G.R. No. L-42885 - Leodegaria Bautista vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission

1. Employer-employee relationship;

2. salary in the amount of P4,303.00 per annum;

3. That claimant has been assigned in Dulag, Leyte as public school teacher; and

4. That claimant has retired under the Disability Retirement Plan. (p. 12, Ibid.)

"1. To the claimant Leodegaria Bautista the amount of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000.00) PESOS (maximum) as compensation benefits and Secs. 14 and 18 of the Act, as amended..... ;

"2. To the claimant the additional amount of TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY ONE & 99/100 (P281.99) PESOS as reimbursement of the duly receipted medical expenses and evaluated hospital and medical bills by the CRMO pursuant to Sec. 13 of the act as amended;

"3. To Atty. Leon Tumandao the amount of THREE HUNDRED (P300.00) PESOS as attorney's fee pursuant to Sec. 31 of the Act; and

"4. To this office the amount of SIXTY ONE (P61.00) PESOS as administrative fee pursuant to Section 55 of the Act." (pp. 15-16, Ibid.)

1. It is not disputed that the 15-day period within which to seek a reconsideration of the referee's decision had elapsed when respondent employer's motion for reconsideration was filed.1Nor was there a petition for relief from judgment filed with the Commission en banc.2The record of the case was perfunctorily elevated to the Commission upon the denial of the employer's motion for reconsideration; by that time, however, and at that stage of the proceedings the referee's decision had become final and executory.

To restate the ruling of this Court in the recent case ofSoliven vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, et al.,3a decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission reversing that of the hearing referee is null and void when it is rendered after the referee's decision had become final and executory for failure of the employer to appeal the same and to file a petition for relief from judgrmnt within the reglementary period.ℒαwρhi৷

Respondent Bureau contends in its memorandum filed with the Court that the hearing officer's decision was nufl and void and could not have attained finality as the "hearing officer had no jurisdiction to hear the claim for compensation in view of the absence of any employer-employee relationship between respondent Bureau of Public Schools and the claimant at the time she filed her claim for compensation as she was then retired."4

It is however correctly claimed by petitioner that respondent employer is now estopped from invoking the absence of employeremployee relationship for the simple reason that during the hearing below the Bureau was represented by Assistant City Fiscal Jose F. Sano and Assistant Provincial Fiscal Joventino Isidro who admitted and agreed on a stipulation of facts among which was the existence of employer-employee relationship between the parties.5

An equally valid point is that petitioner's right to claim disability compensation arose only from the time she was disabled to work and had to retire prematurely by reason of her ailment. Necessarily, the claim for compensation for total permanent disability could be filed only after retirement from the service. But so long as petitioner's action had not prescribed,' respondent Commission had jurisdiction to act on her claim even if at the time of the filing thereof the employer-employee relationship had terminated, for what vests jurisdiction is the fact the illness which caused the disability supervened and/or was aggravated in the course of her teaching job. mother words, the employment was coeval with the ailment, and with the two coexisting, an a leged absence of employer-emplovee relationship at the time of the filing of the claim is untenable as a defense.

2. Anent the issue of compensability, the employer herein cannot evade liability on the ground that "claimant's (herein petitioner) aliments were degenerative in nature, and were caused by the aging process." (p. 52. rollo) Not having controverted this claim for compensation, the emplover suffers the legal consequences of non-controversion - "loss of non-jurisdictional defenses and ultimate admission of compensability."7

3. Moreover, the Workmen's Compensation Act which governs the present situation expressly provides in its Section 44 that in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary it shall be presunied that a claim comes within the provisions of this Act. Under this declaration of a benign sound public policy, an employee is freed from the burden of proving that his illness or injury was caused or aggravated by the nature of his work; all that is expected of him is to establish the employer-employee relationship and the occurrence of the injury at the time such relationship existed, after which the burden is shifted to the employer to overthrow by substantial evidence the presumed link between the injury and the work of the employee.

Thus, under the presumption of compensability established by the law. the Court awarded compensation benefits to employees who in the ordinary course of their employment suffered ailments of the heart, such as: a disease of the coronary artery whereby an artery supplying blood to the muscular walls of the heart is blocked by a clot;8myocardial infarction,9cardiac enlargement10, coronary thrombosis, acute heart failure, or heart attack.11

* * * in accident exists when a man undertaking work is unable to withstand the exertion required to do it, whatever may be the degree of exertion used or the condition of the workman's health." Devlin v. Department of Labor and Industries, 194 Wash. 549, 78 P. 2d 959, cited in McCormick Lumber Co. vs. Department of Industries, et. al., 1941, 108 p. 2d 807, 812.

1See. 50, Workmen's Compensation Act as amended provides that 'Fifteen days after the promulgation of the decision the same shall become final unless previously appealed." See also Sections 1 & 4, Rule 19, Rules of the Workmen's Compensation Commission. See Sections 2 & 3, Rule 22, Ibid. L-44763, June 30, 1977. See also Quintos and others vs. Republic of the Philippines, et al., L46?49-52, August 31, 1977. 4 p. 49, rollo

2See Sections 2 & 3, Rule 22, ibid.

3L-44763, June 30, 1977. See also Quintos and others vs. Republic of the Philippines, et al. L-46249-52, August 31, 1977.

4p. 49, rollo.

5pp 12 & 59, 60, ibid.

6In Manila Railroad Co. vs. Perez and the Workmen's Compensation Commission, 1965, 14 SCRA 504, and Vallo vs. WCC, et al., 1976, 73 SCRA 623, the Court held that compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Acts as amended is a liability vested by statute which prescribes in ten years pursuant to Article 1144 (2) of the Civil Code.

7Justo vs. WCC, et al., L-4364, Jan. 31, 1977: Bael, et al. vs. WCC, et al., L-42255, Jan. 31, 1977; Bihag, et al. vs. WCC, et al., L-43162, Feb 28, 1977; Despe vs. WCC, et al., L-42828, Feb. 28, 1977, National Housing Corporation vs. WCC and Vda. de Niones, et al., L-37907, September 30, 1977

8Lopez vs. WCC, et al., L-42582, Oct 21, 1977

9Caling vs. WCC, et al., L-43209, May 3,1977

10Sudario, Jr. vs. R.P., L-44088, Oct. 6,1977

11Cuyno, Jr. vs. WCC, et al., L-44271, Sept. 22, 1977; Evangelista vs. WCC, et al., L-43572, June 30, 1977; Catibog vs. WCC, et al., L-43416, Dec. 8, 1976, 74 SCRA 243;

Talip vs. WCC, et al., L-42574, May 31, 1976, 71 SCRA 218, citing Visayan Stevedore & Transportation Co. vs. WCC, et al., 1974, 59 SCRA 89

12Schmidt's Attorney's Dictionary of Medicine, 1965 Sup., p. 96.