G.R. No. L-27211 - JULY 1977 - PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE CASE NUMBERCASE TITLE G.R. No. L-27211July 6, 1977 Eusebia Barrameda vs. Engracio Castillo A.M. No. 1551July 21, 1977 Luis D. Santos vs. Atty. Nilo S. Tuason G.R. No. L-24134July 21, 1977 The Bradman Company, Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al. G.R. No. L-43316July 21, 1977 Dulce Vda. De Flores, et al. vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, et al. G.R. No. L-46186July 21, 1977 Narcisa Tul-Id vs. People of the Philippines G.R. No. L-41555July 27, 1977 Industrial Finance Corporation vs. Castor Tobias G.R. No. L-43212July 27, 1977 Antonio Pepito vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, et al. A.M. No. 61-MJJuly 28, 1977 Dominador Tarectecan vs. Mun. Judge Pedro T. Cristobal G.R. No. L-28351July 28, 1977 Universal Mills Corporation vs. Universal Textile Mills, Inc. G.R. No. L-45324July 28, 1977 Anglo-Eastern Shipping Co. Ltd, et al. vs. National Seamen Board, et al. A.M. No. 23-MJJuly 29, 1977 Lorenzo Formoso, Jr. vs. Francisco Ante A.M. No. P-226July 29, 1977 Cesar M. Sotero vs. Atty. Gregorio Bautista A.M. No. P-232July 29, 1977 Matea Eva vs. Florentino R. Calayag A.M. No. 236July 29, 1977 Eduardo G. Bautista vs. Avelino Joaquin, Jr. A.M. No. 284July 29, 1977 Hector Fule, et al. vs. Solon F. Cordero A.M. No. 782-MJJuly 29, 1977 Juan Oyao vs. Prisco Pabatao A.M. No. 981-CFIJuly 29, 1977 Gil Geñorga vs. Hon. Pedro C. Quitain A.M. No. 1382July 29, 1977 Amando G. Lazaro vs. Atty. Juanito Sagun A.M. No. 1656July 29, 1977 Dominador N. Calamba II vs. Atty. Martin V. Delgra, Jr. G.R. No. L-22748July 29, 1977 Gregorio Co, et al. vs. Deportation Board G.R. No. L-25501July 29, 1977 Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Philippines Power and Dev't. Co., Inc. G.R. No. L-27283July 29, 1977 Soledad F. Bengson vs. Mariano M. Chan G.R. No. L-27481July 29, 1977 People of the Philippines vs. Alfonso Oñate G.R. No. L-31934July 29, 1977 Ramon Lanzar vs. Director of Lands, et al. G.R. No. L-34923July 29, 1977 Concepcion Chavez, et al. vs. Hon. Gabriel V. Valero, et al. G.R. No. L-41312July 29, 1977 People of the Philippines vs. Vicente C. Villamala G.R. No. L-42184July 29, 1977 Trans-Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. L-42270July 29, 1977 Rowell Labor Union-Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services vs. Hon. Blas F. Ople G.R. No. L-43203July 29, 1977 Jose C. Cristobal vs. Alejandro Melchor, et al. G.R. No. L-43638July 29, 1977 Carlos Espino vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission G.R. No. L-43800July 29, 1977 Leonila Laurel Almeda, et al. vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. L-46537July 29, 1977 Jose Guballa vs. Hon. Eduardo P. Caguioa, et al. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation, Inc. Eusebia Barrameda vs. Engracio Castillo Luis D. Santos vs. Atty. Nilo S. Tuason The Bradman Company, Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al. Dulce Vda. De Flores, et al. vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, et al. Narcisa Tul-Id vs. People of the Philippines Industrial Finance Corporation vs. Castor Tobias Antonio Pepito vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, et al. Dominador Tarectecan vs. Mun. Judge Pedro T. Cristobal Universal Mills Corporation vs. Universal Textile Mills, Inc. Anglo-Eastern Shipping Co. Ltd, et al. vs. National Seamen Board, et al. Lorenzo Formoso, Jr. vs. Francisco Ante Cesar M. Sotero vs. Atty. Gregorio Bautista Matea Eva vs. Florentino R. Calayag Eduardo G. Bautista vs. Avelino Joaquin, Jr. Hector Fule, et al. vs. Solon F. Cordero Juan Oyao vs. Prisco Pabatao Gil Geñorga vs. Hon. Pedro C. Quitain Amando G. Lazaro vs. Atty. Juanito Sagun Dominador N. Calamba II vs. Atty. Martin V. Delgra, Jr. Gregorio Co, et al. vs. Deportation Board Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Philippines Power and Dev't. Co., Inc. Soledad F. Bengson vs. Mariano M. Chan People of the Philippines vs. Alfonso Oñate Ramon Lanzar vs. Director of Lands, et al. Concepcion Chavez, et al. vs. Hon. Gabriel V. Valero, et al. People of the Philippines vs. Vicente C. Villamala Trans-Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. Rowell Labor Union-Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services vs. Hon. Blas F. Ople Jose C. Cristobal vs. Alejandro Melchor, et al. Carlos Espino vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission Leonila Laurel Almeda, et al. vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al. Jose Guballa vs. Hon. Eduardo P. Caguioa, et al. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation, Inc.

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-27211 July 6, 1977

EUSEBIA BARRAMEDA,plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ENGRACIO CASTILLO,defendant-appellee.

Dante H. Diamante, Medardo B. Medenilla & Teodoro C. Magno, Jr. for appellant.

Leovigildo L. Cerilla for appellee.

AQUINO,J:

This case is about the effectiveness of the service of a court's decision by registered mail.

Eusebia Barrameda sued Engracio Castillo in the municipal court of Lopez, Quezon Province in Civil Case No. 269. (The record does not show the nature of the suit). A copy of the court's decision, which was adverse to Barrameda, was sent by registered mail on January 28, 1966 to her lawyer at San Pablo City. That mail was received in the city post office on the following day, January 29. On that day and on February 3 and 9, 1966 the city postmaster's office supposedly sent to Barrameda's counsel three notices regarding the registered mail.

Barrameda's lawyer did not claim that mail. It was returned to the municipal court and was received there on March 3, 1966 as unclaimed mail.

Eusebia Barrameda must have been informed that the adverse decision could not be served upon her lawyer. On March 9, 1966 she received personally a copy of the decision. (Whether she got it or it was served upon her is not clear in the inadequate record on appeal.)

Through a lawyer, Barrameda filed a notice of appeal on March 11, 1966. Castillo did not interpose in the municipal court any objection to her appeal. The court gave it due course. The record was transmitted to the Court of First Instance where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. C-232.

On April 21, 1966 Castillo filed in the Court of First Instance a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it was filed out of time. His theory was that the fifteen-day reglementary period within which Barrameda could appeal should be counted from the expiration of five days from the date of the first notice sent by the postmaster to Barrameda's lawyer.

In this case, the supposed first notice was sent on January 29, 1966, when the mail in question was received in the San Pablo City post office (not January 28, 1966, as erroneously assumed by Castillo and the lower court). The five days counted from that date expired on February 3, 1966 when the second notice was allegedly sent to Barrameda's lawyer.

Eusebia Barrameda opposed Castillo's motion to dismiss her appeal. She contended that Castillo failed to prove that her counsel actually received the supposed three notices sent by the postmaster. She argued that because in the municipal court Castillo did not object to her appeal, his motion could no longer be entertained in the Court of First Instance.

The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the appeal. It assumed that the fifteen-day period should be counted from February 7, 1966, the date of the third notice (the third notice was allegedly sent on February 9, 1966) and the period expired on February 21, 1966, according to the trial court's computation.

Eusebia Barrameda appealed to this Court. She Specified that she was going to question the legality of the order of dismissal.

Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides:

In service by registered mail, the general rule is that service is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee. The exception is that when the addressee does not claim his mail within five days from the date of the first notice of the postmaster, then the service takes effect at the expiration of such time.

As illustrated by Justice Cesar Bengzon, if the first notice is received by the addressee on December 1, and he gets his mail on December 3, the service is complete on December 3, the date of the actual receipt (general rule).

But if the addressee gets his mail only on December 15, service is deemed complete on December 6 or five days from December 1, the date of the first notice (exception).ℒαwρhi৷

If the addressee never gets the mail, service is also deemed complete on December 6, as provided in the exception to the general rule. If he receives his mail two months after it is registered and there is no proof of the first notice, then service is complete on the date of actual receipt, following the general rule. (Grospe vs. Court of Appeals and Uera, 106 Phil. 1144, 1148-9).

Bearing in mind that the exception in service by registered mail refers to constructive service, not to actual receipt of the mail, it is evident that the fair and just application of that exception depends upon conclusive proof that a first notice was sent by the postmaster to the addressee. The presumption that official duty has been regularly performed should not be applied to such a situation.

Therefore, to obviate injustice, it is incumbent upon a party, who relies on constructive service or who contends that his adversary was served with a copy of a final order or judgment upon the expiration of five days from the first notice of registered mail sent by the postmaster to prove that first notice was sent and delivered to the addressee. A certification from the postmaster would be the best evidence of that fact (Grafil vs. Feliciano L-27156, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 616). The mailman's testimony may also be adduced to prove that fact, as was done in Aldecoa vs. Hon. Arellano and Siguenza, 113 Phil. 75, 78.

The postmaster's certification as to the sending of the first notice "should include the data not only as to whether or not the corresponding notices were issued or sent but also as to how, when and to whom the delivery thereof was made." (Hernandez vs. Navarro, L-28296, November 24, 1972, 48 SCRA 44, 64, per Barredo, J.).

As stressed by Justice Barredo in a recent case, "there must be clear proof of compliance with the postal regulations governing the sending and receipt of the notice referred to in" section 8 of Rule 13 (Vecino vs. Court of Appeals, L-386f2, March 29, 1977). The mere exhibition in court of the envelope containing the unclaimed mail is not sufficient proof that a first notice was sent.

Note that in a certain case a first notice was sent but it was received by the addressee's eleven-year old child who did not deliver it to the addressee himself. It was held that to apply the presumption in that case and to insist on constructive service would work an injustice rather than promote justice (Cabuang vs. Hon. Bello, 105 Phil. 1135, 1138).

In the instant case, there is no evidence that the first notice was sent to Barrameda's lawyer and that it was delivered to him or should have been received by him. The envelope containing the unclaimed mail was presented in court. The face of the envelope contains the notation "Returned to sender. Reason: Unclaimed". Above the stamp, on the back of the envelope, with the legend "City of San Pablo, Philippines, Jan. 29, 1966", are written the dates, "2-3-66 and 2-9-66." Written also on the back of the envelope are the following: "R to S, notified 3/3/66."

Relying on those notations on the envelope, the trial court literally and rigidly applied the presumption as to constructive service. It did not require appellee Castillo to present the postmaster's certification that a first notice was sent to Barrameda's lawyer and that the notice was received by the latter.

Under those circumstances, the trial court's order dismissing Barrameda's appeal is fraught with injustice.

WHEREFORE,the trial court's order of dismissal is reversed and set aside. It is directed to give due course to the appeal of Eusebia Barrameda. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando (Chairman), Barredo and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

ANTONIO,J,concurring:

In case the service of the order or judgment is sought to be effected by registered mail, but there is no proof that the notice for the registered mail was received by the addressee, the presumption, under Section 8 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, of the delivery of the registered mail or completion of the service after five (5) days from date of the first notice, certainly does not arise.