G.R. No. L-56350 - APRIL 1981 - PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE CASE NUMBERCASE TITLE G.R. No. L-56350April 2, 1981 Samuel C. Occena vs. Commission on Elections G.R. No. 56515April 3, 1981 United Democratic Opposition vs. Commission on Elections G.R. No. L-56503April 4, 1981 Ramon Mitra, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections G.R. No. L-27754April 8, 1981 Gregorio Sta. Romana vs. Mariano M. Lacson G.R. No. L-47075April 8, 1981 Erlinda P. Villasan vs. Republic of the Phil G.R. No. L-49995April 8, 1981 Segundina M. Damasen vs. Harold M. Hernando G.R. NO. L-32680April 9, 1981 Republic of the Philippines vs. Jose P. Alejandro G.R. No. L-30997April 21, 1981 Philippine Rubber Project Co., Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Rel. G.R. No. L-32116April 2l, 1981 Rural Bank of Caloocan, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. L-47350April 21, 1981 F. S. Divinagracia Agro-Commercial Inc. vs. Court of Appeals A.M. No. 2113April 22, 1981 Nicomedes Penera vs. Crescencio R. Dalocanog G.R. No. L-44899April 22, 1981 Maria E. Manahan vs. Employees' Compensation Commission G.R. No. L-53062April 24, 1981 Espiridion Jagunap vs. Commission on Elections A.C. No. 1404April 27, 1981 Fe Monton vs. Jose R. Mandrazo, Jr. A.M. No. P-1839April 27, 1981 Pedro Roque vs. Jose C. Hilario A.M. No.-2005-CFIApril 27, 1981 Alfonso De Leon vs. Jose P. Castro A.M. No. P-2457April 27, 1981 Antonio P. Paredes vs. Atilano Barrozo A.M. Nos. 3250April 27, 1981 People of the Philippines vs. Jose Coderes A.C. No. 1567April 27, 1981 Nicolasa Vda. De Sacueza vs. Jesus Salazar, Jr A.M. No. 2351-CFIApril 27, 1981 Jose F. Madara G.R. No. L-52361April 27, 1981 Sunset View Condominium Corp. vs. Jose C. Campos, Jr. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation, Inc. Samuel C. Occena vs. Commission on Elections United Democratic Opposition vs. Commission on Elections Ramon Mitra, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections Gregorio Sta. Romana vs. Mariano M. Lacson Erlinda P. Villasan vs. Republic of the Phil Segundina M. Damasen vs. Harold M. Hernando Republic of the Philippines vs. Jose P. Alejandro Philippine Rubber Project Co., Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Rel. Rural Bank of Caloocan, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals F. S. Divinagracia Agro-Commercial Inc. vs. Court of Appeals Nicomedes Penera vs. Crescencio R. Dalocanog Maria E. Manahan vs. Employees' Compensation Commission Espiridion Jagunap vs. Commission on Elections Fe Monton vs. Jose R. Mandrazo, Jr. Pedro Roque vs. Jose C. Hilario Alfonso De Leon vs. Jose P. Castro Antonio P. Paredes vs. Atilano Barrozo People of the Philippines vs. Jose Coderes Nicolasa Vda. De Sacueza vs. Jesus Salazar, Jr Jose F. Madara Sunset View Condominium Corp. vs. Jose C. Campos, Jr. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation, Inc.
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-56350 April 2, 1981
SAMUEL C. OCCENA,petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE NATIONAL TREASURER, THE DIRECTOR OF PRINTING,respondents.
G.R. No. L-56404 April 2, 1981
RAMON A. GONZALES, MANUEL B. IMBONG, JO AUREA MARCOS-IMBONG, RAY ALLAN T. DRILON, NELSON B. MALANA and GIL M. TABIOS,petitioners,
vs.
THE NATIONAL TREASURER and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,respondents.
FERNANDO,C.J.:
The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa Resolutions1proposing constitutional amendments, goes further than merely assailing their alleged constitutional infirmity. Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Javellana2ruling to the contrary notwithstanding. To put it at its mildest, such an approach has the arresting charm of novelty – but nothing else. It is in fact self defeating, for if such were indeed the case, petitioners have come to the wrong forum. We sit as a Court duty-bound to uphold and apply that Constitution. To contend otherwise as was done here would be, quite clearly, an exercise in futility. Nor are the arguments of petitioners cast in the traditional form of constitutional litigation any more persuasive. For reasons to be set forth, we dismiss the petitions.
The suits for prohibition were filed respectively on March 63and March 12, 1981.4On March 10 and 13 respectively, respondents were required to answer each within ten days from notice.5There was a comment on the part of the respondents. Thereafter, both cases were set for hearing and were duly argued on March 26 by petitioners and Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza for respondents. With the submission of pertinent data in amplification of the oral argument, the cases were deemed submitted for decision.
It is the ruling of the Court, as set forth at the outset, that the petitions must be dismissed.
1. It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In the dispositive portion ofJavellana v. The Executive Secretary,6dismissing petitions for prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid its ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six7to four.8It then concluded: "This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect."9Such a statement served a useful purpose. It could even be said that there was a need for it. It served to clear the atmosphere. It made manifest that, as of January 17, 1973, the present Constitution came into force and effect. With such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for instability was removed. Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law. It is as simple as that. What cannot be too strongly stressed is that the function of judicial review has both a positive and a negative aspect. As was so convincingly demonstrated by Professors Black10and Murphy,11the Supreme Court can check as well as legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it may not only nullify the acts of coordinate branches but may also sustain their validity. In the latter case, there is an affirmation that what was done cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of this character suffices. That is the meaning of the concluding statement in Javellana. Since then, this Court has invariably applied the present Constitution. The latest case in point isPeople v. Sola,12promulgated barely two weeks ago. During the first year alone of the effectivity of the present Constitution, at least ten cases may be cited.13
2. We come to the crucial issue, the power of theInterimBatasang Pambansa to propose amendments and how it may be exercised. More specifically as to the latter, the extent of the changes that may be introduced, the number of votes necessary for the validity of a proposal, and the standard required for a proper submission. As was stated earlier, petitioners were unable to demonstrate that the challenged resolutions are tainted by unconstitutionality.
(1) The existence of the power of theInterimBatasang Pambansa is indubitable. The applicable provision in the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit. Insofar as pertinent it reads thus: "TheInterimBatasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as theinterimNational Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the Members thereof."14One of such powers is precisely that of proposing amendments. The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested theInterimNational Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments.15When, therefore, theInterimBatasang Pambansa, upon the call of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body it acted by virtue Of such impotence Its authority to do so is clearly beyond doubt. It could and did propose the amendments embodied in the resolutions now being assailed. It may be observed parenthetically that as far as petitioner Occena is Concerned, the question of the authority of theInterimBatasang Pambansa to propose amendments is not new. InOccena v. Commission on Elections,16filed by the same petitioner, decided on January 28, 1980, such a question was involved although not directly passed upon. To quote from the opinion of the Court penned by Justice Antonio in that case: "Considering that the proposed amendment of Section 7 of Article X of the Constitution extending the retirement of members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts from sixty-five (65) to seventy (70) years is but a restoration of the age of retirement provided in the 1935 Constitution and has been intensively and extensively discussed at theInterimBatasang Pambansa, as well as through the mass media, it cannot, therefore, be said that our people are unaware of the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendment."17
(2) Petitioners would urge upon us the proposition that the amendments proposed are so extensive in character that they go far beyond the limits of the authority conferred on the Interim Batasang Pambansa as Successor of theInterimNational Assembly. For them, what was done was to revise and not to amend. It suffices to quote from the opinion of Justice Makasiar, speaking for the Court, inDel Rosario v. Commission on Elections18to dispose of this contention. Thus: "3. And whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution based on an Ideology foreign to the democratic system, is of no moment; because the same will be submitted to the people for ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no debate about the validity of the new Constitution. 4. The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one ... is no argument against the validity of the law because 'amendment' includes the 'revision' or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally changed would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people."19There is here the adoption of the principle so well-known in American decisions as well as legal texts that a constituent body can propose anything but conclude nothing.20We are not disposed to deviate from such a principle not only sound in theory but also advantageous in practice.
(3) That leaves only the questions of the vote necessary to propose amendments as well as the standard for proper submission. Again, petitioners have not made out a case that calls for a judgment in their favor. The language of the Constitution supplies the answer to the above questions. TheInterimBatasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as well when it has been convened as the agency through which amendments could be proposed. That is not a requirement as far as a constitutional convention is concerned. It is not a requirement either when, as in this case, theInterimBatasang Pambansa exercises its constituent power to propose amendments. Moreover, even on the assumption that the requirement of three- fourth votes applies, such extraordinary majority was obtained. It is not disputed that Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention. Where then is the alleged infirmity? As to the requisite standard for a proper submission, the question may be viewed not only from the standpoint of the period that must elapse before the holding of the plebiscite but also from the standpoint of such amendments having been called to the attention of the people so that it could not plausibly be maintained that they were properly informed as to the proposed changes. As to the period, the Constitution indicates the way the matter should be resolved. There is no ambiguity to the applicable provision: "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision."21The three resolutions were approved by theInterimBatasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. In the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date of the plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day period provided by the Constitution. Thus any argument to the contrary is unavailing. As for the people being adequately informed, it cannot be denied that this time, as in the cited 1980 Occena opinion of Justice Antonio, where the amendment restored to seventy the retirement age of members of the judiciary, the proposed amendments have "been intensively and extensively discussed at theInterimBatasang Pambansa, as well as through the mass media, [ so that ] it cannot, therefore, be said that our people are unaware of the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendment [ s ]."22
WHEREFORE,the petitions are dismissed for lack of merit. No costs.
Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Abad Santos, J., is on leave.
Footnotes
Buendia v. City of Baguio, L-34011, July 25, 1973, 52 SCRA 155; Flores v. Flores, L-28930, August 17, 1973, 52 SCRA 293; Alfanta v. Nao, L-32362, September 19, 1973, 53 SCRA 76; People v. Molina, L-30191, October 7, 1973, 53 SCRA 495; People v. Zamora, L-34090, November 16, 1973, 54 SCRA 47; Republic v. Villasor, L-30671, November 28, 1973, 54 SCRA 83; Paulo v. Court of Appeals, L-33845, December 18, 1973, 54 SCRA 253; People v. Bacong, L-36161,
December 19, 1973, 54 SCRA 288 and Asian Surety and Insurance Co. v. Herrera, L-25232, December 20, 1973, 54 SCRA 312.
It may be mentioned that the first of such cases, Garcia, was promulgated on July 25, 1973 with the writer of this opinion as opposite and the next case, Buendia, also on the same date, with Justice Teehankee asponente,both of whom were dissenters in Javellana, but who felt bound to abide by the majority decision.
submission reduces itself not as to power, which is the concern of the judiciary, but as to wisdom, which is entrusted to the constituent body proposing the amendments. Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, L-28196, November 9, 1967, 21 SCRA 774, 801. The opposing view was set forth by Justice Sanchez.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE,J.,dissenting:
I vote to give due course to the petitions at bar and to grant the application for a temporary restraining order enjoining the plebiscite scheduled for April 7, 1981.
1. Consistently with my dissenting opinion inSanidad vs. Comelec1on the invalidity of the October 1976 amendments proposals to the 1973 Constitution for not having been proposed nor adopted in accordance with the mandatory provisions thereof, as restated by me inHidalgo vs. Marcos2andDe la Llana vs. Comelec3, questioning the validity of the December 17, 1977 referendum – exercise as to the continuance in office as incumbent President and to be Prime Minister after the organization of the Interim Batasang Pambansa as provided for in Amendment No. 3 of the 1976 Amendments, I am constrained to dissent from the majority decision of dismissal of the petitions.
I had held inSanidadthat the transcendental constituent power to propose and approve amendments to the Constitution as well as to set up the machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of the amendments proposals has been withheld by the Constitution from the President (Prime Minister) as sole repository of executive power and that so long as the regular National Assembly provided for in Article VIII of the Constitution had not come to existence and the proposals for constitutional amendments were now deemed necessary to be discussed and adopted for submittal to the people, strict adherence with the mandatory requirements of the amending process as provided in the Constitution must be complied with.ℒαwρhi৷This means, under the prevailing doctrine ofTolentino vs. Comelec4that the proposed amendments to be valid must come from the constitutional agency vested with the constituent power to do so, i.e. in the Interim National Assembly provided in the Transitory Article XVII which would then have to be convened and not from the executive power as vested in the President (Prime Minister) from whom such constituent power has been withheld.
2. As restated by me in the 1977 case ofHidalgo,under the controlling doctrine ofTolentino,the October 1976 constitutional amendments which created the Interim Batasang Pambansa in lieu of the Interim National Assembly were invalid since as ruled by the Court therein, constitutional provisions on amendments "dealing with the procedure or manner of amending the fundamental law are binding upon the Convention and the other departments of the government (and) are no less binding upon the people" and "the very Idea of deparcing from the fundamental law is anachronistic in the realm of constitutionalism and repugnant to the essence of the rule of law." The proposed amendments at bar having been adopted by the Interim Batasang Pambansa as the fruit of the invalid October, 1976 amendments must necessarily suffer from the same Congenital infirmity.
3. Prescinding from the foregoing and assuming the validity of the proposed amendments, I reiterate my stand inSanidadthat the doctrine of fair and proper submission firs enunciated by a simple majority of six Justices (of an eleven member Court prior to the 1973 Constitution which increased the official composition of the Court to fifteen) inGonzales vs. Comelec5and subsequently officially adopted by the required constitutional two-thirds majority vote of the Court (of eight votes, then) inTolentinois fully applicable in the case at bar. The three resolutions proposing complex, complicated and radical amendments of our very structure of government were considered and approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 27, 1981. It set the date of the plebiscite for thirty-nine days later on April 7, 1981 which is totally inadequate and far short of the ninety-day period fixed by the Constitution for submittal to the people to "sufficiently inform them of the amendments to be voted upon, to conscientiously deliberate thereon and to express their will in a genuine manner."6
4. "The minimum requirements that must be met in order that there can be a proper submission to the people of a proposed constitutional amendment" as stated by retired Justice Conrado V. Sanchez in his separate opinion inGonzalesbears repeating as follows: "... we take the view that the words 'submitted to the people for their ratification,' if construed in the light of the nature of the Constitution – a fundamental charter that is legislation direct from the people, an expression of their sovereign will – is that it can only be amended by the people expressing themselves according to the procedure ordained by the Constitution. Therefore, amendments must be fairly laid before the people for their blessing or spurning. The people are not to be mere rubber stamps. They are not to vote blindly. They must be afforded ample opportunity to mull over the original provisions, compare them with the proposed amendments, and try to reach a conclusion as the dictates of their conscience suggest, free from the incubus of extraneous or possibly insidious influences. We believe the word 'submitted' can only mean that the government, within its maximum capabilities, should strain every short to inform every citizen of the provisions to be amended, and the proposed amendments and the meaning, nature and effects thereof. ... What the Constitution in effect directs is that the government, in submitting an amendment for ratification, should put every instrumentality or agency within its structural framework to enlighten the people, educate them with respect to their act of ratification or rejection. For, as we have earlier stated, one thing is submission and another is ratification. There must be fair submission, intelligent consent or rejection. If with all these safeguards the people still approve the amendments no matter how prejudicial it is to them, then so be it. For the people decree their own fate."
Justice Sanchez therein ended the passage with an apt citation that "... The great men who builded the structure of our state in this respect had the mental vision of a good Constitution voiced by Judge Cooley, who has said 'A good Constitution should be beyond the reach of temporary excitement and popular caprice or passion. It is needed for stability and steadiness; it must yield to the thought of the people; not to the whim of the people, or the thought evolved in excitement, or hot blood, but the sober second thought, which alone if the government is to be safe, can be allowed efficacy ... Changes in government are to be feard unless benefit is certain.' As Montaign says: 'All great mutation shake and disorder a state. Good does not necessarily succeed evil; another evil may succeed and a worse."'
Footnotes