2025 / Jul
A.C. No. 10317 MA. SARITA G. GUERRERO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. MICHELLE V. GONZAGA AND ATTY. REMUS G. GULMATICO, RESPONDENTS. July 29, 2025
EN BANC
[ A.C. No. 10317, July 29, 2025 ]
MA. SARITA G. GUERRERO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. MICHELLE V. GONZAGA AND ATTY. REMUS G. GULMATICO, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
DIMAAMPAO, J.:
This Complaint[1]seeks the expulsion of respondents Atty. Michelle V. Gonzaga (Atty. Gonzaga) and Atty. Remus G. Gulmatico (Atty. Gulmatico) from the legal profession for some anomalies committed in their capacities as notaries public.[2]
The case against Atty. Gonzaga originated from a Letter-Complaint[3]filed by complainant Ma. Sarita G. Guerrero (Guerrero) before the Office of the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Negros Occidental, averring that Atty. Gonzaga violated the Notarial Law and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice[4]when she made it appear that a deed of absolute sale was executed by the signatories therein under oath before her on December 15, 2010[5]when, in fact, it was executed without her presence on December 3, 2010.[6]Worse, she made it appear that the said deed was docketed as "Doc. No. 54, Page No. 11, Book No. 1, Series of 2010," when a different document is referred to in the notarial registry submitted to the clerk of court of the RTC of Bacolod City.[7]Guerrero prayed that: (1) Atty. Gonzaga's notarial commission be revoked; (2) all documents executed before her which failed to comply with existing notarial requirements be cancelled; and (3) the executive judge of the RTC recommend to the Court that Atty. Gonzaga be disbarred for her actions.[8]
For her part, Atty. Gonzaga countered that she duly notarized the subject deed of absolute sale in accordance with prevailing notarial rules, and that the parties personally appeared before her and presented competent evidence of their respective identities.[9]As to the variance in the notarial registry, she insisted that this was not fraudulent or malicious, but a simple mistake due to oversight and human error of her secretary who assisted her in the annotation of the details in the acknowledgment portion of the deed of sale. Atty. Gonzaga then apologized and took full responsibility for the mistakes of her secretary and begged for leniency.[10]
Executive Judge Anita Guanzon Chua (Executive Judge Chua) of the RTC, Bacolod City held Atty. Gonzaga culpable for not ensuring that the correct notarial particulars were reflected in her notarial registry.[11]Additionally, the inconsistency in the acknowledgment that the deed of absolute sale consisted of four pages, when the submitted instrument consisted of seven pages, casts doubt on the accuracy and veracity of her entire notarial registry.[12]For these violations, her notarial commission was revoked and she was prohibited from being commissioned as a notary public for six months. She was likewise sternly warned that a repetition of the same act would be dealt with more severely.[13]
Dissatisfied, Guerrero moved for reconsideration[14]insisting that Atty. Gonzaga should be permanently disqualified as a notary public and disbarred for her actions. Likewise, criminal cases for falsification and/or perjury should be filed against her, her secretary, and the parties to the subject deed of absolute sale. In a subsequent order, Executive Judge Chua denied Atty. Guerrero's motion and held that the jurisdiction of executive judges to supervise and monitor notaries public is not all-encompassing. Disciplinary complaints against lawyers should be lodged with the Court or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) while criminal complaints should be filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor.[15]
On the other hand, the case against Atty. Gulmatico took off from a Petition/Complaint[16]filed by Guerrero before the Office of the Executive Judge, avouching that Atty. Gulmatico was involved in the spurious execution of a secretary's certificate, in violation of the Notarial Law and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice—done at the behest of a certain Ramon C. Lacson, Jr. (Lacson) as part of a nefarious plot to deprive Guerrero of her legitimate interests over certain properties.[17]While the secretary's certificate appears to have been docketed as "Doc. No. 310, Page No. 62, Book No. XXXV, Series of 2010,"[18]the said notarial particulars pertain to a different document altogether as per the notarial registry submitted to the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Bacolod City.[19]Guerrero sought the conduct of a full investigation against Atty. Gulmatico for other potential violations in relation to instruments he may have notarized in favor of Lacson and prayed: (1) that his notarial commission be revoked permanently; and (2) that the results of the investigation against him be forwarded to the Court, with a recommendation that he be disbarred for his actions.[20]
Atty. Gulmatico declaimed knowledge of any property disputes involving Guerrero and denied being a "puppet" of Lacson.[21]The subject secretary's certificate was not spurious as Lacson, who he personally knew, appeared before him on December 15, 2010 and subscribed and swore to the execution of the document.[22]On the error in the notarial particulars of the said secretary's certificate, he admitted that it was an honest mistake following an accidental double recording in the notarial registry by his secretaries.[23]
Similar to the case of Atty. Gonzaga, Executive Judge Chua found Atty. Gulmatico liable for wholly entrusting the recording of entries to his notarial registry to his secretaries, in contravention of established rules and jurisprudence.[24]By allowing two sets of documents to have the same set of notarial particulars, Atty. Gulmatico violated the provisions of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. He was also made liable for submitting a notarial registry wherein documents were not recorded in chronological order.[25]As a result, his notarial commission was revoked and he was prohibited from being commissioned as a notary public for six months, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same act would be dealt with more severely.[26]
Guerrero moved for the reconsideration of the foregoing Resolution, maintaining that Atty. Gulmatico's actions warrant the permanent revocation of his notarial commission.[27]Moreover, Lacson should also be sanctioned for knowingly soliciting, coercing, and influencing him to commit misconduct in his capacity as a notary public.[28]To Guerrero's dismay, Executive Judge Chua denied her Motion.[29]As Lacson was never impleaded in her Petition/Complaint, sanctions could not be imposed on him. So, too, nothing on record supported her claims that Lacson violated Rule XII, Section 1 (c)[30]of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Executive Judge Chua reminded Guerrero that she may file an appeal with the Court or file a case against Lacson before the Prosecutor's Office.[31]
Unsatisfied by the denial of her two cases against Atty. Gonzaga and Atty. Gulmatico, Guerrero instituted the present Complaint.[32]She argues that the sanctions imposed were "not in consonance with the limited findings of the Honorable Executive Judge, being restricted merely to the temporary revocation of the subject notaries' notarial commission for a mere six (6) months [sic] period allegedly due to lack of jurisdiction[.]"[33]For these reasons, she is constrained to raise "the same action before [the] Honorable Supreme Court for the proper disposition of the [disbarment and criminal][34]charges not acted upon in consonance with the seriousness of the offense committed[.]"[35]
Atty. Gulmatico reiterates the same explanation he proffered before Executive Judge Chua and argues that the Resolution finding him liable had already become final and executory. Necessarily, the refiling of the same action grounded on the same facts is highly improper, especially since Guerrero never appealed the rulings of the executive judge. Citing case law promulgated during the effectivity of the Notarial Law, Atty. Gulmatico also argues that the "Supreme Court has no supervisory jurisdiction over notaries public[.]"[36]
Atty. Gonzaga, for her part, echoes the same explanation given to the executive judge.[37]In addition, the Complaint against her is already barred byres judicataas the Resolution of the executive judge finding her liable was a judgment on the merits and she had already fully served the penalty imposed.[38]Since Guerrero failed to appeal the same, the said Resolution had already attained finality.[39]Conversely, Guerrero is guilty of forum shopping in filing the same suit, which merely seeks a harsher punishment.[40]Atty. Gonzaga prays that she be declared guilty of direct contempt.[41]
In her Reply[42]to the separate comments filed by Atty. Gulmatico and Atty. Gonzaga, Guerrero avows that her earlier actions filed before the Office of the Executive Judge is differently situated from her present action such that the former sought sanctions grounded on the violation of notarial rules while the latter sought the disbarment of Atty. Gonzaga and Atty. Gulmatico grounded on their proclivity to do falsehoods as part of their complicity with the machinations of Lacson and his allies.[43]On her failure to appeal the orders of the executive judge, Guerrero argues that she was precluded from doing so for various reasons.[44]
The Court then referred the case to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation.[45]
Proceedings before the IBP then ensued.
The Report and Recommendation of the IBP
In his Report and Recommendation,[46]Investigating Commissioner Gilbert L. Macatangay (Commissioner Macatangay) recommended that no additional sanctions be imposed on Atty. Gonzaga and Atty. Gulmatico as they had already served the six months suspension of their notarial commission.[47]Commissioner Macatangay held that they were accorded due process and penalized accordingly by the executive judge. They acknowledged their faults, accepted the penalty, learned their lessons, and solicited compassion not to be meted with additional penalties.[48]
In due course, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board) issued its Resolution[49]approving and adopting the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Macatangay, with modification in that both Atty. Gonzaga and Atty. Gulmatico were meted an additional penalty of six months suspension from the practice of law.
Atty. Gonzaga and Atty. Gulmatico moved for reconsideration,[50]which the IBP Board granted.[51]In its Extended Resolution,[52]the IBP Board declared that the same factual narrations and evidence were raised and presented before both the executive judge and the IBP to penalize the same incident. However, the Resolutions of the executive judge holding them administratively liable had already attained finality; thus, the principle of immutability of judgments bars the present action.[53]
Issue
At its core, the Court must determine whether respondents hereon should be held administratively liable for the acts complained of.
The Court's Ruling
The Court resolves to adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP and dismisses the Complaint for lack of merit. Nevertheless, the Court takes this occasion to address several arguments and misconceptions of the parties to guide the Bench and the Bar.
First,it bears stressing that the Court undoubtedly has jurisdiction to supervise and correct errant notaries public as the power of supervision over all personnel of the Judiciary is vested unto the Court by no less than the Constitution itself.[54]This also flows from the basic principle that transgressions of notaries public render the individuals equally liable in their capacities as members of the legal profession.[55]While the Notarial Law found under Title IV, Chapter 11 of the Administrative Code[56]of 1917 does indeed grant supervisory authority over notaries public to the judges of the Courts of First Instance,[57]these provisions have long been superseded by the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice.[58]Thus, the assertion of respondent Atty. Gulmatico that the Supreme Court is without authority to entertain the instant Complaint has no leg to stand on.
Second,Executive Judge Chua did not err in limiting her pronouncement and penalties to the violations of notarial rules committed by respondents. This is clear from the wording of Rule XI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice,viz.:
Third,complainant erred in instituting the instant Complaint instead of appealing the dispositions of Executive Judge Chua. Complainant argues that she had no recourse but to refile the same action before the Court as she was not aware of the limited jurisdiction of the executive judge among other procedural concerns, thusly—
It is expressly stated under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice that "[i]f the charges are duly established, the executive judge shall impose the appropriate administrative sanctions. In either case, the aggrieved partymay appeal the decision to the Supreme Court for review."[61]Moreover, Executive Judge Chua herself reminded complainant that she "always has the recourse to appeal the resolution of this office to the Supreme Court."[62]Consequently, she cannot feign ignorance and insist that this was her only option. In the same vein, she cannot claim that lack of administrative case numbers precluded her from appealing as such picayune matters cannot excuse a violation of express procedural requirements.
By the same token, complainant cannot claim that her prayer for disbarment necessitated a re-filing of the same action. The Court, "upon taking cognizance of [an] administrative case, can revoke, shorten, or extend the suspension, or impose additional disciplinary sanctions as the facts may warrant."[63]Had she appealed the rulings of the Executive Judge, the Court could have imposed additional sanctions, if supported by the facts of the case, given that, as adumbrated above, errant notaries public may also be held liable as members of the legal profession. Instead, what complainant did was to erroneously refile the action against respondents grounded on the same violations of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. This cannot be countenanced.
This Court has held, time and again, that the right to appeal is merely statutory and any person seeking to appeal must comply with the rules for its perfection.[64]The failure to do so in the manner and period set by the law renders the ruling sought to be reconsideredfinal and executory, which precludes this Court from acquiring jurisdiction to review the same.[65]
On this score, the Court recognizes that there appears to be an ambiguity in the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice as to the manner and period within which to appeal a decision of an executive judge. Notably, the Court made a similar observation inRe: Order dated January 7, 2020 of Judge Ignacio I. Alajar suspending Atty. Ely F. Azarraga's Notarial Commission for One (1) Year.[66]
All the same, this ambiguity cannot operate to validate the course taken by complainant. She makes it clear that the Complaint was not an appeal as it is "the same action before [the] Honorable Supreme Court for the proper disposition of the [disbarment and criminal][67]charges not acted upon in consonance with the seriousness of the offense committed[.]"[68]
Having lost her right to appeal the dispositions of the executive judge through express abandonment, she cannot now relitigate the same cause of action against respondents. As above-mentioned, her failure to appeal rendered the said rulings final and executory, thus, immutable. While there are recognized exceptions to the rule on immutability of judgment, such as: "(1) correction of any clerical errors; (2) the so-callednunc pro tuncentries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable[,]"[69]none were alleged and proved in this instance.
Complainant's action is likewise barred byres judicata.Res judicataas a bar by prior judgment applies when the following requisites concur:
A cause of action is a delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in violation of the rights of the plaintiff.[72]There is identity of causes of action when two actions are grounded on the same wrongful act.[73]"A party cannot, by varying the form of the action or by adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the doctrine ofres judicata."[74]
Here, although complainant attempts to frame the culpability of respondents on their participation in a grand scheme of fraud, the specific wrongful acts committed still relate to their violations of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, which were already considered and penalized in the dispositions of Executive Judge Chua. Certainly, the supposed variance on the basis for their administrative liability in both instances is more apparent than real, especially since they are rooted in the same factual circumstances. Hence,res judicatabars the present action.
Corollary thereto, it is settled that forum shopping exists when a final judgment in one case amounts tores judicatain another.[75]Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court states that deliberate forum shopping is a "ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions."
Nevertheless, the Court rules and so holds that complainant did not willfully and deliberately commit forum shopping as contemplated by the Rules of Court. Her actions were borne out of ignorance on the matter coupled with a zeal to bring to justice the people she felt had taken part in a conspiracy to defraud her. To be clear, this Court is not adjudging the truth or falsity of these claims, complainant has other forms of recourse available to her to fully ventilate her allegations, which include the institution of civil and criminal suits. Still, the present administrative case is not one of them. "Complaints against members of the Bar are pursued to preserve the integrity of the legal profession,not for private vendetta."[76]
Even if the Court finds for respondents, they are sternly reminded that notaries public must observe "the highest degree of compliance with the basic requirements of notarial practice in order to preserve public confidence in the integrity of the notarial system."[77]Notarization is not an empty act and is vested with substantive public interest; their failure to strictly adhere with the rules undermines the dependability of notarized documents.[78]Thus, any further transgression and noncompliance with the basic requirements of the notarial rules will be dealt with more severely.
Lastly,the Court takes this occasion to reconcile the apparent conflict between the provisions of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and the Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability (CPRA) when it comes to resolving complaints against notaries public filed before executive judges. This particular issue, as highlighted by the facts of the present case, was subject of much debate among the Members of the Court, in particular, the complainant's failure to timely appeal the executive judge's ruling effectively deprived this Court of the opportunity to exercise its supervisory authority to determine if respondents' actions warranted the imposition of additional sanctions. This operated to work in respondents' favor despite their inaction. It is likewise incongruent with the revised processes introduced by the CPRA for disciplinary proceedings.
Thus, in recognition of the function of CPRA as the definitive Code of Conduct for lawyers, and in the exercise of its constitutional power to promulgate the rules concerning the procedure in all courts and to regulate the practice of law, the Court hereby declares that from the promulgation of this Decision, the mechanism under Rule XI, Section 1 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice shall be deemed superseded by the provisions of Canon VI of the CPRA.
While executive judges retain supervisory authority over notaries public within their jurisdiction, any complaints filed against them shall be investigated in the same manner and within the same periods outlined in Canon VI of the CPRA and its other provisions, where applicable:
ACCORDINGLY,the Court resolves toADOPT and APPROVEthe findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in the attached Report and Recommendation dated November 18, 2015, which its Board of Governors likewise adopted and approved in the Extended Resolution dated July 1, 2022. Perforce, the Complaint against Atty. Michelle V. Gonzaga and Atty. Remus G. Gulmatico isDISMISSEDfor lack of merit.
The case is consideredCLOSEDandTERMINATED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all executive judges in the country for their guidance and information.
SO ORDERED.
Gesmundo, C.J., Hernando, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, Marquez, Kho, Jr.,andVillanueva, JJ.,concur.
Leonen,*SAJ.,see separate concurring opinion.
Caguioa,**J.,on official business, with concurring and dissenting opinion.
Singh,***J.,on leave, with concurring and dissenting opinion.
*With concurring opinion.
**On official business, with concurring and dissenting opinion.
***On leave, with concurring and dissenting opinion.
[1]Rollo, pp. 1-11.
[2]Id. at 9-10.
[3]Id. at 12-15.
[4]A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, August 1, 2004.
[5]Rollo, p. 27.
[6]Id. at 25.
[7]Id. at 12-13; 32, Certificate issued by the Clerk of Court manifesting that under the notarial registry submitted by Atty. Gonzaga, "[D]oc. [N]o. 54, [P]age [N]o. 11, [B]ook [N]o. 1, [S]eries of 2010, is a 'Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping[.']"
[8]Id. at 15.
[9]Id. at 33-34.
[10]Id. at 35; 156.
[11]Id. at 33-39. The August 30, 2013 Resolution was penned by Executive Judge Anita Guanzon Chua of the Regional Trial Court, Bacolod City.
[12]Id. at 37-38.
[13]Id. at 39.
[14]Seeid. at 237. The Motion for Reconsideration to the August 30, 2013 Resolution is not attached in therollo, but is referenced in the October 9, 2013 Order of Executive Judge Anita Guanzon Chua of the RTC, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental.
[15]Id. at 237-238.
[16]Id. at 40-44.
[17]Id. at 41-42.
[18]Id. at 46-49.
[19]Id. at 42; 50, Certificate issued by the Clerk of Court manifesting that under the notarial registry submitted by Atty. Gulmatico, "[D]oc. [N]o. 310, [P]age [N]o. 62, [B]ook [N]o. XXXV, [S]eries of 2010, is a 'GENERAL POWER OF ATTORNEY[.']"
[20]Id. at 43.
[21]Id. at 104-105.
[22]Id. at 106.
[23]Id. at 105-106.
[24]Id. at 56-60. The November 16, 2023 Resolution was penned by Executive Judge Anita Guanzon Chua of the RTC, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental.
[25]Id. at 58.
[26]Id. at 60.
[27]Id. at 119-125.
[28]Id. at 124.
[29]Id. at 126-127.
[30]SECTION 1.Punishable Acts. - The Executive Judge shall cause the prosecution of any person who:
[32]Id. at 1-11.
[33]Id. at 5.
[34]Id.
[35]Id.
[36]Id. at 80-81.
[37]Id. at 154-163.
[38]Id. at 148-151.
[39]Id. at 149-150.
[40]Id. at 152-153.
[41]Id. at 163.
[42]Id. at 214-236.
[43]Id. at 215-217.
[44]Id. at 220.
[45]Id. at 365-366. The September 15, 2014 Resolution was signed by Division Clerk of Court Wilfredo V. Lapitan.
[46]Id. at 579-581.
[47]Id. at 581.
[48]Id.
[49]Id. at 641. The June 17, 2017 Notice of Resolution was signed by National Secretary Patricia-Ann T. Prodigalidad.
[50]Id. at 582-594 and 614-628.
[51]Id. at 635-636. The January 26, 2020 Notice of Resolution was signed by National Secretary Roland B. Inting.
[52]Id. at 637-640. The July 1, 2022 Extended Resolution was signed by CBD Task Force Commissioner Diana S. Fajardo-Lampa, by authority of the IBP Board of Governors.
[53]Id. at 639.
[54]CONST., art. VIII, sec. 6, reads: "The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof."
[55]SeeRe: Order dated January 7, 2020 of Judge Ignacio I. Alajar suspending Atty. Ely F. Azarraga's Notarial Commission for One (1) Year, 895 Phil. 386 (2021) [Per J. Delos Santos, Third Division].
[56]Act No. 2711 (1917), AN ACT AMENDING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE.
[57]ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, sec. 248 states:
[59]SeeTan v. Atty. Pangan, 934 Phil. 913 (2023) [Per J. Leonen,En Banc].
[60]Rollo, p. 220.
[61]2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Rule XI, sec. 1(c). (Emphasis supplied)
[62]Rollo, p. 127.
[63]Re: Order dated January 7, 2020 of Judge Ignacio I. Alajar suspending Atty. Ely F. Azarraga's Notarial Commission for One (1) Year, 895 Phil. 386, 392 (2021) [Per J. Delos Santos, Third Division].
[64]SeeOliveros v. Court of Appeals, 885 Phil. 649, 659 (2020) [Per J. Inting, Second Division].
[65]Id.
[66]895 Phil. 386 (2021) [Per J. Delos Santos, Third Division].
[67]Rollo, p. 5.
[68]Id.
[69]Uematsu v. Balinon, 866 Phil. 553, 562 (2019) [Per J. Inting, Second Division].
[70]Golez v. Abais, 868 Phil. 186, 203-204 (2020) [Per J. Caguioa, First Division]. (Citation omitted)
[71]Rollo, pp. 9-10.
[72]Villaroman v. Estate of Arciaga, 905 Phil. 622, 637 (2021) [Per J. Hernando, Third Division]. (Citation omitted)
[73]Id. at 638,citingRiviera Golf Club, Inc. v. CCA Holdings, B.V., 760 Phil. 655 (2015) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
[74]Id.
[75]Atty. Go v. Atty. Teruel, 889 Phil. 1, 8 (2020) [Per J. Hernando, Third Division].
[76]Lim, Jr. v. Atty. Villarosa, 524 Phil. 37, 52 (2006) [Per J. Corona, Second Division]. (Emphasis supplied)
[77]Orenia III v. Atty. Gonzales, 887 Phil. 520, 528 (2020) [Per J. Inting, Second Division].
[78]Id. at 528.
The case against Atty. Gonzaga originated from a Letter-Complaint[3]filed by complainant Ma. Sarita G. Guerrero (Guerrero) before the Office of the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Negros Occidental, averring that Atty. Gonzaga violated the Notarial Law and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice[4]when she made it appear that a deed of absolute sale was executed by the signatories therein under oath before her on December 15, 2010[5]when, in fact, it was executed without her presence on December 3, 2010.[6]Worse, she made it appear that the said deed was docketed as "Doc. No. 54, Page No. 11, Book No. 1, Series of 2010," when a different document is referred to in the notarial registry submitted to the clerk of court of the RTC of Bacolod City.[7]Guerrero prayed that: (1) Atty. Gonzaga's notarial commission be revoked; (2) all documents executed before her which failed to comply with existing notarial requirements be cancelled; and (3) the executive judge of the RTC recommend to the Court that Atty. Gonzaga be disbarred for her actions.[8]
For her part, Atty. Gonzaga countered that she duly notarized the subject deed of absolute sale in accordance with prevailing notarial rules, and that the parties personally appeared before her and presented competent evidence of their respective identities.[9]As to the variance in the notarial registry, she insisted that this was not fraudulent or malicious, but a simple mistake due to oversight and human error of her secretary who assisted her in the annotation of the details in the acknowledgment portion of the deed of sale. Atty. Gonzaga then apologized and took full responsibility for the mistakes of her secretary and begged for leniency.[10]
Executive Judge Anita Guanzon Chua (Executive Judge Chua) of the RTC, Bacolod City held Atty. Gonzaga culpable for not ensuring that the correct notarial particulars were reflected in her notarial registry.[11]Additionally, the inconsistency in the acknowledgment that the deed of absolute sale consisted of four pages, when the submitted instrument consisted of seven pages, casts doubt on the accuracy and veracity of her entire notarial registry.[12]For these violations, her notarial commission was revoked and she was prohibited from being commissioned as a notary public for six months. She was likewise sternly warned that a repetition of the same act would be dealt with more severely.[13]
Dissatisfied, Guerrero moved for reconsideration[14]insisting that Atty. Gonzaga should be permanently disqualified as a notary public and disbarred for her actions. Likewise, criminal cases for falsification and/or perjury should be filed against her, her secretary, and the parties to the subject deed of absolute sale. In a subsequent order, Executive Judge Chua denied Atty. Guerrero's motion and held that the jurisdiction of executive judges to supervise and monitor notaries public is not all-encompassing. Disciplinary complaints against lawyers should be lodged with the Court or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) while criminal complaints should be filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor.[15]
On the other hand, the case against Atty. Gulmatico took off from a Petition/Complaint[16]filed by Guerrero before the Office of the Executive Judge, avouching that Atty. Gulmatico was involved in the spurious execution of a secretary's certificate, in violation of the Notarial Law and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice—done at the behest of a certain Ramon C. Lacson, Jr. (Lacson) as part of a nefarious plot to deprive Guerrero of her legitimate interests over certain properties.[17]While the secretary's certificate appears to have been docketed as "Doc. No. 310, Page No. 62, Book No. XXXV, Series of 2010,"[18]the said notarial particulars pertain to a different document altogether as per the notarial registry submitted to the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Bacolod City.[19]Guerrero sought the conduct of a full investigation against Atty. Gulmatico for other potential violations in relation to instruments he may have notarized in favor of Lacson and prayed: (1) that his notarial commission be revoked permanently; and (2) that the results of the investigation against him be forwarded to the Court, with a recommendation that he be disbarred for his actions.[20]
Atty. Gulmatico declaimed knowledge of any property disputes involving Guerrero and denied being a "puppet" of Lacson.[21]The subject secretary's certificate was not spurious as Lacson, who he personally knew, appeared before him on December 15, 2010 and subscribed and swore to the execution of the document.[22]On the error in the notarial particulars of the said secretary's certificate, he admitted that it was an honest mistake following an accidental double recording in the notarial registry by his secretaries.[23]
Similar to the case of Atty. Gonzaga, Executive Judge Chua found Atty. Gulmatico liable for wholly entrusting the recording of entries to his notarial registry to his secretaries, in contravention of established rules and jurisprudence.[24]By allowing two sets of documents to have the same set of notarial particulars, Atty. Gulmatico violated the provisions of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. He was also made liable for submitting a notarial registry wherein documents were not recorded in chronological order.[25]As a result, his notarial commission was revoked and he was prohibited from being commissioned as a notary public for six months, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same act would be dealt with more severely.[26]
Guerrero moved for the reconsideration of the foregoing Resolution, maintaining that Atty. Gulmatico's actions warrant the permanent revocation of his notarial commission.[27]Moreover, Lacson should also be sanctioned for knowingly soliciting, coercing, and influencing him to commit misconduct in his capacity as a notary public.[28]To Guerrero's dismay, Executive Judge Chua denied her Motion.[29]As Lacson was never impleaded in her Petition/Complaint, sanctions could not be imposed on him. So, too, nothing on record supported her claims that Lacson violated Rule XII, Section 1 (c)[30]of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Executive Judge Chua reminded Guerrero that she may file an appeal with the Court or file a case against Lacson before the Prosecutor's Office.[31]
Unsatisfied by the denial of her two cases against Atty. Gonzaga and Atty. Gulmatico, Guerrero instituted the present Complaint.[32]She argues that the sanctions imposed were "not in consonance with the limited findings of the Honorable Executive Judge, being restricted merely to the temporary revocation of the subject notaries' notarial commission for a mere six (6) months [sic] period allegedly due to lack of jurisdiction[.]"[33]For these reasons, she is constrained to raise "the same action before [the] Honorable Supreme Court for the proper disposition of the [disbarment and criminal][34]charges not acted upon in consonance with the seriousness of the offense committed[.]"[35]
Atty. Gulmatico reiterates the same explanation he proffered before Executive Judge Chua and argues that the Resolution finding him liable had already become final and executory. Necessarily, the refiling of the same action grounded on the same facts is highly improper, especially since Guerrero never appealed the rulings of the executive judge. Citing case law promulgated during the effectivity of the Notarial Law, Atty. Gulmatico also argues that the "Supreme Court has no supervisory jurisdiction over notaries public[.]"[36]
Atty. Gonzaga, for her part, echoes the same explanation given to the executive judge.[37]In addition, the Complaint against her is already barred byres judicataas the Resolution of the executive judge finding her liable was a judgment on the merits and she had already fully served the penalty imposed.[38]Since Guerrero failed to appeal the same, the said Resolution had already attained finality.[39]Conversely, Guerrero is guilty of forum shopping in filing the same suit, which merely seeks a harsher punishment.[40]Atty. Gonzaga prays that she be declared guilty of direct contempt.[41]
In her Reply[42]to the separate comments filed by Atty. Gulmatico and Atty. Gonzaga, Guerrero avows that her earlier actions filed before the Office of the Executive Judge is differently situated from her present action such that the former sought sanctions grounded on the violation of notarial rules while the latter sought the disbarment of Atty. Gonzaga and Atty. Gulmatico grounded on their proclivity to do falsehoods as part of their complicity with the machinations of Lacson and his allies.[43]On her failure to appeal the orders of the executive judge, Guerrero argues that she was precluded from doing so for various reasons.[44]
The Court then referred the case to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation.[45]
Proceedings before the IBP then ensued.
In his Report and Recommendation,[46]Investigating Commissioner Gilbert L. Macatangay (Commissioner Macatangay) recommended that no additional sanctions be imposed on Atty. Gonzaga and Atty. Gulmatico as they had already served the six months suspension of their notarial commission.[47]Commissioner Macatangay held that they were accorded due process and penalized accordingly by the executive judge. They acknowledged their faults, accepted the penalty, learned their lessons, and solicited compassion not to be meted with additional penalties.[48]
In due course, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board) issued its Resolution[49]approving and adopting the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Macatangay, with modification in that both Atty. Gonzaga and Atty. Gulmatico were meted an additional penalty of six months suspension from the practice of law.
Atty. Gonzaga and Atty. Gulmatico moved for reconsideration,[50]which the IBP Board granted.[51]In its Extended Resolution,[52]the IBP Board declared that the same factual narrations and evidence were raised and presented before both the executive judge and the IBP to penalize the same incident. However, the Resolutions of the executive judge holding them administratively liable had already attained finality; thus, the principle of immutability of judgments bars the present action.[53]
At its core, the Court must determine whether respondents hereon should be held administratively liable for the acts complained of.
The Court resolves to adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP and dismisses the Complaint for lack of merit. Nevertheless, the Court takes this occasion to address several arguments and misconceptions of the parties to guide the Bench and the Bar.
First,it bears stressing that the Court undoubtedly has jurisdiction to supervise and correct errant notaries public as the power of supervision over all personnel of the Judiciary is vested unto the Court by no less than the Constitution itself.[54]This also flows from the basic principle that transgressions of notaries public render the individuals equally liable in their capacities as members of the legal profession.[55]While the Notarial Law found under Title IV, Chapter 11 of the Administrative Code[56]of 1917 does indeed grant supervisory authority over notaries public to the judges of the Courts of First Instance,[57]these provisions have long been superseded by the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice.[58]Thus, the assertion of respondent Atty. Gulmatico that the Supreme Court is without authority to entertain the instant Complaint has no leg to stand on.
Second,Executive Judge Chua did not err in limiting her pronouncement and penalties to the violations of notarial rules committed by respondents. This is clear from the wording of Rule XI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice,viz.:
A circumspect reading of the above-quoted provisions yields the inevitable conclusion that the delegated authority to executive judges with respect to supervision over notaries public is limited to ensuring compliance with the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Although the Rules allow the executive judge to impose "appropriate administrative sanctions," this most certainly cannot include the power to disbar respondents as this power is reserved to this Court and is exercised only for the most imperative of reasons.[59]RULE XI
Revocation of Commission and Disciplinary Sanctions
SECTION 1.Revocation and Administrative Sanctions.- (a) The Executive Judge shall revoke a notarial commission for any ground on which an application for a commission may be denied.
(b) In addition, the Executive Judge may revoke the commission of, or impose appropriate administrative sanctions upon, any notary public who:
(c) Upon verified complaint by an interested, affected or aggrieved person, the notary public shall be required to file a verified answer to the complaint. If the answer of the notary public is not satisfactory, the Executive Judge shall conduct a summary hearing. If the allegations of the complaint are not proven, the complaint shall be dismissed. If the charges are duly established, the Executive Judge shall impose the appropriate administrative sanctions. In either case, the aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the Supreme Court for review. Pending the appeal, an order imposing disciplinary sanctions shall be immediately executory, unless otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court.
(d) The Executive Judge maymotu proprioinitiate administrative proceedings against a notary public, subject to the procedures prescribed in paragraph (c) above and impose the appropriate administrative sanctions on the grounds mentioned in the preceding paragraphs (a) and (b).
SECTION 2.Supervision and Monitoring of Notaries Public. -The Executive Judge shall at all times exercise supervision over notaries public and shall closely monitor their activities.
Third,complainant erred in instituting the instant Complaint instead of appealing the dispositions of Executive Judge Chua. Complainant argues that she had no recourse but to refile the same action before the Court as she was not aware of the limited jurisdiction of the executive judge among other procedural concerns, thusly—
Contrary to the misplaced contention of respondents that complainant should have appealed the Order of the Executive Judge instead of filing a similar complaint before the Honorable Supreme Court, the limitation of the actions lying within the jurisdiction of the Office of the Executive Judge to mere disciplinary actions against erring notaries, discovered only upon complainant's receipt of the abovementioned Order, in addition to the fact that both actions were not docketed and assigned their respective case nos., precluded complainant from raising both judgments rendered by said office on Appeal before the Honorable Supreme Court.[60]The contention cannot stand judicial muster.
It is expressly stated under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice that "[i]f the charges are duly established, the executive judge shall impose the appropriate administrative sanctions. In either case, the aggrieved partymay appeal the decision to the Supreme Court for review."[61]Moreover, Executive Judge Chua herself reminded complainant that she "always has the recourse to appeal the resolution of this office to the Supreme Court."[62]Consequently, she cannot feign ignorance and insist that this was her only option. In the same vein, she cannot claim that lack of administrative case numbers precluded her from appealing as such picayune matters cannot excuse a violation of express procedural requirements.
By the same token, complainant cannot claim that her prayer for disbarment necessitated a re-filing of the same action. The Court, "upon taking cognizance of [an] administrative case, can revoke, shorten, or extend the suspension, or impose additional disciplinary sanctions as the facts may warrant."[63]Had she appealed the rulings of the Executive Judge, the Court could have imposed additional sanctions, if supported by the facts of the case, given that, as adumbrated above, errant notaries public may also be held liable as members of the legal profession. Instead, what complainant did was to erroneously refile the action against respondents grounded on the same violations of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. This cannot be countenanced.
This Court has held, time and again, that the right to appeal is merely statutory and any person seeking to appeal must comply with the rules for its perfection.[64]The failure to do so in the manner and period set by the law renders the ruling sought to be reconsideredfinal and executory, which precludes this Court from acquiring jurisdiction to review the same.[65]
On this score, the Court recognizes that there appears to be an ambiguity in the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice as to the manner and period within which to appeal a decision of an executive judge. Notably, the Court made a similar observation inRe: Order dated January 7, 2020 of Judge Ignacio I. Alajar suspending Atty. Ely F. Azarraga's Notarial Commission for One (1) Year.[66]
All the same, this ambiguity cannot operate to validate the course taken by complainant. She makes it clear that the Complaint was not an appeal as it is "the same action before [the] Honorable Supreme Court for the proper disposition of the [disbarment and criminal][67]charges not acted upon in consonance with the seriousness of the offense committed[.]"[68]
Having lost her right to appeal the dispositions of the executive judge through express abandonment, she cannot now relitigate the same cause of action against respondents. As above-mentioned, her failure to appeal rendered the said rulings final and executory, thus, immutable. While there are recognized exceptions to the rule on immutability of judgment, such as: "(1) correction of any clerical errors; (2) the so-callednunc pro tuncentries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable[,]"[69]none were alleged and proved in this instance.
Complainant's action is likewise barred byres judicata.Res judicataas a bar by prior judgment applies when the following requisites concur:
a. it must be a final judgment or order;There can be no serious debate as to the existence of the first, second, and fourth requisite, complainant does not contest that the rulings of the executive judge are final orders on the merits and that it had jurisdiction over the charges against respondents for violations of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. There is likewise no dispute that there is identity of parties and subject matter as both cases seek administrative sanctions against the same respondents. However, complainant maintains that the present Complaint is based on a different cause of action to the Complaints filed before the executive judge; specifically, that respondents, through their pleadings, demonstrated a proclivity for falsehood and that they acted as "puppets" of Lacson and his cohorts in their scheme to defraud her from her just share in some contested realties, which warrant not only their disbarment but also their prosecution for criminal charges.[71]
b. the court rendering the same must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and over parties;
c. there must be between the two cases identity of parties, identity of subject matter and identity of causes of action; and
d. it must be a judgment or order on the merits.[70]
A cause of action is a delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in violation of the rights of the plaintiff.[72]There is identity of causes of action when two actions are grounded on the same wrongful act.[73]"A party cannot, by varying the form of the action or by adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the doctrine ofres judicata."[74]
Here, although complainant attempts to frame the culpability of respondents on their participation in a grand scheme of fraud, the specific wrongful acts committed still relate to their violations of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, which were already considered and penalized in the dispositions of Executive Judge Chua. Certainly, the supposed variance on the basis for their administrative liability in both instances is more apparent than real, especially since they are rooted in the same factual circumstances. Hence,res judicatabars the present action.
Corollary thereto, it is settled that forum shopping exists when a final judgment in one case amounts tores judicatain another.[75]Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court states that deliberate forum shopping is a "ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions."
Nevertheless, the Court rules and so holds that complainant did not willfully and deliberately commit forum shopping as contemplated by the Rules of Court. Her actions were borne out of ignorance on the matter coupled with a zeal to bring to justice the people she felt had taken part in a conspiracy to defraud her. To be clear, this Court is not adjudging the truth or falsity of these claims, complainant has other forms of recourse available to her to fully ventilate her allegations, which include the institution of civil and criminal suits. Still, the present administrative case is not one of them. "Complaints against members of the Bar are pursued to preserve the integrity of the legal profession,not for private vendetta."[76]
Even if the Court finds for respondents, they are sternly reminded that notaries public must observe "the highest degree of compliance with the basic requirements of notarial practice in order to preserve public confidence in the integrity of the notarial system."[77]Notarization is not an empty act and is vested with substantive public interest; their failure to strictly adhere with the rules undermines the dependability of notarized documents.[78]Thus, any further transgression and noncompliance with the basic requirements of the notarial rules will be dealt with more severely.
Lastly,the Court takes this occasion to reconcile the apparent conflict between the provisions of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and the Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability (CPRA) when it comes to resolving complaints against notaries public filed before executive judges. This particular issue, as highlighted by the facts of the present case, was subject of much debate among the Members of the Court, in particular, the complainant's failure to timely appeal the executive judge's ruling effectively deprived this Court of the opportunity to exercise its supervisory authority to determine if respondents' actions warranted the imposition of additional sanctions. This operated to work in respondents' favor despite their inaction. It is likewise incongruent with the revised processes introduced by the CPRA for disciplinary proceedings.
Thus, in recognition of the function of CPRA as the definitive Code of Conduct for lawyers, and in the exercise of its constitutional power to promulgate the rules concerning the procedure in all courts and to regulate the practice of law, the Court hereby declares that from the promulgation of this Decision, the mechanism under Rule XI, Section 1 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice shall be deemed superseded by the provisions of Canon VI of the CPRA.
While executive judges retain supervisory authority over notaries public within their jurisdiction, any complaints filed against them shall be investigated in the same manner and within the same periods outlined in Canon VI of the CPRA and its other provisions, where applicable:
- The Executive Judge shall have 15 days from receipt of any complaint to either dismiss the same for lack of prima facie showing or to issue summons to direct the respondent notary public to file their answer in accordance with Canon VI, Sections 11 and 13.
- The Executive Judge shall then conduct the proceedings, including the preliminary conference and clarificatory hearings whenever necessary, in the same manner and within the same periods under Canon VI, Sections 21 and 22.
- The Executive Judge shall issue and submit to this Court a report and recommendation within a non-extendible period of 60 calendar days from receipt of the last position paper or lapse of the period given as provided in Canon VI, Section 25, but in no case shall it exceed the 180-day period under Canon VI, Section 8 from receipt of the complaint. This report and recommendation shall include the assessment of the Executive Judge on whether the acts complained of likewise constitute violations of the CPRA warranting additional sanctions.
- The Executive Judge may exercise all powers necessary and incidental to effect their jurisdiction but only within the parameters of the applicable provisions under Canon VI.
- The Executive Judge shall likewise retain authority to initiate administrative proceedings against notaries publicmotu propriowhich shall likewise be resolved through the submission of a report and recommendation to this Court.
ACCORDINGLY,the Court resolves toADOPT and APPROVEthe findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in the attached Report and Recommendation dated November 18, 2015, which its Board of Governors likewise adopted and approved in the Extended Resolution dated July 1, 2022. Perforce, the Complaint against Atty. Michelle V. Gonzaga and Atty. Remus G. Gulmatico isDISMISSEDfor lack of merit.
The case is consideredCLOSEDandTERMINATED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all executive judges in the country for their guidance and information.
SO ORDERED.
Gesmundo, C.J., Hernando, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, Marquez, Kho, Jr.,andVillanueva, JJ.,concur.
Leonen,*SAJ.,see separate concurring opinion.
Caguioa,**J.,on official business, with concurring and dissenting opinion.
Singh,***J.,on leave, with concurring and dissenting opinion.
*With concurring opinion.
**On official business, with concurring and dissenting opinion.
***On leave, with concurring and dissenting opinion.
[1]Rollo, pp. 1-11.
[2]Id. at 9-10.
[3]Id. at 12-15.
[4]A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, August 1, 2004.
[5]Rollo, p. 27.
[6]Id. at 25.
[7]Id. at 12-13; 32, Certificate issued by the Clerk of Court manifesting that under the notarial registry submitted by Atty. Gonzaga, "[D]oc. [N]o. 54, [P]age [N]o. 11, [B]ook [N]o. 1, [S]eries of 2010, is a 'Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping[.']"
[8]Id. at 15.
[9]Id. at 33-34.
[10]Id. at 35; 156.
[11]Id. at 33-39. The August 30, 2013 Resolution was penned by Executive Judge Anita Guanzon Chua of the Regional Trial Court, Bacolod City.
[12]Id. at 37-38.
[13]Id. at 39.
[14]Seeid. at 237. The Motion for Reconsideration to the August 30, 2013 Resolution is not attached in therollo, but is referenced in the October 9, 2013 Order of Executive Judge Anita Guanzon Chua of the RTC, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental.
[15]Id. at 237-238.
[16]Id. at 40-44.
[17]Id. at 41-42.
[18]Id. at 46-49.
[19]Id. at 42; 50, Certificate issued by the Clerk of Court manifesting that under the notarial registry submitted by Atty. Gulmatico, "[D]oc. [N]o. 310, [P]age [N]o. 62, [B]ook [N]o. XXXV, [S]eries of 2010, is a 'GENERAL POWER OF ATTORNEY[.']"
[20]Id. at 43.
[21]Id. at 104-105.
[22]Id. at 106.
[23]Id. at 105-106.
[24]Id. at 56-60. The November 16, 2023 Resolution was penned by Executive Judge Anita Guanzon Chua of the RTC, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental.
[25]Id. at 58.
[26]Id. at 60.
[27]Id. at 119-125.
[28]Id. at 124.
[29]Id. at 126-127.
[30]SECTION 1.Punishable Acts. - The Executive Judge shall cause the prosecution of any person who:
. . . .[31]Rollo, p. 127.
(c) knowingly solicits, coerces, or in any way influences a notary public to commit official misconduct.
[32]Id. at 1-11.
[33]Id. at 5.
[34]Id.
[35]Id.
[36]Id. at 80-81.
[37]Id. at 154-163.
[38]Id. at 148-151.
[39]Id. at 149-150.
[40]Id. at 152-153.
[41]Id. at 163.
[42]Id. at 214-236.
[43]Id. at 215-217.
[44]Id. at 220.
[45]Id. at 365-366. The September 15, 2014 Resolution was signed by Division Clerk of Court Wilfredo V. Lapitan.
[46]Id. at 579-581.
[47]Id. at 581.
[48]Id.
[49]Id. at 641. The June 17, 2017 Notice of Resolution was signed by National Secretary Patricia-Ann T. Prodigalidad.
[50]Id. at 582-594 and 614-628.
[51]Id. at 635-636. The January 26, 2020 Notice of Resolution was signed by National Secretary Roland B. Inting.
[52]Id. at 637-640. The July 1, 2022 Extended Resolution was signed by CBD Task Force Commissioner Diana S. Fajardo-Lampa, by authority of the IBP Board of Governors.
[53]Id. at 639.
[54]CONST., art. VIII, sec. 6, reads: "The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof."
[55]SeeRe: Order dated January 7, 2020 of Judge Ignacio I. Alajar suspending Atty. Ely F. Azarraga's Notarial Commission for One (1) Year, 895 Phil. 386 (2021) [Per J. Delos Santos, Third Division].
[56]Act No. 2711 (1917), AN ACT AMENDING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE.
[57]ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, sec. 248 states:
SECTION 248.Supervision of judges of first instance over notaries public. — The judge of the Court of First Instance in each judicial district shall at all times exercise supervision over the notaries public within his district and shall keep himself informed of the manner in which they perform their duties by personal inspection wherever possible, or from reports which he may require from them, or from any other available source.[58]Mabini v. Atty. Kintanar, 825 Phil. 1, 7 (2018) [Per J. Del Castillo, First Division].
[59]SeeTan v. Atty. Pangan, 934 Phil. 913 (2023) [Per J. Leonen,En Banc].
[60]Rollo, p. 220.
[61]2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Rule XI, sec. 1(c). (Emphasis supplied)
[62]Rollo, p. 127.
[63]Re: Order dated January 7, 2020 of Judge Ignacio I. Alajar suspending Atty. Ely F. Azarraga's Notarial Commission for One (1) Year, 895 Phil. 386, 392 (2021) [Per J. Delos Santos, Third Division].
[64]SeeOliveros v. Court of Appeals, 885 Phil. 649, 659 (2020) [Per J. Inting, Second Division].
[65]Id.
[66]895 Phil. 386 (2021) [Per J. Delos Santos, Third Division].
[67]Rollo, p. 5.
[68]Id.
[69]Uematsu v. Balinon, 866 Phil. 553, 562 (2019) [Per J. Inting, Second Division].
[70]Golez v. Abais, 868 Phil. 186, 203-204 (2020) [Per J. Caguioa, First Division]. (Citation omitted)
[71]Rollo, pp. 9-10.
[72]Villaroman v. Estate of Arciaga, 905 Phil. 622, 637 (2021) [Per J. Hernando, Third Division]. (Citation omitted)
[73]Id. at 638,citingRiviera Golf Club, Inc. v. CCA Holdings, B.V., 760 Phil. 655 (2015) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
[74]Id.
[75]Atty. Go v. Atty. Teruel, 889 Phil. 1, 8 (2020) [Per J. Hernando, Third Division].
[76]Lim, Jr. v. Atty. Villarosa, 524 Phil. 37, 52 (2006) [Per J. Corona, Second Division]. (Emphasis supplied)
[77]Orenia III v. Atty. Gonzales, 887 Phil. 520, 528 (2020) [Per J. Inting, Second Division].
[78]Id. at 528.
LEONEN,SAJ.:
I concur with theponencia.
InRe: Order Dated January 7, 2020 of Judge Ignacio I. Alajar Suspending Atty. Ely F. Azarraga's Notarial Commission for one year,[1]this Court had already foreseen the wisdom of amending the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice in order to outline the proper mode and period of appeal of the aggrieved notary public from the imposition of administrative sanctions by the Executive Judge. As aptly pointed out by this Court in the case:
[P]erhaps, for purposes of clarification and guidance to any party meted with disciplinary sanctions pursuant to Sections 1 (c) and (d), Rule XI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, it would be prudent to consider an amendment thereof to clarify the proper mode and period of appeal and to harmonize the same with the pertinent provisions of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.[2]I agree with theponentethat this case is the correct occasion to reconcile the apparent conflict between provisions of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and the new Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability (CPRA).[3]As aptly pointed out by Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, "this is simply in recognition of the well-settled principle in disciplinary cases that a breach of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice would also constitute a violation of the CPRA."[4]
Article VIII, Section 5, Paragraph 5 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution grants this Court the plenary authority to "[p]romulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged."[5]Additionally, Article VIII, Section 11 of the Constitution charges this Court with the "power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal[.]"[6]Likewise, Section 6 of the same Article "mandates that [this Court] shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof."[7]
InJudge Fider-Reyes v. Everglory Metal Trading Corporation,[8]this Court stated that "the administrative functions of this court include disciplinary and administrative matters involving justices, judges, and court personnel."[9]The court personnel over which this Court exercises disciplinary power over include notaries public.
As this Court also stated inRe: Order Dated January 7, 2020 of Judge Ignacio I. Alajar, notaries public may be liable for violating not only the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, but also the tenets of the CPRA, considering that:
[A]n erring lawyer who is found to be remiss in his functions as a notary public is considered to have violated his oath as a lawyer as well. He does not only fail to fulfill his solemn oath of upholding and obeying the law and its legal processes, but he also commits an act of falsehood and engages in an unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct.[10](Citations omitted)In view of the exclusive constitutional power of the Court to discipline lawyers who are also notaries public, I am of the view that the Executive Judge should only make Reports and Recommendations for disciplinary actions and for limitations on the right to have a notarial commission. Likewise, it is the CPRA which should be determinative of the process of appeal from the findings of the Executive Judge regarding the alleged violations of notaries public, since it is the later issuance compared to the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
Hence, I agree with theponenciathat while Executive Judges "retain supervisory authority over notaries public within their jurisdiction, any complaints filed against them shall be investigated in the same manner and within the same periods outlined in Canon VI, Section 25 of the CPRA and its other provisions, where applicable."[11]In short, the Executive Judge, instead of rendering a decision, acts as the primary investigator-in-charge, and shall "conduct the proceedings, including the preliminary conference and clarificatory hearings whenever necessary."[12]
As theponenciaalso states, Executive Judges shall also submit a Report and Recommendation to this Court, which "shall include the assessment of the Executive Judge on whether the acts complained of likewise constitute violations of the CPRA warranting additional sanctions."[13]They shall likewise retain the authority to "initiate administrative proceedings against notaries publicmotu propriowhich shall likewise be resolved through the submission of a [R]eport and [R]ecommendation to this Court."[14]
As observed inJudge Fider-Reyes, when this Court "acts on complaints against judges or any personnel under its supervision, it acts as personnel administrator, imposing discipline and not as a court judging justiciable controversies."[15]The object of a disciplinary proceeding, then, is to "deal with the fitness of the court's officer to continue in that office, to preserve and protect the court and the public from the official ministrations of persons unfit or unworthy to hold such office."[16]In asserting its disciplinary power over lawyers who are likewise notaries public, the principal purpose of this Court is to "assure respect for orders of such court by attorneys who, as much as judges, are responsible for the orderly administration of justice."[17]
ACCORDINGLY, I vote toADOPT AND APPROVEthe findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in the attached November 18, 2015 Report and Recommendation, which its Board of Governors likewise adopted and approved in the July 1, 2022 Extended Resolution. I also vote toDISMISSthe Complaint against Atty. Michelle V. Gonzaga and Atty. Remus G. Gulmatico for lack of merit.
[1]895 Phil. 386 (2021) [Per J. Delos Santos, Third Division].
[2]Id. at 391-392.
[3]Ponencia, p. 12.
[4]Reflections of Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, p. 2.
[5]CONST., art. VIII, sec. 5(5).
[6]CONST., art. VIII, sec. 11.
[7]A.M. No. 18-01-05-SC, Establishment of the Judicial Integrity Board (JIB) and the Corruption and Investigation Office (CPIO), July 7, 2020,citingCONST., art. VIII, sec. 6.
[8]912 Phil. 755 (2021) [Per J. Carandang, Third Division].
[9]Id.
[10]Re: Order Dated January 7, 2020 of Judge Ignacio I. Alajar Suspending Atty. Ely F. Azarraga's Notarial Commission for one (1) year, 895 Phil. 386, 392 (2021) [Per J. Delos Santos, Third Division].
[11]Ponencia, p. 13.
[12]Id.
[13]Id.
[14]Id.
[15]Judge Fider-Reyes v. Everglory Metal Trading Corporation, 912 Phil. 755 (2021) [Per J. Carandang, Third Division].
[16]Id.
[17]Id.
CAGUIOA,J.:
Theponenciarecommends the dismissal of the disbarment complaint against respondents Atty. Michelle V. Gonzaga and Atty. Remus G. Gulmatico (collectively, respondents) for lack of merit. Theponenciaholds that complainant, Ma. Sarita G. Guerrero (Guerrero), who filed a complaint with Executive Judge Anita Guanzon Chua (Executive Judge Chua) of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City against respondents for violations of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, cannot now relitigate this issue through this administrative complaint. According to theponencia, Guerrero's failure to appeal the dispositions of Executive Judge Chua rendered the said rulings final, executory, and immutable.[1]
As well, theponenciafinds that the present administrative complaint is barred byres judicata,observing that "although [Guerrero] attempts to frame the culpability of respondents on their participation in a grand scheme of fraud, the specific wrongful acts committed still relate to their violations of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, which were already considered and penalized in the dispositions of Executive Judge Chua."[2]
I disagree.
At the outset, it bears emphasis that the present case stems from two (2) complaints filed by Guerrero against respondents before Executive Judge Chua for violations of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. These complaints were filed under the procedure in the said Rules, specifically under Section 1 (c), Rule XI thereof. Ultimately, Executive Judge Chua found respondents administratively liable and meted each of them with the penalties of revocation of their respective notarial commissions and prohibition from being commissioned as notaries public for six months. It should be emphasized, however, that Executive Judge Chua did not impose any other sanctions for violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability (CPRA) or the Lawyer's Oath for the simple reason that her jurisdiction to discipline notaries public only lies within the confines of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
Guerrero now comes before the Court, arguing that the sanctions imposed were "not in consonance with the limited findings of the Honorable Executive Judge, being restricted merely to the temporary revocation of the subject notaries' notarial commission for a mere six (6) months [sic] period allegedly due to lack of jurisdiction[.]"[3]Consequently, Guerrero claims, she is constrained to raise "the same action before [the] Honorable Supreme Court for the proper disposition of the [disbarment and criminal] charges not acted upon in consonance with the seriousness of the offense committed[.]"[4]
To be sure, Section 1 (c), Rule XI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice allows a verified complaint to be filed by an interested, affected or aggrieved person before the Executive Judge for any allegation of violations of the Rules by a notary public that warrant the revocation of their commission or the imposition of appropriate administrative sanctions. The Executive Judge is also empowered to conduct a summary hearing if the answer of the notary public to the complaint is not satisfactory. Section 1 (c), Rule XI further provides that in either case of dismissal of the complaint or the finding of liability and imposition of appropriate administrative sanctions made by the Executive Judge, the aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the Court for review. As may be clearly gleaned from this Section, the Court's participation in the matter heavily relies on whether an appeal is made by an aggrieved party. To my mind, this may effectively prevent the Court from exercising its supervision over notaries public, who, as theponenciacorrectly characterizes, are also personnel of the Judiciary.
As this very case illustrates, the Court is precluded from reviewing the rulings of Executive Judge Chua against respondents precisely because they were not appealed at all by either respondents themselves or by Guerrero. As such, respondents were only meted with penalties of revocation of their notarial commissions and prohibition from being commissioned as notaries public for six months,when in practically every case involving violations of the notarial practice, a concomitant finding of liability as a lawyer under the CPRA is also made. This is owing to the settled rule that in the realm of legal ethics, a breach of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice would also constitute a violation of the CPRA, considering that an erring lawyer who is found to be remiss in his functions as a notary public is considered to have violated their oath as a lawyer as well.[5]Thus, for instance, under the CPRA, a violation of notarial rules that is attended by bad faith and does not merely involve reportorial requirements is considered a Serious Offense.[6]
Verily, the Court inRe: Order Dated January 7, 2020 of Judge Alajar Suspending Atty. Azarraga's Notarial Commission for One Year[7]had already observed the need for clarification on the procedure under Sections 1 (c) and (d), Rule XI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. The Court had suggested therein that "it would be prudent to consider an amendment [of the Rules] to clarify the proper mode and period of appeal and to harmonize the same with the pertinent provisions of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court."[8]I agree with this proposal, which, unfortunately, has yet to be done. I agree, therefore, with theponenciathat with the revision of the then CPR, which incorporated various provisions found in other rules such as Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the harmonization of Sections 1 (c) and (d), Rule XI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice would have to be made with the pertinent provisions of the new CPRA.[9]Indeed, this is simply in recognition of the well-settled principle in disciplinary cases that a breach of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice would also constitute a violation of the CPRA.
On this score, I further agree with theponenciathat for uniformity's sake, it may be more prudent to follow the procedure in all administrative cases against lawyers, in that, the report and recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) or the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) should be always elevated to the Court, as a matter of course, for final disposition. This is also regardless of the recommendation of the IBP or the OBC—be it mere admonition or even dismissal.[10]To my mind, the proceeding under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice is a species of an administrative case under the CPRA, wherein the participation or non-participation of a complaining party is not indispensable. Again, in this particular case for instance, despite the penalties imposed against them by Executive Judge Chua, respondents benefitted more in not appealing the rulings before the Court since the possible imposition of additional administrative sanctions under the CPRA was altogether averted.
In this regard, I respectfully submit, however, that the Court may still rule on the liabilities of respondents in this case under the CPRA. Notably, while the basis of Guerrero's present disbarment complaint stems from the same facts or incidents that governed the proceedings before Executive Judge Chua under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, the causes of action may be different since the present disbarment complaint is anchored on allegations of malfeasance on the part of respondents as members of the Bar. Specifically, Guerrero alleges "that respondents, through their pleadings, demonstrated a proclivity for falsehood and that they acted as 'puppets' of Lacson and his cohorts in their scheme to defraud her from her just share in some contested realties, which warrant not only their disbarment but also their prosecution for criminal charges."[11]
To my mind, a disposition of the merits of the above allegations may be aided by the disposition made by Executive Judge Chua under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. To recall, the rulings against respondents cleared them from the same allegations of bad faith in notarizing the subject documents and found them liable instead for their negligence in accomplishing their notarial registers. To reiterate, a violation of notarial rules attended by bad faith, except reportorial requirements, is a Serious Offense under the CPRA. In this case, in the absence of bad faith therefore on the part of respondents, what they committed was simple negligence in the performance of duty, which is a Less Serious Offense under the CPRA. It is punishable by: (1) suspension from the practice of law for a period within the range of one month to six months, or revocation of notarial commission and disqualification as notary public for less than two years; or (2) a fine within the range of PHP 35,000.00 to PHP 100,000.00. Under the circumstances of this case, I submit that an imposition of a fine against respondents would be more commensurate. Considering that it appears that this is respondents' first offense, as well, this may be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance in their favor. Accordingly, a reduced fine of PHP 17,500.00 each would suffice.
[1]Ponencia, p. 10.
[2]Id. at 11.
[3] Id. at 4. (Citation omitted)
[4] Id. at 4-5. (Citations omitted)
[5]SeeRe: Order Dated January 7, 2020 of Judge Alajar Suspending Atty. Azarraga's Notarial Commission for One Year, 895 Phil. 386, 392 (2021) [Per J. Delos Santos, Third Division].
[6]CODE OF PROF. RESPONSIBILITY & ACCOUNTABILITY, Canon VI, sec. 33(p).
[7]Supranote 5.
[8] Id. at 391-392.
[9]Seeponencia, p. 12.
[10]Seeid. at 12-13.
[11] Id. at 10-11. (Citation omitted)
SINGH,J.:
I respectfully submit my Concurring and Dissenting Opinion.
To start off, as pointed out in the Decision, Rule XI of the Notarial Rules is ambiguously worded as to the appropriate manner and period to appeal a decision of an executive judge.[1]This is not the first time the Court has pointed out this gap in the rules. InRe: Order dated January 7, 2020 of Judge Ignacio I. Alajar suspending Atty. Ely F. Azarraga's Notarial Commission for One (1) Year, the Court stated:
Following the prescribed remedy under Section 1(c), Rule XI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, it is reasonable for respondent to appeal the suspension of his notarial commission, which is immediately executory upon his receipt of the Order, with this Court.Perhaps, for purposes of clarification and guidance to any party meted with disciplinary sanctions pursuant to Sections 1(c) and (d), Rule XI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, it would be prudent to consider an amendment thereof to clarify the proper mode and period of appeal and to harmonize the same with the pertinent provisions of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.Evidently, the use of the word "appeal" in Rule XI lacks sufficient specificity to guide the bar and the bench.
The OBC, in its Report, stated that respondent should have filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order - to which the Court agrees, as this is a remedy available to respondent at the time and is not prohibited by any existing rule. Either way, whether respondent had filed a motion for reconsideration on the Order or directly appealed with this Court, Section 1(c), Rule XI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice clearly provides that the order imposing disciplinary sanctions shall be immediately executory pending appeal.[2](Emphasis supplied)
When a provision of law is ambiguous, the Court need not automatically adhere to its technical meaning which may not serve the purpose and intent of the law. The rationale for this principle was aptly explained inSocial Weather Stations, Inc. v. Commission on Elections:
First, verba legis or the so-called plain-meaning rule applies only when the law is completely clear, such that there is absolutely no room for interpretation. Its application is premised on a situation where the words of the legislature are clear that its intention, insofar as the facts of a case demand from the point of view of a contemporary interpretative community, is neither vague nor ambiguous. This is a matter of judicial appreciation. It cannot apply merely on a party's contention of supposed clarity and lack of room for interpretation.It is after all a settled principle of statutory construction that the Court should consider the spirit and reason of the statute where adherence to the literal meaning would defeat the purpose of the lawmakers or otherwise lead to absurdity.[4]Hence, the word "appeal" under Rule XI should be given its ordinary meaning or acceptation, that is, simply a review process, but not necessarily a strict appeal as defined in Rules 40, 41, 42, 43 and 45 of the Rules of Court.
. . . .
Second, statutory construction cannot lend itself to pedantic rigor that foments absurdity.The dangers of inordinate insistence on literal interpretation are commonsensical and need not be belabored. These dangers are by no means endemic to legal interpretation. Even in everyday conversations, misplaced literal interpretations are fodder for humor. A fixation on technical rules of grammar is no less innocuous. A pompously doctrinaire approach to text can stifle, rather than facilitate, the legislative wisdom that unbridled textualism purports to bolster."
Third, the assumption that there is, in all cases, a universal plain language is erroneous. In reality, universality and uniformity of meaning is a rarity. A contrary belief wrongly assumes that language is static.[3](Emphasis supplied).
Admittedly, it has been repeatedly emphasized that direct recourse to this Court is looked down upon especially in relation to the principle of non-interference and the orderly administration of justice.[5]However, this Court must also remain conscious that a trial court may violate the law or otherwise act with such grave abuse of authority as to render its judgments null and void. The remedy for this, as provided in the Rules of Court, is the resort to a higher court with authority to nullify the action of the issuing lower court. This is precisely the judicial power that the 1987 Constitution, under Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2, speaks of and which this Court has operationalized through Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[6]The remedy of a writ ofcertiorari, therefore, is the more appropriate recourse as a safeguard against the abuse of administrative authority without diminishing the respect ordinarily accorded to such authority.
Further, the filing of a Rule 65 petition forcertioraridoes not in any way deprive the respondents of due process. Jurisprudence holds that the essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the chance to explain one's side, or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before any definitive action is taken, the demands of due process are sufficiently met.[7]
To be sure, there is no argument that a petition forcertioraricannot replace an appeal; the two are undeniably distinct and inconsistent. However, the clear intention of the rules here is to provide a review process that is the most suitable to the particular case. Thus, whether the parties avail of a traditional appeal or a special civil action under a petition forcertiorari, the net effect should ultimately be to provide a review of the questioned act.
Following the foregoing, allowing the present petition is the better recourse to resolve the discord before the Court. This is especially true in light of the apparent conflict between the Notarial Rules and the Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability(CPRA).
It is settled that a violation of the Notarial Rules also constitutes a violation of the CPRA. However, the two codes provide strikingly different procedures for elevating such violations to this Court.
On the one hand, the procedure for penalizing lawyers under the Notarial Rules requires an "appeal" to be made before the Court can properly act on a complaint. Thus, the complaining party or the respondent must appeal the decision to the Court before it can acquire jurisdiction over the same. However, as discussed above, the provision itself does not provide a defined procedure for filing an appeal of the ruling of the executive judge:
Section 1Under the CPRA, however, a disciplinary complaint may be instituted directly with the Supreme Court:
. . . .
(c) Upon verified complaint by any interested, affected, or aggrieved person, the notary public shall be required to file a verified answer to the complaint.
If the answer of the notary public is not satisfactory, the Executive Judge shall conduct a summary hearing. If the allegations of the complaint are not proven, the complaint shall be dismissed. If the charges are duly established, the Executive Judge shall impose the appropriate administrative sanctions.In either case, the aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the Supreme Court for review. Pending the appeal, an order imposing disciplinary sanctions shall be immediately executory, unless otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court.[8](Emphasis supplied)
SECTION 2.How Instituted. — Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of lawyers may be commenced by the Supreme Court on its own initiative, orupon the filing of a verified complaint by the Board of Governors of the IBP, or by any person, before the Supreme Court or the IBP. However, a verified complaint against a government lawyer which seeks to discipline such lawyer as a member of the Bar shall only be filed in the Supreme Court.Given the apparent gap in the Notarial Rules, which the Court has noted in the past, I respectfully propose that the correct interpretation of the above provisions is that where the complaint filed before the Court alleges violations of the CPRA that are distinct from violations of the Notarial Rules, even if they arise from the same facts, a party may file a complaint directly before the Court to initiate disciplinary proceedings against a lawyer. This is correct, regardless of the failure to file an appeal of the decision of the executive judge in the complaint pertaining to the Notarial Rules.
. . . . .[9](Emphasis supplied)
In this case, Guerrero's present Complaint stems from the same facts relied upon in the proceedings before the trial court. However, she now alleges "that Atty. Gonzaga and Atty. Gulmatico, through their pleadings, demonstrated a proclivity for falsehood and that they acted as 'puppets' of Lacson and his cohorts in their scheme to defraud her from her just share in some contested realties, which warrant not only their disbarment but also their prosecution for criminal charges."[10]
Clearly, the Complaint before the Court is anchored on violations of the CPRA, rather than the Notarial Rules. The cause of action here is separate from those resolved by the Executive Judge under the provisions of the Notarial Rules. The issue here is whether Atty. Gonzaga and Atty. Gulmatico have exhibited conduct unfit for a lawyer and which warrant their disbarment. Therefore, this case should not be dismissed on the ground that the complainant failed to appeal the rulings of the Regional Trial Court, since this is clearly meant to be a new case independent of the other.
While the above explanation sufficiently resolves the procedural issue in the present case, it is only a partial solution to the conflicting rules. I agree that the Notarial Rules should be amended to conform with the CPRA. The CPRA is intended to be the definitive code governing the discipline of lawyers. Therefore, the CPRA procedure for the initiation of disciplinary proceedings should prevail over the Notarial Rules. I, thus, concur that the way forward is to amend the Notarial Rules to state that executive judges may continue to penalize lawyers for violations of the Notarial Rules through the revocation or suspension of their notarial commission. However, where the executive judge finds that the lawyer's conduct requires the imposition of other penalties under the CPRA, he or she must submit a report and recommendation to the Court, akin to the procedure stated in Sections 25 and 26, Canon VI of the CPRA.[11]
Therefore, I vote to allow the Petition and that the same should be resolved on the merits.
[1]Decision, p. 10.
[2]895 Phil. 386, 391-392 (2021) [Per J. Delos Santos, Third Division].
[3]757 Phil. 483, 520-521 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
[4]Ursua v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 157, 166 (1996) [Per J. Bellosillo, First Division].
[5]Barroso v. Omelio, 771 Phil. 199, 204-205 (2015) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division] citingThe Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, 751 Phil. 301, 327-328 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
[6]CONST., art. VIII, sec. 1, par. 2.
[7]Quisumbing v. Rosales, 755 Phil 892, 901 (2015) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
[8]2004 RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE, Rule XI, sec. 1, A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, July 6, 2004.
[9]CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, Canon VI, sec. 2, A.M. No. 22-09-01-SC, April 11, 2023.
[10]Decision, p. 11.
[11]CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, Canon VI, secs. 25-26, A.M. No. 22-09-01-SC, April 11, 2023.