G.R. No. L-31582 - People of the Philippines vs. Raymundo S. Vistido
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-31582 October 26, 1977
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAYMUNDO VISTIDO y SABAYLE,defendant-appellant.
Ramon A. Gonzales & Associates for appellant.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Dominador L. Quiroz and Solicitor Octavio R. Ramirez for appellee.
CONCEPCION JR.,J.:
In Criminal Case No. CCC-263-P.C. of the Circuit Criminal Court of Rizal, Pasig, Rizal, the accused Raymundo Vistido y Sabayle was charged together with Pepito Montaño and one John Doe (both at large) with the crime of murder, allegedly committed as follows:ñé+.£ªwph!1
That on or about the 1st day of November, 1969, in Pasay City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, armed with a dagger, with deliberate intent to kill, taking advantage of their superior strength and by mean of treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and hit with a dagger Restituto Belbes y Marcelino on the lower part of the abdomen, thereby inflicting upon the latter vital wound which caused his instantaneous death.
Upon arraignment, the accused Raymundo Vistido pleaded not guilty.
WHEREFORE, finding the accused, Raymundo Vistido y Sabalye, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, of the commission of the crime of murder, pursuant to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as charge in the information, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH; to indemnify the heirs of the offended in the amount of TWELVE THOUSAND (P12,000.00) PESOS; and to pay the costs.
The case is now before Us for mandatory review.
The evidence for the prosecution reveals that on November 1, 1969, between 3:00 and 4:00 o'clock in the morning, the deceased Restituto Belbes and his cousin, Reynaldo Pagtakhan after coming home from their work at the cemetery went to eat at the Marzan Restaurant on Taft Avenue, Pasay City.
Thereupon, Pepito Montaño told the deceased: 'Hoy Resting. pauwiin mo na iyong kasama," to which the latter answered: "Huwag pinsan ko ito."
Raymundo Vistido boxed him once.
In the meantime, the accused Raymundo Vistido was picked up, as a suspect in the killing of the deceased, on M. Francisco St., Pasay City, by Pat. Loreto Aguna, who brought him to the police precinct.
"The accused Raymundo Vistido denied any participation in the commission of the crime. According to him, on the night of October 31, 1969, he was at home. Around 9:00 o'clock in the evening, his wife asked him to buy milk at a nearby store but was not able to do so because the store was already closed. In front of the store, he saw Conrado Catadrilla, Antonio Ramos, Pepito Montaño, and Esteban Pugna. The group offered him one-half glass of tanduay rhum. After drinking it, he felt tipsy and requested them to take him home. Conrado Catadrilla and Antonio Ramos accompanied the accused to his house, arriving thereat at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, and immediately, he went to sleep.
Around 4:00 o'clock in the morning of November 1, 1969, a Metrocom Unit came to his house and asked him to go with them as they would show to him some papers which he would sign. As he could not do anything, he went with them to the Pasay City Police Department. Immediately upon his arrival, he was maltreated by the police and repeatedly asked him: 'Who were your companions in the killing?" to which query he repeatedly answered: "I do not know because I was sleeping at home.
The trial court rejected his alibi, and finding that there was conspiracy in the commission of the crime, convicted the accused of the crime of murder and imposed upon him the penalty of death. In this appeal, the accused as appellant does not question the correctness of the trial court's conclusion as to his alibi. However, he assails the courta quoin holding that there was conspiracy in the commission of the offense.
We disagree. There is no question that 'a person may be convicted for the criminal act of another where, between them, there has been conspiracy or unity of purpose and intention in the commission of the crime charged."
In the case at bar, the evidence for the prosecution does not comply with this basic requirement. To begin with, there is no evidence that appellant and his co-accused had any enmity or grudge against the deceased. On the contrary, the cousin of the deceased, Reynaldo Pagtakhan, testified that prior to the stabbing incident, they did not have any quarrel with them.
Neither could it be assumed that when the appellant and his co-accused were together drinking wine, at the time and place of the incident, they were there purposely to wait for and to kill the deceased. For, they could not have surmised beforehand that between 3:00 and 4:00 o'clock in the morning of November 1, 1969, the deceased and his cousin after coming home from their work at the cemetery would go to the Marzan Restaurant, and thereafter, would take a taxi for home, and then, alight at M. Francisco Street. The meeting between the appellant's group and the deceased appears to be purely accidental which negates the existence of conspiracy between the appellant and his co-accused.
Besides, the appellant was unarmed; only his two companions (Pepito Montaño and one John Doe) were armed with daggers.
Moreover, although the appellant and his co-accused acted with some degree of simultaneity in attacking the deceased, nevertheless, the same is insufficient to prove conspiracy.ℒαwρhi৷The rule is well-settled that "simultaneousness does not of itself demonstrate the concurrence of Will nor the unity of action and purpose which are the basis of the responsibility of two or more individuals.
Although the appellants are relatives and had acted with some degree of simultaneity in attacking their victim, nevertheless, this fact alone does not prove conspiracy. (People vs. Caayao, 48 Off. Gaz. 637). On the contrary, from the nature and gravity of the wounds inflicted on the deceased, it can be said that the appellant and the other defendant did not act pursuant to the same objective. Florentino Gapole's purpose was to kill the deceased, as shown by the fact that he inflicted a mortal wound which almost severed the left arm. The injury inflicted by the appellant, merely scratching the subcutaneous tissues, does not indicate a purpose to kill the victim. It is not enough that appellant had participated in the assault made by his codefendant in order to consider him a co-principal in the crime charged. He must have also made thecriminal resolutionof his co-accused his own. ....
and, inPeople vs. Vicente,
In regard to appellant Ernesto Escopizo, there seems; to be no dispute that he stabbed Soriano several times with a small knife only after the latter had fallen to the ground seriously wounded, if not already dead. There is no showing that this accused had knowledge of the criminal intent of Jose Vicente against the deceased. In all likelihood, Escorpizo's act in stabbing the fallen Soriano with a small knife was not in furtherance of Vicente's aim, which is to kill, but merely to 'show off' or express his sympathy or feeling of camaraderie with Vicente. ....
By and large, the evidence for the prosecution failed to show the existence of conspiracy which, according to the settled rule, must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the crime itself. In the absence of conspiracy, the liability of the defendants is separate and individual each is liable for his own acts, the damage caused thereby, and the consequences thereof.
ACCORDINGLY,the judgment of the trial court is modified and another one entered holding the appellant Raymundo Vistido y Sabayle guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries. He is thereby sentenced to suffer fifteen (15) days ofarresto menor.
SO ORDERED.
Castro, C.J., Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Muñoz Palma, Martin, Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.1äwphï1.ñët
Teehankee, J., concurs with the dissent of Justice Aquino.
Antonio, J., agrees that appellant is guilty as accomplice in homicide.
Footnotes
Separate Opinions
AQUINO,J.,dissenting:
Appellant is guilty as an accomplice homicide with the mitigating circumstance of drunkenness (People vs. Babiera, 52 Phil. 97; People vs. Cortes, 55 Phil. 143).