G.R. No. L-29596 - Julian Jr. Rodriguez vs. Sabina Toreno

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-29596 October 14, 1977

JULIAN JR., SERGIO, PEDRO, LUIS and MONICA, all surnamed RODRIGUEZ,petitioners,
vs.
SABINA TORENO, TIMOTEO TORENO, GLICERIA BOCASE ALEJANDRO BOCASE BENJAMIN CAMPOREDONDO, SIMPLICIA BOCASE PEDRO DOCASE BERNARDO BIENVENIDO DOCASE GREGORIA BOCASE and THE FUW DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, MANELA,nts.

Tolentino, Garcia, Cruz & Reyes for petitioners.

Ruiz Law Offices and Arsenio Suazo for private respondents.

CASTRO,C.J.:

This is a review of the decision of the Court of APPEAL in CAG.R. No. 30053- R, dated August 22, 1968, after the decision of the Court of First lnstance of Davao City in Civil Case No. 2718, which (1) adjudicated portions of a parcel of land in favor of Sabina Toreno, Timoteo Toreno, Gliceria Bocase the minors Luciana, Alejandro and Lourdes, off surnamed Bocase who are represented by their legal guardians Benjamin Camporedondo Simplica Pedro, Bemardo Bienvenido and Gregoria, all surnamed Bocase and hereinafter referred to as respondents; and (2) awarded damages against Julian Rodriguez, Sr., hereinafter referred to as the petitioner, now deceased, and substituted in the instant petition by his children Julian, Jr., Sergio, Pedro, Luis and Monica.

It appears that during her lifetime, one Valentine Quiñones owned a parcel of land in Davao City with an area of 39,043 square meters which is designated as Lot No. 2017, formerly Lot No. 1226-G of the cadastral survey of Davao. On her death, Valentine was survived by her children, namely, Maximina, Martiliano, Felix, Petra Eugenia, Restitute and Ana, all surnamed Bocase and all of whom are now deceased.

Maximina died in 1940 and was survived by her children Sabina Toreno and Timoteo Toreno, two of the herein respondents. Martiliano was survived by his children Eugenia Simplicia, Pedro, Bernardo and Green, of whom the latter four are some of the herein respondents. Felix was survived by his children Gliceria and the three minors Luciana Alejandro and Lourdes who are likewise respondents Martiliano Petra died a widow and without any issue. Eugenia does not appear to have left any children. Restitute was survived by her 12 children who, fake Ana's four children, are not parties to the case at bar.

The land left by the late Valentina Quinones was brought for tration before a cadastral court in 1922 and the Original Certificate of Title No. 0-15 was issued on August 7, 1950 in the name of 26 petition, to wit: the three arriving children of Valentine, namely Petra Eugenia and Felix Bocase and their 23 nephews and nieces.ℒαwρhi৷The certificate of title, after its issuance, was delivered to the petitioner by the respondents' counsel in the cadastral case, one Atty. Suazo. The petition still had the said certificate of title in his possession at the tune the case was comnienoed in the trial court.

On July 9, 1958, the respondents filed with the Court of First Instance of Davao, a complaint for ejectment and damages against the petitioner, alleging basically that, together with their cousins, the children of Restitute and Ana, they are pro-ndiviso registered owners of the land covered by O.C.T. No. 0-15; that in or about June 1953, the petitioner reply maliciously' and by means of force and intion entered the land in question and occupied approximately 27,500 square meters thereof, which portion, prior thereto, was in their possession as their share pursuant to a partition agreed upon by the co-owners thereof; and that since June 1953, the petitioner had been collecting rentals from the owners of houses built thereon in the total sum of P300.00 a month.

In his answer, the petitioner claimed that the heirs of Valentine Quinones, with the exception of Restitute and Ana Bocase had already sold their rights over the land covered by O.C.T. No. 0-15 to him as early as 1941 and 1950 either through themselves or their successors in interest, thus making him the rightful and legal owner of approximately 27,899 square meters thereof; that he had been in the peaceful, continuous and public ion of the same; that there was no hen, encumbrance or adverse claim annotated on O.C.T. No 0-15 so that the series of sales made in his favor, although not registered and annotated thereon, are valid and binding between the parties, the said land not having passed to a third person; and that he had spent no less than P5,000.00 in improving the land in question.

On October 31, 1960, after hearing on the merits, the trial court rendered its decision ordering the petitioner to vacate the land in question and to pay the respondents the sum of P750.00, the value of the coconut trees the petitioner had ordered cut down; P125.00 a month from July 10, 1958, representing the rentals collected by him from tenants with their houses built on the questioned estate; P1,000.00 as attorney's fees; and costs. The trial court's decision was anchored on the following rationale: (a) to entertain petitioner's claim that he had bought the questioned portion of the land covered by O.C.T. No. 0-15 as shown in evidence1before the decree of registration was issued would virtually re-open the cadastral proceeding in contravention of the indefeasibility of Torrens titles; (b) the petitioner, being the respondents' counsel in the land registration case, had all the opportunity to have the questioned deeds of sale annotated on the certificate of title in connection with the cadatral case but did not do so; (c) petitioner's failure, despite his having been respondents' counsel to have his adverse claim brought to the attention of the cadastral court and to have the supposed deeds of sale annotated later are proof enough that the alleged deeds of sale were really contracts of loan.

In due course, the petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals c that the trial court erred in its appreciation of the facts and the legal aspects of the case, On August 22, 1968, the Court of Appeal rendered its decision finding the petitioner's claim "to the property in controversy untenable" and affirming, except for to P550.00 the value of the coconut trees the petitioner had to reimburse the respondents (it was found that only 110 trees were faded at P5.00 per tree), the appealed judgment of the trial court. But, unlike the court, the Court of Appeals did not resolve the question of whether the alleged deeds of sale,supra,of the questioned land werebona fidepurchase agreements or mere contracts of loan. It simply noted that "the alleged sales took place in 1940 or some years prior to the issuance of the Original Certificate of Title No. 0-15 ... but none of the alleged deeds of sale appears to have been annotated on said certificate of title" and from that observation, concluded that "Under the Torrens System of registration, claims and hens of whatever character, except those mentioned by law, existing against the land prior to the issuance of the certificate of title, are cut off by such certificate if not noted thereon, and the certificate so issued binds the whole world, including the government."

The petitioner in the instant petition raises two issues, namely (1) whether the existence of a decree of registration is a bar to an action filed after one year from the issuance of the decree to compel reconveyance of the property in question, and (2) whether the unrecorded deeds of sale between the parties are binding upon them and their respective heirs.

In the case at bar, the record suddenly shows that the petitioner was well aware of the existence of the cadastral caw over the land in question as he was engaged by the resents to handle the case for them although it was another lawyer, Atty. Suazo, who appears to have actedly assisted the respondents in court. Indeed, it incontrovertibly appear that Atty. Suazo delivered the certificate of title to the other after the same was issued and the petition in "million for until the complaint was added and the case was tried in the courta quo.Petitioner's actuation, himself a lawyer, under the lances in not having the alleged deeds of sale annotated in the certificate of title, if they were really sake covenants, is certainly inexpble.

Upon the foregoing the conclusion of the trial court that the deeds of sale in question were mere contracts of loan, or properly a at arrangemnt, is not far-fetched. The Court takes cognizance of the common of individual money lenders of taking physical possession of the certificate of title or other not avide ownership of mal estate by the debtor to ensure his faithfited company with the obligation to pay the

ACCORDINGLY,the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 30053-R is hereby affirmed. No costs.

Makasiar, Muñoz, Palma, Martin, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.1äwphï1.ñët

Footnotes

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE,J.,concur:

I concur and wish to add only that while the main opinion has in effect sustained the trial court's factual findings that the so-called deeds of sale in favor of petitioner- defendant were mere contracts of loan or a security arrangement, which under the prevailing rule would call for requiring respondents-plaintiffs as sellers to repay petitioner-creditor the amounts of said loans as a matter of law and fairness, the non- application of such rule in the case at bar is justified by the fact that petitioner does not appear to have filed below a counterclaim, even contingently, for the repayment thereof. Such counterclaim is of a compulsory character and having failed to file the same, petitioner has lost the right to claim repayment.