G.R. No. L-31440 - People of the Philippines vs. Alfredo Bandoquillo
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-31440 November 23, 1988
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALFREDO BANDOQUILLO,accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Pedro A. Bondoquillo for accused-appellant.
NARVASA,J.:
In the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental,
The facts on which the judgment of conviction was founded are hereunder briefly set out.
In the evening of February 3, 1968 a dance was held at a public hall inSitio
A short while afterwards, as Leoncio Saguban was verifying something about a sale of flowers, Franco Divinagracia struck him on his right shoulder with an empty bottle. Leoncio said, "The best thing to do now is, we should have this stereo phono sent home." He was heard byBalodoyBandoquillo, the accused-appellant, who told him, "Go ahead, return that and you will see something will happen." Leoncio ignored Balodoy's statement. He told his father, brother and sister of the incident, and they all decided to go home with their phonograph forthwith.
As the Saguban family was walking home from the dance, accompanied by a certain Rolando Caballero, who was lighting the way with a "Petromax" lamp, Antonia glanced back and saw Alfredo Bandoquillo, Franco Divinagracia, Nicomedes Quisora and some others moving rapidly towards them. She cried out, "You run away becauseBalodoyBandoquillo is after you!" Immediately the brothers ran into a sugar cane field by the side of the road and hid themselves. Their father, Aurelio Saguban, remained on the road, with Antonia, and Rolando Caballero.BalodoyBandoquillo and his group soon reached them. Balodoy went up to Aurelio and asked him, "Where are your sons, Leoncio and Marcelo?" Aurelio answered, "They have gone already. They went home."Balodoysaid, "What gone home are you talking about," and thereupon slapped and boxed the old man. Antonia placed herself between her father andBalodoy."Why are you doing this to my father when my father has not committed any wrong against you," she asked. At this point Leoncio came out of his hiding place and went to his father. All of a suddenBalodoyBandoquillo stabbed Leoncio at the right side of his back. Leoncio dropped to the ground. As he was falling, he reached out to a man near him, a person by the name of Ernesto Raaging, and dragged him down with the result that Raaging was pinned down by Leoncio's weight. Then Leoncio and Ernesto were helped up by Barrio Captain Esparcia and a man named Olimpio Ramirez. As Leoncio was being raised to his feet, he made a cryptic remark, "Doy, you just make good because I am already wounded."
Leoncio was quickly brought to the Siliman University Medical Center, but efforts to save his life proved unavailing. He expired at about 6:30 o'clock the following morning due--according to Dr. Alfredo E. Corpus,
Leoncio was survived by his wife, Emilia Benitez and five (5) children who were then 14, 11, 7, 5 and 2 years old. Emilia testified to these facts, and as to her wounded feelings and her anxieties concerning her support and that of her children, as well as to her claim for attorney's fees, and medical, funeral and other expenses.
Appellant Bandoquillo denied having slain the deceased, and claimed that it was Ernesto Raaging who had killed Leoncio Saguban with a knife thrust while wrestling with him on the ground. His testimony was that the altercation at the dance hall had been between Franco Divinagracia and Leoncio, not between Leoncio and him; that it was not he but Franco Divinagracia who had uttered the statement that if the record-player was taken home, "something will happen."
Olimpio Ramirez testified that he went to the scene of the crime in response to a woman's cries for help and came upon Leoncio Saguban and Ernesto Raaging wrestling on the ground; that he had helped pull them apart, had seen Raaging make a thrusting motion, and had then noticed that Leoncio had a wound at the right side of his body. He also stated that Raaging had warned him not to testify against him, if he did not wish to be the next victim.
Barangay Captain Esparcia also testified to a similar version of the occurrence. Additionally, he said that on seeing Leoncio wounded, he had advised the father and sister to bring him to the hospital; that Raaging had run away, he had followed but had been unable to talk to him because he saw that Raaging was quarreling with his wife; that when he finally spoke to Raaging the following morning, the latter had pleaded for his help, but he had instead asked Raaging to go with him to themunicipiobecause he would file the complaint corresponding to the crime; that Ernesto had refused and then gone home; that he had told Pamplona Municipal Judge Uldarico Ramirez that Raaging had stabbed Leoncio Saguban .
The defense version was belied by the State's rebuttal witnesses. PC Corporal Asterio Esparcia declared that he had gone to the place of the incident and had seen Leoncio already wounded; that he had asked who had stabbed him and Leoncio had replied, "BalodoyBandoquillo," that he had not however arrested Balodoy then because Leoncio appeared to him to be in serious condition and had to be taken to the hospital, and what is more, he had been cowed into inaction by the menacing words and mien of Bandoquillo and his companions .
Quite apart from the doctrine of long standing that because a trial court enjoys the distinct advantage of observing the witnesses and the evidence personally and directly, its factual findings consequently carry with them a strong presumption of correctness and will not be modified or reversed on appeal absent any persuasive showing that it has overlooked certain facts substantially affecting its conclusions,
As to the appellant's argument that the credibility of the State's chief witness, Aurelio Saguban, is seriously impaired by the circumstance of his being the victim's father, relationship to a party has never been recognized as an adverse factor in determining either the credibility of a witness or—subject only to well-recognized exceptions
However, the proofs do not, in our view, warrant affirming the appellant's conviction for murder. Contrary to the finding of the Trial Court, said proofs do not sufficiently demonstrate that the killing of Leoncio Saguban was attended by treachery. What they do show is that the deceased and his brother, Marcelo, were forewarned by their sister, Antonia, that the appellant was after them, and this prompted them to flee and hide in the sugar cane field. It was when Leoncio left his hiding place to come to the aid of his father, who was being assaulted by the appellant, that the latter turned on him and dealt him the fatal stab wound. In these circumstances treachery cannot be assumed, even from the suddenness of the attack, because it can hardly be said that Leoncio went to his parent's aid oblivious of the fact that in doing so he was exposing himself to attack from the appellant. As was well said inPeople v. Ardisa.
... The qualifying circumstance of treachery may not be simply deduced from presumption as it is necessary that the existence of this qualifying or aggravating circumstance should be proven as fully as the crime itself in order to aggravate the liability or penalty incurred by the culprit.
While the information also charged evident premeditation, the Trial Court, in holding that murder (qualified by treachery) was committed without aggravating or mitigating circumstances, in effect found either that such circumstance of evident premeditation did not exist or that it was absorbed by the qualifying circumstance of treachery, At any rate, we find that the evidence also fails to indicate with any positivity the presence of said aggravating circumstance. The utterance of threats prior to the commission of the crime, absent the supervention of an appreciable period of time between their making and the commission of the offense sufficient to afford the culprit opportunity to either plan or prepare for its execution, does not constitute evident premeditation.
There being no clear or acceptable evidence of the existence of any circumstance that would qualify the killing of Leoncio Saguban to murder, the Trial Court erred in convicting the appellant of such offense. The appellant is guilty only of homicide committed without either aggravating or mitigating circumstances, for which the appropriate penalty isreclusion temporalin its medium period.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Footnotes