G.R. No. 47004 - Maritime Company of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals
Manila
G.R. No. 47004 March 8, 1989
MARITIME COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RIZAL SURETY & INSURANCE CO.,respondents.
FIRST DIVISION
Rafael Dinglasan for petitioner.
Carlos, Ibarra & Valdez for private respondent.
NARVASA,J.:
In the Court of First Instance of Manila, Rizal Surety & Insurance Co. (hereafter, simply Rizal Surety) sued the National Development Company (NDC) and Maritime Co. of the Philippines (hereafter simply Maritime Co.) for the recovery of a sum of money paid by it as insurer for the value of goods lost in transit on board vessel known as the SSDoña Nati.
1. Rizal Surety 'was the insurer of 800 packages of PVC compound loaded on the SSDoña Natiat Yokohama and consigned to the Acme Electrical Manufacturing Company."
2. " The SSDoña Natiwas owned by the National Development Company whereas he Maritime Company of the Philippines was its Agent. This appears indubitably in the Bill of Lading. Exhibit D."
3. The goods were never delivered to the consignee (Acme Electrical, etc.,supra) so that x x (Rizal) as Insurer, paid x x (said) consignee the sum of P38,758.50."
4. The cause of the non-delivery of the goods, from the evidence presented by both Defendants is that in Nagoya Bay, while the SSDoña Natiwas being piloted by a Japanese pilot, the SSDoña Natiwas rammed by M/V Yasushima Maru, causing damage to the hull of the SSDoña Natiand the resultant flooding of the holds damaged beyond repair the goods of the consignee in question."
5. There is no doubt that under our Code of Commerce, it would be the vessel at fault in this collision, that would be responsible for the damage to the cargo. And the evidence of both Defendants, which has not been rebutted, is that the M/VYasushima Maruwas at fault in the collision, so that the cause of action of plaintiff should be directed to the owners of the negligent vessel. However, as Plaintiff has brought this action in good faith, attorney's fees are not recoverable."
Rizal Surety elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
This judgment of the Appellate Tribunal was in turn appealed by Maritime Company. To that Court Maritime Co. attributes the following errors, in a bid to have its judgment reversed by this Court,viz:
1) holding that it was a ship agent under the Code of Commerce instead of merely an agent under the Civil Code;
2) not holding that under the Bill of Lading sued upon, Rizal Surety had no cause of action against either impleaded defendant;
3) not holding that the collision between the SSDoña Natiand the M/V Yasushima Maru which caused the loss of the insured goods was due solely to the fault or negligence of the complement of theYasushima Maru,as well as the character of the goods themselves and the defect in their packing, and
4) not holding that Rizal Surety's cause of action was barred by prescription as well as Stipulation No. 19 of the Bill of Lading.
The evidence establishes that NDC had appointed petitioner Maritime Co., as its agent to manage and operate three vessels owned by it, including the SSDoña Natifor and in its behalf and account, and for a determinable period (i.e., until full reimbursement of all moneys advanced and/or full relief from or payment of all guarantees made by Maritime Co. for account of the vessels). Under their written agreement, Maritime Co. was bound to "provision and victual" the SSDoña Natiand the other two vessels, and to render a complete report of the operations of the vessels within 60 days after conclusion of each voyage; it was also authorized to appoint sub-agents at any ports or places that it might deem necessary, remaining however responsible to the shipowner (NDC) for the timely and satisfactory performance of said sub-agents. These facts preponderantly demonstrate the character of Maritime Co. as ship agent under the Code of Commerce, a ship agent, accordingly to that Code, being "the person entrusted with provisioning or representing the vessel in the port in which it may be found."
Maritime Co. however insists that it was not the ship agent of NDC in Japan but "the Fuji Asano Co., Ltd., which supplied her with provisions, and represented her therein and which issued the bill of lading for the owner NDC The claim is belied by the bill of lading referred to.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL LINES
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY
MARITIME COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES
AGENT
PHILIPPINES-HONGKONG, JAPAN, U.S. PACIFIC
COAST-GULF PORTS
HONGKONG-COSMOS DEVELOPMENT COMPANY
* JAPAN-FUJI ASANO KAIUN CO, LTD.
* U.S.A-NORTH AMERICAN MARITIME AGENCIES
As will be observed, in what may be described as the main letterhead, Maritime Co. is indicated as "Agent" for the (1) Philippines, (2)"Hongkong,(3) Japan, and the (4) U.S. Pacific Coast-Gulf Ports. Underneath this main letterhead is a sort of secondary sub-head: "Hongkong-Cosmos Development Company;Japan-Fuji ASANO Kaiun Co., Ltd., U.SA-North American Maritime Agencies." The necessary connotation is that the firms thus named are sub-agents or secondary representatives of Maritime Co., Fuji ASANO Kaiun Co., Ltd., particularly, being the representative of NDC and Maritime Co. in Japan, as distinguished from the Maritime Co., which is described as AGENT not only in Japan but also in other places: the Philippines, Hongkong, U.S. Pacific Coast, and the Gulf Ports. Moreover, the bill shows on its face that it was issued 'FOR THE MASTER' by "Maritime Company of the Philippines, Agent."
Equally unacceptable is the contention that Acme Electrical Manufacturing, Manila," was not the consignee of the goods described in the bill of lading and therefore, payment to it for the loss of said goods did not operate to make Rizal Surety its subrogee. The contention is in the first place belied by the bill of lading which states that if the goods are "consigned to the Shipper's Order"-and the bill is so consigned: "to the order of China Banking Corporation, Manila, or assigns"-the "Acme Electrical Manufacturing, Manila," shall be notified. This shows, in the context of the other documents hereafter adverted to, that Acme was the importer and China Banking Corporation the financing agency. The contention is also confuted by the Commercial Invoice of the shipper
There is thus no question of the entitlement of Acme Electrical Manufacturing to the proceeds of the insurance against loss of the goods in question, nor about the fact that it did receive such proceeds from the Rizal Surety, as insurer, which made payment upon due ascertainment of the actuality of the loss. The legal effect is inescapable. Rizal Surety was subrogated to Acme's rights against the shipowner and the ship agent arising from the loss of the goods.
Now, according to the Court of Appeals, Acme's rights are to be determined by the Civil Code, not the Code of Commerce.ℒαwρhi৷This conclusion derives from Article 1753 of the Civil Code to the effect that it is the "law of the country to which the goods are to be transported (which) shall govern the liability of the common carrier for their loss, destruction or deterioration." It is only in "matters not regulated by x x (the Civil) Code," according to Article 1766, that "the rights and obligations of common carriers shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and by special laws." Since there are indeed specific provisions regulating the matter of such liability in the Civil Code, these being embodied in Article 1734, as well as prescribing the period of prescription of actions, it follows that the Code of Commerce, or the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, has no relevancy in the determination of the carrier's liability in the instant case. InAmerican President Lines v. Klepper,
Under the established facts, and in accordance with Article 1734 above mentioned, petitioner Maritime Co. and NDC, as "common carriers," are liable to Acme for "the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods," and may be relieved of responsibility if the loss, etc., "is due to any of the following causes only:
1. Flood, storm, earthquakes, lightning or other natural disaster or calamity;
2. Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
3. Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
4. The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers;
5. Order or act of competent public authority.'
Since none of the specified absolutory causes is present, the carrier's liability is palpable.
The petitioner's other claim that the loss of the goods was due entirely to the fault of the Japanese vessel,Yasushima Maru,which rammed into theDoña Naticannot be sustained. The Appellate Tribunal found, as a fact, after a review and study of the evidence, that theDoña Nati"did not exercise even due diligence to avoid the collision.' In line with the familiar axiom that factual conclusions of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and may not be reviewed, the petitioners attempt to shift the blame to the Japanese vessel is futile. Having failed to exercise extraordinary diligence to avoid any loss of life and property, as commanded by law, not having in fact exercised "even due diligence to avoid the collision,' it must be held responsible for the loss of the goods in question. Besides, as remarked by the Court of Appeals, "the principal cause of action is not derived from a maritime collision, but rather, from a contract of carriage, as evidenced by the bill of lading."
WHEREFORE,the Decision of the Court of Appeals subject of the petition for review isAFFIRMED,with costs against petitioner.
Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Footnotes