2001 / Apr
G.R. No. 133806 HEIRS OF PEDRO ATEGA REPRESENTED BY VERONICA ATEGA-NABLE, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON. ISIDRO DUBLADO AS REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DAR REGION XIII, AND TERESITA DEPENOSO AS OFFICER-IN-CHARGE, DAR AGUSAN DEL NORTE PROVINCIAL OFFICE, RESPONDENTS. April 20, 2001
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 133806, April 20, 2001 ]
HEIRS OF PEDRO ATEGA REPRESENTED BY VERONICA ATEGA-NABLE, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON. ISIDRO DUBLADO AS REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DAR REGION XIII, AND TERESITA DEPENOSO AS OFFICER-IN-CHARGE, DAR AGUSAN DEL NORTE PROVINCIAL OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
THE HEIRS OF PEDRO ATEGA, petitioners herein, owned a parcel of land containing an area of 129.4615 hectares covered by OCT No. P-5 situated in Taligaman, Butuan City, Agusan del Norte. In December 1992 they received notice from the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO) that their land was subject of compulsory acquisition and distribution pursuant to RA 6657 otherwise known as theComprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. They protested before the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) the inclusion of their property in theComprehensive Agrarian Reform Program(CARP) arguing that their land was classified as non-agricultural. Apparently, the MARO ignored their protest since the PARO sent petitioners on 9 September 1994 aNotice of Land Acquisition and Valuation.
In April 1996 petitioners filed with DAR-Region XIII anApplication for Exemptionfrom the coverage of CARP. But their application for exemption was denied on 27 November 1996 by respondent Regional Director Isidro Dublado on the ground thatSP Ordinance No. 33-79invoked by them was not submitted for approval to theHousing and Land Use Regulatory Board(HLURB) as required by DAR Administrative Order No. 6-94 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 44-90.
Petitioners thereafter filed with the Court of Appeals aPetition for Certiorari,Prohibition and Mandamuswhich assailed theResolutionof respondent Regional Director denying theirApplication for Exemption.
But the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioners acted prematurely in filing the petition before the appellate court. The appellate court held that petitioners should have first exhausted all the available administrative remedies,i.e.,filing a motion for reconsideration of theResolutionof respondent Regional Director or appealing the same to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform before filing their petition with the Court of Appeals.[1]Corollarily, the appellate court ruled that respondent Regional Director did not abuse his discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying theApplication for Exemption.
The Court of Appeals opined that pursuant to DAR Adm. Order No. 9-94 Regional Directors are empowered to hear and decide all protests involving coverage under RA 6657, and that respondent Regional Director's finding thatSP Resolution No. 33-79of the City of Butuan was not submitted for approval to the HLURB was well within the ambit of his authority.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but their motion was denied; hence, this petition.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that they acted prematurely in filing their petition forcertiorariwithout first filing a motion for reconsideration of theResolutionof respondent Regional Director or appealing to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.
This contention is meritorious. Pursuant to DAR Administrative Orders Nos. 9-94, 10-94 and 12-94, the remedy of a party aggrieved by the decision of the Regional Director is to file a motion for reconsideration, and in the event the motion is denied, to appeal to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. Nonetheless, we agree that in the instant case a motion for reconsideration of theResolutionof respondent Regional Director would have been useless. It appears that upon the issuance of theResolutionof respondent Regional Director denying petitioners'Application for Exemptionon 27 November 1996 or thereabouts, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform proceeded to cancel their title over the disputed property and transferred it to designated beneficiaries through the issuance of a collectiveCertificate of Land Ownership Award No. 00059320as far back as 26 November 1994, and petitioners learned of it only upon the issuance of the assailedResolution. Hence, considering that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform had already canceled petitioners' title to the property and caused its distribution to designated beneficiaries even before the pending incidents with respondent Regional Director could be resolved, it would indeed be futile to expect the latter to reconsider his earlier posture and contradict or reverse the position taken by his superior, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.
Certainly,certiorariwill lie only if there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The determination of what constitutes a plain, speedy and adequate remedy rests on judicial discretion and depends on the particular circumstances of each case.[2]In the case before us, we find that an appeal to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform would appear to be a useless exercise because he had already canceled petitioners' title to the property, which simply means, he concurred in the decision of respondent Regional Director denying the application for exemption; hence, an appeal would no longer be deemed an adequate remedy in the instant case.
Petitioners next insist that theResolutionof respondent Regional Director was a patent nullity as it was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. They maintain that the Regional Director gravely abused his authority in ruling thatSP Resolution No. 33-79of the City of Butuan was not submitted to the HLURB for approval. They point out that per certification issued by the HLURB attached to theirMotion for Reconsiderationbefore the Court of Appeals,SP Resolution No. 33-79was actually submitted to and approved by the HLURB.
This is misleading. A meticulous perusal of the records would reveal that the certification issued by the HLURB to the petitioners did not even mention, much less can it be fairly inferred therefrom, that what was submitted and approved was indeedSP Resolution No. 33-79, contrary to the assertion of petitioners.[3]SP Resolution No. 33-79or theResolution Amending the General Policy on Zonification and Land Use Plan,City of Butuan[4]was not the only town plan or zoning ordinance of the City of Butuan. In fact,SP Ordinance No. 102-78or theRevised Zoning Ordinance of the City of Butuan and Providing for the Administration and Enforcement Thereof[5]was another town plan or zoning ordinance. Consequently, it could not be deduced that what was being referred to in the certification wasSP Resolution No. 33-79.
In fact, we agree with the conclusion of respondent Regional Director that indeedSP Resolution No. 33-79was not submitted to, much less approved by, the HLURB. His conclusion, apparently, was based on another certification issued by the HLURB which categorically stated that what was submitted to and approved by it wasSP Ordinance No. 102-78.[6]According to DAR Adm. Order No. 6-94 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 44-90, anApplication for Exemptionfrom the coverage of CARP filed before the Regional Director must be accompanied by a certification from the HLURB that the pertinent zoning ordinance has been approved by the Board prior to 15 June 1988, the date when the CARL took effect. In the instant case, no such accompanying certification from the HLURB was filed by petitioners.
Assuming for the sake of argument thatSP Ordinance No. 102-78which was submitted to and approved by the HLURB accompanied theApplication for Exemptionfiled by petitioners before the DAR Regional Office, that fact, nonetheless, would not reverse our position. SP Ordinance No. 102-78was a general zoning plan containing no categorical statement that the disputed property was classified as non-agricultural. In fact, a new ordinance was enacted reclassifying the disputed property from agricultural to non-agricultural. Thus, on 8 April 1994 theSangguniang Panglungsodof Butuan City adoptedSP Resolution No. 246-94Reclassifying the Use of the Property Owned by the Heirs of Pedro Atega Situated at Taligaman, Butuan City, and for Other Purposes.[7]In sum, we rule thatcertiorariwill lie because a motion for reconsideration before the Regional Director or an appeal to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform will not prove to be a speedy or adequate remedy. However, we find that the Regional Director did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners'Application for Exemptionof their property from the CARP.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED insofar as it held that petitioners acted prematurely in filing the petition forcertioraribut AFFIRMED insofar as it found that the Regional Director of DAR-Region XIII did not gravely abuse his discretion when he denied petitioners'Application for Exemptionfrom the coverage of theComprehensive Land Reform Program. Consequently, the instantPetition for Review on Certiorariis DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing,andBuena JJ.,concur.
De Leon, Jr., J.,on leave.
[1]Decision penned by Justice Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr., concurred in by Justices Ruben T. Reyes and Hilarion L. Aquino; CARollo, pp. 153-161.
[2] SMI Development Corporationv.Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 137537, 28 January 2000.
[3]Rollo, p. 172.
[4]Id., p. 106.
[5]Id., p. 62.
[6]Id., p. 130.
[7]Id., p. 92.
In April 1996 petitioners filed with DAR-Region XIII anApplication for Exemptionfrom the coverage of CARP. But their application for exemption was denied on 27 November 1996 by respondent Regional Director Isidro Dublado on the ground thatSP Ordinance No. 33-79invoked by them was not submitted for approval to theHousing and Land Use Regulatory Board(HLURB) as required by DAR Administrative Order No. 6-94 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 44-90.
Petitioners thereafter filed with the Court of Appeals aPetition for Certiorari,Prohibition and Mandamuswhich assailed theResolutionof respondent Regional Director denying theirApplication for Exemption.
But the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioners acted prematurely in filing the petition before the appellate court. The appellate court held that petitioners should have first exhausted all the available administrative remedies,i.e.,filing a motion for reconsideration of theResolutionof respondent Regional Director or appealing the same to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform before filing their petition with the Court of Appeals.[1]Corollarily, the appellate court ruled that respondent Regional Director did not abuse his discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying theApplication for Exemption.
The Court of Appeals opined that pursuant to DAR Adm. Order No. 9-94 Regional Directors are empowered to hear and decide all protests involving coverage under RA 6657, and that respondent Regional Director's finding thatSP Resolution No. 33-79of the City of Butuan was not submitted for approval to the HLURB was well within the ambit of his authority.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but their motion was denied; hence, this petition.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that they acted prematurely in filing their petition forcertiorariwithout first filing a motion for reconsideration of theResolutionof respondent Regional Director or appealing to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.
This contention is meritorious. Pursuant to DAR Administrative Orders Nos. 9-94, 10-94 and 12-94, the remedy of a party aggrieved by the decision of the Regional Director is to file a motion for reconsideration, and in the event the motion is denied, to appeal to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. Nonetheless, we agree that in the instant case a motion for reconsideration of theResolutionof respondent Regional Director would have been useless. It appears that upon the issuance of theResolutionof respondent Regional Director denying petitioners'Application for Exemptionon 27 November 1996 or thereabouts, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform proceeded to cancel their title over the disputed property and transferred it to designated beneficiaries through the issuance of a collectiveCertificate of Land Ownership Award No. 00059320as far back as 26 November 1994, and petitioners learned of it only upon the issuance of the assailedResolution. Hence, considering that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform had already canceled petitioners' title to the property and caused its distribution to designated beneficiaries even before the pending incidents with respondent Regional Director could be resolved, it would indeed be futile to expect the latter to reconsider his earlier posture and contradict or reverse the position taken by his superior, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.
Certainly,certiorariwill lie only if there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The determination of what constitutes a plain, speedy and adequate remedy rests on judicial discretion and depends on the particular circumstances of each case.[2]In the case before us, we find that an appeal to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform would appear to be a useless exercise because he had already canceled petitioners' title to the property, which simply means, he concurred in the decision of respondent Regional Director denying the application for exemption; hence, an appeal would no longer be deemed an adequate remedy in the instant case.
Petitioners next insist that theResolutionof respondent Regional Director was a patent nullity as it was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. They maintain that the Regional Director gravely abused his authority in ruling thatSP Resolution No. 33-79of the City of Butuan was not submitted to the HLURB for approval. They point out that per certification issued by the HLURB attached to theirMotion for Reconsiderationbefore the Court of Appeals,SP Resolution No. 33-79was actually submitted to and approved by the HLURB.
This is misleading. A meticulous perusal of the records would reveal that the certification issued by the HLURB to the petitioners did not even mention, much less can it be fairly inferred therefrom, that what was submitted and approved was indeedSP Resolution No. 33-79, contrary to the assertion of petitioners.[3]SP Resolution No. 33-79or theResolution Amending the General Policy on Zonification and Land Use Plan,City of Butuan[4]was not the only town plan or zoning ordinance of the City of Butuan. In fact,SP Ordinance No. 102-78or theRevised Zoning Ordinance of the City of Butuan and Providing for the Administration and Enforcement Thereof[5]was another town plan or zoning ordinance. Consequently, it could not be deduced that what was being referred to in the certification wasSP Resolution No. 33-79.
In fact, we agree with the conclusion of respondent Regional Director that indeedSP Resolution No. 33-79was not submitted to, much less approved by, the HLURB. His conclusion, apparently, was based on another certification issued by the HLURB which categorically stated that what was submitted to and approved by it wasSP Ordinance No. 102-78.[6]According to DAR Adm. Order No. 6-94 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 44-90, anApplication for Exemptionfrom the coverage of CARP filed before the Regional Director must be accompanied by a certification from the HLURB that the pertinent zoning ordinance has been approved by the Board prior to 15 June 1988, the date when the CARL took effect. In the instant case, no such accompanying certification from the HLURB was filed by petitioners.
Assuming for the sake of argument thatSP Ordinance No. 102-78which was submitted to and approved by the HLURB accompanied theApplication for Exemptionfiled by petitioners before the DAR Regional Office, that fact, nonetheless, would not reverse our position. SP Ordinance No. 102-78was a general zoning plan containing no categorical statement that the disputed property was classified as non-agricultural. In fact, a new ordinance was enacted reclassifying the disputed property from agricultural to non-agricultural. Thus, on 8 April 1994 theSangguniang Panglungsodof Butuan City adoptedSP Resolution No. 246-94Reclassifying the Use of the Property Owned by the Heirs of Pedro Atega Situated at Taligaman, Butuan City, and for Other Purposes.[7]In sum, we rule thatcertiorariwill lie because a motion for reconsideration before the Regional Director or an appeal to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform will not prove to be a speedy or adequate remedy. However, we find that the Regional Director did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners'Application for Exemptionof their property from the CARP.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED insofar as it held that petitioners acted prematurely in filing the petition forcertioraribut AFFIRMED insofar as it found that the Regional Director of DAR-Region XIII did not gravely abuse his discretion when he denied petitioners'Application for Exemptionfrom the coverage of theComprehensive Land Reform Program. Consequently, the instantPetition for Review on Certiorariis DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing,andBuena JJ.,concur.
De Leon, Jr., J.,on leave.
[1]Decision penned by Justice Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr., concurred in by Justices Ruben T. Reyes and Hilarion L. Aquino; CARollo, pp. 153-161.
[2] SMI Development Corporationv.Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 137537, 28 January 2000.
[3]Rollo, p. 172.
[4]Id., p. 106.
[5]Id., p. 62.
[6]Id., p. 130.
[7]Id., p. 92.