2025 / Aug
G.R. No. 264132 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. YYY, ZZZ (ACQUITTED), AND XXX,* ACCUSED; XXX, ACCUSED-APPELLANT. August 13, 2025
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 264132, August 13, 2025 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. YYY, ZZZ (ACQUITTED), AND XXX,*ACCUSED;
XXX, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
D E C I S I O N
ROSARIO, J.:
The law punishes the mere receipt of persons, regardless of the victim's consent or knowledge, for purposes of trafficking.
This is an ordinary appeal[1]of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision,[2]which affirmed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision[3]convicting XXX of qualified trafficking in persons under Section 4(a) in relation to Section 6(a) of Republic Act No. 9208,[4]as amended by Republic Act No. 10364.[5]
I
XXX and her co-accused, YYY and ZZZ, were charged with the above crime in an Information which reads:
The CA adopted the prosecution's version of the facts as summarized in the People's Brief:
In its Brief,[12]the Office of the Solicitor General, representing the People, contended that XXX's guilt for qualified trafficking was proven beyond reasonable doubt through the consistent, straightforward, and unequivocal testimony of the victim who testified that it was XXX, the owner and the manager ofxxxxxBar, who recruited or hired her as a GRO to allegedly oversee the bar and serve beer to its male customers. Furthermore, XXX's exploitative intent to peddle AAA was manifested when the latter declared that it was XXX who forced her to drink with male customers and go out with them to have sex after XXX received payment for the service. Thus, XXX's defense of denial must crumble in light of AAA's categorical and positive identification of XXX.
Accused YYY, on the other hand, failed to file his brief, resulting in the dismissal of his appeal.[13]
The CA affirmed the RTC Decision with modification as follows:
II
Accused-appellant was charged and convicted of qualified trafficking in persons under Section 4(a), in relation to Section 6(a), of Republic Act No. 9208, as amended by Republic Act No. 10364, which provide:
As regards the second element, while the victim agreed during cross-examination that she was not forced to work at the bar[25]and that she could say no if she did not want to work there,[26]We held inPeople v. De Dios[27]that trafficking in persons may be committed also by means of taking advantage of the person's vulnerability as a minor, as in this case. This element was further achieved through the financial gain for the illicit services that were provided by the victim to the customers.
The third element was likewise duly established by the prosecution. The victim's testimony reveals that the purpose of the trafficking was prostitution or other forms of sexual exploitation, to wit:
ACCORDINGLY, the appeal isDISMISSED. The July 2, 2020 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 10297 isAFFIRMED. Accused-appellant XXX is foundGUILTYbeyond reasonable doubt of qualified trafficking in persons. She is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of PHP 2 million. She is furtherORDEREDto pay the victim PHP 500,000.00 as moral damages and PHP 100,000.00 as exemplary damages, both of which shall earn legal interest at 6% per annum from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Gesmundo, C.J. (Chairperson), Hernando, Zalameda,andMarquez, JJ.,concur.
*In line with SC Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015, as mandated by Republic Act No. 9208 in trafficking in persons cases, the names of the parties and their relatives, and other personal circumstances that may tend to establish their identities, are made confidential to protect their privacy and dignity.
[1]Rollo, pp. 3-5.
[2]Id. at 8-27. The July 2, 2020 Decision in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 10297 was penned by Associate Justice Walter S. Ong and concurred in by Associate Justices Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo and Victoria Isabel A. Paredes of the Fifth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
[3]CArollo, pp. 54-60. The December 8, 2017 Decision in Criminal Case No. 23-2530 was penned by Judge Bernabe B. Mendoza of Branch 23, Regional Trial Court,xxxxxxxxxxx, Isabela.
[4]Republic Act No. 9208 (2003), Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003.
[5]Republic Act No. 10364 (2012), Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012.
[6]Geographical location is concealed pursuant to SC Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015.
[7]RTC Records, p. 1.
[8]Rollo, p. 11.
[9]Id. at 12.
[10]CArollo, pp. 58-60.
[11]Id. at 40-53.
[12]Id. at 66-78.
[13]Rollo, p. 8, n.1.
[14]Id. at 26.
[15]Republic Act No. 9208, sec. 3(b), as amended, defines a child as "a person below [18] years of age or one who is over [18] but is unable to fully take care of or protect himself/herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition."
[16]People v. Casio, 749 Phil. 458, 472-473 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
[17]TSN, AAA, May 24, 2016, pp. 11-13.
[18]TSN, XXX, September 5, 2017, p. 8.
[19]TSN, AAA, August 25, 2016, p. 13.
[20]Id. at 29.
[21]TSN, SPO2 Roberto Rañeses, November 8, 2016, pp. 7-8.
[22]People v. Villanueva, 795 Phil. 349 (2016) [Per J. Perez, Third Division].
[23]Id. at 361.
[24]TSN, AAA, September 5, 2017, p. 13.
[25]TSN, AAA, August 25, 2016, p 12.
[26]Id. at 13.
[27]832 Phil. 1034, 1044 (2018) [Per J. Reyes, Jr., Second Division].
[28]TSN, AAA, May 24, 2016, pp. 15-34.
This is an ordinary appeal[1]of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision,[2]which affirmed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision[3]convicting XXX of qualified trafficking in persons under Section 4(a) in relation to Section 6(a) of Republic Act No. 9208,[4]as amended by Republic Act No. 10364.[5]
XXX and her co-accused, YYY and ZZZ, were charged with the above crime in an Information which reads:
That on or about [July 1,] 2014, and for sometime thereafter, in the municipality ofxxxxxxxxxxx,[6]province of Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, recruit, transport, hire, receive, keep and maintain the person of [AAA], a minor of 17 years old, for the purpose of prostitution and sexual exploitation under the pretext of employing her as Guest Relation Officer (GRO) at the "xxxxxBar", owned by the accused [XXX], located atxxxxxxxxxxx, in said municipality.Upon arraignment, all accused pleaded not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
The CA adopted the prosecution's version of the facts as summarized in the People's Brief:
On [July 1,] 2014, [AAA], who was then only [17] years old, was accompanied by her friends, BJE and [ZZZ], toxxxxxBar located atxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Isabela. Said beer house is owned and managed by [XXX] and [YYY].As for the defense's version of the facts, the CA quoted the following statements from the Brief for Accused-Appellant:
Thereat, [AAA] was introduced to [XXX], who immediately hired [her] as a [GRO]. . . tasked to oversee the bar. As a GRO, [AAA] was forced by [XXX] to entertain male customers by sitting and drinking liquors with them, with which [AAA] earns a commission of [PHP 50.00] per bottle.
Also, during her employment as a GRO, [AAA] would be peddled by [XXX] to go out to a hotel, and have sex with male customers after they pay [XXX] a "bar fine." [AAA] would refuse going out with the customers and have sex with them but [XXX] would compel her as the customer already paid for her.
[AAA] continued to work atxxxxxBar until [July 7,] 2014, when she was rescued by police operatives. . . after receiving information that [AAA], a minor, is working in a beer house and being peddled to male customers for sex.[8]
[XXX] denied the charge against her. She maintained that she is not the owner, manager, or supervisor ofxxxxxbar, but a [GRO] who entertains customers. On June 30, 2014, AAA and BJE went to her boarding house to drink with [YYY], the owner of the boarding house. AAA inquired where she was working, and she told her that she works inxxxxxxxxxxx. AAA then asked her if she could also work there and [XXX] answered that she should ask [YYY]. On July 1, 2014, while she was cleaning. . . [YYY], AAA, and BJE arrived. [YYY] then told her that AAA and BJE will work at the bar, and left. On July 7, 2014, while she was sitting with a customer, policemen arrived and brought her to the Police Station.The RTC convicted XXX and YYY of the crime charged. The pertinent portion of its Decision reads:
[ZZZ] likewise denied the charge against her. She did not know anyone fromxxxxxBar. AAA was introduced to her by BJE as the latter's girlfriend [on] March 30, in a nipa hut, where they would usually hangout. The last time they met was on June 30, 2014.
[YYY] denied the charge against him and maintained that he does not own any videoke bar inxxxxxxxxxxx. He does not know AAA and his co-accused.[9]
Based on the definition of trafficking in persons, prostitution and sexual exploitation and the enumeration of acts of trafficking in persons, [XXX] and [YYY] performed all the elements in the commission of the offense when AAA was hired [as a GRO], but was made to sit and drink intoxicating liquor with male customers and was brought out for sex after the male customers paid the bar-fine [sic] to [XXX].On appeal, XXX argued in her Brief[11]that the trial court gravely erred in convicting her of the crime charged despite the prosecution's failure to prove all its elements and for failing to give credence to her defense of denial in light of the weakness of the prosecution's case. As to the first element, XXX claims that she was not the owner, manager or supervisor ofxxxxxBar, but merely an ordinary employee who worked as a GRO in said establishment. Neither did she have the authority to recruit, hire, or maintain anyone. In fact, AAA admitted that it was ZZZ and BJE who invited, recruited, and helped her get a job atxxxxxBar. She was also not employed to work as a sex worker or for purposes of sexual exploitation, but to oversee the store. She also never stated that XXX pimped her out to customers. XXX claimed that she had nothing to do with AAA's personal decision to go out with whoever she likes.
The act of requiring AAA to sit and drink with male customers for a fee and the fact that [XXX] after receiving the bar-fine [sic] from male customers of thexxxxxBar, she allowed AAA to be brought outside for flesh services. This is sexual exploitation and prostitution.
The prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that [YYY] and [XXX] committed the offense of trafficking in persons, qualified by the fact that AAA was a child.
. . . .
WHEREFORE... judgment is hereby rendered CONVICTING accused [YYY] and [XXX] of the crime of Qualified Trafficking in Person. . . SENTENCING each of them to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of [PHP 2 million].
Further, they are hereby ordered solida[ril]y to pay AAA [PHP] 500,000.00 as moral damages and [PHP] 100,000.00 as exemplary damages or a total of [PHP] 600,000.00 plus [12%] thereof per annum as interest from April 28, 2015 until fully paid.
For failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused [ZZZ] is hereby ACQUITTED from the offense charged.
. . . .
SO ORDERED.[10]
In its Brief,[12]the Office of the Solicitor General, representing the People, contended that XXX's guilt for qualified trafficking was proven beyond reasonable doubt through the consistent, straightforward, and unequivocal testimony of the victim who testified that it was XXX, the owner and the manager ofxxxxxBar, who recruited or hired her as a GRO to allegedly oversee the bar and serve beer to its male customers. Furthermore, XXX's exploitative intent to peddle AAA was manifested when the latter declared that it was XXX who forced her to drink with male customers and go out with them to have sex after XXX received payment for the service. Thus, XXX's defense of denial must crumble in light of AAA's categorical and positive identification of XXX.
Accused YYY, on the other hand, failed to file his brief, resulting in the dismissal of his appeal.[13]
The CA affirmed the RTC Decision with modification as follows:
The appeal is DENIED. The [RTC] Decision. . . finding appellant [XXX] guilty beyond reasonable doubt of [qualified trafficking in persons]. . . is [AFFIRMED] with MODIFICATION, in that all monetary awards shall earn interest at the legal rate of [6%] per annum, from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.[14]Hence, this appeal.
Accused-appellant was charged and convicted of qualified trafficking in persons under Section 4(a), in relation to Section 6(a), of Republic Act No. 9208, as amended by Republic Act No. 10364, which provide:
Section 4.Acts of Trafficking in Persons.– It shall be unlawful for any person, natural or juridical, to commit any of the following acts:The Court has enumerated the elements of trafficking in persons under Republic Act. No. 9208, as amended, as follows:
(a) To recruit, obtain, hire, provide, offer, transport, transfer, maintain, harbor, or receive a person by any means, including those done under the pretext of domestic or overseas employment or training or apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, or sexual exploitation[.]
. . . .
Section 6.Qualified Trafficking in Persons. —The following are considered as qualified trafficking:
(a) When the trafficked person is a child[.][15]
As correctly found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, accused-appellant was the one who hired or received the victim. This was duly proven by the victim's testimony, to wit:
(1) The act of "recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation, transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders;" (2) The means used include "by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person;" (3) The purpose of trafficking includes "the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs."[16]
Accused-appellant herself confirmed the victim's testimony when she testified that YYY brought the victim to her:
Q: Who helped you to look for a job, Madam witness? A: [ZZZ] and [BJE], sir. . . . . Q: And when they were not able to find you a job, what did you do next, if there be any? A: We rode a tricycle going toxxxxxxxxxxxsir, . . . . Q: And can you please tell us the reason why you proceeded toxxxxxxxxxxx[?] A: To work in a bar, sir. . . . . Q: And were you able to know the name of the owners of this bar, Madam witness? A: I know, sir. . . . . A: [YYY], sir. . . . . Q: And when you proceeded toxxxxxBar, were you able to talk to [YYY]? A: No, sir, I just heard. Q: Can you please tell us what did you hear? A: They talked to each other, sir.Q: To whom did he talk to, Madam witness? A: [XXX], sir.[17]
When cross-examined, the victim affirmed that she was introduced to accused-appellant, who eventually "employed" her:
Q: On July 1, 2014, where were you? A: At thexxxxxBar, the place of Kuya [YYY], ma'am. . . . . Q: What happened, if there is any[?] A: Kuya [YYY], [AAA] and [BJE] arrived ma'am. Q: Did [YYY] tell you anything? A: Kuya [YYY] informed me that [AAA] and [BJE] will work with me at the bar, ma'am.[18](Emphasis supplied.)
On re-direct examination, the victim reconfirmed that it was accused-appellant who hired her:
Q: To whom were you introduced? A: To [XXX], sir. . . . . Q: And it is [XXX] who employed youand not [ZZZ] and [BJE], am I correct? A: Yes. sir.[19](Emphasis supplied.)
Her testimony is corroborated by the testimony of Senior Police Officer II (SPO2) Roberto Rañeses who rescued the victim from the bar, to wit:
Q: And it was [XXX] who hired you to work inxxxxxVideoke Bar, is that correct? . . . . A: Yes, sir.[20] (Emphasis supplied.)
Even assuming that accused-appellant is not the registered owner ofxxxxxBar, the same does not make her any less guilty. While We held inPeople v. Villanueva[22]that being the registered ownerper sedoes not make one criminally liable for the acts of trafficking committed in the establishment, the acts that constitute trafficking in persons may be performed by persons who may or may not be registered owners of establishments.[23]The law punishes the mere receipt of persons, with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, for purpose of trafficking. Despite not being the owner of the bar, it is clear from the above testimonies that accused-appellant was made responsible for the hiring and supervision of the victim. In fact, the victim pointed to her as the manager of the bar.[24]
Q: So, there were only [three] Police Officers who went with you in going toxxxxxxxxxxx? A: Yes, sir. . . . . Q: And what happened there when you reachedxxxxxxxxxxx? A: Upon reaching thexxxxxVideoke Bar, we saw [AAA] sitting at a table drinking wine together with a customer, sir. Q: And when you have seen the minor, what did you do, Mr. Witness? A: When we saw her and she was identified by her mother, we asked the minor if who owns or managing thexxxxxVideoke Bar, sir. Q: And what was her reply, Mr. Witness? A: She pointed to the Manager who was then present thereat in the name of [XXX], sir.
. . . . Q: And were you able to come to know who is the owner of that establishment during your investigation, Mr. Witness? A: We asked the Manager [XXX] who owns that bar and she answered it was [YYY], sir Q: How about the victim, did she identify the owner of thatxxxxxxestablishment? A: When we asked the minor, she only answered that the manager and the owner is [XXX], sir.[21]
As regards the second element, while the victim agreed during cross-examination that she was not forced to work at the bar[25]and that she could say no if she did not want to work there,[26]We held inPeople v. De Dios[27]that trafficking in persons may be committed also by means of taking advantage of the person's vulnerability as a minor, as in this case. This element was further achieved through the financial gain for the illicit services that were provided by the victim to the customers.
The third element was likewise duly established by the prosecution. The victim's testimony reveals that the purpose of the trafficking was prostitution or other forms of sexual exploitation, to wit:
Accused-appellant's claim that she never pimped the victim out to customers and had nothing to do with her personal decision to go out with them is clearly belied by the fact, that the victim's customer first spoke to accused-appellant before taking the victim to the hotel, and accused-appellant instructed him to return her to the bar afterward. Even more telling is that fact that accused-appellant received the supposed commission or bar fine that the customer paid for the victim's services.
Q: Aside from overseeing the store, can you please tell us what other job did you do there, Madam witness? A: "Pa-table", sir. Q: When you say "pa-table", what do you mean by that, Madam Witness? A: To sit with the customers, sir. Q: Who asked you to sit with a customer? A: [XXX], sir. Q: When did that happen, Madam witness, if you can recall? A: On July 1, 2014, sir.. . . . Q: And you said that you sat with a customer, is that correct? A: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Q: What was that customer doing when you sat beside him? A: He placed his arm around my shoulder, sir. . . . . Q: Can you please tell us where did he go? A: He brought me to a hotel, sir. Q: [W]hy did he bring you to a hotel, Madam witness? A: To use my womanhood, sir. Q: And how did he do that, Madam witness? A: He forced me, sir. . . . . INTERPRETER: Make it of record that the witness is crying. . . . . Q: So, you were brought fromxxxxxBar toxxxxxxxxxxxby your customer, Madam witness? A: Yes, sir. Q: Did your employer know that you were with your customer to [sic] the hotel, Madam witness? A: Yes, sir. Q: Who is that owner you are referring to who knows that you will be brought to a hotel. Madam witness? A: [XXX], sir. . . . . Q: [W]hy do you know that [XXX] knows that you will be brought to a hotel? A: They talked with each other, sir. Q: Who talked to each other, Madam witness? A: My customer and [XXX], sir. . . . . Q: [W]hat did they talk about, Madam witness? A: My customer told her that he will take me out, sir. . . . . Q: Can you please tell us the reply of [XXX]? A: She just instructed him to return me, sir. . . . . Q: And what happened there, Madam witness? A: We had a [sic] sex, sir. Q: And did you gain anything in going to your customer in a hotel, if any[?] A: [PHP 1,500.00], sir. Q: Who gave you that amount of [PHP 1,500.00]? A: The customer handed to my employer, sir. Q: To whom in particular, Madam witness? A: To [XXX], sir. . . . . Q: You were there in thexxxxxBar for how many days? A: [One] week, sir. Q: And you did not receive any salary, is that correct? A: None, sir. Q: But your services were not free according to you, is that correct? A: No, sir. Q: Will you please explain to us why you claimed that [your] services were not free and yet you do not receive any salary? A: Every time I earned commission, the Manager will take hold of it, sir. Q: What commission? A: Bar fine, sir. . . . . Q: What is that "bar fine"? A: They will take you out and bring you to a hotel, sir. . . . . Q: You mentioned about commission. Where do you get that commission? A: From the manager, sir. Q: Where will the manager get the commission given to you? A: From the customers, sir. . . . . Q: And you never received your commission from [XXX], is that correct, Madam witness? A: None, sir. Q: Because your friends were the ones who took you out from the bar, is that correct, Madam witness? . . . . A: Yes, sir.[28]
ACCORDINGLY, the appeal isDISMISSED. The July 2, 2020 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 10297 isAFFIRMED. Accused-appellant XXX is foundGUILTYbeyond reasonable doubt of qualified trafficking in persons. She is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of PHP 2 million. She is furtherORDEREDto pay the victim PHP 500,000.00 as moral damages and PHP 100,000.00 as exemplary damages, both of which shall earn legal interest at 6% per annum from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Gesmundo, C.J. (Chairperson), Hernando, Zalameda,andMarquez, JJ.,concur.
*In line with SC Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015, as mandated by Republic Act No. 9208 in trafficking in persons cases, the names of the parties and their relatives, and other personal circumstances that may tend to establish their identities, are made confidential to protect their privacy and dignity.
[1]Rollo, pp. 3-5.
[2]Id. at 8-27. The July 2, 2020 Decision in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 10297 was penned by Associate Justice Walter S. Ong and concurred in by Associate Justices Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo and Victoria Isabel A. Paredes of the Fifth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
[3]CArollo, pp. 54-60. The December 8, 2017 Decision in Criminal Case No. 23-2530 was penned by Judge Bernabe B. Mendoza of Branch 23, Regional Trial Court,xxxxxxxxxxx, Isabela.
[4]Republic Act No. 9208 (2003), Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003.
[5]Republic Act No. 10364 (2012), Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012.
[6]Geographical location is concealed pursuant to SC Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015.
[7]RTC Records, p. 1.
[8]Rollo, p. 11.
[9]Id. at 12.
[10]CArollo, pp. 58-60.
[11]Id. at 40-53.
[12]Id. at 66-78.
[13]Rollo, p. 8, n.1.
[14]Id. at 26.
[15]Republic Act No. 9208, sec. 3(b), as amended, defines a child as "a person below [18] years of age or one who is over [18] but is unable to fully take care of or protect himself/herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition."
[16]People v. Casio, 749 Phil. 458, 472-473 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
[17]TSN, AAA, May 24, 2016, pp. 11-13.
[18]TSN, XXX, September 5, 2017, p. 8.
[19]TSN, AAA, August 25, 2016, p. 13.
[20]Id. at 29.
[21]TSN, SPO2 Roberto Rañeses, November 8, 2016, pp. 7-8.
[22]People v. Villanueva, 795 Phil. 349 (2016) [Per J. Perez, Third Division].
[23]Id. at 361.
[24]TSN, AAA, September 5, 2017, p. 13.
[25]TSN, AAA, August 25, 2016, p 12.
[26]Id. at 13.
[27]832 Phil. 1034, 1044 (2018) [Per J. Reyes, Jr., Second Division].
[28]TSN, AAA, May 24, 2016, pp. 15-34.