G.R. No. L-48926 - Manuel Sosito vs Aguinaldo Development Corporation
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-48926 December 14, 1987
MANUEL SOSITO,petitioner,
vs.
AGUINALDO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,respondent.
CRUZ,J.:
We gave due course to this petition and required the parties to file simultaneous memoranda on the sole question of whether or not the petitioner is entitled to separation pay under the retrenchment program of the private respondent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Manuel Sosito was employed in 1964 by the private respondent, a logging company, and was in charge of logging importation, with a monthly salary of P675.00,
For a better understanding of this case, the memorandum of the private respondent on its retrenchment program is reproduced in full as follows:
"July 20, 1976
"Memorandum To: ALL EMPLOYEES
"Re: RETRENCHMENT PROGRAM
"As you are all aware, the operations of wood-based industries in the Philippines for the last two (2) years were adversely affected by the worldwide decline in the demand for and prices of logs and wood products. Our company was no exception to this general decline in the market, and has suffered tremendous losses. In 1975 alone, such losses amounted to nearly P20,000,000.00.
"The company has made a general review of its operations and has come to the unhappy decision of the need to make adjustments in its manpower strength if it is to survive. This is indeed an unfortunate and painful decision to make, but it leaves the company no alternative but to reduce its tremendous and excessive overhead expense in order to prevent an ultimate closure.
"Although the law allows the Company, in a situation such as this, to drastically reduce it manpower strength without any obligation to pay separation benefits, we recognize the need to provide our employees some financial assistance while they are looking for other jobs.
"The Company therefore is adopting a retrenchment program whereby employees who are in the active service as of June 30, 1976 will be paid separation benefits in an amount equivalent to the employee's one-half (1/2) month's basic salary multiplied by his/her years of service with the Company. Employees interested in availing of the separation benefits offered by the Company must manifest such intention by submitting written letters of resignation to the Management not later than July 31, 1976. Those whose resignations are accepted shall be informed accordingly and shall be paid their separation benefits.
"After July 31, 1976, this offer of payment of separation benefits will no longer be available. Thereafter, the Company shall apply for a clearance to terminate the services of such number of employees as may be necessary in order to reduce the manpower strength to such desired level as to prevent further losses.
"(SGD.) JOSE G. RICAFORT
President"N.B.
"For additional information
and/or resignation forms,
please see Mr. Vic Maceda
or Atty. Ben Aritao.6
It is clear from the memorandum that the offer of separation pay was extended only to those who were in the active service of the company as of June 30, 1976. It is equally clear that the petitioner was not eligible for the promised gratuity as he was not actually working with the company as of the said date. Being on indefinite leave, he was not in the active service of the private respondent although, if one were to be technical, he was still in its employ. Even so, during the period of indefinite leave, he was not entitled to receive any salary or to enjoy any other benefits available to those in the active service.
It seems to us that the petitioner wants to enjoy the best of two worlds at the expense of the private respondent. He has insulated himself from the insecurities of the floundering firm but at the same time would demand the benefits it offers. Being on indefinite leave from the company, he could seek and try other employment and remain there if he should find it acceptable; but if not, he could go back to his former work and argue that he still had the right to return as he was only on leave.
There is no claim that the petitioner was temporarily laid off or forced to go on leave; on the contrary, the record shows that he voluntarily sought the indefinite leave which the private respondent granted. It is strange that the company should agree to such an open-ended arrangement, which is obviously one-sided. The company would not be free to replace the petitioner but the petitioner would have a right to resume his work as and when he saw fit.
We note that under the law then in force the private respondent could have validly reduced its work force because of its financial reverses without the obligation to grant separation pay.ℒαwρhi৷This was permitted under the original Article 272(a), of the Labor Code,7which was in force at the time. To its credit, however, the company voluntarily offered gratuities to those who would agree to be phased out pursuant to the terms and conditions of its retrenchment program, in recognition of their loyalty and to tide them over their own financial difficulties. The Court feels that such compassionate measure deserves commendation and support but at the same time rules that it should be available only to those who are qualified therefore. We hold that the petitioner is not one of them.
While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working class, it should not be supposed that every labor dispute will be automatically decided in favor of labor. Management also has its own rights which, as such, are entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair play. Out of its concern for those with less privileges in life, this Court has inclined more often than not toward the worker and upheld his cause in his conflicts with the employer. Such favoritism, however, has not blinded us to the rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and the applicable law and doctrine.
WHEREFORE,the petition isDISMISSEDand the challenged decisionAFFIRMED,with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Paras and Gancayco, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
"(a) the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or enterprise, or where the employer has to reduce his work force by more than one-half due to serious business reverses, unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Chapter; ... . "