G.R. No. 253342 DIONISIO C. LAROCO, PETITIONER, VS. AURORA B. LAROCO AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS. June 22, 2022

The Case

This petition for review on certiorari assails the following dispositions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 111010 entitled "Dionisio C. Laroco v. Aurora B. Laroco, Republic of the Philippines:"

1)	Decision[1]dated November 6, 2019, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) – Branch 9, La Trinidad, Benguet, denying the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage of petitioner Dionisio C. Laroco with respondent Aurora B. Laroco; and
2)	Resolution[2]dated June 15, 2020, which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Antecedents

On February 20, 2014, petitioner filed a petition^[3]for declaration of nullity of his marriage with respondent based on Article 36^[4]of the Family Code. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 14-F-2133 and raffled to RTC – Branch 9, La Trinidad, Benguet.

Petitioner alleged that he first met respondent in 1970 while they were both students at Saint Louis University, Baguio City. He courted her until they became a couple. He later broke up with her after learning that she was still entertaining other suitors even though they were already in a relationship. His parents also disapproved of their relationship because of respondent's reputation as a promiscuous, dishonest, and flirtatious woman. He left respondent and went to Manila to support her mother, then undergoing cobalt therapy. When he returned to Baguio, respondent informed him that she was pregnant and invited him to meet her parents in Lepanto Mines, Mankayan, Benguet. There, respondent's parents forced him to marry her.^[5]

On September 6, 1971, he and respondent tied the knot before a municipal judge in Mankayan, Benguet. They begot three children, namely: Dennise David, Donna Marie, and Baby Boy, who were born in 1972, 1973, and 1977, respectively. His mother brought him back to Baguio City to finish his studies after Dennise's birth. When his mother passed away in 1973, it was only then that respondent was able to move and join him in Baguio, together with their children. But since his father still disliked respondent, she stayed in an apartment beside the Laroco's residence. When his father left for America in 1978, he and respondent rented out the store his father gave them and moved into an adjacent apartment. He worked in the government while respondent managed a canteen inside his family's residence.^[6]

While managing the canteen, respondent continued to go on dates with other men, especially when he was not around. She also deceived him and embarrassed the family by borrowing money from several persons without paying them. He confronted respondent about it but she simply denied it. She also refused to account for and explain the income shortage of the canteen, although it had a lot of customers. Even after their separation, respondent's creditors still tried to collect her loans from him. When respondent got arrested for estafa for failing to pay for or return the pieces of jewelry she bought, he went home to search for these items. He did not find them though. What he found instead were love letters from men respondent was dating and some love letters of respondent herself that she was unable to send to her men. He entrusted these letters to a certain Atty. Aquino as he planned to file a case against respondent and these men. Unfortunately, Atty. Aquino died and he was not able to retrieve anymore the letters. Respondent stayed in jail for almost a week until he was able to raise the money for her bail. After the incident, respondent never returned to their home. She took their children and lived with her paramour. Their children later on decided to live with him because respondent's paramour maltreated them. He remained in custody of their children since 1983 until they started their own families.^[7]

Meantime, petitioner consulted a physician-psychiatrist, Dr. Clarette Rosario Dy (Dr. Dy), who opined that their marriage should be nullified on the ground of psychological incapacity of both spouses. Dr. Dy interviewed petitioner, his sister Carmelita Mendoza, and their neighbors, Benjamin and Daisy Mendoza.^[8]

Based on the assessment, Dr. Dy diagnosed petitioner withobsessive-compulsive personality disordercharacterized by a pervasive pattern of preoccupation with orderliness, perfectionism, and mental and interpersonal control at the expense of flexibility.^[9]More specifically, petitioner was diagnosed, as follows:

1. He is preoccupied with details, list, and order.
2. He needs to be perfect in everything he does, has difficulty accepting failure, expects others to be like him, and thus, tends to be critical.
3. He is excessively devoted to his work and productivity.
4. He is overly conscientious and scrupulous about morality and values.
5. He is rigid and stubborn.^[10]

Dr. Dy concluded that petitioner's disorder evolved from his past personal history. Having been raised by strict and controlling parents who inculcated in him the value of education, industry, and obedience, petitioner thought that he had to possess these traits to earn his parents' appreciation. He became submissive to anything they said, like being diligent in his studies, avoiding social activities to concentrate on his studies, and obediently following the house rules. When he impregnated respondent, he felt he should take responsibility. During their marriage, he wanted her to submit to his desires but she refused. He wanted her to distance herself from other men (ex-suitors, boarders, and customers) and make a detailed accounting of their business, which became a source of their frequent arguments. He, however, kept it to himself to show the people that he had a perfect marital relationship. When he learned about respondent's relationship with the boarders and customers in their store, he felt bad and betrayed, and consequently began to fall out of love. He lost his love, trust, honor, and respect for respondent. He never gave themselves a chance to reconcile and fix their marriage because he believed that respondent would never submit herself to his desires. This rendered him psychologically incapacitated as a spouse to respondent.^[11]

Dr. Dy concluded that petitioner's psychological incapacity has been existing at the time of the celebration of his marriage to respondent and had juridical antecedence from his past history. It is a lifetime disorder, hence, considered permanent and incurable. It is also grave enough to bring petitioner's disability to assume the essential marital obligations of marriage.^[12]

As for respondent, Dr. Dy diagnosed her withHistrionic Personality Disordercharacterized by the following personality traits:

1. She feels uncomfortable in situations in which she is not the center of attraction.
2. She rapidly shifts and shows shallow expressions of emotions.
3. She has a style of speech that is excessively impressionistic and lacking in detail.
4. She engages in self-dramatization, theatrically and exaggerated expression of emotions.
5. She is easily influenced by others or by circumstances.^[13]

Dr. Dy opined that respondent's incapacity may have evolved from her past personal history. Respondent was unable to develop the richness of her inner feelings. Her relationship with petitioner was based on a dependency need that someone was still there to take care of her. When petitioner began avoiding her because she refused to listen to him, she felt rejected. She was incapable of sustaining affection and became intolerant of frustration and disappointment. Her emotions were shallow and fleeting. She accused him of neglecting her. Trust, respect, honor, and love toward her husband consequently got lost, making her incapable of assuming the essential obligations of her marriage to petitioner.^[14]Dr. Dy concluded that respondent's personality disorder is also serious, grave, incurable, and had juridical antecedence, rendering her psychologically incapacitated to assume the essential obligations of marriage.^[15]

During the trial, petitioner presented Dr. Dy as expert witness to prove his and respondent's respective psychological incapacities, his friend Christina Martinez (Christina), and his nephew's wife, Charina Mendoza (Charina).

Christina and Charina both testified that petitioner was a good and responsible person and a disciplinarian to his children, yet, he was also stubborn, making it difficult sometimes to deal with him.^[16]Respondent, on the other hand, was more concerned with her paramour than her own children, craved for attention, was living beyond her financial means, and was indicted for estafa because of her attitude.^[17]

Despite notice and summons, respondent neither filed an Answer nor participated in the proceedings. After investigation, the assistant provincial prosecutor of Benguet, on behalf of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), determined that no collusion existed between the parties.^[18]

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

By Decision^[19]dated May 22, 2017, the trial court denied the petition, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court resolves to DENY the prayer in this Petition and hereby renders judgment declaring that the marriage of Dionisio C. Laroco to Aurora B. Laroco subsists and remains valid.

Furnish copies of this Decision to the Office of the Solicitor General, Makati City; the Provincial Prosecutor of Benguet; the plaintiff and his counsel; and defendant.

SO ORDERED.^[20]

It held that the totality of evidence presented failed to establish either or both spouses' respective psychological incapacities that antedated the marriage and that are grave and incurable. The gravity of the disorders was not duly proven. There was no sufficient basis to conclude that petitioner's orderliness and perfectionism can be equated with psychological incapacity. Neither was the gravity of his behavior in relation to his failure to perform the essential marital obligations sufficiently described in Dr. Dy's report. Petitioner's characterization of respondent as unfaithful, selfish, and irresponsible in managing the family canteen was not sufficient to constitute psychological incapacity. At most, respondent's mismanagement of the family's finances merely constituted difficulty, refusal, or neglect, during the marriage, in the handling of funds intended for the family's financial support.^[21]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration^[22]which the trial court likewise denied under Order dated April 3, 2018.^[23]

The Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

On appeal, petitioner faulted the trial court for denying the petition for nullity of marriage. He argued in the main that the totality of evidence proved his and respondent's psychological incapacities to comply with their marital obligations, as well as the gravity and incurability thereof. Their psychological defects have been shown to exist even prior to their marriage or during their childhood.^[24]

For its part, the OSG^[25]defended the validity of the petitioner's marriage with respondent. It maintained that the totality of evidence failed to show that either of the spouses is psychologically incapacitated to assume and perform their respective essential marital obligations which may warrant the nullification of their marriage. Neither were the root cause, gravity, and incurability of their supposed psychological incapacities duly established.^[26]

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its assailed Decision^[27]dated November 6, 2019, the Court of Appeals affirmed, thus:

In fine, there being no evidence presented by appellant Dionisio showing that he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated to perform marital duties, their marriage shall be upheld, following the mandate of the Constitution to protect the marriage from dissolution at the whim of the parties.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 22 May 2017 of Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, La Trinidad, Benguet Province isAFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.^[28]

The Court of Appeals ruled that the totality of evidence was not sufficient to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Petitioner failed to present proof to substantiate his imputations of infidelity, propensity to lie, deceit, and indifference on respondent. The psychiatric evaluation report failed to specifically explain the gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability of the spouses' alleged personality disorders. It also lacked credibility considering that the evidence adduced were biased in petitioner's favor and respondent was not personally examined and interviewed by Dr. Dy.^[29]

The Court of Appeals denied reconsideration^[30]through Resolution^[31]dated June 15, 2020.

The Present Petition

Petitioner now seeks affirmative relief from the CourtviaRule 45 of the Rules of Court. He faults the Court of Appeals for sustaining the validity of his marriage with respondent. He asserts anew that the totality of evidence sufficiently established that he and respondent have grave and incurable psychological disorders already existing at the time of their marriage and made them both incapable of performing their marital obligations.^[32]

Our Ruling

WeGRANTthe petition.

Theoverarching issuein the case at bar iswhether the marriage between petitioner and respondent should be set aside for being a nullity on the ground of psychological incapacityunder Article 36 of theFamily Code. Hence, the applicable rules begin with Article 36 and the relevant decisional law on this statutory provision.

Article 36 states:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Previously, the Supreme Court explained Article 36 by consistently reiterating the rule that psychological incapacity had been intended by law to be confined to the "most serious cases ofpersonality disorders,"clinicallyormedicallyidentified, as theroot causeof the spouse's or the spouses' clear demonstration of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

This however wasreconceptualizedinTan-Andal v. Andal.^[33]This case lawset asidethefocusonpersonality disorders. Instead, the Court re-tooled psychological incapacity as themutual incompatibilityandantagonismbetween the spouses arising from their respectivepersonality structures. Thus:

Psychological incapacity is neither a mental incapacity nor only a personality disorderthat must beproven through expert opinion. There maynowbeproofof thedurable aspectsof aperson's personality, called"personality structure,"whichmanifestsitself throughclear acts of dysfunctionalitythatundermines the family. Thespouse's personality structuremust make itimpossiblefor him or her tounderstandand, more importantly, tocomply withhis or heressential marital obligations.

Proofof these aspects ofpersonality need not onlybegivenby anexpert.Ordinary witnesses who have been present in the life of the spousesbefore the latter contracted marriage maytestify on behaviors that they have consistently observedfrom the supposedly incapacitated spouse. From there, the judge will decide if thesebehaviorsareindicative of a trueandserious incapacityto assume the essential marital obligations.

In this way, the intent of the Joint Committeeto limit the incapacity to "psychic causes" is fulfilled. Furthermore, there will beno need to label a person as mentally disordered just to obtain a decree of nullity.x x x^[34]

x x x x

Difficult to prove as it may be, a party to a nullity case isstill required to prove juridical antecedencebecause it is anexplicit requirement of the law. xx x^[35]

x x x x

Furthermore, not only being an illness in a medical sense,psychological incapacity is not something to be healed or cured. And evenif it were a mental disorder, itcannot be describedin terms of beingcurable or incurable.^[36]

x x x x

Reading together the deliberations of the Joint Committee and our rulings in Santos and Molina,we hold that the psychological incapacitycontemplated in Article 36 of the Family Codeis incurable, not in the medical, butin the legal sense; hence, the third Molina guideline is amended accordingly. This means that theincapacityis soenduringandpersistentwith respectto a specific partner, andcontemplatesasituationwhere thecouple's respective personality structuresareso incompatible and antagonisticthat theonly result of the unionwould be theinevitable and irreparable breakdown of the marriage."Anundeniable patternof suchpersisting failure [to be a present, loving, faithful, respectful, and supportive spouse]must be established so as to demonstrate thatthere isindeed apsychological anomaly or incongruity in the spouse relative to the other."

With respect togravity, the requirement isretained, notin the sense that the psychological incapacity must be shown to be aseriousordangerous illness, but that"mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" are excluded.x x x^[37]

x x x x

To summarize, psychological incapacity consists ofclear acts of dysfunctionalitythat show alack of understandingandconcomitant compliancewith one's essential marital obligationsdue to psychic causes. It isnot a medical illnessthat has to bemedicallyorclinically identified; hence,expert opinionisnot required.

As an explicit requirement of the law, thepsychological incapacitymust be shown to have beenin existence at the time of the celebrationof the marriage, and iscaused by a durable aspect of one's personality structure, one that wasformed before the parties married. Toprove psychological incapacity, a party mustpresent clear and convincing evidence of its existence.^[38](citations omitted)

x x x x

To restate, psychological incapacity consists of themutual incompatibilityandantagonismbetween the spouses that(i)showsthelack of understandingandconcomitant compliancewith the spouses' essential marital obligations and(ii)underminethe unity and harmony within the family. Thisstateofdiscordanddisharmonymay be traced to the spouses'psychicorpersonality structuresthatclashwith one another. Becausepsychicorpersonality structuresare invariablyinternal, mental,andemotional processesand may themselves be theproductof, orcausedby, complex factors of volition, predisposition, or congenital origins, we have to look forother forms of evidenceto prove psychic or personality structuresif we are to veer away from thefocus on personality disordersandrender expendable theneed for expert opinion.

Theseother forms of evidence, perceivable and expressible by ordinary pieces of evidence and in turnverifiableby the lawyers' examinations thereof, are theclear, persistent,andchronicacts, behavior, conduct, events, reputation, character,orcircumstancesofdysfunctionalitiesthatresult inthe state of mutual incompatibility and antagonism, which, in turn undermines the family. Seen in this manner, the reconceptualization of psychological incapacity inTan-Andalwould now beaccessibleto proof byordinary, andnot necessarilyexpert,witnesses, documents,andobjects.

To prove psychological incapacity according to the conceptual framework outlined inTan-Andal, our courts must first recognize the complex task of turning theory to practice, ofconverting internal, mental,andemotional processesabout psychic or personality structures toevidence-based decisions.

The first order of business is to preclude the writing of willy-nilly decisions whose outcomes are determined arbitrarily if not whimsically. The decisions must be based on evidence, and not upon anything else that judges may have no expertise on. To this end, we aim to provide guidelines on how to establish psychological incapacity. Theseguidelinesconsist of nonbinding or suggested proof of facts for this ground of nullity.

Elements of Proof of
Psychological Incapacity

We begin with whatTan-Andalhas decreed:psychological incapacityisno longer provenmerely by medically or clinically establishing apersonality disorderthrough an expert opinion.

Rather, while proof of a personality disorder may help establish psychological incapacity, thestarting pointis now theproof of the durable aspects of a spouse's personality, calledpersonality structure, whichmanifests itselfthrough one or both spouses'clear, persistentandchronicacts, behavior, conduct, events, reputation, character, orcircumstancesofdysfunctionalities, indicative of themutual incompatibilityandantagonismbetween them, which in turn alreadyunderminesthe veryexistenceandessenceof thefamily.

Theoverarchingandbaselineissue in every psychological incapacity case iswhether mutual incompatibility and antagonism between the spouses exists. The decision on every claim of psychological incapacitybeginswith this question andendswith an answer to this question.

The existence and essence of thefamilyis undermined bypsychological incapacitybecause of theensuingincompatibilityandantagonismbetween thepersonality structureofone spouseand thepersonality structureof theother spouse. Theincompatibilityandantagonismbetween the spouses must make itclearly and convincingly improbableforboth spousestounderstandand, more important, tocomplywith their respective family and marital obligations. Thedisharmonyof the spouses in their common life must be so deep and intense as to be irremediable. Theresultshould be anundeniable patternor habit of apersisting failureforboth spousesto be present, loving, faithful, respectful, and supportivetowards each otherand to establish a healthy and respectful family and marital relationshipsbetween them. It must beclearly and convincingly improbablefor the spousesto continue a normal marital relationship with each othermuch less for themto live together in peace and happiness. There must be clear and convincing proof that the spouses are somismatchedthat their marriage hasin fact endedas the result of their hopeless disagreement and discord.^[39]Only then should the courts be empowered to terminate the marriage as a matter of law and declare it a nullity.

With the foregoing characterization, theincompatibilityandantagonismbetween the spouses donotrefer topetty quarrelsandminor bickeringsthat are part of normal human frailty. The terms signifymore than a mere mental process or an afterthoughtconceived and nurtured in the psyche of the complaining spouse.^[40]

Incompatibilityandantagonismnecessarily involvebothspouses. This discordant state should bemutual. Itcannotbe justunilateral. While one spouse may have amore normalpersonality structure than the other, and the overt acts evidencing the incompatibility and antagonismmay come largely from the other spouse, it isinconceivablethat a spouse's personality can be compatible with that of the other,if the latter is already incompatiblewith the former.If there is a clash of personalities, both must clash.

We hold that the termsincompatibilityandantagonismdescribe astateorqualityof therelationshipbetweenthe spouses. One spouse in a case for Article 36cannotestablish incompatibility and antagonism on the latter's part alone. To repeat, incompatibility and antagonismcannot be unilateralbut shouldalways be mutual.

Thus, where one spouse alleges to be disillusioned or disappointed in the marriage due to some difficulties, this would beinsufficientto destroy anotherwise normal and wholesome matrimonial associationon the ground of psychological incapacity. It isessentialthat there must beproof firstof aclearly and convincinglyhopeless marriage already tormented by fundamental disagreement and discord between them.Conversely, it would be ofno significancethat one spouse testified that the latter feltnoincompatibility and antagonismif the marriage hadin factbeen wracked by dissensionanddiscordbetween the spouses, or where there is no present, loving, faithful, respectful, and supportive conducttoward each other, or where establishing a healthy and respectful family and maritalrelationshipsis already improbable, since to continue a normal marital relationship with each other, much less to live together in peace and happiness, has been undermined by their hopeless disagreement and quarrels.

For purposes of establishing psychological incapacity,mutual incompatibility and antagonismdenote a state of irremediable rift or discord produced by areciprocalconflict of personalities. The condition envisioned is by its naturebilateral. Once a marital relation of this character is established as a fact,there existsin contemplation of law a state ofactionable incompatibility and antagonism, though the effect of the mismatch may be wholly unbearable to one spouse yet appear somewhat less harmful and disturbing to the other spouse.

This situation isespecially trueandmanifestedwhere the allegedunilateralconduct amounts to or is actually arelational act of violence by one spouse against the otheror thelatter's childrenandother close relatives.^[41]Where this type of crime is involved, we have topresume conclusivelythat the incompatibility and antagonism aremutual. In this instance, as when the spousal privilege is lost,the crime"directly attacks, or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, there is no more spousal harmony to be preserved as the identity of interests has disappeared and the law's aim of protecting the privacy and the security of private life ceases to exist."^[42]

In proving psychological incapacity,faultin the sense ofmatrimonial misconductisnotan essential element. It isnotincumbent on the petitioner to show any misconduct or guilt by or against the respondent. It isenoughthat therequired state of incompatibility and antagonism exists, regardless of whether it is the fault of any one or both of the spouses or no one is at fault. Misconduct, fault, or blame is of no significanceif in factincompatibility and antagonism as described above already characterize the troubled marriage.

Previous toTan-Andal, thepersonality disorderof the spouse or spousesmust be proven clinicallyormedicallyas the root cause of the marital breakdown. Today, under the framework ofTan-Andal, this isno longer the case. Of course, presenting evidence of personality disorderwould still helpto show that the incompatibility and antagonism really does exist and that this state is grave, incurable, and prenuptial. But this evidence of personality disorder isnot anymore necessary.

For practical purposes, itwould helppetitioner's cause for the trial court to be informed, so far as it is possible, of thecauseof theincompatibilityandantagonism— whether it is the result of volition, or a predisposition, or is congenital. The evidence of personality disorderwould helpin this regard.

A word of caution though. The relationship between spouses iscomplicatedand to attempt to isolate individual contributing factors in the destruction of the marital relationship, as we once required prior toTan-Andal, is to engage in anartificial, problematic,andunrealisticinquiry. Theelements and qualities that may create incompatibility and antagonismbetween persons, more so between spouses,cannotbe precisely defined. Indeed, the state of one spouse's personal disposition varies betweenpersonal circumstances, such as either or both of the spouses'health, financial status, work opportunities, education, habits of thought, life contentment, opportunities for other relationships, physical distance,andpeculiarities of character.^[43]

To summarize, in proving psychological incapacity, petitioner must establish —

• clear and convincing evidence ofacts, behavior, conduct, events, reputation, character, orcircumstancesofdysfunctionalitiesin the lives of the spouses,
  
  
• that are clearly and convincingly indicative or illustrative of theincompatibilityandantagonismbetween them and the resultingimpairmentof family harmony and unity.

Theacts, behavior, conduct, events, reputation, character, orcircumstancesofdysfunctionalitieswould often revolve around or be classified as one of -

• general differences of interests and antagonistic feelings,
• loss of love,
• hostilityandresentment,
• distrust,
• theinability to live harmoniously together,
• lack of concernorindifference,
• lack of common interests and goals,
• instances of violence against women and their children as defined in Republic Act 9262 and other laws,
• zero probability of reconciliation between the spouses, and
• failure of the spouse or the spouses to perform his, her, or their marital duties and obligations clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.^[44]

This list isnotby any means exclusive. They are only illustrative.

More, the last example refers to the characterization clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This was once used to describe the personality disorder that gave rise to psychological incapacity.^[45]

But ever sinceTan-Andalabandonedthefocus on personality disordersand expert opinions, thislast examplemay now be appropriated to capture such facts as (i)forms of addictiondemonstrative of such insensitivity or inability; (ii)abandonmentby one spouse of the other; or (iii)instances of mutual actual lossof trust, love, and respect for each other.

Distinctive of these and other instances ofacts, behavior, conduct, events, reputation, character, orcircumstancesofdysfunctionalitiesis theharsh realitythat spousescoerced together in a meaningless marital relationshipwould onlyphysicallyorpsychologically endangereither or both of them. They easily fall prey to isolation and depression, because they cannot move on to productive relationships. As these spouses are trapped within relationships that offer no intimate interactions where there should be one, they are compelled to seek normalcy and happiness by living secret double lives.

On whether theincompatibilityandantagonismthat could be inferred from theacts, behavior, conduct, events, reputation, character, orcircumstancesofdysfunctionalitiesin the lives of the spouses ismutual, the petitioning party may canvass –

• whether there is still mutual concern for the emotional needs of each other;
  
  
• whether the marriage is characterized by financial difficulties, long physical separation, differences of interests, decisions, wantsandvalues, resentment, coolness, distrust, constant bickering, andantagonistic feelingsthat are irreversible and demonstrate an irremediable rift; and
  
  
• whether there is an overall conflict of personalities, that is,if their conduct, actions, decisions, wants, interests, or values often collide.

As regards thepotential causeand thetruthfulnessorreliabilityandvalidityof theclaimofmutual incompatibilityandantagonism, since thepersonality structuremay only be established by outward appearances, the petitioning party may consider such factors as –

• age disparityandages of the spouses,
• actual indiscreet or unfaithful conduct,
• suspicions of adultery or infidelity,
• charges or suspicions of child abuse,
• financial difficulties and nonsupport,
• intemperanceoraddiction,
• lack of marital or psychiatric counseling,
• medical problems,
• physical violence,
• problems with relations or friends,
• religious, moral,orpolitical differences,
• lack of or unsatisfactory sexual relations,
• unsociabilityorrefusal to speak or communicate,
• physical separation,
• verbal abuseandobjectionable language, among others.

Note that the immediately preceding factorsmay themselves constitutetheacts, behavior, conduct, events, reputation, character, orcircumstancesofdysfunctionalitiesin the lives of the spouses, which witnesses may testify on.

Further, while proof ofpersonality disordersmay help explain thecauseof the dysfunctional acts, conduct, or behavior, as well as theensuingincompatibility and antagonism, personality disorders are no longerby themselvesproof of psychological incapacity — the dysfunctional acts, conduct, or behavior that characterizes the incompatibility and antagonism between the spousesmustbe validated clearly and convincingly.

Tan-Andalhasretainedthe rule that themutual incompatibilityandantagonismto constitutepsychological incapacitymust be characterized by theelementsof –

(a)	gravity,i.e., they must be serious, such that the spouses would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b)	juridical antecedence,i.e., they must be rootedand shownin thehistoryof the spouses antedating their marriage though the overt manifestations mayemerge substantiallyandsignificantly only afterthe marriage; and
(c)	incurability,i.e., they must not be susceptible to any cure, or even if they were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the meansand inclinationof the spouses.[46]

Each of these elements must be provenclearly and convincingly.

Standard of Proof

Tan-Andalclarified that thestandard of proofin an Article 36 case isclear and convincing evidence, notmerepreponderant evidence. This isbecause every marriageispresumed to be valid. Thispresumption of validityof marriage, like any other rebuttable presumption, must berebuttedbyclear and convincing evidence.^[47]

Clear and convincing evidenceis the quantum of proof that requiressubstantially and significantly morethan preponderance of evidencebut lessthan proof beyond reasonable doubt.^[48]In this standard, the evidence must besubstantiallyandsignificantly greater than a 50% likelihood of being true.^[49]

Thepresumption stronglyupholds thevalidityof marriage. Thispresumptionis thetrump cardthat acts as anevidentiary barrieragainst claims of psychological incapacity,though noone may have adduced anycontraryevidence but for the inconsistencies and improbabilities in petitioner's case.^[50]

Trial courts hearing psychological incapacity cases that areuncontestedmust invariably bear in mind this legal requirement — any petitioner bears theheavy burdenof proving byclear and convincing evidencethe legal requisites of psychological incapacity. Any petitioner must rebut the presumptive validity of marriage and obtain the relief sought,even ifneither the State nor the respondent presents any evidence in chief and depends only,or even not at all, on the cross-examination of a petitioner's witnesses and objections to the latter's evidence.^[51]Verily, theinconsistencieswithin, and theimprobabilitiesof, a petitioner's evidence, or thepaucityof a petitioner's evidence itself, could make the evidenceinadequate to hurdlethe standard of clear and convincing evidence and could therefore be the reason to deny the relief prayed for.

To stress —semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.Thepresumptionis always in favor of the validity of the marriage. Every intendment of the law or fact leanstoward the validityof the marital bonds. Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled. Every case to nullify a marriage positions the petitioner as invariably standing against this presumption. Thus, a petitioner would have to successfully discharge the burden of proving the existence of psychological incapacity byclear and convincing evidenceto overcome the presumed validity of the marriage.^[52]

Types of Evidence

Laypersons can testify aboutdysfunctional actsthatundermine the family. InTan-Andal,^[53]the Court held:

.... Ordinary witnesses who have been present in the life of the spouses before the latter contracted marriage maytestify on behaviorsthat they haveconsistently observedfrom the supposedly incapacitated spouse. From there, the judge will decide if these behaviors are indicative of a true and serious incapacity to assume the essential marital obligations.^[54](Emphasis supplied)

Thetypes of evidencethat alayperson may adducefor this purpose are (i) thereputationof the spouses being psychologically incapacitated — that is, the viewpoint of reasonable members of the spouses' relevant communities; (ii) thecharacterof the spouses relevant to or indicative of psychological incapacity; (iii) theeveryday specific behavior, acts,orconductof the spouses; and (iv) the individualspouse's own experienceof neglect, abandonment, unrequited love, and infliction of mental distress, among others.^[55]

By training, lawyers have the competence to assemble the evidence on these matters. They know how to present witnesses who wouldtestify on everyday behavior, acts, or conduct, or adduce reputation and character evidence. They know how to question the spouses about theirown experience of neglect, abandonment, unrequited love, and infliction of mental distress. Similarly, judges — especially family court judges — are already equipped to assess these pieces of evidence. These clarifications allow us to operationalizeTan-Andal's teaching toreconfigure psychological incapacity as a legal conceptand for us to understand and apply this concept within legal parameters.

Applying the reconceptualized framework and elements of proof inTan-Andalto the case at bar, we at once would find the existence and gravity of themutual incompatibilityandantagonismbetween Spouses Laroco. This state ofdiscordanddisharmonybetween them hasunderminedtheunityandharmonyin their family.

Theacts, behavior, conduct, events, reputation, character, orcircumstancesofdysfunctionalitiesrevolve aroundchargesandsuspicionsof respondent's adultery and child abuse, and the spouses' long separation in fact. The dysfunctional acts have led to the children bouncing from one parent to another while they were growing up and maturing. That theseacts, behavior, conduct, events, reputation, character, orcircumstancesofdysfunctionalitiesclearly and convincingly happened cannot be doubted.

Thetruthfulnessorreliabilityandvalidityof this claim areconfirmedby theagesof the spouses. Having wed in 1971, the spouses are now senior citizens who will gain nothing much romantically or sexually from this nullity proceeding. We may validly infer that given their ages, petitioner's claim cannot be characterized as a petty quarrel or minor bickerings, but the product of life-long hostilities in their marital life. We also cannot say that the instant petition was motivated by the whims of a macho lothario whose warped predilection is to make more conquests of women. What we see here is petitioner's desire to set things right for both him and respondent and see things as they really are, as they reach the twilight of their lives.

Corroborativeof these dysfunctionalities is the clinical psychologist's finding of personality disorders on the part of both petitioner and respondent. Petitioner was found to have a compulsive-obsessive personality disorder while respondent was diagnosed to be suffering from a histrionic personality disorder. These defects in their personality structures made it clearly and convincingly improbable to reconcile and build a harmonious family.^[56]

Themutual incompatibilityandantagonismare,self-evidently,clearly and convincinglygrave. The long separation of the spouses, the way the children has bounced from one parent to another, and the undying charges and suspicions of adultery of respondent no matter how aged have they each come, prove significantly and substantially, more likely than not, that the state of discord and disharmony isgrave.^[57]

That it isincurableis also,self-evidently, clear and convincingly established. The spouses were married in 1971, had children, and yet, their marital relationship and family relations have beenunceasingly interrupted. Time did not heal the wounds of the mutual incompatibility and antagonism. The findings of the clinical psychologistcorroboratethe fact that this state significantly and substantially, more likely than not, will go with them in their graves.^[58]

Thejuridical antecedenceof the fundamental discord and disharmony already showed itself when it was said that—

Petitioner alleged that he first met respondent in 1970 while they were both students at Saint Louis University, Baguio City. He courted her until they became a couple. He later broke up with her after learning that she was still entertaining other suitors even though they were already in a relationship. His parents also disapproved of their relationship because of respondent's reputation as a promiscuous, dishonest, and flirtatious woman. He left respondent and went to Manila to support her mother, then undergoing cobalt therapy. When he returned to Baguio, respondent informed him that she was pregnant and invited him to meet her parents in Lepanto Mines, Mankayan, Benguet. There, respondent's parents forced him to marry her.

Neither the State nor respondent contradicted this narration of petitioner. We believe it to be clearly and convincingly more probable than not. There is no contradiction. It stands unrebutted. It is also not improbable or contrary to human experience. As regards respondent's alleged flirtatious disposition, we do not exactly accept this to be true. We take this allegation as evidence of petitioner's consistent charge and suspicion of respondent's unfaithfulness, which rightly or wrongly, factually or falsely, haslaid down the seedsprenuptiallyof theirmutual incompatibilityandantagonism.

All told, the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in their respective decisions. It isnotthat these courts applied the wrong standards and misanalysed the case. Possibly, they did not, but they did so under the strictures of the now-abandoned doctrines on psychological incapacity. But since the Court has now the benefit of hindsight, a vision clarified byTan-Andal, a lens that we say is progressive and responsive to the times, we reverse these decisions.

There are no vested rights impacted by the application ofTan-Andalto this case.^[59]No party relied in good faith and reaped benefits under the defunct doctrine of psychological incapacity. In fact, its application to this case is more in-tune with remediating the adverse consequences of the old view of psychological incapacity.^[60]As a corrective interpretation of Article 36,Tan-Andalproperly governs nullity cases whose dispositions are still pending and have not become final and executory.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition isGRANTED. The Decision dated November 6, 2019 and Resolution dated June 15, 2020 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 111010 and the Decision dated May 22, 2017 and Order dated April 3, 2018 of the Regional Trial Court – Branch 9, La Trinidad, Benguet in Civil Case No. 14-F-2133 areREVERSED and SET ASIDE. In place thereof, aNEW JUDGMENTis rendereddeclaringthe marriage between Dionisio C. Laroco and Aurora B. LarocoVOIDfrom the beginning on the ground of psychological incapacity.

SO ORDERED.

Leonen, SAJ. (Chairperson), M. Lopez, J. Lopez, andKho, Jr., JJ., concur.

^[2]Id.at 69-71.

^[3]Id.at 72-79.

^[4]Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

^[5]Rollo, pp. 73-74.

^[6]Id.at 74-75.

^[7]Id.at 48; 75-76.

^[8]Id.at 48; 116.

^[9]Id.at 48-49.

^[10]Id.at 49.

^[11]Id.at 30.

^[12]Id.at 49.

^[13]Id.at 50.

^[14]Id.at 30-31; 91.

^[15]Id.at 49-50.

^[16]Id.at 25.

^[17]Id.at 50-51.

^[18]Id.at 22; 51.

^[19]Penned by Judge Marietta S. Brawner-Cualing,id.at 22-39.

^[20]Id.at 39.

^[21]Id.at 34-39.

^[22]Id.at 40-44.

^[23]Id.at 51.

^[24]Id.at 94-104.

^[25]Represented by Senior State Solicitor Enamarie Lizzette C. Medenceles-Villalon and Associate Solicitor II Jacqueline H. Acorda-Ragasa.

^[26]Rollo, pp. 116-119.

^[27]Penned by Associate Justice Manuel M. Barrios and concurred in by Associate Justices Louis P. Acosta and Walter S. Ong,id.at 46-59.

^[28]Id.at 58-59.

^[29]Id.at 55-56.

^[30]Id.at 60-67.

^[31]Id.at 69-71.

^[32]Id.at 3-17.

^[33]G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021 [PerJ.Leonen,En Banc].

^[34]Id.at 32.

^[35]Id.

^[36]Id.at 33.

^[37]Id.at 33-34.

^[38]Id.at 33-40.

^[39]Id.at 33-34.

^[40]Id.

^[41]For instance, violation of Republic Act No. 9262, also known as theAnti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004.

^[42]Sanchez v. Darroca, G.R. No. 242257, October 15, 2019 [PerJ.Leonen,En Banc].

^[43]SeeTan-Andal v. Andal,supra, at 144; PerJ. Caguioa' Separate Opinion, p. 15.

^[44]SeeEstella v. Perez, G.R. No. 249250, September 29, 2021 [PerJ. Lazaro-Javier, First Division].

^[45]SeeRepublic v. Deang, G.R. No. 236279, March 25, 2019 [PerJ. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division].

^[46]Supranote 33, at 32-34; PerJ. Lazaro-Javier's Concurring Opinion, p. 2.

^[47]Id.at 27.

^[48]Id.

^[49]Estella v. Perez,supranote 44.

^[50]Id.

^[51]Espiritu v. Boac-Espiritu, G.R. No. 247583, October 6, 2021. [PerJ. Lazaro-Javier, First Division].

^[52]Estella v. Perez,supra.

^[53]Supra, note 33.

^[54]Id.at 32.

^[55]Espiritu v. Boac-Espiritu,supra.

^[56]Record, pp. 75-81, Psychological Report.

^[57]Id.

^[58]Id.

^[59]Manuel L. Quezon University v. National Labor Relations Commission, 419 Phil. 776 (2001) [PerJ. Pardo, Second Division].

^[60]Philippine Health Insurance Corporation v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 222710, September 10, 2019 [PerJ. Gesmundo,En Banc].