2025 / Feb
G.R. No. 256452 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. WILLEM JOHANNES PEEK, ACCUSED-APPELLANT. February 25, 2025
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 256452, February 25, 2025 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. WILLEM JOHANNES PEEK, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
D E C I S I O N
KHO, JR., J.:
Assailed in this ordinary appeal[1]are the Decision[2]dated July 19, 2019 and the Resolution[3]dated August 25, 2020 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02054-MIN, which affirmed the Joint Decision[4]dated April 2, 2018 of the Regional Trial Court ofxxxxxxxxxxx(RTC) in CRM-FMY Case Nos. 2017-1126 and 2017-1127, finding accused-appellant Willem Johannes PeekyStange (Peek) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Sexual Abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. (RA) 7610[5]and Qualified Trafficking in Persons, as defined and penalized under Section 4, in relation to Section 6(a), of RA 9208,[6]as amended by RA 10364.[7]
The Facts
This case stemmed from two Informations filed before the RTC charging Peek with Sexual Abuse under Section 5(b) of RA 7610 and Qualified Trafficking in Persons under RA 9208, as amended by RA 10364, the accusatory portions of which read:
On the agreed date, AAA256452 went toxxxxxxxxxxxwith her sister. Thereat, Peek instructed AAA256452 to go to his apartment inxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. In the apartment, AAA256452 and her sister ate food, and later, they drank wine with Peek. Consequently, when AAA256452's sister went out, Peek started to remove AAA256452's panty, licked her vagina, removed her upper garment, inserted his penis into her vagina, and sucked her breast. AAA256452 asked Peek to stop, but to no avail. Afterwards, AAA256452 saw blood coming from her vagina. However, Peek did not stop and continue to make a push and pull motion.[12]Afterwards, Peek inserted his penis into AAA256452's anus, and thereafter, they did the "69" position and Peek asked AAA256452 to suck his penis. Even if AAA256452 told Peek that she did not want to do it, Peek forced her by pushing her head into his scrotum. AAA256452 cried and asked Peek to stop, but to no avail. When AAA256452 would shout, Peek would insert his tongue into her mouth. Subsequently, when Peek was asleep, AAA256452 went out of the apartment and told her sister what happened. They then proceeded to the police station to ask for help.[13]
For his part, Peek denied the charges against him, claiming instead, that AAA256452 voluntarily sent him her nude pictures, and in exchange, he gave her money. When AAA256452 found out that Peek will go toxxxxxxxxxxx, she expressed her excitement to see him and even told him that she will make him happy in bed while continuously asking for money. AAA256452's sister was likewise sending nude pictures to Peek and was asking him to give her money. He further averred that when AAA256452 and her sister went to his apartment inxxxxxxxxxxx, they ate supper, and while AAA256452 and her sister were washing the dishes, he went to his room to rest as he was very tired. After an hour, Peek's landlord woke him up and asked him if he was hurt as she saw AAA256452 and her sister hurriedly going out from the apartment. Peek tried to call AAA256452's sister, but she was not picking up her phone. About an hour later, Peek's landlord again knocked on the door and told Peek that there was a policeman looking for him. When Peek went out, he was arrested by the police officer and was brought to the police station. Consequently, AAA256452 testified that she executed an affidavit of recantation relative to the instant case.[14]
The RTC Ruling
In a Joint Decision[15]dated April 2, 2018, the RTC convicted Peek of the crimes charged. The dispositive portion of the RTC ruling reads:
Aggrieved, Peek moved for reconsideration, which was denied in an Order dated May 16, 2018;[18]thus, he appealed[19]to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[20]dated July 19, 2019, the CA affirmed with modification the RTC ruling, the dispositive portion of which states:
InCR-FMY Case No. 2017-1127, the CA found that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements Qualified Trafficking in Persons as it was proven that Peek enticed AAA256452 to send him nude pictures and to meet him inxxxxxxxxxxx, in exchange for money, taking advantage of the latter's youth, immaturity, and poverty. It likewise held that even if AAA256452 consented in sending Peek nude pictures or meeting him inxxxxxxxxxxx, it will not negate the commission of the crime, not being an allowable defense under RA 9208, as amended.[23]
Moreover, the CA did not give probative value to AAA256452's affidavit of recantation as it can easily be secured from a poor and ignorant witness, usually through intimidation or for monetary consideration. Further, it held that Peek cannot impeach AAA256452's credibility as a witness, as well as the truthfulness of her testimony, as he failed to question the same during the trial of the case.[24]
Undeterred, Peek moved for reconsideration, which was, however, denied in a Resolution[25]dated August 25, 2020; hence, the instant appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue before the Court is whether the CA erred in finding Peek guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is unmeritorious.
At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.[26]
Guided by the foregoing consideration, the Court upholds Peek's criminal liability in bothCR-FMY Case No. 2017-1126andCR-FMY Case No. 2017-1127, with modification in that his criminal liability forCR-FMY Case No. 2017-1126should be that for Rape, as defined and penalized under Article 266-A (1) (a) in relation to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as will be explained hereunder.
It is settled that when it comes to the issue of credibility of the victim or the prosecution witnesses, the findings of the trial courts carry great weight and respect and, generally, the appellate courts will not overturn these findings. For the trial courts are in the best position to ascertain and measure the sincerity and spontaneity of witnesses through their actual observation of the witnesses' manner of testifying, their demeanor and behavior in court. Unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, the trial court's assessment must be respected, for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying and detect if they were lying. The rule finds an even more stringent application where the said findings are sustained by the CA,[27]as in this case.
Pertinent portions of Article 266-A(l)(a) and Article 266-B of the RPC respectively read:
On the other hand, Section 5(b) of RA 7610 provides:
It bears stressing that sexual abuse cases are, more often than not, solely decided based on the credibility of the testimony of the private complainant. Thus, in evaluating the credibility of witnesses, the Court should abide by the following guidelines: (a) the Court gives the highest respect to the RTC's evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses, considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a witness on the stand. From its vantage point, the trial court is in the best position to determine the truthfulness of witnesses; (b) absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the RTC's assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the lower court's findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances, affecting the outcome of the case, are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded; and (c) the rule is even more stringently applied if the CA concurred with the RTC.[31]
Here, it must be recalled that AAA256452 merely agreed to meet Peek inxxxxxxxxxxxwhen she was given by the latter the amount of PHP 10,000.00 and when he threatened to post her nude pictures on Facebook if she declined, to wit:
At this juncture, the Court makes a proper determination on the correct designation of the offense for which Peek should be convicted. In the landmark case ofPeople v. Tulagan[35](Tulagan), the Court exhaustively discussed the proper designation of sexual abuse offenses committed against minors, including those instances where there was sexual intercourse. Pertinent portions ofTulaganread:
In November 2000, the United Nations adopted the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children supplementing United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime[39](Trafficking Protocol). As of May 31, 2024, there are 182 state parties to the Trafficking Protocol, including the Philippines. The Trafficking Protocol was signed by the Philippines on December 14, 2000, and it was ratified on May 28, 2002.[40]
Article 3 of said Protocol defined trafficking in persons as the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs. The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall be considered "trafficking in persons."[41]
Further, Article 5 of the Trafficking Protocol requires the countries to ensure that the conduct found in Article 3 thereof be criminalized in their domestic legislation.[42]Thus, on February 6, 2013, the Philippines adopted[43]the Protocol's definition of trafficking in persons in Section 3(a) of RA 9208, as amended by RA 10364,viz.:
Subsequently, under Section 3(a), paragraph 2 of RA 9208, as amended, when the trafficked victim is a child, it is considered as trafficking in persons even if it does not involve any of themeansstated above. In relation thereto, a child is defined under Section 3(b) of the same Act as a person below 18 years of age or one who is over 18 but unable to fully take care of or protect himself/herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition. Thus, in such cases, it is enough that the following was established by the prosecution: (a) the trafficked victim was achild; (b) theactof recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation, transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders; and (c) thepurposeof trafficking includes the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.
Moreover, under Section 6(a) of RA 9208, as amended, the crime of trafficking in persons isqualifiedwhen the trafficked victim is achild.[46]
A reading of the Information inCR-FMY Case No. 2017-1127reveals that Peek was charged of Qualified Trafficking in Persons under Section 4(a) in relation to Section 3(b) and Section 6(a) and (d) of RA 9208, as amended,[47]thus:
The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) recognized that the Trafficking Protocol does not provide for the exact definition of the acts listed under Article 3(a) of the Trafficking Protocol, i.e., recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, or receipt of persons. In this regard, the UNODC published its Issue Paper entitled "The Concept of Harbouring in the Trafficking in Persons Protocol."
In its Issue Paper, the UNODC provided that under the second edition of theLegislative Guide for the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress And Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Woman and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (2020), theactsof trafficking in persons under the Trafficking Protocol are understood in theirordinary meaning, and provided for a brief comment on the definition of harboring and receipt,[48]thus:
The UNODC's Issue Paper then explained that reference to "harboring and receipt" operates to bring not just the process of trafficking, i.e., recruitment, transportation, and transfer, but also its end situation within the definition of Trafficking in Persons. In other words, the act of buying or taking possession of an individual for the purpose of exploitation, as well as the act of maintaining of the individual in a situation of exploitation, would amount to trafficking. It then added that the purpose of the Trafficking Protocol was not only to prosecute the facilitators, but also the exploiters.[52]Further, it cited the 2019 Trafficking in Persons Report of the Unites Stated of America, which explained that theacts in trafficking in persons is not limited only to the movement of the victim from one place to another, i.e., transportation, transfer, and recruitment, but also to actions that does not entail movement, i.e., harboring.[53]
The UNODC provided for three general scenarios wherein harboring may occur: (a) where the victim is harbored prior to exploitation, and before following, and/or concurrent with an act of recruitment, transportation or receipt; (b)where the victim is harbored during the exploitation itself, following recruitment, transportation, transfer or receipt into the situation of exploitation; and (c) where harboring occurs during or prior to exploitation, absent any other trafficking conduct. In the last scenario, harboring is the sole act of trafficking.[54]
Sexual exploitation, on the other hand, is defined under Section 3(f) of RA 9208 as the participation by a person in prostitution or the production of pornographic materials as a result of being subjected to a threat, deception, coercion, abduction, force, abuse of authority, debt bondage, fraud or through abuse of a victim's vulnerability.
Consequently, Section 3(c) of RA 9208 defines prostitution as any act, transaction, scheme or design involving the use of a person by another, for sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct in exchange for money, profit or any other consideration.
The definition of sexual exploitation and prostitution does not require that the victim to be transacted, hired, or recruited by the other person to be pimped out to another person (customer or client). While a person can act as a pimp to offer someone to a customer for prostitution, the term prostitution does not preclude a scenario wherein the person who recruit, harbor, receive, or maintain a person is the one who will use said person. In both scenarios, there can be trafficking in person under RA 9208.
Applying the foregoing in this case, the Court finds that all the elements of Qualified Trafficking in Persons under RA 9208, as amended, were sufficiently established by the prosecution as it was proven that: (a) AAA256452 was only 15 years old when the crime was committed; (b) Peek received and harbored AAA256452 inxxxxxxxxxxx; and (c) the main purpose of which is for sexual exploitation. Clearly, Peek's act of receiving and harbouring AAA256452 was evident as when AAA256452 and her sister arrived inxxxxxxxxxxx, Peek received them in his apartment and gave them food and wine. While the mere fact that AAA256452 was a child foregoes with the need to establish themeansof trafficking in persons, the prosecution was still able to prove that Peek took advantage of AAA256452's vulnerability and youth, and her family's abject poverty, to satisfy his bestial acts. Further, records clearly showed that Peek threatened AAA256452 that if she declined to meet him inxxxxxxxxxxx, he will post the latter's nude pictures in Facebook. Consequently, the alleged inconsistencies in AAA256452's testimonies refer only to trivial matters, which do not impair her credibility as a witness.[55]
Further, Peek's contention that AAA256452 consented to the sexual act cannot prosper. Section 17 of RA 9208, as amended recognized that the trafficked persons were victims of the act or acts of trafficking. As such, the trafficked persons cannot be penalized for crimes directly related to the acts of trafficking under this Act or in obedience to the order made by the trafficker in relation thereto. In this regard, said Act explicitly provided thatthe consent of a trafficked person to the intended exploitation shall be irrelevant.
Retractions are generally unreliable and are looked upon with considerable disfavor by the courts, especially in rape cases. Verily, a retraction of a witness does not necessarily negate an original testimony as it can easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses usually for a monetary consideration. Like any other testimony, recantations are subject to the test of credibility based on the relevant circumstances and, especially, on the demeanor of the witness on the stand.[56]"It would be risky to reject the testimony taken before the court of justice simply because the witness who has given it later may change his mind for one reason or another. Such rule will make a solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses."[57]
As correctly observed by the courtsa quo, the affidavit of recantation executed by AAA256452 is doubtful, and can be considered as an afterthought, as it was made after the latter positively identified Peek as her perpetrator in the trial of the case.
In light of the Peek's criminal liabilities as above-discussed, the Court now proceeds with the determination of his imposable criminal penalties and civil liabilityex delicto.
As regardsCR-FMY Case No. 2017-1126, the prescribed penalty for rape in its simple form isreclusion perpetua; hence, Peek should be sentenced to suffer such penalty. Further, and pursuant toTulagan, he should be ordered to pay AAA256452 the amounts of PHP 75,000.00 each as civil liability, moral damages, and exemplary damages.
With respect toCR-FMY Case No. 2017-1127, Section 10(c) of RA 9208, as amended, states that the prescribed penalties for qualified trafficking are life imprisonment and a fine of not less than PHP 2,000,000.00 but not more than PHP 5,000,000.00. Thus, the courtsa quocorrectly sentenced Peek to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of PHP 2,000,000.00 for qualified trafficking in Persons.[58]Further, the awards of damages in the amount of PHP 500,000.00 as moral damages and PHP 100,000.00 as exemplary damages were likewise proper pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.[59]
Finally, the courtsa quoproperly imposed on all monetary awards due to AAA256452 legal interest at the rate of 6% interest per annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until full payment.[60]
ACCORDINGLY, the instant appeal isDENIED. The Decision dated July 19, 2019 and the Resolution dated August 25, 2020 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02054-MIN are herebyAFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, as follows:
SO ORDERED.
Gesmundo, C.J., Caguioa, Inting, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, Marquez, andSingh, JJ., concur.
Leonen, SAJ., see concurring opinion.
Hernando,*J., on official leave.
Lazaro-Javier, J., with concurrence and dissent.
Dimaampao, J., see concurring opinion.
*On official leave.
[1]Rollo, p. 4.
[2]Id.at 8-49. Penned by Associate Justice Walter S. Ong and concurred in by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello and Florencio M. Mamauag, Jr. of the Twenty-First Division, Court of Appeals,xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.
[3]CArollo, pp. 477-481. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello and concurred in by Associate Justices Evalyn M. Arellano-Morales and Angeline Mary W. Quimpo-Sale of the Twenty-First Division, Court of Appeals,xxxxxxxxxxx.
[4]Rollo, pp. 51-64. Penned Judge Richard D. Mordeno.
[5]Entitled "An Act Providing For Stronger Deterrence And Special Protection Against Child Abuse, Exploitation And Discrimination, Providing Penalties For Its Violation And For Other Purposes," approved on June 17, 1992.
[6]Entitled "An Act To Institute Policies To Eliminate Trafficking In Persons Especially Women And Children, Establishing The Necessary Institutional Mechanisms For The Protection And Support Of Trafficked Persons, Providing Penalties For Its Violations, And For Other Purposes," approved on May 26, 2003.
[7]Entitled "An Act Expanding Republic Act No. 9208, Entitled 'An Act To Institute Policies To Eliminate Trafficking In Persons Especially Women And Children, Establishing The Necessary Institutional Mechanisms For The Protection And Support Of Trafficked Persons, Providing Penalties For Its Violations And For Other Purposes,'" approved on February 6, 2013.
[8]SeeAmended Information dated February 22, 2017; records, pp. 147-148.
[9]The identity of the victim or any information which could establish or compromise her identity, as well as those of her immediate family or household members, and the accused, shall be withheld pursuant to RA 7610, entitled "An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination, and for Other Purposes," approved on June 17, 1992; RA 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefore, and for Other Purposes," approved on March 8, 2004; and Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, otherwise known as the "Rule on Violence against Women and Their Children" (November 15, 2004). (Seefootnote 4 inPeople v. Cadano, Jr., 729 Phil. 576, 578 [2014] [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division],citingPeople v. Lomaque, 710 Phil. 338, 342 [2013] [Per J. Brion, Second Division].See alsoAmended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015, entitled "Protocols and Procedures in the Promulgation, Publication, and Posting on the Websites of Decisions, Final Resolutions, and Final Orders Using Fictitious Names/Personal Circumstances," dated September 5, 2017.)
[10]Id.at 164-165.
[11]Rollo, pp. 11-12.
[12]Records, pp. 47-48.
[13]Rollo, p. 12.
[14]Id.at 13-16.
[15]Id.at 51-64.
[16]Id.at 63-64.
[17]Id.at 56-63.
[18]Id.at 17.
[19]CArollo, pp. 10-11.
[20]Id.at 8-49.
[21]Id.at 48-49.
[22]Id.at 18-31.
[23]Id.at 32-39.
[24]Id.at 39-46.
[25]CArollo, pp. 477-481.
[26]People v. Bernardo, 890 Phil. 97 (2020) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division],citingArambulo v. People, 857 Phil. 828 (2019) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division].
[27]People v. Gerola, 813 Phil. 1055, 1063-1064 (2017) [Per J. Caguioa, First Division].
[28]SeePeople v. Tubillo, 811 Phil. 525, 533 (2017) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
[29]People v. CA, 584 Phil. 594, 602 (2008) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Second Division].
[30]People v. Udang, Sr., 823 Phil. 411, 435-436 (2018) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division]; citations omitted.
[31]People v. Amarela, 823 Phil. 1188, 1201 (2018) [Per J. Martires, Third Division].
[32]TSN, March 22, 2017, pp. 12-13.
[33]Id.at 15.
[34]Id.at 17-19.
[35]849 Phil. 197 (2019) [Per J. Peralta,En Banc].
[36]Id.at 241-246; citations omitted.
[37]Id.at 246-247.
[38]Id.at 247.
[39]Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, November 15, 2020 <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/protocol-prevent-suppress-andpunish-trafficking-persons> (last accessed May 31, 2024).
[40]United Nations Treaty Collection <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-12-a&chapter=18> (last accessed May 31, 2024).
[41]Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, November 15, 2020 <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/protocol-prevent-suppress-andpunish-trafficking-persons> (last accessed May 31, 2024).
[42]Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, November 15, 2020 <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/protocol-prevent-suppress-andpunish-trafficking-persons> (last accessed May 31, 2024).
[43]SeeTCM dated May 24, 2002, pp. 14-15, thus:
[45]People v. Monsanto, 850 Phil. 301 (2019) [Per J. Reyes, Jr., Second Division],citingPeople v. Casio, 749 Phil. 458, 474 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
[46]People v. Lopez, 877 Phil. 782, 792-793 (2020) [Per J. Gaerlan, Third Division].
[47]Sections 3(b) and 6(a) of RA 9208, as amended by RA 10364, respectively read:
Section 3.Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act:
. . . .
(b)Child– refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or one who is over eighteen (18) but is unable to fully take care of or protect himself/herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition.
Section 6.Qualified Trafficking in Persons. – Violations of Section 4 of this Act shall be considered qualified trafficking:
(a) When the trafficked person is a child;
[48]See2.2 International Law and Policy, The Concept of Harbouring in the Trafficking in Persons Protocol, p. 21 <chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/Review_Mechanism/Review_Mechanism_2020/Website/Legislative_Guide_on_TiP/TiP_LegislativGuide_Final.pdf> (last accessed May 31, 2024).
[49]Id.
[50]Id.
[51]See4.2 'Harbouring' and 'Means';id.at 33.
[52]Id.
[53]See id.
[54]See 4.1 Scenarios of Harbouring;id.at 31-33.
[55]People v. Caguing, 400 Phil. 1161 (2000) [Per J. Melo, Third Division].
[56]People v. Pili, 619 Phil. 180, 201 (2009) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division]; citations omitted.See alsoPeople v. ZZZ, 854 Phil. 481, 484 (2019) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
[57]Lopez v. CA, 309 Phil. 519 (1994) [Per J. Quiason, First Division].
[58]People v. XXX, 835 Phil. 1083, 1096 (2018) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division].
[59]Id.
[60]Lara's Gifts & Decors, Inc. v. Midtown Industrial Sales, Inc., 929 Phil. 754, 780-782 (2022) [Per A.C.J., Leonen,En Banc].
CONCURRING OPINION
LEONEN,SAJ.:
I concur with the well-writtenponenciaof my esteemed colleague, Associate Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr. Willem Johannes Peek (Peek) committed the crime of rape and not sexual abuse under Article III, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610. I contribute the following observations.
Two separate Informations were filed against Peek charging him with sexual abuse and qualified trafficking in persons under Republic Act No. 9208, as amended by Republic Act No. 10364.[1]
According to the prosecution, sometime in October 2016, AAA256452, a 15-year-old minor, and Peek, a 68-year-old adult, met through Facebook Messenger and eventually became sweethearts. Peek started asking AAA256452 for nude photos, to which the latter complied by sending him photos of her naked body, breasts, and vagina. In exchange for the photos, Peek gave AAA256452 money in the amount of PHP 1,000.00, PHP 5,000.00, and PHP 10,000.00, respectively. AAA256452 asked Peek to stop asking for pictures, but the latter got angry and threatened to upload her nude photos on her Facebook page.[2]
Later, Peek asked AAA256452 if they could meet in person inxxxxxxxxxxxCity. They then talked about what will they do when they meet "including having sexual intercourse."[3]AAA256452 relented and agreed to meet Peek for PHP 10,000.00.[4]
On January 31, 2017, AAA256452, together with her sister, went to Peek's apartment where they ate and drank wine. When AAA256452's sister went out of the apartment, Peek forced AAA256452 to have sexual intercourse with him. Despite AAA256452's plea for Peek to stop, the latter inserted his penis into her vagina and anus. AAA256452 screamed, but Peek would insert his tongue in her mouth whenever she tried to do so. After Peek fell asleep, AAA256452 went out and informed her sister of what happened. Together, they reported the incident to the police.[5]
For his part, Peek denied the allegations against him and insisted that AAA256452 voluntarily sent him the nude photos in exchange for money. AAA256452 allegedly expressed her excitement to see him when he informed her that he would go toxxxxxxxxxxxand further "told him that she will make him happy in bed."[6]According to Peek, when AAA256452 and her sister visited him in his apartment, they only ate dinner, and he went to sleep after. Later, Peek's landlord knocked on his door and told him that a police officer was looking for him. Following this, the police officer arrested Peek and brought him to the police station.[7]
Subsequently, AAA256452 submitted an Affidavit of Recantation.[8]
On April 7, 2018, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Joint Decision convicting Peek of the crimes charged.[9]The Court of Appeals sustained Peek's conviction but modified the penalty imposed.[10]
Theponencia, while affirming the conviction of Peek, decreed that the proper designation of the offense committed was not sexual abuse, but rape as defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code.[11]
I agree with theponencia.
I
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of rape. It states:
II
I also concur that accused-appellant should be convicted of qualified trafficking under Republic Act No. 9208 as amended by Republic Act No. 10364.[16]Section 3 (a) of the law defines trafficking in persons as:
Jurisprudence dictates that in cases involving trafficking in persons, it is imperative for the prosecution to prove the following elements:
It is undisputed that AAA256452 was 15 years old at the time accused-appellant harbored and received her in his apartment. It was also proven that accused-appellant's acts were done for the purpose of sexually molesting AAA256452. With these proven facts, I concur in convicting accused-appellant of qualified trafficking in persons.
III
On a final note, it is unfortunate that no Information was filed against accused-appellant for violation of Republic Act No. 9775, or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 in relation to Republic Act No. 10175 or the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012.
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 9775 enumerates the acts which the law considers as prohibited. In particular, paragraph (a) states:
Republic Act No. 9775 defines child pornography as "any representation, whether visual, audio, or written combination thereof, by electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means, of child engaged or involved in real or simulated explicit sexual activities."[23]Meanwhile, the term "explicit sexual activit[y]" includes "lascivious exhibition of the genitals, buttocks, breasts, pubic area and/or anus[.]"[24]
InCadajas v. People[25]this Court laid down the elements of child pornography:
ACCORDINGLY, I vote toDENYthe appeal.
[1]Ponencia, p. 2.
[2]Id.at 3.
[3]Id.
[4]Id.
[5]Id.at 3-4.
[6]Id.at 4.
[7]Id.
[8]Id.
[9]Id.at 4-5.
[10]Id.at 5.
[11]Id.at 7-12.
[12]849 Phil. 197 (2019) [Per J. Peralta,En Banc].
[13]Id.at 244.
[14]Id.at 242-245.
[15]Ponencia, pp. 8-12.
[16]Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012.
[17]Republic Act No. 9208 as amended by Republic Act No. 10364, sec. 3(a).
[18]Republic Act No. 9208 as amended by Republic Act No. 10364, sec. 4(a).
[19]Republic Act No. 9208, sec. 6(a).
[21]Ponencia, pp. 16-17.
[22]Republic Act No. 10175, Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, sec. 4(c).
SECTION 4. Cybercrime Offenses. — The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:
. . . .
(c) Content-related Offenses:
(1) Cybersex. — The willful engagement, maintenance, control, or operation, directly or indirectly, of any lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity, with the aid of a computer system, for favor or consideration.
(2) Child Pornography. — The unlawful or prohibited acts defined and punishable by Republic Act No. 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009, committed through a computer system: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be (1) one degree higher than that provided for in Republic Act No. 9775.
[23]Republic Act No. 9775, Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009, sec. 3(b).
[24]Republic Act No. 9775, Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009, sec. 3(c)(5).
[25]915 Phil. 220 (2021) [Per J. J.Y. Lopez,En Banc].
[26]Id.at 235.
CONCURRENCE AND DISSENT
LAZARO-JAVIER,J.:
To recall, complainant AAA,*a 15-year-old minor at the time of the incidents, testified that she met accused-appellant Willem Johannes Peek (Peek) via Facebook Messenger. She admitted that they became sweethearts. Peek asked her, on numerous occasions, to send him her nude pictures for which he paid her PHP 1,000.00, PHP 5,000.00, and PHP 10,000.00, respectively. Though she asked him to stop asking for pictures, he threatened to upload her nude photos on her Facebook page if she did not comply.[1]
After paying AAA the PHP 10,000.00, Peek asked her to meet up in person inxxxxxxxxxxx. AAA went to Peek's apartment with her 33-year-old sister.[2]There, they ate and drank wine with Peek. When AAA's sister went out, Peek undressed AAA, inserted his penis into her vagina, and sucked her breasts. He thereafter inserted his penis into her anus. Then, he forced her to do the "69" position. AAA cried and told Peek she did not want to do it, but he pushed her head into his scrotum. Whenever she would shout, he would insert his tongue into her mouth. He would not let her out of the apartment. She was only able to escape when he fell asleep. AAA and her sister reported the incident to the police.[3]
Peek countered that it was AAA's sister with whom he was chatting on Facebook. She would send him nude photos of hers and AAA. They always asked him for money for birthdays, Christmas, or their bills. On the day they met in person, he denied ever sexually abusing AAA and posited that he fell asleep after eating.[4]Peek was thus charged under two separate Informations with sexual abuse under Article III, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 and qualified trafficking in persons, viz.:[5]
I, however, respectfully diverge from the Majority's conviction of Peek for qualified trafficking in persons under Section 4(e) in relation to Section 6(a) and (d) of Republic Act No. 9208,[7]as amended by Republic Act No. 10364,[8]for purportedly receiving and harboring AAA for purposes of having sexual intercourse with her.
Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208, as amended, defines trafficking in persons as follows:
With due respect, I cannot agree with the characterization of Peek's acts as trafficking in persons. Section 4(e) of Republic Act No. 9208, as amended, under which Peek is being convicted, refers to maintaining or hiring a personto engage in prostitution or pornography. The Information alleged that Peek received and harbored AAAfor sexual exploitation. Section 3(c) and (f) define "prostitution" and "sexual exploitation" as follows:
I humbly opine that Peek may not be penalized for qualified trafficking in persons for the simple reason that he did not "traffic" AAA. The act of maintaining or hiring a person engaged in prostitution under Section 4(e) of Republic Act No. 9208, as amended, does not pertain to "hiring" the latter for one's personal benefit. Rather, it is for purposes of "transacting" the person engaged in prostitution to third persons or those who "use" the trafficked person for sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct as contemplated by the definition of "prostitution." Here, however, Peek neither "hired" nor "maintained" AAA for a third party. Rather, Peek himself exploited AAA. In sum, thesecond elementfor qualified trafficking in persons is not present, i.e., Peek did not commit any of the acts of trafficking under the law, hence, he cannot be convicted of qualified trafficking in persons.
Thus, inPeople v. XXX and YYY,[11]the Court convicted the accused therein of violations of Section 4(e) of Republic Act No. 9208 for making their own children, who were under their custody, perform acts of cybersex for different foreign customers in exchange for pecuniary consideration.
InPeople v. Arraz,[12]the accused was convicted of qualified trafficking in persons in violation of Section 4(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 9208, for compelling his domestic helper to strip and commit sexual acts via the internet for foreign customers.
Finally, inPeople v. XXX,[13]XXX was convicted both of rape and qualified trafficking in persons under Section 4(e) of Republic Act No. 9208 committed against 14-year-old AAA. XXX himself had carnal knowledge of AAA through force for which he was found guilty of Rape. On the other hand, he was also convicted of qualified trafficking in persons for making AAA render sexual services to a male customer in exchange for PHP 2,000.00.
These cases illustrate a common denominator: the accused who was convicted of qualified trafficking in persons under Section 4(e) acted as the pimp, not the customer.
Indeed, if Congress intended to penalize those who engage the services of trafficked persons under Section 4(e), there would have been no reason to separately penalize the use of trafficked persons under Section 11 for such would have already been subsumed by Section 4(e). Basic is the rule in statutory construction that "[t]he whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole. A statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible. In short, every meaning to be given to each word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases and its meaning may be modified or restricted by the latter."[14]
During deliberations, my esteemed and learned colleague, Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao (Justice Dimaampao), voiced his agreement to the Majority, noting that the law does not explicitly require the presence of the "trafficker" or "pimp" for trafficking under Section 4 to exist. It was submitted that trafficking, under the expanded definition proffered by Republic Act No. 10364, covers not only acts done during the trafficked persons' captivity or custody in the hands of the trafficker, but also preparatory acts done to acquire the individual to be trafficked.[15]
I agree with this erudite observation. To be clear, whether receiving or harboring a trafficked person for the purposes enumerated by the law constitutes trafficking in person is not the issue here. Rather, the ambiguity that comes to fore is whether the individual who sexually exploited the victim through any of the means under Republic Act No. 9208, as amended, may be held liable for trafficking in persons.
As discussed, I submit that the answer is no.
Instead of qualified trafficking in persons under Section 4(e) of Republic Act No. 9208, as amended, I humbly propose to convict Peek of use of trafficked persons under Section 11 of the same law, viz.:
It was posited, however, that considering that there was no third-party trafficker who hired AAA for Peek, use of trafficked persons could not have been committed.[18]The existence or identity of the trafficker, however, is not relevant in use of trafficked persons so long as all the elements of the offense have been established,as here. As earlier discussed, it was established that Peekboughtorengaged the servicesof AAA, a minor, for sexual exploitation. As the subject of such illegal transaction, AAA is clearly a trafficked person.
Accordingly, I vote to sustain Peek's conviction for rape but suggest that instead of qualified trafficking in persons, he should be convicted of use of trafficked persons under Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 9208, as amended.
*In line with Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015, as mandated by Article 266(A) of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, the names of the private offended parties, along with all other personal circumstances that may tend to establish their identities, are made confidential to protect their privacy and dignity.
[1]Draftponencia, p. 3.
[2]CA Decision dated July 19, 2019, p. 3.
[3]Draftponencia, p. 3.
[4]CA Decision dated July 19, 2019, pp. 6-8.
[5]Draftponencia, p. 2.
[6]849 Phil. 197 (2019) [Per J. Peralta,En Banc].
[7]Otherwise known as the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003.
[8]Otherwise known as the Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012.
[9]Draft ponencia, p. 19.
[10]Id.at 18.
[11]835 Phil. 1083 (2018) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division].
[12]925 Phil. 462 (2022) [Per J. M.V. Lopez, Second Division].
[13]921 Phil. 758 (2022) [Per J. Hernando, Second Division].
[14]Eizmendi, Jr. et al. v. Ramos, Jr., 839 Phil. 902 (2019) [Per C.J. Peralta, Third Division].
[15]Reflections of Justice Dimaampao, p. 5.
[16]858 Phil. 884 (2019) [Per J. Caguioa,En Banc],citingUnited States v. Lim San, 017 Phil. 273 (1910) [Per J. Moreland, First Division].
[17]Republic Act No. 9208, as amended, Section 3(b).
[18]Reflections of Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, p. 5.
CONCURRING OPINION
DIMAAMPAO,J.:
At the outset, I commend the well-writtenponenciaof Justice Kho and its extensive discussion anent Republic Act No. 9208,[1]as amended by, Republic Act No. 10364.[2]
I fully concur that accused-appellant Willem Johannes Peek (Peek) must be held guilty of both rape and qualified trafficking in persons. Still, I write only to add further discourse on the essence of the crime of trafficking, especially in light of the equally well-reasoned dissent on the matter of Justice Lazaro-Javier.
While the Court has had more occasion to expound on the nature of this crime in recent years, it may still be further developed not only to guide the public but also to reinforce the will of Congress in passing this imperative protective legal measure.
Fairly recently, the Third Division of the Court had occasion to elucidate on the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 10364 to the crime of qualified trafficking in persons. InPeople v. Arraz,[3]the Court observed that the essence of the offense was not substantially altered and while some of the provisions were expanded to be more encompassing, others were simply renumbered, and the others remained wholly unchanged.
In her sponsorship speech of Senate Bill No. 2625, the predecessor bill of Republic Act No. 10364, Senator Legarda explained that the expansion of the definition of trafficking is part of their efforts to fill the policy gap identified by law enforcement agencies which prevent convictions of this crime:[4]
As applied to the present case, theponenciaposits that while Peek was charged with Section 4 (e) of Republic Act No. 9208, as amended, i.e., "maintain[ing] or hir[ing] a person to engage in prostitution or pornography[,]" the actual act he is guilty of is in harboring and receiving the minor victim for sexual exploitation, which is found in Section 4 (a).[7]
On this score, I wholeheartedly agree with this nuance recognized by theponencia.
It bears stressing that Section 4 of the law lists a whole gamut of activities constitutive of trafficking in persons. It does not only list preparatory acts of engaging or "procuring" the trafficked individual, but also acts done after the trafficked individual is in the trafficker's custody. As theponenciaobserves, trafficking is not limited to the movement from one place to another of an individual against their will or with their vitiated consent.[8]It includes all other acts of exploitation after the fact. In other words, trafficking may be said to involve the whole "experience" as it were of coming into the custody or control of the trafficker, the victim's maintenance or movement, their exploitation, and their subsequent sale.
To my mind, the essence of trafficking is exploitation. It is the commodification of human life, turning another person into a commercial product that can be acquired, used, and sold.
In the case at bench, the act of trafficking is not the hiring per se of the victim as a prostitute. Rather, Peek trafficked AAA by forcing her to meet him through the promise of a large sum, with the added threat of publishing her sensitive photos if she refuses, all for the purpose of sexually exploiting her. In my humble opinion, this falls squarely with the expansive definition of qualified trafficking under the amended law.
At this point, it behooves the Court to address the erudite observation of J. Lazaro-Javier that trafficking in persons necessarily includes at least three parties: the trafficked person, the customer, and the trafficker.[9]J. Lazaro-Javier asserts that Peek did not "traffic" AAA as he procured her for his own benefit. Rather, he should be held guilty of "Use of Trafficked Persons"; defined and penalized under Section 11 of the law.[10]
As above-adumbrated, however, this observation may not be wholly supported by the letter and intent of the law. Nowhere is it explicitly stated in the law that the presence of the "trafficker" or "pimp" is necessary before trafficking under Section 4 is said to occur. This is consistent with the above-proffered observation that trafficking covers not only acts done during the trafficked persons' captivity or custody in the hands of the trafficker, but also preparatory acts done to acquire the individual to be trafficked. Necessarily, prior to the acquisition of the trafficked individual, there is no customer to speak of, and yet the act itself constitutes trafficking.
If at all, it is only in Section 11 of the law where at least three parties may be involved, although the provision itself only punishes the customer:
Consequently, considering that there was no third-party trafficker that hired out AAA to Peek, Section 11 finds no application.
With the foregoing disquisition, I express my concurrence with theponenciaand vote toDENYthe appeal.
[1]Republic Act No. 9208 (2003), An Act to Institute Policies to Eliminate Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, Establishing the Necessary Institutional Mechanisms for the Protection and Support of Trafficked Persons, Providing Penalties for its Violations, and for Other Purposes, otherwise known as the "Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003."
[2]Republic Act No. 10364 (2013), An Act Expanding Republic Act No. 9208, Entitled "An Act to Institute Policies to Eliminate Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, Establishing the Necessary Institutional Mechanisms for the Protection and Support of Trafficked Persons, Providing Penalties for its Violations and for Other Purposes," otherwise known as the "Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012."
[3]G.R. No. 262362, April 8, 2024 [Per J. Dimaampao, Third Division].
[4]50 Journal, Senate, 15thCongress, First Regular Session (January 17, 2011), pp. 961-962.
[5]People v. Arraz, April 28, 2024 [Per J. Dimaampao, Third Division] at 20-22. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.
[6]Ponencia, pp. 16-17.
[7]Id.at 17-18.
[8]Id.at 19.
[9]Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of J. Lazaro-Javier, p. 5.
[10]Id.pp. 6-7.
This case stemmed from two Informations filed before the RTC charging Peek with Sexual Abuse under Section 5(b) of RA 7610 and Qualified Trafficking in Persons under RA 9208, as amended by RA 10364, the accusatory portions of which read:
The prosecution alleged that sometime in October 2016, AAA256452 met Peek thru Facebook Messenger. Eventually, AAA256452 and Peek became sweethearts. Peek then started asking AAA256452 for nude pictures. Complying with Peek's request, AAA256452 sent Peek the pictures of her naked body, breasts, and vagina, and in exchange, the latter gave her money in the amount of PHP 1,000.00, PHP 5,000.00, and PHP 10,000.00, respectively. While AAA256452 sent the pictures voluntarily, she tried to tell Peek to stop asking for pictures. However, Peek got angry and threatened AAA256452 that if she stopped sending him nude pictures, he will upload the same to AAA256452's Facebook page. Afterwards, Peek expressed his interest in meeting AAA256452 in person inxxxxxxxxxxx. In their Facebook messenger conversation, Peek and AAA256452 talked about what they will do when they meet inxxxxxxxxxxx, including having sexual intercourse. Subsequently, in consideration of the PHP 10,000.00, AAA256452 agreed to meet Peek. They then decided to meet on January 31, 2017.[11]CR-FMY Case No. 2017-1126[8] That on or about January 31, 2017, at 9:30 . . . in the evening, [at]xxxxxxxxxxx, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with lewd design and by the use of force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously remove the shortpants (sic), panty, brassiere and upper garment of the offended party, [AAA256452[9]], a minor, fifteen (15) years of age, born on April 12, 2001, and mash (sic) her breasts, touch (sic) her face, and other parts of her body, and had sexual intercourse with her by, inserting his penis into her vagina, against her will, which acts demeaned her dignity as child (sic) and is detrimental to her development into a normal human being, to her damage and prejudice.
(Sexual Abuse)
Contrary to law.CR-FMY Case No. 2017-1127[10]
(Qualified Trafficking in Persons)
That on January 31, 2017 and the dates prior thereto, atxxxxxxxxxxx, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, for the purpose of sexual exploitation, taking advantage of the offended party's vulnerability by reason of her poverty, by giving her benefits in monetary form in order to achieve her consent, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally receive and harbor [AAA256452], fifteen (15) years old, for the purpose of having sexual intercourse with her, to her great damage and prejudice.
Contrary to law, qualified by the circumstance of minority of the offended party.
On the agreed date, AAA256452 went toxxxxxxxxxxxwith her sister. Thereat, Peek instructed AAA256452 to go to his apartment inxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. In the apartment, AAA256452 and her sister ate food, and later, they drank wine with Peek. Consequently, when AAA256452's sister went out, Peek started to remove AAA256452's panty, licked her vagina, removed her upper garment, inserted his penis into her vagina, and sucked her breast. AAA256452 asked Peek to stop, but to no avail. Afterwards, AAA256452 saw blood coming from her vagina. However, Peek did not stop and continue to make a push and pull motion.[12]Afterwards, Peek inserted his penis into AAA256452's anus, and thereafter, they did the "69" position and Peek asked AAA256452 to suck his penis. Even if AAA256452 told Peek that she did not want to do it, Peek forced her by pushing her head into his scrotum. AAA256452 cried and asked Peek to stop, but to no avail. When AAA256452 would shout, Peek would insert his tongue into her mouth. Subsequently, when Peek was asleep, AAA256452 went out of the apartment and told her sister what happened. They then proceeded to the police station to ask for help.[13]
For his part, Peek denied the charges against him, claiming instead, that AAA256452 voluntarily sent him her nude pictures, and in exchange, he gave her money. When AAA256452 found out that Peek will go toxxxxxxxxxxx, she expressed her excitement to see him and even told him that she will make him happy in bed while continuously asking for money. AAA256452's sister was likewise sending nude pictures to Peek and was asking him to give her money. He further averred that when AAA256452 and her sister went to his apartment inxxxxxxxxxxx, they ate supper, and while AAA256452 and her sister were washing the dishes, he went to his room to rest as he was very tired. After an hour, Peek's landlord woke him up and asked him if he was hurt as she saw AAA256452 and her sister hurriedly going out from the apartment. Peek tried to call AAA256452's sister, but she was not picking up her phone. About an hour later, Peek's landlord again knocked on the door and told Peek that there was a policeman looking for him. When Peek went out, he was arrested by the police officer and was brought to the police station. Consequently, AAA256452 testified that she executed an affidavit of recantation relative to the instant case.[14]
In a Joint Decision[15]dated April 2, 2018, the RTC convicted Peek of the crimes charged. The dispositive portion of the RTC ruling reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused WILLEM JOHANNES PEEKyStange:In so ruling, the RTC found that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements of the crimes charged. It did not give credence to Peek's defense of denial and alibi as there was no showing that it was impossible for him to be at the crime scene during the commission of the crime. Moreover, it held that even if AAA256452 executed an affidavit of recantation, it would not exculpate Peek of criminal liability as recantation can easily be obtained from witnesses through intimidation or for monetary consideration.[17]In addition, an interest at the rate of 6% per annum is imposed on all damages awarded from date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.[16]
Aggrieved, Peek moved for reconsideration, which was denied in an Order dated May 16, 2018;[18]thus, he appealed[19]to the CA.
In a Decision[20]dated July 19, 2019, the CA affirmed with modification the RTC ruling, the dispositive portion of which states:
The appeal is DENIED. The assailedJoint Decisiondated [April 2,] 2018 issued by the Regional Trial Court,xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, in CR-FMY No. 2017-1126 and CR-FMY No. 2017-1127 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, in that: (i) appellant is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years and one day ofprision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day ofreclusion temporal, as maximum, in CR-FMY No. 2017-1126; (ii) appellant is ordered to pay [AAA256452] civil indemnity in the amount of [PHP] 20,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of [PHP] 15,000.00, in CR-FMY No. 2017-1126, and (iii) the fine imposed in CR-FMY No. 2017-1127 in the amount of [PHP] 15,000.00 is deleted.[21]InCR-FMY No. 2017-1126, the CA held that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements of Sexual Abuse under Section 5(b) of RA 7610. It found that the absence of spermatozoa on AAA256452's vagina will not negate the commission of the crime, not being an essential element of the crime. Moreover, it ruled that consent was immaterial in cases involving Sexual Abuse under Section 5(b) of RA 7610 as the mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense. Finally, it - noted that the age disparity between AAA256452 and Peek—15 years old and 68 years old, respectively—placed the latter in a stronger position against the former.[22]
InCR-FMY Case No. 2017-1127, the CA found that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements Qualified Trafficking in Persons as it was proven that Peek enticed AAA256452 to send him nude pictures and to meet him inxxxxxxxxxxx, in exchange for money, taking advantage of the latter's youth, immaturity, and poverty. It likewise held that even if AAA256452 consented in sending Peek nude pictures or meeting him inxxxxxxxxxxx, it will not negate the commission of the crime, not being an allowable defense under RA 9208, as amended.[23]
Moreover, the CA did not give probative value to AAA256452's affidavit of recantation as it can easily be secured from a poor and ignorant witness, usually through intimidation or for monetary consideration. Further, it held that Peek cannot impeach AAA256452's credibility as a witness, as well as the truthfulness of her testimony, as he failed to question the same during the trial of the case.[24]
Undeterred, Peek moved for reconsideration, which was, however, denied in a Resolution[25]dated August 25, 2020; hence, the instant appeal.
The issue before the Court is whether the CA erred in finding Peek guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged.
The petition is unmeritorious.
At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.[26]
Guided by the foregoing consideration, the Court upholds Peek's criminal liability in bothCR-FMY Case No. 2017-1126andCR-FMY Case No. 2017-1127, with modification in that his criminal liability forCR-FMY Case No. 2017-1126should be that for Rape, as defined and penalized under Article 266-A (1) (a) in relation to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as will be explained hereunder.
It is settled that when it comes to the issue of credibility of the victim or the prosecution witnesses, the findings of the trial courts carry great weight and respect and, generally, the appellate courts will not overturn these findings. For the trial courts are in the best position to ascertain and measure the sincerity and spontaneity of witnesses through their actual observation of the witnesses' manner of testifying, their demeanor and behavior in court. Unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, the trial court's assessment must be respected, for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying and detect if they were lying. The rule finds an even more stringent application where the said findings are sustained by the CA,[27]as in this case.
Peek's conviction in CR-FMY Case No. 2017-1126 should be for Rape under the RPC, and not Sexual Abuse under RA 7610 |
Pertinent portions of Article 266-A(l)(a) and Article 266-B of the RPC respectively read:
Article 266-A. Rape: When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –Thus, the elements of Rape are: (a) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (b) such act was accomplished through force or intimidation, or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when the victim is under 12 years of age.[28]
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:. . . .Article 266-B. Penalties. – Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished byreclusion perpetua.
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
. . . .
On the other hand, Section 5(b) of RA 7610 provides:
Section 5.Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. – Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.Consensual sexual intercourse or even acts of lasciviousness with a minor who is 12 years old or older could constitute a violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610.[29]In order to successfully prosecute an accused charged of violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610, the following elements must be established: (a) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; (b) said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution; and (c) the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.[30]
The penalty ofreclusion temporalin its medium period toreclusion perpetuashall be imposed upon the following:
. . . .
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse;Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be:Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall bereclusion temporalin its medium period;. . .
. . . .
It bears stressing that sexual abuse cases are, more often than not, solely decided based on the credibility of the testimony of the private complainant. Thus, in evaluating the credibility of witnesses, the Court should abide by the following guidelines: (a) the Court gives the highest respect to the RTC's evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses, considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a witness on the stand. From its vantage point, the trial court is in the best position to determine the truthfulness of witnesses; (b) absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the RTC's assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the lower court's findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances, affecting the outcome of the case, are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded; and (c) the rule is even more stringently applied if the CA concurred with the RTC.[31]
Here, it must be recalled that AAA256452 merely agreed to meet Peek inxxxxxxxxxxxwhen she was given by the latter the amount of PHP 10,000.00 and when he threatened to post her nude pictures on Facebook if she declined, to wit:
PROS. TOMAMPOS: (to witness) So when you were already sent with the Ten Thousand, was there any agreement aside from the pictures you sent, if any?Once inxxxxxxxxxxx, Peek succeeded in having carnal knowledge of AAA256452 without the latter's consent. As the victim testified:
A: Yes.
Q: What was the agreement?
A: He wanted us to meet inxxxxxxxxxxx.[32]
. . .
Q: You said that you did not fall in love with the accused, why is it that you agreed to meet him at that time I (sic)xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx?
A: Because he told me that if I am not going to meet him all her pictures will be posted in my Face Book. (sic)[33]
Q: When you say he had sexual intercourse with you, you mean to say he inserted his penis into your vagina, is that correct?Given these, the Court upholds Peek's criminal liability for having carnal knowledge of AAA256452 against her will.
A: Yes.
Q: So what was your reaction in all those things?
A: I cried.
Q: Did you tell him to stop?
A: I told him but he does not want to and he wanted us to be always inside the room.
. . .
Q: You said earlier that at the place where you meet the accused he was threatening you to upload your pictures in the internet, at the time that he did sexual things on you, why did you not shout or ran away from the apartment?
A: Whenever I shout he insert his tongue into my mouth.
Q: So you were not able to shout?
A: No.[34]
At this juncture, the Court makes a proper determination on the correct designation of the offense for which Peek should be convicted. In the landmark case ofPeople v. Tulagan[35](Tulagan), the Court exhaustively discussed the proper designation of sexual abuse offenses committed against minors, including those instances where there was sexual intercourse. Pertinent portions ofTulaganread:
With this decision, We now clarify the principles laid down inAbay, PangilinanandTubilloto the effect that there is a need to examine the evidence of the prosecution to determine whether the person accused of rape should be prosecuted under the RPC or [RA] 7610 when the offended party is 12 years old or below 18.Thus, pursuant toTulagan—and further considering that the information inCR-FMY Case No. 2017-1126alleges that Peek himself used "force and intimidation" in order to have carnal knowledge of AAA256452, and that there was no allegation therein that AAA256452 was "exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse"—Peek should be rightfully convicted of the crime of Rape, as defined and penalized under Article 266-A(l)(a) in relation to Article 266-B of the RPC. In any case, and as expounded byTulagan, even if it be assumed "that the elements of both violations of Section 5(b) of RA 7610 and of Article 266-A, paragraph 1(a) of the RPC are mistakenly alleged in the same Information . . . and proven during the trial in a case where the victim who is 12 years old or under 18 did not consent to the sexual intercourse, the accused should still be prosecuted pursuant to the RPC, as amended by RA 8353, which is the more recent and special penal legislation that is not only consistent, but also strengthens the policies of RA 7610."[37]Verily, the RPC, as amended by RA 8353, "provides 'a stronger deterrence and special protection against child abuse,' as it imposes a more severe penalty ofreclusion perpetuaunder Article 266-B of the RPC."[38]
First, if sexual intercourse is committed with an offended party who is a child less than 12 years old or is demented, whether or not exploited in prostitution, it is always a crime of statutory rape; more so when the child is below 7 years old, in which case the crime is always qualified rape.
Second, when the offended party is 12 years old or below 18 and the charge against the accused is carnal knowledge through "force, threat or intimidation," then he will be prosecuted for rape under Article 266-A (1) (a) of the RPC. In contrast, in case of sexual intercourse with a child who is 12 years old or below 18 and who is deemed "exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse," the crime could not be rape under the RPC, because this no longer falls under the concept of statutory rape, and the victim indulged in sexual intercourse either "for money, profit or any other consideration or due to coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group," which deemed the child as one "exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse."
To avoid further confusion, We dissect the phrase "children exploited in prostitution" as an element of violation of Section 5 (b) of [RA] 7610. As can be gathered from the text of Section 5 of [RA] 7610 and having in mind that the term "lascivious conduct: has a clear definition which does not include "sexual intercourse," the phrase "children exploited in prostitution" contemplates four (4) scenarios: (a) a child, whether male or female, who for money, profit or any other consideration, indulges in lascivious conduct; (b) a female child, who for money, profit or any other consideration, indulges in sexual intercourse; (c) a child, whether male or female, who due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulges in lascivious conduct; and (d) a female, due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse.
The term "other sexual abuse," on the other hand, is construed in relation to the definitions of "child abuse" under Section 3, Article I of [RA] 7610 and "sexual abuse" under Section 2 (g) of theRules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases. In the former provision, "child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes sexual abuse, among other matters. In the latter provision, "sexual abuse" includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children.
InQuimvel, it was held that the term "coercion or influence" is broad enough to cover or even synonymous with the term "force or intimidation."Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that "coercion or influence" is used in Section 5 of [RA] 7610 to qualify or refer to the means through which "any adult, syndicate or group" compels a child to indulge in sexual intercourse. On the other hand, the use of "money, profit or any other consideration" is the other mode by which a child indulges in sexual intercourse, without the participation of "any adult, syndicate or group."In other words, "coercion or influence" of a child to indulge in sexual intercourse is clearly exerted NOT by the offender whose liability is based on Section 5 (b) of [RA] 7610 for committing sexual act with a child exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse. Rather, the "coercion or influence" is exerted upon the child by "any adult, syndicate, or group" whose liability is found under Section 5 (a) for engaging in, promoting, facilitating or inducing child prostitution, whereby the sexual intercourse is the necessary consequence of the prostitution.
For a clearer view, a comparison of the elements of rape under the RPC and sexual intercourse with a child under Section 5 (b) of [RA] 7610 where the offended party is between 12 years old and below 18, is in order.
As can be gleaned above, "force, threat or intimidation" is the element of rape under the RPC, while "due to coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group" is the operative phrase for a child to be deemed "exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse," which is the element of sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of [RA] 7610. The "coercion or influence" is not the reason why the child submitted herself to sexual intercourse, but it was utilized in order for the child to become a prostitute. Considering that the child has become a prostitute, the sexual intercourse becomes voluntary and consensual because that is the logical consequence of prostitution. . .
. . . .
Therefore, there could be no instance that an Information may charge the same accused with the crime of rape where "force, threat or intimidation" is the element of the crime under the RPC, and at the same time violation of Section 5 (b) of [RA] 7610 where the victim indulged in sexual intercourse because she is exploited in prostitution either "for money, profit or any other consideration or due to coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group" — the phrase which qualifies a child to be deemed "exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse" as an element of violation of Section 5 (b) of [RA] 7610.[36](Emphases and underscoring supplied)
The CA properly convicted Peek of Qualified Trafficking in Persons in CR-FMY Case No. 2017-1127 |
In November 2000, the United Nations adopted the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children supplementing United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime[39](Trafficking Protocol). As of May 31, 2024, there are 182 state parties to the Trafficking Protocol, including the Philippines. The Trafficking Protocol was signed by the Philippines on December 14, 2000, and it was ratified on May 28, 2002.[40]
Article 3 of said Protocol defined trafficking in persons as the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs. The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall be considered "trafficking in persons."[41]
Further, Article 5 of the Trafficking Protocol requires the countries to ensure that the conduct found in Article 3 thereof be criminalized in their domestic legislation.[42]Thus, on February 6, 2013, the Philippines adopted[43]the Protocol's definition of trafficking in persons in Section 3(a) of RA 9208, as amended by RA 10364,viz.:
(a)Trafficking in Persons– refers to the recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation, transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.Consequently, Section 4 of RA 9208, as amended by RA 10364 enumerated the specific acts that would constitute trafficking in persons, to wit:
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, adoption or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation or when the adoption is induced by any form of consideration for exploitative purposes shall also be considered as 'trafficking in persons' even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph.
SEC. 4.Acts of Trafficking in Persons. – It shall be unlawful for any person, natural or juridical, to commit any of the following acts:Verily, since Section 4 of RA 9208 pertains to the specific acts that would constitute trafficking in persons, all the enumerated acts therein must be harmonized with Section 3(a) of the same Act which provided for the general definition of trafficking in persons. This can be inferred in the deliberations of RA 9208 when it was stated in the Senate Hearing that in order to be covered by the said law, all the elements of trafficking in person under Section 3(a) must be present,viz.:
(a) To recruit, obtain, hire, provide, offer, transport, transfer, maintain,harbor, or receivea person by any means, including those done under the pretext of domestic or overseas employment or training or apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, orsexual exploitation;
(b) To introduce or match for money, profit, or material, economic or other consideration, any person or, as provided for under Republic Act No. 6955, any Filipino woman to a foreign national, for marriage for the purpose of acquiring, buying, offering, selling or trading him/her to engage in prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;
(c) To offer or contract marriage, real or simulated, for the purpose of acquiring, buying, offering, selling, or trading them to engage in prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor or slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;
(d) To undertake or organize tours and travel plans consisting of tourism packages or activities for the purpose of utilizing and offering persons for prostitution, pornography or sexual exploitation;
(e) To maintain or hire a person to engage in prostitution or pornography;
(f) To adopt persons by any form of consideration for exploitative purposes or to facilitate the same for purposes of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;
(g) To adopt or facilitate the adoption of persons for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;
(h) To recruit, hire, adopt, transport, transfer, obtain, harbor, maintain, provide, offer, receive or abduct a person, by means of threat or use of force, fraud, deceit, violence, coercion, or intimidation for the purpose of removal or sale of organs of said person;
(i) To recruit, transport, obtain, transfer, harbor, maintain, offer, hire, provide, receive or adopt a child to engage in armed activities in the Philippines or abroad;
(j) To recruit, transport, transfer, harbor, obtain, maintain, offer, hire, provide or receive a person by means defined in Section 3 of this Act for purposes of forced labor, slavery, debt bondage and involuntary servitude, including a scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the person either:(1) To believe that if the person did not perform such labor or services, he or she or another person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint; or(k) To recruit, transport, harbor, obtain, transfer, maintain, hire, offer, provide, adopt or receive a child for purposes of exploitation or trading them, including but not limited to, the act of baring and/or selling a child for any consideration or for barter for purposes of exploitation. Trafficking for purposes of exploitation of children shall include:
(2) To abuse or threaten the use of law or the legal processes; and(1) All forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, involuntary servitude, debt bondage and forced labor, including recruitment of children for use in armed conflict;(l) To organize or direct other persons to commit the offenses defined as acts of trafficking under this Act.
(2) The use, procuring or offering of a child for prostitution, for the production of pornography, or for pornographic performances;
(3) The use, procuring or offering of a child for the production and trafficking of drugs; and
(4) The use, procuring or offering of a child for illegal activities or work which, by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm their health, safety or morals; and
SENATOR ORETA. Now, may I go to another question then, if the distinguished sponsor would care to answer. Section 3 (a) states:In order to prosecute violations of Section 4 of RA 9208, as amended the prosecution must establish: (1) theactof recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation, transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders; (2) themeansused include by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person; and (3) thepurposeof trafficking includes the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.[45]Trafficking in Persons. – Shall refer to the recruitment, transportation, transfer, provision, harboring, receipt or deployment of a person, done legally or illegally, with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders, by means of threat or use of force, fraud, deceit, violence, coercion, intimidation, abuse of position or authority, taking advantage of the vulnerability of a person or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person for the purpose of, resulting in prostitution, pornography, sex tourism, forced labor, slavery or slavery-like practices, sexual exploitation, involuntary servitude, debt bondage, physical and other forms of abuse, removal or sale of organs or involvement in armed activities or other similar act.Now, this is a very long and comprehensive definition of the term "trafficking in persons". I believe that this definition is, more or less, the same as what was used in the Trafficking Protocol which we ratified on September 30, 2001 (sic).
It is necessary that all these must concur, meaning, recruitment, transportation, provision, harboring, et cetera before the acts is considered trafficking?
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, all the elements must concur. That is an elementary principle and all elements should be considered.
Senator Oreta. So, before we can declare that act committed is against trafficking, all these elements must concur?
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, if there is the existence of the elements of trafficking which are done by means of threat, by use of force, fraud, deceit, intimidation, coercion, abuse of position or authority or taking advantage of the vulnerability of women and children.
Senator Oreta. If there trafficking within the coverage of the bill if the recruitment is done legally and with the victim's consent?
Senator Estrada. Yes, that is trafficking – whether or not the recruitment is done legally, or whether or not the victim has given consent.
Please take note, Mr. President, that the definition expressly provides that as long as the [elements] of trafficking are met, like recruitment that resulted in prostitution or the acts committed constitute the offense.[44]
Subsequently, under Section 3(a), paragraph 2 of RA 9208, as amended, when the trafficked victim is a child, it is considered as trafficking in persons even if it does not involve any of themeansstated above. In relation thereto, a child is defined under Section 3(b) of the same Act as a person below 18 years of age or one who is over 18 but unable to fully take care of or protect himself/herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition. Thus, in such cases, it is enough that the following was established by the prosecution: (a) the trafficked victim was achild; (b) theactof recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation, transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders; and (c) thepurposeof trafficking includes the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.
Moreover, under Section 6(a) of RA 9208, as amended, the crime of trafficking in persons isqualifiedwhen the trafficked victim is achild.[46]
A reading of the Information inCR-FMY Case No. 2017-1127reveals that Peek was charged of Qualified Trafficking in Persons under Section 4(a) in relation to Section 3(b) and Section 6(a) and (d) of RA 9208, as amended,[47]thus:
That on January 31, 2017 and the dates prior thereto, atxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,for the purpose of sexual exploitation, taking advantage of the offended party's vulnerability by reason of her poverty, by giving her benefits in monetary form in order to achieve her consent, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminallyreceive and harbor[AAA256452], fifteen (15) years old, for the purpose of having sexual intercourse with her, to her great damage and prejudice.Based on the Information, thespecific actsof trafficking in persons for which Peek was charged are the acts ofharboringandreceiptof a person for the purpose of sexual exploitation. Thus, a definition of the terms "receipt," "harbor," and "sexual exploitation" is necessary to fully understand Peek's charge.
The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) recognized that the Trafficking Protocol does not provide for the exact definition of the acts listed under Article 3(a) of the Trafficking Protocol, i.e., recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, or receipt of persons. In this regard, the UNODC published its Issue Paper entitled "The Concept of Harbouring in the Trafficking in Persons Protocol."
In its Issue Paper, the UNODC provided that under the second edition of theLegislative Guide for the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress And Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Woman and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (2020), theactsof trafficking in persons under the Trafficking Protocol are understood in theirordinary meaning, and provided for a brief comment on the definition of harboring and receipt,[48]thus:
"Harbouring" may be understood differently in different jurisdiction and may refer, for instance, toaccommodate a person at the point ofdeparture, transit, ordestination, before orat the place of exploitation, or it may refer to steps take[n] to conceal a person's whereabouts. Harbouring can also be understood to mean holding a person.Further, the 2009 Council of Europe and United Nations' study concerning "Trafficking in Organs, Tissues and Cells and Trafficking in Human Beings for the Purpose of the Removal of Organs" defined harboring as "accommodating or housing persons in whatever way, whether during their journey to their final destination or at the place of the exploitation," which includes "accommodation of persons in a medical clinic or other place where the illegal removal of organs is conducted."[50]The UNODC defined harboring in practice as likely to be linked to some restriction of the victim's liberty, in physical or psychological sense, through the use of threat, force or coercion.[51]
"Receipt" of a person is the correlative of "transfer" and may refer to the arrival of the person,the meeting of a person at an agreed place, or the gaining of control over a person. It can also include receiving persons into employment or for the purposes of employment, including forced labour. Receipt can also apply to situations in which there was no proceedings process, such as inter-generational bonded labour or where a working environment changes from acceptable to coercively exploitative.[49]
The UNODC's Issue Paper then explained that reference to "harboring and receipt" operates to bring not just the process of trafficking, i.e., recruitment, transportation, and transfer, but also its end situation within the definition of Trafficking in Persons. In other words, the act of buying or taking possession of an individual for the purpose of exploitation, as well as the act of maintaining of the individual in a situation of exploitation, would amount to trafficking. It then added that the purpose of the Trafficking Protocol was not only to prosecute the facilitators, but also the exploiters.[52]Further, it cited the 2019 Trafficking in Persons Report of the Unites Stated of America, which explained that theacts in trafficking in persons is not limited only to the movement of the victim from one place to another, i.e., transportation, transfer, and recruitment, but also to actions that does not entail movement, i.e., harboring.[53]
The UNODC provided for three general scenarios wherein harboring may occur: (a) where the victim is harbored prior to exploitation, and before following, and/or concurrent with an act of recruitment, transportation or receipt; (b)where the victim is harbored during the exploitation itself, following recruitment, transportation, transfer or receipt into the situation of exploitation; and (c) where harboring occurs during or prior to exploitation, absent any other trafficking conduct. In the last scenario, harboring is the sole act of trafficking.[54]
Sexual exploitation, on the other hand, is defined under Section 3(f) of RA 9208 as the participation by a person in prostitution or the production of pornographic materials as a result of being subjected to a threat, deception, coercion, abduction, force, abuse of authority, debt bondage, fraud or through abuse of a victim's vulnerability.
Consequently, Section 3(c) of RA 9208 defines prostitution as any act, transaction, scheme or design involving the use of a person by another, for sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct in exchange for money, profit or any other consideration.
The definition of sexual exploitation and prostitution does not require that the victim to be transacted, hired, or recruited by the other person to be pimped out to another person (customer or client). While a person can act as a pimp to offer someone to a customer for prostitution, the term prostitution does not preclude a scenario wherein the person who recruit, harbor, receive, or maintain a person is the one who will use said person. In both scenarios, there can be trafficking in person under RA 9208.
Applying the foregoing in this case, the Court finds that all the elements of Qualified Trafficking in Persons under RA 9208, as amended, were sufficiently established by the prosecution as it was proven that: (a) AAA256452 was only 15 years old when the crime was committed; (b) Peek received and harbored AAA256452 inxxxxxxxxxxx; and (c) the main purpose of which is for sexual exploitation. Clearly, Peek's act of receiving and harbouring AAA256452 was evident as when AAA256452 and her sister arrived inxxxxxxxxxxx, Peek received them in his apartment and gave them food and wine. While the mere fact that AAA256452 was a child foregoes with the need to establish themeansof trafficking in persons, the prosecution was still able to prove that Peek took advantage of AAA256452's vulnerability and youth, and her family's abject poverty, to satisfy his bestial acts. Further, records clearly showed that Peek threatened AAA256452 that if she declined to meet him inxxxxxxxxxxx, he will post the latter's nude pictures in Facebook. Consequently, the alleged inconsistencies in AAA256452's testimonies refer only to trivial matters, which do not impair her credibility as a witness.[55]
Further, Peek's contention that AAA256452 consented to the sexual act cannot prosper. Section 17 of RA 9208, as amended recognized that the trafficked persons were victims of the act or acts of trafficking. As such, the trafficked persons cannot be penalized for crimes directly related to the acts of trafficking under this Act or in obedience to the order made by the trafficker in relation thereto. In this regard, said Act explicitly provided thatthe consent of a trafficked person to the intended exploitation shall be irrelevant.
The Affidavit of Recantation executed by AAA256452 will not exculpate Peek of his criminal liabilities |
Retractions are generally unreliable and are looked upon with considerable disfavor by the courts, especially in rape cases. Verily, a retraction of a witness does not necessarily negate an original testimony as it can easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses usually for a monetary consideration. Like any other testimony, recantations are subject to the test of credibility based on the relevant circumstances and, especially, on the demeanor of the witness on the stand.[56]"It would be risky to reject the testimony taken before the court of justice simply because the witness who has given it later may change his mind for one reason or another. Such rule will make a solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses."[57]
As correctly observed by the courtsa quo, the affidavit of recantation executed by AAA256452 is doubtful, and can be considered as an afterthought, as it was made after the latter positively identified Peek as her perpetrator in the trial of the case.
Penalties and consequent civil liabilities ex delicto |
In light of the Peek's criminal liabilities as above-discussed, the Court now proceeds with the determination of his imposable criminal penalties and civil liabilityex delicto.
As regardsCR-FMY Case No. 2017-1126, the prescribed penalty for rape in its simple form isreclusion perpetua; hence, Peek should be sentenced to suffer such penalty. Further, and pursuant toTulagan, he should be ordered to pay AAA256452 the amounts of PHP 75,000.00 each as civil liability, moral damages, and exemplary damages.
With respect toCR-FMY Case No. 2017-1127, Section 10(c) of RA 9208, as amended, states that the prescribed penalties for qualified trafficking are life imprisonment and a fine of not less than PHP 2,000,000.00 but not more than PHP 5,000,000.00. Thus, the courtsa quocorrectly sentenced Peek to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of PHP 2,000,000.00 for qualified trafficking in Persons.[58]Further, the awards of damages in the amount of PHP 500,000.00 as moral damages and PHP 100,000.00 as exemplary damages were likewise proper pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.[59]
Finally, the courtsa quoproperly imposed on all monetary awards due to AAA256452 legal interest at the rate of 6% interest per annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until full payment.[60]
ACCORDINGLY, the instant appeal isDENIED. The Decision dated July 19, 2019 and the Resolution dated August 25, 2020 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02054-MIN are herebyAFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, as follows:
Finally, all monetary awards shall earn a legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until full payment.
- InCR-FMY Case No. 2017-1126, accused-appellant Willem Johannes PeekyStange is foundGUILTYbeyond reasonable doubt of Rape, as defined and penalized under Article 266-A(l)(a), in relation to Article 266-B, of the Revised Penal Code. He is sentenced to suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua; and is ordered to pay AAA256452 the amounts of PHP 75,000.00 as civil indemnity, PHP 75,000.00 as moral damages, and PHP 75,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
- InCR-FMY Case No. 2017-1127, accused-appellant Willem Johannes PeekyStange is foundGUILTYbeyond reasonable doubt of qualified trafficking in persons, as defined and penalized under Section 4(a) in relation to Section 3(b) and Section 6(a) and (d) of Republic Act No. 9208, as amended by Republic Act No. 10364. He is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, and to pay a fine in the amount of PHP 2,000,000.00; and is ordered to pay AAA256452 the amounts of PHP 500,000.00 as moral damages and PHP 100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
Gesmundo, C.J., Caguioa, Inting, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, Marquez, andSingh, JJ., concur.
Leonen, SAJ., see concurring opinion.
Hernando,*J., on official leave.
Lazaro-Javier, J., with concurrence and dissent.
Dimaampao, J., see concurring opinion.
*On official leave.
[1]Rollo, p. 4.
[2]Id.at 8-49. Penned by Associate Justice Walter S. Ong and concurred in by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello and Florencio M. Mamauag, Jr. of the Twenty-First Division, Court of Appeals,xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.
[3]CArollo, pp. 477-481. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello and concurred in by Associate Justices Evalyn M. Arellano-Morales and Angeline Mary W. Quimpo-Sale of the Twenty-First Division, Court of Appeals,xxxxxxxxxxx.
[4]Rollo, pp. 51-64. Penned Judge Richard D. Mordeno.
[5]Entitled "An Act Providing For Stronger Deterrence And Special Protection Against Child Abuse, Exploitation And Discrimination, Providing Penalties For Its Violation And For Other Purposes," approved on June 17, 1992.
[6]Entitled "An Act To Institute Policies To Eliminate Trafficking In Persons Especially Women And Children, Establishing The Necessary Institutional Mechanisms For The Protection And Support Of Trafficked Persons, Providing Penalties For Its Violations, And For Other Purposes," approved on May 26, 2003.
[7]Entitled "An Act Expanding Republic Act No. 9208, Entitled 'An Act To Institute Policies To Eliminate Trafficking In Persons Especially Women And Children, Establishing The Necessary Institutional Mechanisms For The Protection And Support Of Trafficked Persons, Providing Penalties For Its Violations And For Other Purposes,'" approved on February 6, 2013.
[8]SeeAmended Information dated February 22, 2017; records, pp. 147-148.
[9]The identity of the victim or any information which could establish or compromise her identity, as well as those of her immediate family or household members, and the accused, shall be withheld pursuant to RA 7610, entitled "An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination, and for Other Purposes," approved on June 17, 1992; RA 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefore, and for Other Purposes," approved on March 8, 2004; and Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, otherwise known as the "Rule on Violence against Women and Their Children" (November 15, 2004). (Seefootnote 4 inPeople v. Cadano, Jr., 729 Phil. 576, 578 [2014] [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division],citingPeople v. Lomaque, 710 Phil. 338, 342 [2013] [Per J. Brion, Second Division].See alsoAmended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015, entitled "Protocols and Procedures in the Promulgation, Publication, and Posting on the Websites of Decisions, Final Resolutions, and Final Orders Using Fictitious Names/Personal Circumstances," dated September 5, 2017.)
[10]Id.at 164-165.
[11]Rollo, pp. 11-12.
[12]Records, pp. 47-48.
[13]Rollo, p. 12.
[14]Id.at 13-16.
[15]Id.at 51-64.
[16]Id.at 63-64.
[17]Id.at 56-63.
[18]Id.at 17.
[19]CArollo, pp. 10-11.
[20]Id.at 8-49.
[21]Id.at 48-49.
[22]Id.at 18-31.
[23]Id.at 32-39.
[24]Id.at 39-46.
[25]CArollo, pp. 477-481.
[26]People v. Bernardo, 890 Phil. 97 (2020) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division],citingArambulo v. People, 857 Phil. 828 (2019) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division].
[27]People v. Gerola, 813 Phil. 1055, 1063-1064 (2017) [Per J. Caguioa, First Division].
[28]SeePeople v. Tubillo, 811 Phil. 525, 533 (2017) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
[29]People v. CA, 584 Phil. 594, 602 (2008) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Second Division].
[30]People v. Udang, Sr., 823 Phil. 411, 435-436 (2018) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division]; citations omitted.
[31]People v. Amarela, 823 Phil. 1188, 1201 (2018) [Per J. Martires, Third Division].
[32]TSN, March 22, 2017, pp. 12-13.
[33]Id.at 15.
[34]Id.at 17-19.
[35]849 Phil. 197 (2019) [Per J. Peralta,En Banc].
[36]Id.at 241-246; citations omitted.
[37]Id.at 246-247.
[38]Id.at 247.
[39]Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, November 15, 2020 <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/protocol-prevent-suppress-andpunish-trafficking-persons> (last accessed May 31, 2024).
[40]United Nations Treaty Collection <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-12-a&chapter=18> (last accessed May 31, 2024).
[41]Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, November 15, 2020 <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/protocol-prevent-suppress-andpunish-trafficking-persons> (last accessed May 31, 2024).
[42]Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, November 15, 2020 <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/protocol-prevent-suppress-andpunish-trafficking-persons> (last accessed May 31, 2024).
[43]SeeTCM dated May 24, 2002, pp. 14-15, thus:
MS. MARIANO: In light with the Philippines adoption of the new UN Protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in person, especially women and children, supplementing the U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crimes, we suggest that the definition embodied in the said protocol be used in these consolidated bills, to wit: (Reading)[44]SeeTSP dated February 18, 2003 at 12-13.
[45]People v. Monsanto, 850 Phil. 301 (2019) [Per J. Reyes, Jr., Second Division],citingPeople v. Casio, 749 Phil. 458, 474 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
[46]People v. Lopez, 877 Phil. 782, 792-793 (2020) [Per J. Gaerlan, Third Division].
[47]Sections 3(b) and 6(a) of RA 9208, as amended by RA 10364, respectively read:
Section 3.Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act:
. . . .
(b)Child– refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or one who is over eighteen (18) but is unable to fully take care of or protect himself/herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition.
Section 6.Qualified Trafficking in Persons. – Violations of Section 4 of this Act shall be considered qualified trafficking:
(a) When the trafficked person is a child;
[48]See2.2 International Law and Policy, The Concept of Harbouring in the Trafficking in Persons Protocol, p. 21 <chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/Review_Mechanism/Review_Mechanism_2020/Website/Legislative_Guide_on_TiP/TiP_LegislativGuide_Final.pdf> (last accessed May 31, 2024).
[49]Id.
[50]Id.
[51]See4.2 'Harbouring' and 'Means';id.at 33.
[52]Id.
[53]See id.
[54]See 4.1 Scenarios of Harbouring;id.at 31-33.
[55]People v. Caguing, 400 Phil. 1161 (2000) [Per J. Melo, Third Division].
[56]People v. Pili, 619 Phil. 180, 201 (2009) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division]; citations omitted.See alsoPeople v. ZZZ, 854 Phil. 481, 484 (2019) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
[57]Lopez v. CA, 309 Phil. 519 (1994) [Per J. Quiason, First Division].
[58]People v. XXX, 835 Phil. 1083, 1096 (2018) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division].
[59]Id.
[60]Lara's Gifts & Decors, Inc. v. Midtown Industrial Sales, Inc., 929 Phil. 754, 780-782 (2022) [Per A.C.J., Leonen,En Banc].
I concur with the well-writtenponenciaof my esteemed colleague, Associate Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr. Willem Johannes Peek (Peek) committed the crime of rape and not sexual abuse under Article III, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610. I contribute the following observations.
Two separate Informations were filed against Peek charging him with sexual abuse and qualified trafficking in persons under Republic Act No. 9208, as amended by Republic Act No. 10364.[1]
According to the prosecution, sometime in October 2016, AAA256452, a 15-year-old minor, and Peek, a 68-year-old adult, met through Facebook Messenger and eventually became sweethearts. Peek started asking AAA256452 for nude photos, to which the latter complied by sending him photos of her naked body, breasts, and vagina. In exchange for the photos, Peek gave AAA256452 money in the amount of PHP 1,000.00, PHP 5,000.00, and PHP 10,000.00, respectively. AAA256452 asked Peek to stop asking for pictures, but the latter got angry and threatened to upload her nude photos on her Facebook page.[2]
Later, Peek asked AAA256452 if they could meet in person inxxxxxxxxxxxCity. They then talked about what will they do when they meet "including having sexual intercourse."[3]AAA256452 relented and agreed to meet Peek for PHP 10,000.00.[4]
On January 31, 2017, AAA256452, together with her sister, went to Peek's apartment where they ate and drank wine. When AAA256452's sister went out of the apartment, Peek forced AAA256452 to have sexual intercourse with him. Despite AAA256452's plea for Peek to stop, the latter inserted his penis into her vagina and anus. AAA256452 screamed, but Peek would insert his tongue in her mouth whenever she tried to do so. After Peek fell asleep, AAA256452 went out and informed her sister of what happened. Together, they reported the incident to the police.[5]
For his part, Peek denied the allegations against him and insisted that AAA256452 voluntarily sent him the nude photos in exchange for money. AAA256452 allegedly expressed her excitement to see him when he informed her that he would go toxxxxxxxxxxxand further "told him that she will make him happy in bed."[6]According to Peek, when AAA256452 and her sister visited him in his apartment, they only ate dinner, and he went to sleep after. Later, Peek's landlord knocked on his door and told him that a police officer was looking for him. Following this, the police officer arrested Peek and brought him to the police station.[7]
Subsequently, AAA256452 submitted an Affidavit of Recantation.[8]
On April 7, 2018, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Joint Decision convicting Peek of the crimes charged.[9]The Court of Appeals sustained Peek's conviction but modified the penalty imposed.[10]
Theponencia, while affirming the conviction of Peek, decreed that the proper designation of the offense committed was not sexual abuse, but rape as defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code.[11]
I agree with theponencia.
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of rape. It states:
Article 266-A.Rape; When And How Committed. — Rape is Committed —On the other hand, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 punishes sexual intercourse committed against a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
SECTION 5.Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. — Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.InPeople v. Tulagan[12]this Court discussed the difference between these two crimes. These pertain not only to the employment of force, threat or intimidation as an element, but likewise the circumstance of the offended party, such that in Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 what is involved is a "child exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse[.]"[13]Tulaganexpounded:
The penalty ofreclusion temporalin its medium period toreclusion perpetuashall be imposed upon the following:. . . .
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall bereclusion temporalin its medium period[.]
Second, when the offended party is 12 years old or below 18 and the charge against the accused is carnal knowledge through "force, threat or intimidation," then he will be prosecuted for rape under Article 266-A (1) (a) of the RPC. In contrast, in case of sexual intercourse with a child who is 12 years old or below 18 and who is deemed "exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse," the crime could not be rape under the RPC, because this no longer falls under the concept of statutory rape, and the victim indulged in sexual intercourse either "for money, profit or any other consideration or due to coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group," which deemed the child as one "exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse."In this case, it appears that accused-appellant Willem Johannes Peek. employed threat and intimidation in the commission of his bestial act. To be sure, AAA256452 agreed to meet accused-appellant for two reasons: first, the PHP 10,000 accused-appellant promised to give her; and second, his threat that he would post her nude photos on Facebook should she decline. Once they were alone in his apartment, accused-appellant forced himself into AAA256452 and had nonconsensual sexual intercourse with her.[15]These facts, as established by the prosecution, suffice to prove that accused appellant committed the crime of rape as defined under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code.. . . .
As can be gleaned above, "force, threat or intimidation" is the element or rape under the RPC, while "due to coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group" is the operative phrase for a child to be deemed "exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse," which is the element of sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) or R.A. No. 7610. The "coercion or influence" is not the reason why the child submitted herself to sexual intercourse, but it was utilized in order for the child to become a prostitute. Considering that the child has become a prostitute, the sexual intercourse becomes voluntary and consensual because that is the logical consequence of prostitution as defined under Article 202 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 10158 where the definition of "prostitute" was retained by the new law[.]"[14]
I also concur that accused-appellant should be convicted of qualified trafficking under Republic Act No. 9208 as amended by Republic Act No. 10364.[16]Section 3 (a) of the law defines trafficking in persons as:
[T]he recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation, transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose or exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.Republic Act No. 9208, as amended, enumerates the various acts considered as trafficking. These acts include, but are not limited to, the recruitment, obtaining, hiring, maintaining, harboring or receiving of "a person . . . for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, or sexual exploitation[.]"[18]Under Section 6(a) of Republic Act No. 9208, when any of these acts have been committed against a child, the crime shall be considered as qualified trafficking in persons.[19]
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, adoption or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation or when the adoption is induced by any form of consideration for exploitative purposes shall also be considered as 'trafficking in persons' even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph.[17]
Jurisprudence dictates that in cases involving trafficking in persons, it is imperative for the prosecution to prove the following elements:
(1) The act of "recruitment,obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation, transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders;"I also agree with theponenciathat when the victim is a child as defined under the law and it was proven that "[t]he recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, adoption or receipt" was done for the purpose of exploitation, the offender may be convicted of trafficking in persons without the need of establishing any of the means set for in the first paragraph of Section 3(a).[21]
(2) The means used include "by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person[;]"
(3) The purpose of trafficking includes "the exploitation or the prostitution or others or other forms or sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery; servitude or the removal or sale of organs[.]"[20]
It is undisputed that AAA256452 was 15 years old at the time accused-appellant harbored and received her in his apartment. It was also proven that accused-appellant's acts were done for the purpose of sexually molesting AAA256452. With these proven facts, I concur in convicting accused-appellant of qualified trafficking in persons.
On a final note, it is unfortunate that no Information was filed against accused-appellant for violation of Republic Act No. 9775, or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 in relation to Republic Act No. 10175 or the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012.
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 9775 enumerates the acts which the law considers as prohibited. In particular, paragraph (a) states:
SECTION 4.Unlawful or Prohibited Acts. — It shall be unlawful for any person:Under Republic Act No. 10175, when the crime of child pornography is committed using a computer system, "the penalty to be imposed shall be (1) one degree higher than that provided for in Republic Act No. 9775."[22](a) To hire, employ, use, persuade, induce or coerce a child to perform in the creation or production of any form of child pornography[.]
Republic Act No. 9775 defines child pornography as "any representation, whether visual, audio, or written combination thereof, by electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means, of child engaged or involved in real or simulated explicit sexual activities."[23]Meanwhile, the term "explicit sexual activit[y]" includes "lascivious exhibition of the genitals, buttocks, breasts, pubic area and/or anus[.]"[24]
InCadajas v. People[25]this Court laid down the elements of child pornography:
From the foregoing, one can be convicted for committing child pornography upon proof of the following: (1) victim is a child; (2) victim was induced or coerced to perform in the creation or production of any form of child pornography; and (3) child pornography was performed through visual, audio or written combination thereof by electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means.[26]It is apparent that accused-appellant's act of communicating with AAA256452 online through Facebook Messenger and soliciting nude photos from her fall under the prohibited acts under Republic Act No. 9775 in relation to Republic Act No. 10175. If the prosecution had been more diligent, it should have filed separate items of Information for child pornography. This was a violation separate from and carries different penalties from that of qualified trafficking.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote toDENYthe appeal.
[1]Ponencia, p. 2.
[2]Id.at 3.
[3]Id.
[4]Id.
[5]Id.at 3-4.
[6]Id.at 4.
[7]Id.
[8]Id.
[9]Id.at 4-5.
[10]Id.at 5.
[11]Id.at 7-12.
[12]849 Phil. 197 (2019) [Per J. Peralta,En Banc].
[13]Id.at 244.
[14]Id.at 242-245.
[15]Ponencia, pp. 8-12.
[16]Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012.
[17]Republic Act No. 9208 as amended by Republic Act No. 10364, sec. 3(a).
[18]Republic Act No. 9208 as amended by Republic Act No. 10364, sec. 4(a).
[19]Republic Act No. 9208, sec. 6(a).
Section 6.Qualified Trafficking in Persons. – The following are considered as qualified trafficking:
(a) When the trafficked person is a child[.][20]People v. Casio, 749 Phil. 458, 474 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
[21]Ponencia, pp. 16-17.
[22]Republic Act No. 10175, Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, sec. 4(c).
SECTION 4. Cybercrime Offenses. — The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:
. . . .
(c) Content-related Offenses:
(1) Cybersex. — The willful engagement, maintenance, control, or operation, directly or indirectly, of any lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity, with the aid of a computer system, for favor or consideration.
(2) Child Pornography. — The unlawful or prohibited acts defined and punishable by Republic Act No. 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009, committed through a computer system: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be (1) one degree higher than that provided for in Republic Act No. 9775.
[23]Republic Act No. 9775, Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009, sec. 3(b).
[24]Republic Act No. 9775, Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009, sec. 3(c)(5).
[25]915 Phil. 220 (2021) [Per J. J.Y. Lopez,En Banc].
[26]Id.at 235.
LAZARO-JAVIER,J.:
To recall, complainant AAA,*a 15-year-old minor at the time of the incidents, testified that she met accused-appellant Willem Johannes Peek (Peek) via Facebook Messenger. She admitted that they became sweethearts. Peek asked her, on numerous occasions, to send him her nude pictures for which he paid her PHP 1,000.00, PHP 5,000.00, and PHP 10,000.00, respectively. Though she asked him to stop asking for pictures, he threatened to upload her nude photos on her Facebook page if she did not comply.[1]
After paying AAA the PHP 10,000.00, Peek asked her to meet up in person inxxxxxxxxxxx. AAA went to Peek's apartment with her 33-year-old sister.[2]There, they ate and drank wine with Peek. When AAA's sister went out, Peek undressed AAA, inserted his penis into her vagina, and sucked her breasts. He thereafter inserted his penis into her anus. Then, he forced her to do the "69" position. AAA cried and told Peek she did not want to do it, but he pushed her head into his scrotum. Whenever she would shout, he would insert his tongue into her mouth. He would not let her out of the apartment. She was only able to escape when he fell asleep. AAA and her sister reported the incident to the police.[3]
Peek countered that it was AAA's sister with whom he was chatting on Facebook. She would send him nude photos of hers and AAA. They always asked him for money for birthdays, Christmas, or their bills. On the day they met in person, he denied ever sexually abusing AAA and posited that he fell asleep after eating.[4]Peek was thus charged under two separate Informations with sexual abuse under Article III, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 and qualified trafficking in persons, viz.:[5]
I concur with the conviction of Peek for rape under Section 266-A(l)(a) in relation to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. It was established to a moral certainty by AAA's clear and categorical testimony. I also agree that, followingPeople v. Tulagan,[6]the offense committed here is rape regardless whether the minor is below 12 years old or more.CR-FMY Case No. 2017-1126
(Sexual Abuse)
That on or about January 31, 2017, at 9:30 in the evening, [at]xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with lewd design and by the use of force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully[,] and feloniously remove the shortpants, panty, brassiere and upper garment of the offended party, [AAA], a minor, 15 years of age, born onxxxxxxxxxxx, 2001, and mash her breasts, touch her face, and other parts of her body, and had sexual intercourse with her by, inserting his penis into her vagina, against her will, which acts demeaned her dignity as a child and is detrimental to her development into a normal human being, to her damage and prejudice.
Contrary to law.That on January 31, 2017 and the dates prior thereto, atxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, for the purpose of sexual exploitation, taking advantage of the offended party's vulnerability by reason of her poverty, by giving her benefits in monetary form in order to achieve her consent, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally receive and harbor [AAA], 15 years old, for the purpose of having sexual intercourse with her, to her great damage and prejudice.CR-FMY Case No. 2017-1127
(Qualified Trafficking in Persons)
Contrary to law, qualified by the circumstance of minority of the offended party.
I, however, respectfully diverge from the Majority's conviction of Peek for qualified trafficking in persons under Section 4(e) in relation to Section 6(a) and (d) of Republic Act No. 9208,[7]as amended by Republic Act No. 10364,[8]for purportedly receiving and harboring AAA for purposes of having sexual intercourse with her.
Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208, as amended, defines trafficking in persons as follows:
SEC. 3.Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act:Section 4(e), on the other hand, penalizes the act of maintaining or hiring a person to engage in prostitution as an act of trafficking in persons, viz.:
SEC. 4.Acts of Trafficking in Persons. – It shall be unlawful for any person, natural or juridical, to commit any of the following acts:. . .In convicting Peek of violation of Section 4(e) of Republic Act No. 9208, as amended, the majority ordained that all the elements of qualified trafficking in persons were present, viz.: (a) AAA was only 15 years old when the crime was committed; (b) Peek received and harbored AAA inxxxxxxxxxxx; (c) the main purpose of which is for sexual exploitation.[9]Citing the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Issue Paper, theponenciadefined "harboring" as the accommodation of a person at the point of departure, transit, or destination, before or at the place of exploitation, or it may refer to steps taken to conceal a person's whereabouts. Meanwhile, "receipt" is the arrival of the person, the meeting of a person at an agreed place, or to gaining control over a person.[10]
(e) To maintain or hirea person to engage in prostitution or pornography.. . . (Emphasis supplied)
With due respect, I cannot agree with the characterization of Peek's acts as trafficking in persons. Section 4(e) of Republic Act No. 9208, as amended, under which Peek is being convicted, refers to maintaining or hiring a personto engage in prostitution or pornography. The Information alleged that Peek received and harbored AAAfor sexual exploitation. Section 3(c) and (f) define "prostitution" and "sexual exploitation" as follows:
SEC. 3.Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act: . . .From these definitions as well as the description of prohibited acts under Republic Act No. 9208, trafficking in persons, in essence, contemplates anillegal commercial transactioninvolving three parties:first, the trafficked person;second, the customer who may be held liable under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9208, as amended, for use of trafficked persons; andthird, the person who transacts the trafficked individual to the customer, for which the former may be held liable under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 9208, as amended, for trafficking in persons.
(c)Prostitution– refers to any act, transaction, scheme or designinvolving the use of a person by another, for sexual intercourse or lascivious conductin exchange of money, profit or any other consideration.
. . . .
(f)Sexual Exploitation– refers toparticipation by a person in prostitution, pornography or the production of pornography, in exchange for money, profit or any other consideration where the participation is caused or facilitated by any means of intimidation or threat, use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, debt bondage, abuse of power or of position or of legal process, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person;or in sexual intercourse or lascivious conductcaused or facilitated by any means as provided in this Act. (Emphasis supplied)
I humbly opine that Peek may not be penalized for qualified trafficking in persons for the simple reason that he did not "traffic" AAA. The act of maintaining or hiring a person engaged in prostitution under Section 4(e) of Republic Act No. 9208, as amended, does not pertain to "hiring" the latter for one's personal benefit. Rather, it is for purposes of "transacting" the person engaged in prostitution to third persons or those who "use" the trafficked person for sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct as contemplated by the definition of "prostitution." Here, however, Peek neither "hired" nor "maintained" AAA for a third party. Rather, Peek himself exploited AAA. In sum, thesecond elementfor qualified trafficking in persons is not present, i.e., Peek did not commit any of the acts of trafficking under the law, hence, he cannot be convicted of qualified trafficking in persons.
Thus, inPeople v. XXX and YYY,[11]the Court convicted the accused therein of violations of Section 4(e) of Republic Act No. 9208 for making their own children, who were under their custody, perform acts of cybersex for different foreign customers in exchange for pecuniary consideration.
InPeople v. Arraz,[12]the accused was convicted of qualified trafficking in persons in violation of Section 4(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 9208, for compelling his domestic helper to strip and commit sexual acts via the internet for foreign customers.
Finally, inPeople v. XXX,[13]XXX was convicted both of rape and qualified trafficking in persons under Section 4(e) of Republic Act No. 9208 committed against 14-year-old AAA. XXX himself had carnal knowledge of AAA through force for which he was found guilty of Rape. On the other hand, he was also convicted of qualified trafficking in persons for making AAA render sexual services to a male customer in exchange for PHP 2,000.00.
These cases illustrate a common denominator: the accused who was convicted of qualified trafficking in persons under Section 4(e) acted as the pimp, not the customer.
Indeed, if Congress intended to penalize those who engage the services of trafficked persons under Section 4(e), there would have been no reason to separately penalize the use of trafficked persons under Section 11 for such would have already been subsumed by Section 4(e). Basic is the rule in statutory construction that "[t]he whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole. A statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible. In short, every meaning to be given to each word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases and its meaning may be modified or restricted by the latter."[14]
During deliberations, my esteemed and learned colleague, Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao (Justice Dimaampao), voiced his agreement to the Majority, noting that the law does not explicitly require the presence of the "trafficker" or "pimp" for trafficking under Section 4 to exist. It was submitted that trafficking, under the expanded definition proffered by Republic Act No. 10364, covers not only acts done during the trafficked persons' captivity or custody in the hands of the trafficker, but also preparatory acts done to acquire the individual to be trafficked.[15]
I agree with this erudite observation. To be clear, whether receiving or harboring a trafficked person for the purposes enumerated by the law constitutes trafficking in person is not the issue here. Rather, the ambiguity that comes to fore is whether the individual who sexually exploited the victim through any of the means under Republic Act No. 9208, as amended, may be held liable for trafficking in persons.
As discussed, I submit that the answer is no.
Instead of qualified trafficking in persons under Section 4(e) of Republic Act No. 9208, as amended, I humbly propose to convict Peek of use of trafficked persons under Section 11 of the same law, viz.:
SEC. 11.Use of Trafficked Persons. – Any person whobuys or engages the services of a trafficked person for prostitutionshall be penalized with the following:Provided, That the Probation Law (Presidential Decree No. 968) shall not apply:Doing so would not violate Peek's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him for the Information adequately set forth the facts constituting the charge. Indeed, as the Court taught inPeople v. Solar,[16]the accused's right to be informed of the nature and charges against him or her is not violated where the Information clearly alleges the facts constituting the offense regardless whether the provision of law cited is incorrect:
From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the technical name of the crime of which he [or she] stands charged. It in no way aids him [or her] in a defense on the merits. . . . That to which his [or her] attention should be directed, and in which he [or she], above all things else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged.The real question is not did he [or she] commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he [or she] perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set forth.If he [or she] did, it is of no consequence to him [or her], either as a matter of procedure or of substantive right, how the law denominates the crime which those acts constitute.The designation of the crime by name in the caption of the information from the facts alleged in the body of that pleading is a conclusion of law made by the fiscal. . . . If he [or she] performed the acts alleged, in the manner stated, the law determines what the name of the crime is and fixes the penalty therefor. It is the province of the court alone to say what the crime is or what it is named.(Emphasis supplied)Notably, the Information here, albeit denominated as "Qualified Trafficking in Persons" alleged acts constituting the use of trafficked persons, i.e., Peek, taking advantage of the minor victim's vulnerability by reason of her poverty, had sexual intercourse with her in exchange for monetary benefits, viz.:
Here, the positive testimony of AAA established the foregoing allegations in the Information: (a) she was only 15 years old, hence, a child, at the time of the incident; (b) Peek paid her PHP 10,000.00, so she agreed to meet up with him during which they also talked about having sexual intercourse; and (c) though she eventually changed her mind and no longer wished to be intimate with Peek, he fulfilled his carnal desires by forcing her to have sex with him and to commit other lascivious acts. Clearly, Peek is guilty of use of trafficked persons. Under Section 11(a)(l) of Republic Act No. 9208, as amended, when the use of trafficked persons is committed against a child, i.e., a person below 18 years old,[17]the penalty shall bereclusion temporalin its medium period toreclusion perpetuaor 17 years to 40 years imprisonment and a fine of at least PHP 500,000.00 to PHP 1,000,000.00.CR-FMY Case No. 2017-1127
(Qualified Trafficking in Persons)
That on January 31, 2017 and the dates prior thereto, atxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, for the purpose of sexual exploitation, taking advantage of the offended party's vulnerability by reason of her poverty, by giving her benefits in monetary form in order to achieve her consent, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally receive and harbor [AAA], fifteen (15) years old, for the purpose of having sexual intercourse with her, to her great damage and prejudice.
Contrary to law, qualified by the circumstance of minority of the offended party.
It was posited, however, that considering that there was no third-party trafficker who hired AAA for Peek, use of trafficked persons could not have been committed.[18]The existence or identity of the trafficker, however, is not relevant in use of trafficked persons so long as all the elements of the offense have been established,as here. As earlier discussed, it was established that Peekboughtorengaged the servicesof AAA, a minor, for sexual exploitation. As the subject of such illegal transaction, AAA is clearly a trafficked person.
Accordingly, I vote to sustain Peek's conviction for rape but suggest that instead of qualified trafficking in persons, he should be convicted of use of trafficked persons under Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 9208, as amended.
*In line with Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015, as mandated by Article 266(A) of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, the names of the private offended parties, along with all other personal circumstances that may tend to establish their identities, are made confidential to protect their privacy and dignity.
[1]Draftponencia, p. 3.
[2]CA Decision dated July 19, 2019, p. 3.
[3]Draftponencia, p. 3.
[4]CA Decision dated July 19, 2019, pp. 6-8.
[5]Draftponencia, p. 2.
[6]849 Phil. 197 (2019) [Per J. Peralta,En Banc].
[7]Otherwise known as the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003.
[8]Otherwise known as the Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012.
[9]Draft ponencia, p. 19.
[10]Id.at 18.
[11]835 Phil. 1083 (2018) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division].
[12]925 Phil. 462 (2022) [Per J. M.V. Lopez, Second Division].
[13]921 Phil. 758 (2022) [Per J. Hernando, Second Division].
[14]Eizmendi, Jr. et al. v. Ramos, Jr., 839 Phil. 902 (2019) [Per C.J. Peralta, Third Division].
[15]Reflections of Justice Dimaampao, p. 5.
[16]858 Phil. 884 (2019) [Per J. Caguioa,En Banc],citingUnited States v. Lim San, 017 Phil. 273 (1910) [Per J. Moreland, First Division].
[17]Republic Act No. 9208, as amended, Section 3(b).
[18]Reflections of Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, p. 5.
DIMAAMPAO,J.:
At the outset, I commend the well-writtenponenciaof Justice Kho and its extensive discussion anent Republic Act No. 9208,[1]as amended by, Republic Act No. 10364.[2]
I fully concur that accused-appellant Willem Johannes Peek (Peek) must be held guilty of both rape and qualified trafficking in persons. Still, I write only to add further discourse on the essence of the crime of trafficking, especially in light of the equally well-reasoned dissent on the matter of Justice Lazaro-Javier.
While the Court has had more occasion to expound on the nature of this crime in recent years, it may still be further developed not only to guide the public but also to reinforce the will of Congress in passing this imperative protective legal measure.
Fairly recently, the Third Division of the Court had occasion to elucidate on the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 10364 to the crime of qualified trafficking in persons. InPeople v. Arraz,[3]the Court observed that the essence of the offense was not substantially altered and while some of the provisions were expanded to be more encompassing, others were simply renumbered, and the others remained wholly unchanged.
In her sponsorship speech of Senate Bill No. 2625, the predecessor bill of Republic Act No. 10364, Senator Legarda explained that the expansion of the definition of trafficking is part of their efforts to fill the policy gap identified by law enforcement agencies which prevent convictions of this crime:[4]
Trafficking in Persons is a complex problem and its full dimensions are hard to measure. Furthermore, trafficking modes and patterns continue to evolve over time as perpetrators of the crime seek to outflank policies and regulations of government.With this definition in mind, the Court inArraz, took occasion to outline the constitutive elements for qualified trafficking under both Republic Act No. 9208 and Republic Act No. 10364:
I recognize that it is by understanding the depth and scope of the problem that we will be able to address the issue of trafficking squarely.
As perpetrators become more innovative in their actions, so should government be more deliberate in its efforts to strengthen policies, improve on enforcement, and enhance interagency coordination, both at the local and international level.
Issues Identified
The Philippines is one among about 100 countries that have passed legislation on trafficking in persons. The Global Report on Trafficking in Persons reported that "47 countries reported making at least 10 convictions per year, with 15 making at least five times this number."
The Philippines, on the other hand, has made only 33 convictions over a period of seven years.Such dismal conviction rate, according to law enforcement agencies, may be attributed to a number of policy gaps that can only be addressed through a stronger anti-trafficking law.
. . . .
Policy Reform
In the policy front, we need to harmonize policies and definitions on trafficking in persons, child labor, and forced labor. As such, Republic Act No. 9208 needs to be harmonized with pe1iinent provisions of Republic Act No. 9231 (on the worst forms of child labor), and Republic Act No. 7610 (on child abuse and discrimination).Varying, if not conflicting definitions on trafficking weakens our capacity to prosecute and bring perpetrators to answer for their crimes.(Emphasis supplied)
According to jurisprudence, the elements for trafficking in persons are derived from Section 3 (a) of Republic Act No. 9208. Moreover, when the crime is qualified trafficking, the prosecution must likewise prove any of the qualifying circumstances under Section 6 of the same law. Taken together, the general elements for qualified trafficking in personsunder the original Republic Act No. 9208are as follows:The same straightforward enumeration of elements is echoed in theponenciaas well.[6]When the crime is committedafter the effectivity of Republic Act No. 10364on February 28, 2013, the elements for qualified trafficking in persons are as follows:
As applied to the present case, theponenciaposits that while Peek was charged with Section 4 (e) of Republic Act No. 9208, as amended, i.e., "maintain[ing] or hir[ing] a person to engage in prostitution or pornography[,]" the actual act he is guilty of is in harboring and receiving the minor victim for sexual exploitation, which is found in Section 4 (a).[7]
On this score, I wholeheartedly agree with this nuance recognized by theponencia.
It bears stressing that Section 4 of the law lists a whole gamut of activities constitutive of trafficking in persons. It does not only list preparatory acts of engaging or "procuring" the trafficked individual, but also acts done after the trafficked individual is in the trafficker's custody. As theponenciaobserves, trafficking is not limited to the movement from one place to another of an individual against their will or with their vitiated consent.[8]It includes all other acts of exploitation after the fact. In other words, trafficking may be said to involve the whole "experience" as it were of coming into the custody or control of the trafficker, the victim's maintenance or movement, their exploitation, and their subsequent sale.
To my mind, the essence of trafficking is exploitation. It is the commodification of human life, turning another person into a commercial product that can be acquired, used, and sold.
In the case at bench, the act of trafficking is not the hiring per se of the victim as a prostitute. Rather, Peek trafficked AAA by forcing her to meet him through the promise of a large sum, with the added threat of publishing her sensitive photos if she refuses, all for the purpose of sexually exploiting her. In my humble opinion, this falls squarely with the expansive definition of qualified trafficking under the amended law.
At this point, it behooves the Court to address the erudite observation of J. Lazaro-Javier that trafficking in persons necessarily includes at least three parties: the trafficked person, the customer, and the trafficker.[9]J. Lazaro-Javier asserts that Peek did not "traffic" AAA as he procured her for his own benefit. Rather, he should be held guilty of "Use of Trafficked Persons"; defined and penalized under Section 11 of the law.[10]
As above-adumbrated, however, this observation may not be wholly supported by the letter and intent of the law. Nowhere is it explicitly stated in the law that the presence of the "trafficker" or "pimp" is necessary before trafficking under Section 4 is said to occur. This is consistent with the above-proffered observation that trafficking covers not only acts done during the trafficked persons' captivity or custody in the hands of the trafficker, but also preparatory acts done to acquire the individual to be trafficked. Necessarily, prior to the acquisition of the trafficked individual, there is no customer to speak of, and yet the act itself constitutes trafficking.
If at all, it is only in Section 11 of the law where at least three parties may be involved, although the provision itself only punishes the customer:
SEC. 11. Use of Trafficked Persons. – Any person who buys or engages the services of a trafficked person for prostitution shall be penalized with the following: Provided, That the Probation Law (Presidential Decree No. 968) shall not apply:The use of the word "trafficked person" in the provision necessarily implies that the victim is already being trafficked by another. It is a loaded term that necessarily implies the existence of a prior act of trafficking.
Consequently, considering that there was no third-party trafficker that hired out AAA to Peek, Section 11 finds no application.
With the foregoing disquisition, I express my concurrence with theponenciaand vote toDENYthe appeal.
[1]Republic Act No. 9208 (2003), An Act to Institute Policies to Eliminate Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, Establishing the Necessary Institutional Mechanisms for the Protection and Support of Trafficked Persons, Providing Penalties for its Violations, and for Other Purposes, otherwise known as the "Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003."
[2]Republic Act No. 10364 (2013), An Act Expanding Republic Act No. 9208, Entitled "An Act to Institute Policies to Eliminate Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, Establishing the Necessary Institutional Mechanisms for the Protection and Support of Trafficked Persons, Providing Penalties for its Violations and for Other Purposes," otherwise known as the "Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012."
[3]G.R. No. 262362, April 8, 2024 [Per J. Dimaampao, Third Division].
[4]50 Journal, Senate, 15thCongress, First Regular Session (January 17, 2011), pp. 961-962.
[5]People v. Arraz, April 28, 2024 [Per J. Dimaampao, Third Division] at 20-22. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.
[6]Ponencia, pp. 16-17.
[7]Id.at 17-18.
[8]Id.at 19.
[9]Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of J. Lazaro-Javier, p. 5.
[10]Id.pp. 6-7.