.g., the Supreme Court.^[49]A piecemeal resort to one court and another gives rise to a multiplicity of suits.^[50]Split jurisdiction results in loss of time, waste of effort, augmented anxiety, and additional expense^[51]– clearly intolerable and abhorrent in a well-ordered administration of justice.^[52]Grecia-Cuerdofurther elucidated:

If this Court were to sustain petitioners' contention that jurisdiction over theircertioraripetition lies with the CA, this Court would be confirming the exercise by two judicial bodies, the CA and the CTA, of jurisdiction over basically the same subject matter — precisely the split-jurisdiction situation which is anathema to the orderly administration of justice. The Court cannot accept that such was the legislative motive, especially considering that the law expressly confers on the CTA, the tribunal with the specialized competence over tax and tariff matters, the role of judicial review over local tax cases without mention of any other court that may exercise such power. Thus, the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA thatsince appellate jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint for tax refund is vested in the CTA, it follows that a petition forcertiorariseeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the same court. To rule otherwise would lead to an absurd situation where one court decides an appeal in the main case while another court rules on an incident in the very same case.

Stated differently,it would be somewhat incongruent with the pronounced judicial abhorrence to split jurisdiction to conclude that the intention of the law is to divide the authority over a local tax case filed with the RTC by giving to the CA or this Court jurisdiction to issue a writ ofcertiorariagainst interlocutory orders of the RTC but giving to the CTA the jurisdiction over the appeal from the decision of the trial court in the same case. It is more in consonance with logic and legal soundness to conclude that the grant of appellate jurisdiction to the CTA over tax cases filed in and decided by the RTC carries with it the power to issue a writ ofcertiorariwhen necessary in aid of such appellate jurisdiction.The supervisory power or jurisdiction of the CTA to issue a writ ofcertiorariin aid of its appellate jurisdiction should co-exist with, and be a complement to, its appellate jurisdiction to review, by appeal, the final orders and decisions of the RTC, in order to have complete supervision over the acts of the latter.

Thecertioraripower to the CTAEn Bancover interlocutory orders or resolutions of the Divisions is consistent with the rule on the hierarchy of courts.

The doctrine of hierarchy of courts requires that recourse must be first obtained from the lower courts to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention, which are better devoted to those within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further overcrowding of this Court's docket.^[53]The doctrine was first introduced inPeople v. Cuaresma,^[54]viz:

This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs ofcertiorari(as well as prohibition,mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance), which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their respective regions. It is also shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals (formerly, Intermediate Appellate Court), although prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latter's competence to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted to those "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however; to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. Tt is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket. Indeed, the removal of the restriction on the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in this regard,supra— resulting from the deletion of the qualifying phrase, "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" — was evidently intended precisely to relieve this Courtpro tantoof the burden of dealing with applications for the extraordinary writs which, but for the expansion of the Appellate Court corresponding jurisdiction, would have had to be filed with it.

The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections^[55]expounded on this doctrine, to wit:

The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by this court to ensure that every level of the judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner. Trial courts do not only determine the facts from the evaluation of the evidence presented before them. They are likewise competent to determine issues of law which may include the validity of an ordinance, statute, or even an executive issuance in relation to the Constitution. To effectively perform these functions, they are territorially organized into regions and then into branches. Their writs generally reach within those territorial boundaries. Necessarily, they mostly perform the all-important task of inferring the facts from the evidence as these are physically presented before them. In many instances, the facts occur within their territorial jurisdiction, which properly present the 'actual case' that makes ripe a determination of the constitutionality of such action. The consequences, of course, would be national in scope. There are, however, some cases where resort to courts at their level would not be practical considering their decisions could still be appealed before the higher courts, such as the Court of Appeals.

In other words, the Supreme Court may take cognizance and assume jurisdiction over special civil actions forcertiorarionly as a last resort and in exceptional cases. The CTA is a highly specialized body created to resolve all tax problems. It should be allowed to determine firsthand all matters relative to the exercise of its specific jurisdiction.

Accordingly, I maintain that the CTAEn Banchas primary jurisdiction to determine grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on all interlocutory orders or judgments issued by any of its divisions.

^[2]SEC. 2, RULE 4, A.M. No. 05-11-07-CTA.

^[3]City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo, 726 Phil. 9-28 (2014) [Per J. Peralta,En Banc].

^[4]Rollo, pp. 13-31.

^[5]Id.at 39-47. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Marian Ivy F. Reyes-Fajardo. Presiding Justice Roman G. Del Rosario issued Dissenting Opinion and joined by Associate Justices Ma. Belen M. Ringpis-Liban, Catherine T. Manahan, and Maria Rowena Modesto-San Pedro,Id.at 48-54. Associate Justice Jean Marie A. Bacorro-Villena issued Separate Concurring Opinion,Id.at 55-60. Associate Justice Lanee S. Cui-David issued Separate Concurring Opinion and joined by Associate Justice Corazon G. Ferrer-Flores,Id.at 61-65.

^[6]Id.at 67-70. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Marian Ivy F. Reyes-Fajardo and concurred in by Associate Justices Jean Marie A. Bacarro-Villena, Lanee S. Cui-David, Corazon G. Ferrer-Flores, and Henry S. Angeles. Presiding Justice Roman G. Del Rosario reiterated his Dissenting Opinion and joined by Associate Justices Ma. Belen M. Ringpis-Liban, Catherine T. Manahan, and Maria Rowena Modesto-San Pedro.

^[7]The dispositive portion of the Decision in CTA Case No. 10450 dated September 28, 2023 reads:

WHEREFORE,the foregoing premises considered, the Petition for Review filed by Nippon Express Philippines Corporation on 15 January 2021 is herebyDENIEDfor lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

The dispositive portion of the Resolution in CTA Case No. 10450 dated January 29, 2024 reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, petitioner's "Motion for Reconsideration" filed on 03 November 2023 isDENIEDfor lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

^[8]So v. Tacla, Jr., 648 Phil. 149-165 (2010) [Per J. Nachura,En Banc];Philippine Airlines v. Pascua, 456 Phil. 425-439 (2003) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].

^[9]Philippine Airlines v. Pascua, 456 Phil. 425-439 (2003) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].

^[10]Vilando v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 671 Phil. 524-540 (2011) [Per J. Mendoza,En Banc].

^[11]Umali v. Judicial and Bar Council, 814 Phil. 253-343 (2017) [Per J. Velasco, Jr.En Banc].

^[12]SeeCommissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals, 765 Phil. 140 (2015) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].

^[13]City of Iloilo v. Philippine Ports Authority, 893 Phil. 399 (2021) [Per J. Zalameda, First Division].

^[14]Philippine Appliance Corp. Employees Association - NATU v. Philippine Appliance Corp., 159 Phil. 551-556 (1975) [Per J. Fernando, Second Division].

^[15]G.R. No. L-12396, January 31, 1962 [Per J. Paredes,En Banc].

^[16]Entitled, "REVISED RULES OF THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS," November 22, 2005.

^[17]765 Phil. 140 (2015) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].

^[18]898 Phil. 131 (2021) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division].

^[19]902 Phil. 446 (2021) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

^[20]G.R. No. 244723 (Notice), April 27, 2022 [Unsigned Resolution, Third Division].

^[21]Entitled, "AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS (CTA), ELEVATING ITS RANK TO THE LEVEL OF A COLLEGIATE COURT WITH SPECIAL JURISDICTION AND ENLARGING ITS MEMBERSHIP, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE CERTAIN SECTIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1125, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LAW CREATING THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," March 30, 2004.

^[22]Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Kepco Ilijan Corp., 787 Phil. 698 (2016) [Per J. Peralta,En Banc].

^[23]787 Phil. 698 (2016) [Per J. Peralta,En Banc].

^[24]921 Phil. 1090 (2022) [Per J. Caguioa, First Division].

^[25]932 Phil. 139 (2022) [Per J. Inting, Third Division].

^[26]G.R. No. 254591 & 254675 (Notice), January 30, 2023 [Unsigned Resolution, Third Division].

^[27]726 Phil. 9-28 (2014) [Per J. Peralta,En Banc]. See alsoCE Casecnan Water & Energy Co., Inc. v. Province of Nueva Ecija, 760 Phil. 835-845 (2015) [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division].

^[28]SEC. 1, ART. VIII, 1987 CONSTITUTION.

^[29]84 Phil. 618-627 (1949) [Per J. Feria,En Banc].

^[30]670 Phil. 665-673 (2011) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro,En Banc].

^[31]659 Phil. 65-70 (2011) [Per J. Peralta,En Banc].

^[32]118 Phil. 1022-1032 (1963) [Per J. Reyes, J.B.L.,En Banc].

^[33]San Miguel Bukid Homeowners Association, Inc. v. City of Mandaluyong, 617 Phil. 231-241 (2009) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].

^[34]Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Kepco Ilijan Corp., 787 Phil. 698 (2016) [Per J. Peralta,En Banc]. See alsoHeirs of Pulido, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161088, September 16, 2015 [Unsigned Resolution, First Division], citing Feria, J. & Noche, Civil Procedure Annotated, 2013 edition, Central Book Store, Quezon City, pp. 669-700.

^[35]Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc., 802 Phil. 116-190 (2016) [Per J. Brion,En Banc], citingMadrigal Transport Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corp., 479 Phil. 768-786 (2004) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division]. See alsoGarcia v. De Jesus, 283 Phil. 735-768 (1992) [Per J. Melencio-Herrera,En Banc] andCentral Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 253 Phil. 39-50 (1989) [Per CJ. Fernan, Third Division].

^[36]Paa v. Court of Appeals, 347 Phil. 122-138 (1997) [Per J. Davide, Jr.,En Banc], citing Florenz D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium [6th ed. 1997], pp. 543-544.

^[37]283 Phil. 735-768 (1992) [Per J. Melencio-Herrera,En Banc].

^[38]497 Phil. 313-327 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].

^[39]See SEC. 2, RULE 4, RRCTA; SEC. 4, RULE 8, RRCTA; and SEC. 9, RULE 9, RRCTA.

^[40]SeeCommissioner of Internal Revenue v. Kepco Ilijan Corp., 787 Phil. 698 (2016) [Per J. Peralta,En Banc].

^[41]Sponsorship Speech of Senate President Franklin M. Drilon, December 1, 2003, Record of the Senate, Volume III, No. 41, Twelfth Congress, Third Regular Session, p. 53.

^[42]House of Representatives Committee Hearing, Committee on Justice, March 4, 2003, pp. 4-6.

^[43]Committee Hearing, Committee on Justice, March 4, 2003, pp. 10-11.

^[44]932 Phil. 139 (2022) [Per J. Inting, Third Division].

^[45]G.R. No. 254591 & 254675 (Notice), January 30, 2023 [Unsigned Resolution, Third Division].

^[46]CE Casecnan Water & Energy Co., Inc. v. Province of Nueva Ecija, 760 Phil. 835-845(2015) [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division].

^[47]The Philippine American Life and General Insurance Co. v. The Secretary of Finance, 747 Phil. 811-832 (2014) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division].

^[48]Banco De Oro v. Republic, 793 Phil. 97 (2016) [Per J. Leonen,En Banc].

^[49]City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo, 726 Phil. 9-28 (2014) [Per J. Peralta,En Banc].

^[50]Bay View Hotel, Inc. v. Manila Hotel Worker's Union-PTGWO, 125 Phil. 247-256 (1966) [Per J. Sanchez,En Banc].

^[51]Bay View Hotel, Inc. v. Manila Hotel Worker's Union-PTGWO, 125 Phil. 247-256 (1966) [Per J. Sanchez,En Banc].

^[52]Filipro, Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 150-B Phil. 537-555 (1972) [Per J. Makasiar, First Division].

^[53]Maynilad Water Services, Inc. v. National Water and Resources Board, 918-A Phil. 17 (2021) [Per J. Leonen,En Banc].

^[54]254 Phil. 418-428 (1989) [Per J. Narvasa, First Division].

^[55]751 Phil. 301-450 (2015) [Per J. Leonen,En Banc].