G.R. No. L-27743 - Asso. Labor Union vs.Amador E. Gomez

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-27743 March 28, 1980

ASSOCIATED LABOR UNION, DEMOCRITO T. MENDOZA, and CECILIO T. SENO,petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE AMADOR E. GOMEZ, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, 14th Judicial District, Branch II, and GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION,respondents.

Seno, Mendoza & Associates for petitioners.

M. A. Zosa for private respondent.

FERNANDO,C.J.:

The decisive question in this certiorari proceeding is one of Jurisdiction. The competence of then respondent Judge, Amador E. Gomez, now retired, to issue a writ of preliminary injunction in a labor dispute considering that there was then pending in the now defunct Court of Industrial Relations an unfair labor practice can filed by petitioner Associated Labor Union1against the employer, Mactan Lighterage and Trucking Corporation, was one of the customers being served by such corporation was private respondent General Milling Corporation. As picketing was then resorted to In the course of the strike, it was alleged in the petition that private respondent, "mutually conniving with the mid Lighterage Corporation, also unduly interferred with the said picketing" by acts of harrassment, coercion and intimidation.2Mention was likewise made therein of the existence of a civil case filed by private respondent against petitioner labor union as well as the co-petitioners Mendoza and Seno. To repeat, it was the assumption of jurisdiction of a labor dispute interwined with a pending unfair labor practice case with the then Court of Industrial Relations that was sought to be nullified by this petition for certiorari with a prayer for preliminary injunction filed on July 6, 1967. In a resolution of this Court soon after the filing of the petition, respondents were required to answer, and the prayer for a writ of pre injunction was granted upon the posting of a bond in the amount of One Thousand Pesos.3The answer was duly filed.4Thereafter, a memorandum in lieu of oral argument was filed by private respondent.5

As will hereafter be shown, the petition is impressed with merit.

1. To lend plausibility to the assumption of jurisdiction by respondent Judge, stress is laid on the fact that it was not the employer, Mactan Lighterage and Trucking Corporation, but its customer, respondent General Milling Company, that filed the complaint for injunction. It is undeniable, however, that there was in existence a labor dispute arising from an unfair labor practice taken cognizance of by the then existing Court of Industrial Relations.6The remedy sought should have been obtained from that tribunal then rather than a Court of First Instance. That has been the settled law sinceAssociated Labor Union v. Gomez,7where the exclusive jurisdiction of the then existing Court of Industrial Relations was emphasized. In the language of theponente,Justice Sanchez: "Nor will Sugeco's averment below that it suffers damages by reason of the strike, work to defeat the CIR's jurisdiction to hear the unfair labor practice charge. Reason for this is that the right to damages 'would still have to depend on the evidence in the unfair labor practice case' — in the CIR. To hold otherwise is to sanction split jurisdiction — which is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice.8The following subsequent cases speak to the same effect:Progressive Labor Association v. Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation,9Leoquinco v. Canada Dry Bottling Co.,10Associated Labor Union v. Cruz,11Goodrich Employees Association v. Flores,12Holganza v. Apostol,13Cyphil Employees Association-NATU v. Pharmaceutical Industries Inc.,14andPrudon v. Court of First Instance.15

2. It does not admit of doubt that, as noted in the petition, in addition to the failure to observe the mandatory re. requirements for the issuance of a preliminary injunction under the Industrial Peace Act,16the orders complained of were fatally defective, suffering as it did from the infirmity that peaceful picketing was enjoined. That would be violative of the freedom of speech clause of the Constitution.Paflu v. Barot,17a 1956 decision, was cited by petitioner. Actually, such a doctrine dates back toMortera v. Court of Industrial Relations,18decided in 1947. Since then, a number of cases affirming such principle has been rendered by this tribunal the latest of which is the aforesaid Cyphil Employees Association-NATU v. Pharmaceutical Industries Inc. decision.19

WHEREFORE,the writ of certiorari is granted, the orders of respondent Judge dated January 23 and 24, 1967 are nullified and declared void, and the preliminary injunction issues on July 11, 1967 is hereby made permanent.ℒαwρhi৷No costs.

Barredo, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., and De Castro, JJ., concur.

Abad Santos, J., is on leave.

Footnotes