G.R. No. L-62270 - Crispin Malabanan vs. Hon. Anastacio D. Ramento

1. As is quite clear from the opinion in Reyes v. Bagatsing,6the invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the implication that the right to free speech has likewise been disregarded. Both are embraced in the concept of freedom of expression which is Identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully, any matter of public interest without censorship or punishment and which "is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing ... of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent."7

2. In the above case, a permit was sought to hold a peaceful march and rally from the Luneta public park to the gates of the united States Embassy, hardly two blocks away, where in an open space of public property, a short program would be held. Necessarily then, the question of the use of a public park and of the streets leading to the United States Embassy was before this Court. We held that streets and parks have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and have been used for purposes of assembly to communicate thoughts between citizens and to discuss public issues.8

3. The situation here is different. The assembly was to be held not in a public place but in private premises, property of respondent University. There is in the Reyes opinion as part of the summary this relevant excerpt: "The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public placewhereand the timewhenit will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required."9Petitioners did seek such consent. It was granted. According to the petition: "On August 27, 1982, by virtue of a permit granted to them by the school administration, the Supreme Student Council where your petitioners are among the officers, held a General Assembly at the VMAS basketball court of the respondent university."10There was an express admission in the Comment of private respondent University as to a permit having been granted for petitioners to hold a student assembly.11The specific question to be resolved then is whether on the facts as disclosed resulting in the disciplinary action and the penalty imposed, there was an infringement of the right to peaceable assembly and its cognate right of free speech.

4. Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. They are entitled to do so. They enjoy like the rest of the citizens the freedom to express their views and communicate their thoughts to those disposed to listen in gatherings such as was held in this case. They do not, to borrow from the opinion ofJustice Fortas in Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District,12"shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."13While, therefore, the authority of educational institutions over the conduct of students must be recognized, it cannot go so far as to be violative of constitutional safeguards. On a more specific level there is persuasive force to this formulation in the Fortas opinion: "The principal use to which the schools are dedicated is to accommodate students during prescribed hours for the purpose of certain types of activities. Among those activities is personal intercommunication among the students. This is not only an inevitable part of the process of attending school; it is also an important part of the educational process. A student's rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the classroom hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without 'materially and substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school' and without colliding with the rights of others. ... But conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason — whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior — materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech."14

5. As tested by such a standard, what is the verdict on the complaint ofpetitioners that there was a disregard of their constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. It must be in their favor, but subject to qualification in view of their continuing their demonstration in a place other than that specified in the permit for a longer period and their making use of megaphones therein, resulting in the disruption of classes and the stoppage of work by the non-academic personnel in the vicinity of such assembly.

6. Objection is made by private respondents to the tenor of the speeches by the student leaders. That there would be a vigorous presentation of views opposed to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture was to be expected. There was no concealment of the fact that they were against such a move as it confronted them with a serious problem(iisang malaking suliranin.")15They believed that such a merger would result in the increase in tuition fees, an additional headache for their parents ("isa nanamansakit sa ulo ng ating mga magulang.").16If in the course of such demonstration, with an enthusiastic audience goading them on, utterances, extremely critical, at times even vitriolic, were let loose, that is quite understandable. Student leaders are hardly the timid, diffident types. They are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be ineffective if during a rally they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the academe. At any rate, even a sympathetic audience is not disposed to accord full credence to their fiery exhortations. They take into account the excitement of the occasion, the propensity of speakers to exaggerate, the exuberance of youth, They may give the speakers the benefit of their applause, but with the activity taking place in the school premises and during the daytime, no clear and present danger of public disorder is discernible. This is without prejudice to the taking of disciplinary action for conduct, which, to borrow from Tinker, "materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."

7. Nor is this a novel approach to the issue raised by petitioners that they were denied the right to peaceable assembly. In a 1907 decision, United States v. Apurado,17the facts disclosed that shortly before the municipal council of San Carlos, Occidental Negros, started its session, some five hundred residents of the municipality assembled near the municipal building, and, upon the opening of the session, a substantial number of such persons barged into the council chamber, demanding that the municipal treasurer, the municipal secretary, and the chief of police be dismissed, submitting at the same time the proposed substitutes. The municipal council gave its conformity. Such individuals were wholly unarmed except that a few carried canes; the crowd was fairly orderly and well-behaved except in so far as their pressing into the council chamber during a session of that body could be called disorder and misbehavior. It turned out that the movement had its origin in religious differences. The defendant Filomeno Apurado and many other participants were indicted and convicted of sedition in that they allegedly prevented the municipal government from freely exercising its duties. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. Justice Carson, who penned the opinion, correctly pointed out that "if the prosecution be permitted to seize upon every instance of such disorderly conduct by individual members of a crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly as a seditious and tumultuous rising against the authorities, then the right to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances would become a delusion and a snare and the attempt to exercise it on the most righteous occasion and in the most peaceable manner would expose all those who took part therein to the severest form of punishment, if the purposes which they sought to attain did not happen to be pleasing to the prosecuting authorities."18The principle to be followed is enunciated thus: "If instances of disorderly conduct occur on such occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought out and punished therefor, but the utmost discretion must be exercised in drawing the line betweendisorderly and seditiousconduct and between an essentially peaceable assembly and a tumultuous uprising."19A careful reading of this decision is in order before private respondents attach, as they did in their comments, a subversive character to the rally held by the students under the leadership of petitioners.

8. It does not follow, however, that petitioners can be totally absolved for the events that transpired. Admittedly, there was a violation of the terms of the permit. The rally was held at a place other than that specified, in the second floor lobby, rather than the basketball court, of the VMAS building of the University. Moreover, it was continued longer than the period allowed. According to the decision of respondent Ramento, the "concerted activity [referring to such assembly] went on until 5:30 p. m.20Private respondents could thus, take disciplinary action. On those facts, however, an admonition, even a censure-certainly not a suspension-could be the appropriate penalty. Private respondents could and did take umbrage at the fact that in view of such infraction considering the places where and the time when the demonstration took place-there was a disruption of the classes and stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel. They would not be unjustified then if they did take a much more serious view of the matter. Even then a one-year period of suspension is much too severe. While the discretion of both respondent University and respondent Ramento is recognized, the rule of reason, the dictate of fairness calls for a much lesser penalty. If the concept of proportionality between the offense connoted and the sanction imposed is not followed, an element of arbitrariness intrudes. That would give rise to a due process question. To avoid this constitutional objection, it is the holding of this Court that a one-week suspension would be punishment enough.

9. One last matter. The objection was raised that petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies. That is true, but hardly decisive. Here, a purely legal question is presented. Such being the case, especially so where a decision on a question of law is imperatively called for, and time being of the essence, this Court has invariably viewed the issue as ripe for adjudication. What cannot be too sufficiently stressed is that the constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are invoked by petitioners. Moreover, there was, and very likely there will continue to be in the future, militancy and assertiveness of students on issues that they consider of great importance, whether concerning their welfare or the general public. That they have a right to do as citizens entitled to all the protection in the Bill of Rights.

10. It would be most appropriate then, as was done in the case ofReyes v. Bagatsing,21for this Court to lay down the principles for the guidance of school authorities and students alike. The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of educational institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not to be subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of a clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the state, has a right to present. As a corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is accorded the content of the placards displayed or utterances made. The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however, by an advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent, whatever grievances that may be aired being susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly is to be held in school premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel. Even if, however, there be violations of its terms, the penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense.

1The other respondents named are Cesar Mijares, in his capacity as the President of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation: Gonzalo del Rosario, in his capacity as the Director for Academic Affairs of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation; Tomas B. Mesina, in his capacity as the Dean of Student Affairs of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation; Atty. Leonardo Padilla, in his capacity as Chief Legal Counsel and Security Supervisor of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation: Atty. Fablita Ammay, Rosendo Galvante and Eugenio Tayao, in their capacities as members of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation.

2After obtaining an order to allow petitioners to lift temporarily the suspension and allow their attendance at classes, no further information as to what subsequently transpired was furnished this Court.

3Resolution of this Court dated November 16, 1982.

4Comment of Private Respondents, 18.

5Comment of Public Respondent, 9-10.

6G.R. No. 65366, November 9, 1983, 125 SCRA 553.

7Ibid,561. Cf. Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, L-27833, April 18, 1969, 27 SCRA 835, 856-857.

8Ibid,563-564. Reference was made to Municipality of Roxas v. Cavite, 30 Phil. 602 (1915) and Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil, 71 (1948). The above formulation of the immemorial use of public parks comes from the plurality opinion in Hague vs. CIO, 307 US 495 (1937).

9Ibid,569.

10Petition, par. 2, Annex A.

11Comment of Private Respondents, par. 2.

12393 US 503 (1969).

13Ibid,507.

14Ibid,513-514.

15Comment of Private Respondents, Annex M.

16Ibid.

177 Phil. 422.

18Ibid,426.

19Ibid.

20Petition, Annex J.

21Cf. Reyes v. Bagatsing, G.R. No. 65366, November 9, 1983, 125 SCRA 553.