G.R. No. L-39742 - DECEMBER 1980 - PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE CASE NUMBERCASE TITLE G.R. No. L-39742December 2, 1980 Air Manila, Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations G.R. No. L-27733December 3, 1980 Renato Raymundo vs. Honorable Alberto R. De Joya G.R. No. L-30686December 3, 1980 Mariano Umali vs. Floro Capli Cruz G.R. No. L-38840December 3, 1980 People of the Phils. vs. Judge Pio B. Ferandos G.R. No. L-44493 & L-44494December 3, 1980 Diatagon Labor Federation Local 110 of the Ulgwp vs. Hon. Blas F. Ople, et al. G.R. No. L-26944-45December 5, 1980 People of the Philippines vs. Eladio Galvez A.C. No. 1928December 19, 1980 Atty. Marcial A. Edillon A.M. No. 1867December 19, 1980 Namawu-Mif vs. Romeo A. Real A.M. No. OCA-112December 19, 1980 In Re: Judge Jose G. Paulin G.R. No. L-23494December 19, 1980 Alfredo Catolico vs. Florencio Deudor G.R. No. L-26993December 19, 1980 Prescioso Ereve vs. Lazaro Escaros G.R. No. L-27469December 19, 1980 Nat'l. Sugar Workers Union-Paflu vs. Arsenio I. Martinez G.R. No. L-28821December 19, 1980 Lilia Yusay Gonzales vs. Court of Tax Appeals G.R. No. L-34057December 19, 1980 Tropical Homes, Inc. vs. Delfin Flores G.R. No. L-34532December 19, 1980 Pasay Law and Conscience Union vs. Pablo Cuneta G.R. No. L-40150December 19, 1980 People of the Philippines vs. Cesar Obeda G.R. No. L-41764December 19, 1980 New Pacific Timber & Supply Company, Inc. vs. Hon. Alberto V. Seneris, et al. G.R. No. L-41885December 19, 1980 Nautica Shipping Agency and Management Company, Inc. vs. National Seamen Board G.R. No. L-45517December 19, 1980 People of the Philippines vs. Herminigildo Muñoz G.R. No. L-47188December 19, 1980 Victor Nator vs. Jose Ramolete G.R. No. L-49654December 19, 1980 Virgilio V. Dionisio vs. Hon. Vicente Paterno G.R. No. L-50241December 19, 1980 Pasudeco Workers Union Officers vs. Bureau of Labor Relations G.R. No. L-51809December 19, 1980 Abraham Razon vs. Amado G. Inciong G.R. No. L-52789December 19, 1980 Romeo S. Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections G.R. No. L-52806December 19, 1980 Gregorio Araneta University Foundation vs. Amado G. Inciong G.R. No. L-53581-83December 19, 1980 Mariano J. Pimentel vs. Com. on Elections G.R. No. L-54247December 19, 1980 Reynaldo A. Fabula vs. Nat'l. Labor Relations Com. A.M. No. 100December 29, 1980 Candido Bulan vs. Teofilo B. Cardenas A.M. No. 126December 29, 1980 In Re. Atty. Tranquilino Rovero A.M. No. 2112-CFIDecember 29, 1980 Jose Mangulabnan vs. Jose Tecson A.M. No. P-1343December 29, 1980 Pablo Garcia vs. Jose S. Catbagan G.R. No. L-23950December 29, 1980 Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Pilar Tanjuatco G.R. No. L-35007December 29, 1980 The Chief of Staff, Afp vs. Hon. Teofilo Guadiz, Jr. G.R. No. L-40872December 29, 1980 Melecia M. Macabuhay vs. Hon. Juan L. Manuel G.R. No. L-41144December 29, 1980 Ignacio Buenbrazo vs. Hon. Geronimo R. Marave G.R. No. L-43203December 29, 1980 Jose C. Cristobal vs. Alejandro Melchor G.R. No. L-44597December 29, 1980 Correa A. Ajero vs. Employees Compensation Commission G.R. No. L-46584December 29, 1980 Nicetas Vda. De Casapao vs. Republic of the Phils. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation, Inc. Air Manila, Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations Renato Raymundo vs. Honorable Alberto R. De Joya Mariano Umali vs. Floro Capli Cruz People of the Phils. vs. Judge Pio B. Ferandos Diatagon Labor Federation Local 110 of the Ulgwp vs. Hon. Blas F. Ople, et al. People of the Philippines vs. Eladio Galvez Atty. Marcial A. Edillon Namawu-Mif vs. Romeo A. Real In Re: Judge Jose G. Paulin Alfredo Catolico vs. Florencio Deudor Prescioso Ereve vs. Lazaro Escaros Nat'l. Sugar Workers Union-Paflu vs. Arsenio I. Martinez Lilia Yusay Gonzales vs. Court of Tax Appeals Tropical Homes, Inc. vs. Delfin Flores Pasay Law and Conscience Union vs. Pablo Cuneta People of the Philippines vs. Cesar Obeda New Pacific Timber & Supply Company, Inc. vs. Hon. Alberto V. Seneris, et al. Nautica Shipping Agency and Management Company, Inc. vs. National Seamen Board People of the Philippines vs. Herminigildo Muñoz Victor Nator vs. Jose Ramolete Virgilio V. Dionisio vs. Hon. Vicente Paterno Pasudeco Workers Union Officers vs. Bureau of Labor Relations Abraham Razon vs. Amado G. Inciong Romeo S. Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections Gregorio Araneta University Foundation vs. Amado G. Inciong Mariano J. Pimentel vs. Com. on Elections Reynaldo A. Fabula vs. Nat'l. Labor Relations Com. Candido Bulan vs. Teofilo B. Cardenas In Re. Atty. Tranquilino Rovero Jose Mangulabnan vs. Jose Tecson Pablo Garcia vs. Jose S. Catbagan Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Pilar Tanjuatco The Chief of Staff, Afp vs. Hon. Teofilo Guadiz, Jr. Melecia M. Macabuhay vs. Hon. Juan L. Manuel Ignacio Buenbrazo vs. Hon. Geronimo R. Marave Jose C. Cristobal vs. Alejandro Melchor Correa A. Ajero vs. Employees Compensation Commission Nicetas Vda. De Casapao vs. Republic of the Phils. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation, Inc.

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-39742 December 2, 1980

AIR MANILA, INC., ET AL.,petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, ET AL.,respondents.

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated December 2, 1980.

"L-39742 (Air Manila, Inc., et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al.). — The Court finds no further reason for delay in the enforcement and implementation of the writ of execution issued by its Clerk of Court on June 14, 1978 against petitioner Air Manila, Inc. for satisfaction of the total net amount of P4,012,090.42 (one third of the gross award of P6,018,135.63 or the sum of P2,006,045.21 having been deducted as and for earnings elsewhere) determined and awarded as and by way of net backwages, pursuant to the Court'sper curiamResolution of June 9, 1978, (reported in 83 SCRA 579, 592) — more than sufficient time and opportunity having been afforded petitioner Air Manila, Inc. and its owner-president, Ricardo C. Silverio since the hearing held on June 20, 1978 for the purpose of hearing any specific proposal from Mr. Silverio on how to satisfy the money judgment in the aforesaid amount of P4,012,090.42 and such amicable settlement as the parties may reach, for which purpose the Court had extended the period of suspension of the execution of the judgment up toJune 28, 1978only although several extensions were granted thereafter — and accordingly DENIES petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution of June 9, 1978 and this denial is FINAL and immediately executory. The aforesaid writ of execution issued by the Clerk of Court is hereby made returnable to this Court within sixty (60) days from this date.

FERNANDO,C.J.:

while not oblivious to the significance of the procedural principles expressed so emphatically and so vehemently in the dissent of Justice Barredo, concurs in the result primarily on the ground that in labor controversies, doctrines of such character must yield to the peremptory force of both the social justice and protection to labor provisions of the Constitution if the fundamental law is to retain its character as such and if this Court is to be faithful to its sworn duty of enforcing its mandates.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE,J,concurring:

I. Our basicper curiamResolution ofJune 9, 1978(reported in 83 SCRA 579)unanimouslyand correctly declared null and void the NLRC "decision" ofMarch 30, 1976which despite respondent AMILPA's (Air Manila Line Pilots Association) objection ofres judicatawould have granted petitioner AMI (Air Manila, Inc.) the very same relief already denied by the CIR's per curiam Resolution ofOctober 10, 1974(which granted only a limited recomputation or reopening of theapproved computationof backpay award of P6,018,135.63 to respondents pilots by principally allowing petitioner AMI to prove and deduct theirearnings elsewhere) as upheld by this Court's final judgment in the case at barenteredonJune 22, 1975and would have all over again brought the litigation back to square one by ordering a "total reopening of the disputed computation" made in the approvedcomputationof award inimplementationof the CIR's long finalAugust 25, 1971decision which granted such award after finding petitioner AMI guilty of unfair labor practice acts. The NLRC would in effect have overruled this Court's final judgment.

What remained — we said then — was to avoid further protracted delays and for respondents pilots to be enabled to savor the fruits of their victory and to expedite the execution of the judgment and award in their favor, and following settled precedents cited in ourper curiamResolution of "fixing the amount of backwages at a reasonable level without qualification and deduction so as to relieve the employees from proving their earnings during their layoffs and the employer from submitting counter-proofs and thus obviate the twin evils of Idleness on the part of the employees and attrition and undue delay in satisfying the award on the part of the employer," we still reduced the total award by one-third or P2,006,045.21 to the net amount of P4,012,090.42 due and payable by way ofnet backwagesand ordered our own Clerk of Court toforthwithissue awrit of executionfor the said net amount. The Court'sper curiamResolution was unanimous,1including Mr. Justice Barredo who now has filed a "vehement dissent and protest" (while his vote then was " I concur but I reserve the making of a few observations").

Upon petitioners' filing on June 15, 1978 of their "Urgent Motion for pre-execution conference and to hold in abeyance writ of execution" statinginter alia"that in order to find ways and means tosatisfy the awardin favor of respondent AMILPA or its members an immediate conference or dialogue between the respondent AMILPA and its lawyers and petitioner Air Manila, Inc. be heldto work out a satisfactory solution for the satisfaction of the award in favor of respondentAMILPA, the Chairman of the Board of Air Manila, Inc. and/or Mr. Ricardo C. Silverio are willing to sit down at any time convenient to this Honorable Court and respondents," the Courtunanimouslyper its Resolution of the same date, set the motion for a special hearing on June 20, 1978 and ordered that "the enforcement of the writ of execution be suspended until after the hearing" and "directed petitioners to submit at the hearing their specific written proposalsfor the satisfaction of the award in favor of respondent AMILPA."2

The hearing was held as scheduled on June 20, 1978 and as recorded in the Court's unanimous Resolution of the same date "Upon motion of counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Ricardo C. Silverio, President of petitioner Air Manila, Inc. (AMI) was allowed to address the Court and submit any specific proposal on howto satisfy the money judgmentin the net amount of P4,012,090.42 in favor of respondent AMILPA. Mr. Silverio made a proposal to pay P500,000.00 of the judgment in cash and the balance with AMI shares, but the same was not acceptable to respondent AMILPA:" and

Several extensions were thereafter obtained upon joint motion of the parties of the suspension of the execution of judgment during which they would continue their conferencesfor satisfaction of the judgment(the last one of record being that which expired July 17, 1978)4until the AMILPA reported the failure of the negotiations in its motion of August 7, 1978 for enforcement of the writ of execution issued by the Clerk of Court on June 14, 1978. Notwithstanding the lapse of the specific period of suspension of the writ of execution that had been granted by the Court and several other urgent and anguished motions for enforcement of the writ of execution and resolution of AMI's motion for reconsideration which had meanwhile been filed on August 1, 1978 after numerous extension and sought to relitigate all over again the issues already resolved, it is only now after almost a year and a half, that the Court has finally writtenfiniswith the resolution at bar.

II. The foregoing amply demonstrates the fundamental error of the premise of Mr. Justice Barredo's dissent, to wit, that the CIR decision and award of backwages computed at P6,018.135.63 less earnings elsewhere (which we reduced to two-thirds asnetbackwages to avoid further attrition and undue delay, following the Mercury case and other precedents) "no longer existsbecause it has beenreplacedby another one rendered by the NLRC"5, a contention thatnot evenpetitioner AMI has put forward — when such approved computation was but animplementationof the CIR award of backwages as granted in itsbasic decision of August 25, 1971 — longandundisputedly finalandexecutory,with this Court having dismissed a petition to review the same per its Resolution of May 8,1972.

The CIR in itsper curiamResolution of July 23, 1974 (erroneously referred to in the dissent as a "2-2-1decision") denied reconsideration of the trial judge's previous Orders approving the computation of the award at P6,018,135.63 for backwages inimplementationof theunquestionedbasic decision ofAugust 25, 1971but modified the same by allowing AMI to prove and deduct earnings elsewhere of the pilots.

Upon AMI's motion for clarification that the 2-2-1 vote did not conclusively resolve the motion for reconsideration,all fourjudges of the CIR issued theirper curiamResolution of October 10, 1974 (with Acting Presiding Judge Ansberto P. Parades continuing his inhibition) andunanimouslydenied the motion, holding that all four of them voted in favor of thelimitedmodification allowed in its July 23, 1974 Resolution by allowing further evidence and deduction of the pilots'earnings elsewhere,while only two votes were for a total granting of AMI's motion for reconsideration which would set aside the CIR's approval of the P6 million plus computation of the backwages and totally reopen the computations all over again from scratch.'6

This CIRper curiamresolution was the subject of AMI's petition in this case, with AMI praying that the case be remanded to the NLRC to break the supposed tie vote of 2-2-1 and to decide on a total reopening and recomputation of the award for backwages, and this Court denied (a) the petition for lack of merit, and (b) reconsideration of such denial by our Resolutions of February 24 and June 6, 1975, and entry of judgment was made on June 22, 1975. Since the CIR'sper curiamresolution was patently correct based on a 4-0-1 vote, our denial of the petition could hardly be termed "cavalier", as Mr. Justice Barredo states in his dissent (at par. II-A thereof).

III. Clearly, then, the only authority left for the NLRC(as successor of the defunct CIR) was toimplementandenforcethe award of backwages as finally computed in the sum of P6,018,135.63 by determining theearnings elsewhereof respondents pilots and deducting the same, as per thefinal judgmentof this Court upholding the CIR'sper curiamresolution of October 10, 1974.

The NLRC hadnojurisdiction or authority to act on AMI's petition in the guise of an injunction to restrain the Labor Arbiter from further hearing the case for the purpose of determining only such earnings elsewhere nor to grant thesamerelief alreadydeniedby the above-citedper curiamresolution of October 10, 1974 as upheld by this Court'sfinal judgment in the very case at baras entered onJune 22, 1975,by ordering anew a "total reopening" of the approved report and computation of the award for backwages.

The NLRC was barred from doing so byres judicatawhich was duly pleaded by respondents before it.ℒαwρhi৷When it nevertheless persisted in totally reopening the case and starting the computation all over again, instead of its limited authority only to force the award as upheld by final judgment of this Court through its void "decision" of March 30, 1976, respondent AMILPA properly filed in this case its "Motion to Compel Execution of Final Judgment" which partakes of the nature of a special civil action of certiorari and mandamus to set aside the void "decision" of the NLRC and to compel or enforce execution of a long final and executory judgment and award of backwages.

IV. As we stressed in ourper curiamResolution in question, "(T)he foregoing brief narration of the antecedents in this case clearly shows that the final disposition of the case on hand which was finally decided by the defunct Court of Industrial Relations on August 25, 1971 (and upheld by this Court as per its Resolution of May 8, 1972 dismissing the petition to review the same) or more than six (6) years ago [over eight years now] has been unreasonably delayed due to the unrelenting and repeated objections (boardering on contempt of court and abuse of judicial processes [Gabriel vs. Court of Appeals, L-43757-58, July 30, 1976]) of petitioners to the computation of the award for backwages made by the Examining Division of the defunct CIR, as well as, to the failure of the said industrial court and now the National Labor Relations Commission to finally resolve the matter."7

Such a void "decision" of the NLRC which was a flagrant refusal to perform itsministerial dutyofenforcingandimplementationafinalandexecutory judgment for backwagescannot conceivably "replace" the valid and subsisting judgment of the CIR as affirmed by this Court. No appeal lies therefrom and the motion for enforcement of judgment was properly filed directly with this Court as a matter of urgent justice and equity. As was stressed inDe Luna vs. Kayanan8"the settled rule is that once a judgment has become final and executory, the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to a writ of execution and issuance thereof is the court'sministerial duty,compellable bymandamus." Equally settled is the rule that once the decision becomes final, it isbinding on all inferior courts,and hence, beyond their power and authority to alter or modify.9

InReyes vs. Arca,10then Acting Chief Justice J. B. L. Reyes reiterated for the Court the injunction inShioji vs. Harvey([1922], 43 Phil. 333, 337), and reiterated in subsequent cases, "(that) if each and every Court of First Instance could enjoy the privilege of overruling decisions of the Supreme Court, there would beno end to litigationandjudicial chaoswould result. Abecoming modestyof inferior courts demands on conscious realization of the position that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation."

V. It is elementary that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated between the same parties and litigation must end sometime and somewhere. As former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion stressed for the Court inGalvez vs. PLDT,11the demands of public policy and public interest — which are also responsive to the tenets of equity - require that all issued passed upon in decisions or final orders that have become executory, be deemed conclusively disposed of and definitely closed, for, otherwise, there would beno end to litigations,thus setting at naught themain role of courts of justice,which is to assist in the enforcement of therule of lawandmaintenance of peace and order,by settling justiciable controversieswith finality."

VI. In several other cases, as in this case in order to avoid further undue delay and to expedite execution for the prevailing parties who have long waited to realize the satisfaction of judgment, the Court has ordered the Clerk of this Court to issue directly the corresponding writs of execution of judgment addressed to the sheriffs of the locality (not the Supreme Court's own sheriffs). Thus, has the Court sought to reach out and do complete justice expeditiously and effectively, if not speedily, as in the cases herein listed.12

VII. Finally, on the extraneous note as to why this case has been finished ahead of another case, where Mr. Justice Barredo states that he has prepared a decision favorable to the same party, Mr. Ricardo Silverio (also involved herein as principal stockholder of AMI), but that the same has been pending with me for a much longer time for the preparation of a dissenting opinion, suffice it to state that as already indicated above, the immediate execution ordered in theper curiamResolution of June 9, 1978 was suspended only up to July 17, 1978 in order to allow AMI and Mr. Silverio upon their own motion to confer and negotiate with respondents "in order to find ways and meansto satisfy the award" in respondents' favor and that it was understood that upon the failure of negotiations or the lapse of the period of suspension of the writ of execution, enforcement of the backwages award would ensue, as ordered by the Court. I therefore opposed his insistence that the two cases be taken up and decided at the same time — which already delayed for over a year such execution and resolution of AMI's motion for reconsideration which merely reiterated in one form or another the grounds already rejected by the Court — as there was nopari materianor common factual or legal issue, and cases are decided on the merits of each case and not on the personality involved therein.

The fact is that the other case has not yet been the actual subject of the Court's deliberations, due to the Court's being swampered with other urgent cases of public interest and significance, such as habeas corpus cases involving ASSO's and election cases, etc., as against this other case which involves adjudication of purely private adversary rights over a sum of money and where Mr. Silverio has filed with this Court his pending special civil action challenging the Court of Appeals' refusal to dismiss the appeal of his adversary. Withal, I reiterate the assurance that I am preparing my own draft opinion in the case which should be ready before year's end for the Court's consideration and deliberation, despite the constraints of circumstances which require the diversion of time and effort therefrom and from other urgent cases such as the rush preparation of the present separate opinion, impelled by Mr. Justice Barredo's manifest personal dissatisfaction with the brief resolution at bar cutting short any further delay in the enforcement of the Court's writ of execution of June 14, 1978 (regardless of the alleged bankrupt or insolvent stateofAMI that I had drafted for the Court.

Footnotes

Separate Opinions

BARREDO,J.,dissenting:

I VEHEMENTLY DISSENT AND PROTEST. THE DENIAL RESOLUTION PREPARED BY MR. JUSTICE TEEHANKEE IS TO MY MIND VERY MUCH SHORT OF WHAT LAW, EQUITY AND JUSTICE REQUIRE. FOR ONE THING, IT SIDESTEPS THE PRINCIPAL AND DECISIVE MATTERS IN ISSUE BETWEEN THE PARTIES. INDEED, I WONDER WHY NOT A LITTLE MORE TIME IS DEVOTED TO SAID FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES AND WHY WE HAVE TO HURRY FINISHING THIS CASE WHICH IS VIRTUALLY AGAINST MR. RICARDO SILVERIO, THE PRINCIPAL STOCKHOLDER OF AIR MANILA, WHEN THERE IS ANOTHER DECISION FAVORABLE TO THE SAME PARTY ALREADY PREPARED BY THE UNDERSIGNED AND ALREADY BEARING THE CONCURRENCE OF OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COURT AND ALREADY IN THE HANDS OF MR. JUSTICE TEEHANKEE FOR A MUCH LONGER TIME, ONLY BECAUSE HE FEELS HE HAS TO PREPARE A DISSENTING OPINION. THE DISTINCTION ATTEMPTED TO BE DRAWN BETWEEN THE TWO CASES IN THAT THIS ONE IS A LABOR CASE WHILE THE OTHER IS A SIMPLE RECOVERY OF MONEY IS TO ME UNACCEPTABLE, FOR, IN TRUTH, THE PETITIONERS HERE ARE NOT ORDINARY LABORERS BUT AIRPLANE PILOTS WHO EARN SUBSTANTIAL SALARIES AND IF I AM NOT MISTAKEN HAVE NEVER LOST GAINFUL OCCUPATION IN A SUBSTANTIAL DEGREE NOTWITHSTANDING THE PENDENCY OF THIS CASE.

I

THE PRESENT RESOLUTION REITERATES THE INDUBITABLY BAD AND PROCEDURALLY ERRONEOUS ACTION OF THIS COURT, DONE ONLY IN THIS CASE, OF GRANTING THE PETITIONERS MORE THAN WHAT THEY ARE ASKING FOR. WE ARE BEING MORE POPISH THAN THE POPE. THE PRESENT RESOLUTION ORDERS THE EXECUTION OF A JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS BY THE SUPREME COURT'S OWN SHERIFFS, BY VIRTUE OF A WRIT OF EXECUTION TO BE ISSUED BY OUR OWN CLERK OF COURT, WHEN ALL THAT PETITIONERS ARE ASKING IS THAT WE ENJOIN THE ENFORCEMENT OF SAID JUDGMENT, WHICH SIMPLY MEANS, WE SHOULD ORDER THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, THE SUCCESSOR OF THE INDUSTRIAL COURT, TO EXECUTE SAID DECISION.

II

THE PRESENT RESOLUTION IS NOTHING BUT A MERE INSISTENCE TO REPEAT A GRAVE ERROR WE DID NOT NOTICE IN THE ORIGINAL RESOLUTION, NAMELY, THAT OF EXECUTING A DECISION THAT NO LONGER EXISTS BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN REPLACED BY ANOTHER ONE RENDERED BY THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION.

- A -

THE BASIC DECISION OF THE INDUSTRIAL COURT WAS A 2-2-1 DECISION — TWO JUDGES VOTED IN FAVOR OF ORDERING A RECOMPUTATION BY THE COURT EXAMINERS OF THEIR MANIFESTLY ERRONEOUS COMPUTATION OF THE BACKWAGES DUE PETITIONERS. TWO JUDGES VOTED TO GRANT ONLY A PARTIAL RECOMPUTATION, IGNORING THE OBVIOUS FACT THAT THE ORIGINAL COMPUTATION WAS BASED NOT ON ACTUAL RECORDS OF AIR MANILA BUT MORE GENERALLY ON A STRAIGHT COUNTING OF THE NUMBER OF THE DAYS INVOLVED MULTIPLIED BY THE SALARY OF EACH OF THE PILOT-PETITIONERS, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER OR NOT THERE WERE ACTUAL FLIGHTS OR PLANES ON CERTAIN DAYS (NOT VERY FEW) FOR WHICH REASON THEY WOULD NOT BE ENTITLED TO ANY PAY. ONE JUDGE ABSTAINED. AIR MANILA ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION AND EXPRESSED DOUBT AS TO THE VALIDITY OF A RESOLUTION NOT SUPPORTED BY THREE (3) VOTES. RESOLVING THE MOTION, THE COURT SIMPLY DENIED THE SAME BY SAYING WHAT WAS ALREADY MANIFEST, I.E, THAT THERE ARE TWO VOTES IN FAVOR OF COMPLETE RECOMPUTATION AND TWO VOTES FOR PARTIAL RECOMPUTATION AND, THEREFORE, THERE ARE FOUR VOTES FOR PARTIAL RECOMPUTATION AND ONLY TWO FOR COMPLETE RECOMPUTATION, AND WITHOUT SAYING ONE WORD ABOUT THE DOUBTFUL LEGAL STATUS OF SUCH 2-2-1 VOTING WHICH WAS THE THRUST OF THE MOTION. AIR MANILA ELEVATED THE MATTER TO THIS COURT BY certiorari BUT ITS PETITION WAS CAVALIERLY DENIED IN A MINUTE RESOLUTION.

AS THE MATTER INVOLVED WAS ONE OF EXECUTION, AT WHICH STAGE THE RULE IS THAT MATTERS OF EQUITY MAY BE RAISED NOTWITHSTANDING FINALITY OF THE JUDGMENT, AIR MANILA RESUBMITTED TO THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, AS SUCCESSOR OF THE INDUSTRIAL COURT, WHICH HAD BEEN ABOLISHED IN THE MEANWHILE, THE ISSUE OF THE CLARIFICATION AND/OR INVALIDITY OF THE 2-2-1 DECISION. ADMITTEDLY, IN THE PREMISES, SUCH RESUBMISSION COULD HAVE BEEN BARRED BY A PLEA OFRES ADJUDICATA,WHICH, HOWEVER IS A WAIVABLE DEFENSE. INDEED, AMILPA, THE PETITIONER, RAISED SAID DEFENSE, BUT WAS OVERRULED BY THE NLRC. FROM THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSION, WHICH WAS UNANIMOUS, WITH THE SOLE ABSTENTION,NOT DISSENT,OF JUDGE VELOSO WHO HAD RENDERED THE 2-2-1 RESOLUTION WHEN HE WAS IN THE INDUSTRIAL COURT, AMILPA DID NOT APPEAL. AND SO, THE SUBJECT OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION OF EXECUTION IS THE CIR DECISION, BUT NOTABLY, THE MOTION PRAYING THEREFOR WAS FILED BY AMILPA ALREADY SEVEN MONTHS AFTER THE DECISION OF THE NLRC HAD BECOME FINAL. EVEN IF WE SHOULD CONSIDER THE PRESENT INCIDENT AS A certiorari TO NULLIFY WHAT MIGHT BE ALLEGED TO BE A VOID DECISION OF THE NLRC, PETITIONER IS ALREADY GUILTY OF LACHES. THE PRESENT INCIDENT IS A MERE AFTERTHOUGHT CONCEIVED BELATEDLY BY COUNSEL WHO MUST HAVE BEEN STUNNED BY THE COGENCY OF THE NLRC DECISION.

- B -

WHAT IS MOST ESSENTIAL IN THIS CASE IS TO UNDERSTAND EXACTLY THERES ADJUDICATAISSUE THAT HAS CREPT IN. THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT AS A RULE A DECISION THAT IS ALREADY FINAL AND EXECUTORY SHOULD BE EXECUTED ACCORDING TO ITS TERMS. BUT THIS GENERAL RULE HAS EXCEPTIONS, SUCH AS WHEN OTHER EVENTS SUPERVENE WHICH WOULD MAKE THE LITERAL EXECUTION UNJUST, INEQUITABLE OR LEGALLY INAPPROPRIATE.

BUT MORE THAN THESE EXCEPTIONS, THERE IS THE RULE THAT THE DEFENSE OFRES ADJUDICATAIS A WAIVABLE ONE. SO, EVEN ASSUMING THE ABSENCE OF THE SUPERVENING EVENTS JUST MENTIONED OR THAT THE AMBIGUITY OF THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE SO-CALLED FINAL DECISION OF THE CIR, WHICH THIS COURT REFUSED TO PASS UPON, MAY NOT AFFECT THE EXECUTORY CHARACTER OF THE CIR DECISION IN QUESTION, AS IS, THERE IS, HOWEVER, THE IMPORTANT AND DECISIVE POINT OFRES ADJUDICATAINVOLVED IN THIS CASE IN ITS PRESENT SITUATION.

WE CANNOT JUST IGNORE THE DECISION OF NLRC AS THE ACT OF AN INTERLOPER AND CASUALLY REFER TO IT AS NULL AND VOID. WE MUST BEAR IN MIND THAT A CASE ALREADY DECIDED CAN IN SOME INSTANCES BE REVIVED OR RESURRECTED. WHETHER OR NOT THIS CAN BE DONE DEPENDS ON THE PARTY FEELING AGGRIEVED THEREBY, IN WHICH EVENT, HE HAS THE RIGHT TO PLEAD THE DEFENSE OFRES ADJUDICATA.BUT AGAIN, I EMPHASIZE,RES ADJUDICATAIS A WAIVABLE DEFENSE. IT IS ENTIRELY THE PRIVILEGE OF A PARTY TO WISH TO FIGHT OR NOT ALL OVER AGAIN A MATTER ALREADY PREVIOUSLY JUDICIALLY SETTLED CERTAINLY, HOWEVER, IT IS NOT FOR THE COURT, NOT EVEN THE SUPREME COURT, TO INVOKE IT FOR HIM.

WHAT IS MORE, IN THIS CASE, WHAT HAPPENED IS THAT WHEN AMI RESORTED TO THE REOPENING OF THE ISSUE OF THE 2-2-1 DECISION IN THE NLRC, THE PETITIONER AMILPA JOINED ISSUES WITH IT, RAISING, OF COURSE, AT THE SAME TIME THE DEFENSE OFRES ADJUDICATA(POINT OF JURISDICTION IN EXECUTION IS COMPELLING ONLY WHEN THE DECISION IS INDUBITABLE LEGALLY OR OTHERWISE, WHICH IS NOT THE CASE HERE, HENCE PROPERLY, ONLYRES ADJUDICATACOULD BE INVOKED). IN THE ULTIMATE SENSE, THE NLRC OVERRULED THE DEFENSE OFRES ADJUDICATA.NOW, THE QUESTION ARISES, WHAT DID AMILPA DO AFTER THAT DECISION? THE RECORD IS CLEAR THAT IT TOOK NO STEP AGAINST IT, MUCH LESS AN APPEAL OR EVEN A CERTIORARI. JUDGMENTS OF THE NLRC ALSO REACH A POINT OF FINALITY LIKE THOSE OF OTHER JUDICIAL OR QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES. THE MOST IMPORTANT CIRCUMSTANCE IN THIS CASE, WHICH I SUBMIT IS DECISIVE, IS THAT, IT WAS ONLY AFTER SEVEN MONTHS AFTER THE FINALITY OF THE NLRC DECISION THAT AMILPA CAME TO US. AND ITS MOTION IS FOR US TO ORDER THE NLRC TO ENFORCE THE CIR DECISION. CERTAINLY, NOT FOR US TO BE THE COURT TO EXECUTE IT.

MY POINT IS THAT DECISION OF THE CIR HAS ALREADY BEEN SUPERSEDED BY THE NLRC DECISION WHICH HAD BECOME FINAL THRU THE INDIFFERENCE OR OMISSION OF HEREIN PETITIONER. THAT CIR DECISION NO LONGER EXISTS IN THE CONTEMPLATION OF THE RULE ONRES ADJUDICATAAND ITS WAIVABILITY. IN ANY EVENT, IF THE MAJORITY OF THE COURT FEELS THAT MY POSITION IS WRONG, ALL I AM ASKING IS THAT THE RESOLUTION GIVE THE REASONS IN SUPPORT OF THE OPPOSITE VIEW FOR THE GUIDANCE OF ALL CONCERNED.

III

THE MAIN PREMISE OF THE COURT'S ORIGINAL RESOLUTION IS THAT ONCE A DECISION HAS BECOME FINAL IT CAN NO LONGER BE CHANGED IN ANY WAY. IF THAT IS SO, WHY DID THE RESOLUTION MODIFY THE AWARD OF THE CIR BY APPLYING THE MERCURY CASE-THREE-YEAR FORMULA? BESIDES, THIS COURT HAS NEVER APPLIED THE MERCURY CASE FORMULA TO DECISIONS ALREADY FINAL AND EXECUTORY, BUT ONLY TO INSTANCES WHERE WE WERE CALLED UPON TO DETERMINE ORIGINALLY HOW MUCH BACKWAGES SHOULD BE AWARDED. THERE IS NO PARITY BETWEEN THAT CASE AND THE PRESENT ONE. MAY I ADD, IF WE CAN ALTER THE CIR DECISION ON GROUNDS OF EQUITY UTILIZING THE MERCURY RULE, WHY DO WE REFUSE TO DO REAL JUSTICE AND EQUITY BY ATTENDING TO THE NLRC DECISION?

IV

ON THE PRACTICAL SIDE, AIR MANILA APPEARS TO BE BANKRUPT IF NOT INSOLVENT. IF WE ARE GOING TO APPLY IN PRINCIPLE THE MERCURY RULE BY CHANGING A FINAL JUDGMENT, WHICH WE HAVE NEVER DONE BEFORE, I SUBMIT IT WOULD BE IN THE BETTER INTERESTS OF JUSTICE TO BASE OUR RESOLUTION ON THE PROPOSAL OF MR. SILVERIO, OFFERING P2,000,000.00 CASH, PAYABLE QUARTERLY, AND SEVERAL MILLION PESOS WORTH OF SHARES OF STOCK OF AIR MANILA, WHATEVER THEY MIGHT BE WORTH IN THE FUTURE.

Very truly yours,

S/ GLORIA C. PARAS
T/ GLORIA C. PARAS
CLERK OF COURT

Atty. Renato G. dela Cruz (x)
Counsel for petitioners
SALVA CARBALLO & ASSOCIATES
5th Flr. Sterling life Bldg.
dela Rosa cor. Esteban Sts.
Legaspi Village, Makati
Metro Manila

Atty. Ceferino P. Padua (x)
Counsel for respondents AMILPA
501 L & S Bldg., 1515 Roxas Blvd.
Manila

Capt. Napoleon B. Sayson (x)
President
Air Manila Line Pilots Assoc.
2428 Dapdap St. UPSI
Paranaque, Metro Manila

The Hon. Minister (x)
Ministry of Labor
Intramuros, Manila

Atty. Linda P. Ilagan (x)
National Labor Relations
Commission
Phoenix Bldg., Intramuros
Manila

The National Labor Relations
Commission (x)
Phoenix Bldg., Intramuros
Manila
(Case No. 5295-ULP)

The Executive Director (x)
National Labor Relations Commission
Phoenix Bldg., Intramuros Manila

Aquino and Abad Santos, JJ., took no part.