G.R. No. L-27070-71 - Joseph Cochingyan, Jr. vs. Gaudencio Cloribel, et al.

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-27070-71 April 22, 1977

JOSEPH COCHINGYAN, JR.,petitioner,
vs.
HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL, Presiding Judge of Branch VI, Court of First Instance of Manila, LEGIONNAIRES ENTERPRISES, INC., IRENEO R. CLAPANO, JR., KEYSER MERCANTILE CO., INC., PANAY LEGIONNAIRES, INC., VICENTE B. MAGNO, CESAR EGUIA, PHILIPPINE VETERANS LEGION, WORLDWIDE TRADING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, FILIPINAS MERCHANDISING CORPORATION, JOAQUIN SO, TOMAS B. TORREFRANCA and THE PHILIPPINE REPARATIONS COMMISSION,respondents.

Lino M. Patajo for petitioner.

Panfilo M. Manguera & Associates for respondent Phil. Reparations Commission.

CASTRO,C.J.:

Petition for certiorari to review the orders of the respondent Court of First Instance of Manila (in civil cases 54912 and 55250) dated November 2, 1966, November 11, 1966, December 19, 1966, December 28, 1966 and January 3, 1967.

By mandate of Republic Act 1789, otherwise known as the Reparations Law, which took effect on June 21, 1957, the amount of US$20 million was set aside to form a "Trust Fund" to be used exclusively for the benefit and rehabilitation of veterans of the Philippines of World War II and their widows and orphans (sec. 2 (d), SCRA 1789). This amount is to be generated from cash sales of reparations goods to be procured from Japan.

On May 18, 1958, Resolution 24 was adopted at the 13th Convention of the Philippine Veterans Legion (hereinafter referred to as thePVL) held in Bacolod City, the resolutory part of which is as follows:

Pursuant to the above-mentioned resolution, Legionaire Francisco B. Offemaria formed and organized on June 10, 1958 the Legionnaires Enterprises, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as theLEI), and registered the same with the Securities and Exchange Commission with an authorized capital of P110,000 and a paid-up capital of P25,000, with himself as president and concurrently chairman of the board of directors.

On November 21, 1958, theLEIsigned a contract with Filipinas Merchandising Corporation (hereinafter referred to as theFilipinas) whereby the former agreed to sell to the latter all reparations consumer goods that were to be procured by theLEIunder such grant or award as may be approved by the Reparations Commission (hereinafter referred to as theRepacom).

On December 3, 1958, in Tokyo, Japan, thePVLand four other veterans organizations, to wit, the Philippine Association of War Widows, Parents, and Orphans (hereinafter referred to as theWar Widows), the President Quezon's Own Guerillas (hereinafter referred to as thePQOG), the Veterans Organization of the Philippines (hereinafter referred to as theVOP), and the Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor (hereinafter referred to as theDBC) entered into an agreement essentially to the effect "that any award granted to one of us shallipso factoconfer upon the Commission the authority to consider all other applications submitted by any member as automatically withdrawn in favor of the awardee," stipulating to observe the following sharing in profit percentages:

(a) A sum equal to 15% of the invoice value of the goods to be procured, or thirty centavos (P0.30) to thePVL; and

(b) A sum equal to 3% of the invoice value of the goods to be procured, or six centavos (P0.06) each to theWar Widows, PQOG, VOPandDBC.

On February 3, 1959, thePVLsucceeded in getting an allocation of US$4 million from theRepacomwhich was embodied in the latter's Resolution 88.

On March 12, 1959, theRepacom,by virtue of its Resolution 91, recognized the right of theLEIto act as the business arm of thePVLin the implementation of the said award.

The board of directors of thePVL,on August 8, 1959, approved a resolution accepting the 15% guarantee payment offered in writing by theLEIto thePVLper US$1.00 invoice value of the goods which may be generated into cash under the grant authorized by theRepacomin its Resolution 88. Following the acceptance of the 15% guarantee payment, the board of directors of thePVL,in a meeting on December 12, 1959, approved a resolution authorizing its national commander to enter into a contract with theLEIand to sign on behalf of thePVL.

On January 5, 1960, theLEI,by and through Offemaria and/or Cesar P. Roces, its president and attorney-in-fact, respectively, sold to the Panay Legionnaires Enterprises (hereinafter referred to as thePanay) US$200,000 worth of reparations rights. On January 10, 1960, it sold US$600,000 worth of reparations rights to Vicente Magno (hereinafter referred to asMagno). A

t the 15thPVLnational convention in Iloilo City, thePVLsplit into two splinter groups, one body headed by Offemaria and the other by Jaime Piopongco, each operating independently for a period of two years — from the last half of 1960 to the first half of 1962.

On October 7, 1960, thePVL(Piopongco faction) executed an agreement with Joseph Cochingyan, Jr. (hereinafter referred to asCochingyan) by virtue of which the implementation of the allocation of US$4 million approved by theRepacomunder Resolution 88 was to be undertaken jointly byCochingyanand the management board formed by thePVL.

On February 1, 1961, theLEIsold US$150,000 worth of reparations rights to Joaquin So.

On March 13, 1961, theRepacomapproved Resolution 396 making available to theLEIUS$ million of the US$4 million award for implementation under the fifth reparations year schedule. The corresponding procurement order was issued on June 16, 1961 byRepacomfor the procurement of reparations consumer goods for the end-use of theLEIin the amount of US$1 million.

On August 21, 1961, theLEIsold to Tomas Sy US$200,000 worth of reparations rights, a contract acquired through assignment by Cesar Eguia (hereinafter referred to asEguia).

On September 15, 1961, theLEIsold to Roman Baldovino US$350,000 worth of reparations rights. This contract was subsequently assigned by Baldovino to Joaquin So on August 30, 1963.

On August 31, 1961, theLEIsold to Worldwide Trading and Development Corporation (hereinafter referred to as theWorldwide) US$500,000 worth of reparations rights. This was also subsequently assigned byWorldwideto Joaquin So.

On March 12, 1963, a formal contract was executed by and between thePVLandLEIfor the implementation of thePVLUS$1 million award, which contract stipulated,inter alia:

The "LEGIONNAIRES" represent theLEIthe "VETERANS" thePVL,and the sum of P300,000 is the 15% theLEIstipulated to pay thePVLfor the generation of the US$1 million award (at the agreed exchange rate of P2 to every US$1) or P0.30 for each $1.00.

On March 15, 1963, virtue of a contract of advance sales, theLEIsold to the Keyser Mercantile Co., Inc. (hereinafter referred to asKeyser) $120,000 worth of the $1 million allocation of theLEIper theRepacomResolution 396. Subject-matter of this $120,000 allocation consisted of photographic supplies which were to be procured from Japanese suppliers.

In the latter part of August 1963, the first shipment of reparations goods procured under theRepacomResolution 396, consisting of photographic supplies and materials with an invoice value of US$37,016, left Japan.

On October 16, 1963, Joaquin So filed on his behalf and as assignee ofWorldwideand Baldovino, an action against theLEI,Cesar Roces, vice-president and director of theLEIand theRepacomfor specific performance of his contract of $150,000 executed on September 9, 1961 and the contracts executed by theLEIwithWorldwideon August 31, 1961 for $500,000 and with Baldovino on September 15, 1961 for $350,000 which he claimed were both assigned to him. The said action was premised upon Joaquin So's claim that inasmuch as the said contracts totalled US$1 million, all reparations goods procured under the allocation of theLEIunder Resolution 396 for US$1 million were covered by the aforesaid three contracts and, consequently, the shipment of photographic materials about to arrive from Japan should be delivered by the defendants to him. The said case was docketed as Civil Case 54912 and was assigned to Branch VI of the Court of First Instance of Manila. All claiming to have a right to the incoming shipment of photographic supplies by virtue of contracts executed and/or assigned in their favor,Eguia, Worldwide,andMagnofiled motions to intervene which were all granted.Keyseralso filed a similar motion, but before its motion could be acted upon, it withdrew the same and filed a new action against theLEIwhich was docketed as Civil Case 55250 and was assigned to Branch I of the Court of First Instance of manila.Eguia, MagnoandWorldwidealso filed their respective motions to intervene in the said Civil Case 55250 for the enforcement of their respect rights.

On November 7, 1963, the court issued in Civil Case 54912, pending before Branch VI, a mandatory preliminary injunction ordering theRepacomto release the shipment of photographic materials which had already arrived worth US$37,016 to the plaintiff in the said case, Joaquin So. On the other hand, in Civil Case 55250 pending before Branch I, the court issued on November 27, 1963 a restraining order enjoining the release of the goods until further orders of the said court.

On February 7, 1964,Cochingyanentered into an agreement with theLEIwherein he assumed, among others, the following obligations:

TheLEI,on the other hand, specifically declined to issue any warranty at all, in general, and of its right to Still sell or dispose of the same, in particular. On the basis of the above-mentioned agreement,Cochingyanfiled motions and was allowed to intervene in both cases, alleging as his the entire US$4 million allocation.

On March 12, 1964, Branch I of the Court of First Instance of Manila, in Civil Case 55250, issued an order restraining the Bureau of Customs from releasing the goods until further orders of the said court.

In Civil Case 55250,Panayfiled a motion to intervene and also a petition for the appointment of a Receiver for theLEIon the grounds first, that a Receiver was necessary to protect the interests of all the parties claiming the same goods procured under the allocation of theLEI,and second, that the said corporation was insolvent or in imminent danger of insolvency due to the gross mismanagement of its officers. On April 6, 1964, Judge Francisco Arca of Branch I granted the motion of the intervenorPanayfor the appointment of a Receiver for theLEIand required the parties to agree on a common receiver. The court (Branch I) appointed Atty. Ramon M. Velayo as theLEIReceiver on April 22, 1964.

Because of the stalemate arising from the conflicting orders of two branches of the Court of First Instance of Manila, the parties in both cases who were claiming the same goods went into serious negotiations, and, as a result, a compromise agreement was executed on May 13, 1964 betweenCochingyan,on one hand, andEguia, Keyser, Magno, Panayand theLEI,on the other, in which it was specifically provided that the latter (except theLEI), in consideration of the various undertakings and other obligations assumed by the former —

Joaquin So refused to join the compromise agreement; thus, a proviso was included therein requiringCochingyanto file an appropriate bond in favor of theLEI,its Receiver, or Joaquin So to answer for damages that might be awarded to the latter.

Atty. Velayo, theLEIReceiver, submitted the Compromise Agreement on May 13, 1964 to both Branch VI and Branch I in Civil Cases 54912 and 55250, respectively, which, in separate orders both dated June 1, 1964, approved the same.

After the approval of the aforementioned compromise agreement in Civil Cases 54912 and 55250, and after the said approval was virtually confirmed by this Court when we denied the petition for preliminary injunction filed by Joaquin So in certiorari proceedings docketed as G.R. No. L-23026 and L-23027,*Filipinas,which had also entered into a contract with theLEIcovering all goods under theLEIallocation (totalling an invoice value of US$4 million), filed, on July 18, 1964, a motion to intervene in Civil Case 55250, seeking the enforcement of its contract withLEIand further praying that all other contracts executed by theLEIwith other parties in the case be declared null and void. However, seeing the futility of a continued court litigation,Filipinason September 30, 1965 and October 8, 1965, respectively, executed an agreement and supplemental agreement withCochingyan,assigning and transferring to the latter all its rights, obligations and interests of whatsoever nature. The agreement dated September 30, 1965 provides, among other things, that:

On November 15, 1966, Atty. Velayo, then theLEIReceiver, submitted to Branch I the compromise agreement betweenFilipinasandCochingyanin Civil Case 55250, and on December 9, 1965, the said court approved said compromise agreement and its supplement, and in approving said compromise agreement ordered the Receiver of theLEI:

On October 13, 1964, Resolution 522 was passed by theRepacomapproving the procurement of goods worth US$1.5 million, but under this no implementation has started as yet.

In addition to $120,000 worth of photographic films and supplies covered by Reparations Contracts No. 439 and 448,Cochingyanagreed on January 8, 1965 to sell toKeyser$300,000 worth of photographic films and supplies at P7.00 to every US$1.00 f.o.b. Japan instead of $200,000 at P7.10 to every US$1.00. To secure full compliance by the parties to this agreement, thePVLandLEIgave their conformity to it, the former by Resolution 13 approved on October 2, 1965 and the latter by a resolution approved on the same date.

Because of the series of amicable settlements mentioned above, the parties thought that implementation of the allocation of theLEIcould be made without the need of a Receiver. Thus, on December 31, 1965, theLEIfiled in Civil Case 55250 a motion for the dissolution of the receivership of theLEI,which motion was granted by the court on February 21, 1966.

On the very same day when the receivership of theLEIwas dissolved,Cochingyanfiled an urgent ex-parte motion, dated February 21, 1966, alleging that as the attorney-in-fact of theLEIto implement the US$4 millionPVL/LEIallocation and because the receivership was already dissolved, his power of attorney be exclusively recognized as it was "necessary for the purpose of implementing the Compromise Agreements entered into by the parties to this case on May 13, 1964, September 30, 1965 and February 17, 1966." The court, on February 23, 1966, granted said motion.

On February 12, 1966, Judge Arca, before whom Civil Case 55250 was pending, indorsed said case to Branch VI for consolidation with Civil Case 54912, which indorsement was accepted by Judge Cloribel, Presiding Judge of Branch VI.

Realizing also the uselessness of a continued court litigation, Joaquin So, who refused to join the Compromise Agreement of May 13, 1964, executed on February 17, 1966 withCochingyana compromise agreement, under which he,Worldwideand Tomas Torrefranca, as assignee of Cesar P. Roces, in consideration of the sum of P1 million payablepro rataupon the arrival of the goods procured under the allocation of theLEI,renounced their respective claims against the allocations of theLEI,and assigned toCochingyanthe contracts executed in their favor. More particularly, Joaquin So, on his behalf and as assignee of Baldovino, renounced all his claims againstPVLand theLEIand assigned in favor ofCochingyanall the contracts in his favor and his claim for advances made by him to theLEI;Torrefranca, as assignee of Roces, renounced all his claims against theLEIand waived all his rights under the various powers of attorney executed in his favor and that of Cesar Roces, andWorldwideassigned toCochingyanits contract of US$340,000 worth of porcelain wares, renounced all its claims to the balance of US$3 million, and assigned to intervenor all contracts and powers of attorney in its favor. The amount of P1 million to be paid byCochingyantoWorldwide,Joaquin So and Torrefranca was to be paid to them at the rate of P1.10 for every US$1.00 of the goods procured under Resolution 396 up to US$600,000 value of said goods, or P660.000, while the balance of P340,000 was to be paid at the rate of P0.75 for every US1.00 from the goods procured under the Ninth Reparations Schedule. The aforesaid amounts were to be paid byCochingyanwithin thirty (30) days from the release of said goods to him. The agreements also provided,inter alia,that:

On the same day,i.e., February 17,1966,Worldwide,Joaquin So and Torrefranca executed a supplemental agreement among themselves apportioning the payment of the P1.10 due them at P0.85 toWorldwideand Torrefranca, and P0.25 to Joaquin So. With respect to the balance of P340,000 which was payable at P0.75 per US$1.00, Joaquin So was to receive P0.25, andWorldwideand Torrefranca, P0.50.

Parenthetically, the parties-payees to the foregoing agreement have not been fully paid byCochingyanup to the present.

Even before the dissolution of theLEIreceivership was actually ordered and during the period from February 12, 1966 to October 13, 1966, when theLEIwas no longer under receivership, reparations consumer goods procured under thePVL/LEIallocation had arrived in the Philippines, andCochingyantook delivery of the same in various shipments from theRepacom.

After all the goods were delivered toCochingyan,the parties who were entitled to share in the proceeds of the goods, as well as the Veterans, thePVLandLEIand four other veterans organizations, as agreed upon in the various amicable settlements, requested Cochingyan, on various instances, to pay them their respective shares as the goods delivered to him were all fully paid by the buyers, but to no avail.

On July 6, 1966, by reason of Cochingyan's alleged unreasonable refusal to pay the parties-payees and the veterans, a motion for payment and to compel payment was, for the first time, filed againstCochingyan,which was granted by the court in its order dated July 9, 1966.

On August 12, 1966, thePVLalso filed a motion againstCochingyanfor the payment of its shares in accordance with the agreements, and the respondent court granted the same in its order dated August 24, 1966.

On August 24, 1966,Worldwideand Torrefranca filed an "urgent motion for a definite order for Joseph Cochingyan, Jr. to pay parties the agreed consideration," stating therein, among others, unsavory but proper averments for compliance and payment of parties-payees' shares. In view ofCochingyan'sfailure to file an opposition to said motion, it was granted by the court by order dated September 1, 1966. However, the said order was, after a motion was filed, clarified andCochingyanwas directed to effect immediately payment of all that are due and Payable to the parties-payees.

Due to several motions filed by parties-payees for the payment of dues byCochingyan,the court on November 19, 1966, finally admonished him to pay the said parties immediately "otherwise disciplinary action would be taken against him."

By reason of the serious disagreements and the renewed conflicts of the parties in these cases,Cochingyanfiled on October 12, 1966, an urgent ex-parte unverified motion to reinstate the receivership of theLEIand recommended Atty. Mariano L. Mercado for appointment as Receiver. TheLEIfiled an opposition to the said motion but the court, overruling the said opposition, on October 14, 1966 reinstated the receivership of theLEIand appointedCochingyan'snominee, Atty. Mercado, as theLEIReceiver, on a bond of P10,000 which the court requiredCochingyanto file, to answer for damages in the event that the appointment of a receiver be later adjudged as not justified.

On October 31, 1966, Attys. Dolorfino and Casiano Villanueva, representingPVLand four other veterans organizations, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of October 14, 1966 reinstating theLEIreceivership and appointing Atty. Mercado as theLEIreceiver. However, before the court could finally resolve said motion for reconsideration, it issued an order dated November 17, 1966 requiring all parties to the Compromise Agreement of May 13, 1964, namely, Cochingyan, Eguia, Magno, Panay, WorldwideandKeyser,to give their comments and stand on the said motion and to submit their common choice of receiver five (5) days from December 10, 1966. In compliance with the said order, the parties submitted different names as their nominees forLEIreceiver. TheLEIsubmitted the names of Juan Q. Miranda, Tomas G. Mapa and Ireneo R. Clapano, Jr.;MagnoandEguiasubmitted the names of Atty. Iturralde, Tomas G. Mapa, and Ireneo R. Clapano, Jr.;Cochingyansubmitted the name of Atty. Mercado but did not oppose the nomination of his former counsel, Atty. Ireneo R. Clapano, Jr;Worldwidenominated Natalio R. Castillo; andPanaysubmitted the names of Attys. Ireneo R. Clapano, Jr. and Ernesto P. Golez. On December 6, 1966, the court finally set the hearing of Attys. Dolorfino and Villanueva's motion for reconsideration and the various manifestations of the parties on December 10, 1966 in order that all could be fully heard on their respective stands on the incident.

Prior to the hearing on December 10, 1966, i.e., on December 7, 1966, other parties who were interested but were not required to file their comments on the motion for reconsideration of Attys. Dolorfino and Villanueva, also submitted their nominees forLEIReceiver. ThePVLand Cesar P. Roces, assignor of Torrefranca, submitted the names of Natalio R. Castillo and Zosimo C. Soria, while the four veterans organizations, namely,VOP, PQOG, DBC,and theWar Widowsnominated Castillo or Soria.

At the hearing of December 10, 1966, where all the parties were fully heard and represented, the propriety of again placing theLEIunder receivership was fully discussed and deliberated upon. However, as the parties could not agree, or sit down withCochingyan,although the other parties themselves had their conferences on who would be submitted as the common nominee, majority of the parties to the Compromise Agreement (Keyser, LEI, Magno, PanayandEguia), includingPVLwhich now changed its stand, submitted, in a joint manifestation dated December 12, 1966, the name of Atty. Ireneo R. Clapano, Jr. to replace Atty. Mercado.

On December 13, 1966,Cochingyanfiled a manifestation praying that Atty. Mercado be retained as theLEIReceiver, reiterating his manifestation of November 29, 1966.

On December 19, 1966, the Court issued an order denying thePVL'smotion dated October 31, 1966, relieving Atty. Mercado as theLEIReceiver, and appointing, in his stead, Atty. Ireneo R. Clapano, Jr.

On December 21, 1966,Cochingyanfiled a motion for reconsideration of the order of December 19, 1966, which was set for hearing by him on December 24, 1966. However, on the day of the hearing, an urgent motion was filed by the counsel ofMagnoandEguiafor the postponement and resetting of the hearing ofCochingyan'smotion to January 7, 1967. In the early morning prior to hearing time of January 7, 1967, the branch clerk of court informed all the parties and those who had other cases on that motion day that the presiding Judge was invited to the Malacañang Open House by the President of the Philippines. All the parties in these cases were also informed about the two telegrams from Iloilo City requesting the postponement of the incidents of the case, one from the counsel of theLEIand the other from the counsel ofPanay,protesting that they did not receive or were not furnished copies of the motions to be heard on that day. Thus, the lower court re-set the said motion for January 28, 1967 to be heard together with other motions in both cases.

On October 18, 1966, the Executive Secretary wrote a letter to the Chairman of theRepacomstating that "The President desires that you suspend all reparations awards to the Philippine Veterans Legion until further investigation by you and submit your recommendation on this matter."

Since the contract for the procurement of goods that would completeCochingyan'sallocation of US$1 million had long been signed, theRepacomapproved a second release of allocation to thePVL/LEIin the amount of $789,600 under Resolution 199 (66) dated September 8, 1966, and on the same date, issued the corresponding purchase order.

In the meantime,Panay, Keyser, EguiaandMagnolearned thatCochingyanhad left for Japan in October 1966 and had entered into contracts with various Japanese firms whereby he committed $710,000 of the $789,600 for items that were never ordered byPanay, Keyser, EguiaorMagno.

On October 19, 1966,Panayfiled an urgent motion praying that its contract with theLEIfor US$200,000 be implemented according Lo the terms and conditions of the Compromise Agreement of May 13, 1964. This motion was not objected to by the other parties to the said agreement of May 13, 1964. This motion was not objected to by the other parties to the said agreement.Panay'smotion was set for hearing on October 22, 1966 andCochingyanwas given five days to file his opposition thereto. Alleging thatCochingyanwas in Tokyo following up procurements on theLEIallocation, despite the appointment and existence of a Receiver at that time, his counsel filed an urgent ex-parte motion for extension to file an opposition, and he was granted until October 29, 1966 within which to do so. However, without verifying whether his motion was granted or not, Cochingyan's counsel filed his opposition on November 2, 1966 at 3:30 in the afternoon, which was clearly out of time. The respondent court, therefore, issued on November 2, 1966 an order granting the motion ofPanaybecause the same was non-controversial and was asking only what was due it under the Compromise Agreement, and ordering theLEIReceiver, then Atty. Mercado, to comply with theLEI'sobligation toPanay. Cochingyanfiled on November 7, 1966 a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order, while theLEIfiled on November 23, 1966 a reply to the opposition contained inCochingyan'smotion for reconsideration.

On November 4, 1966,Keyserfiled an urgent ex-parte motion for the enforcement of its contract with theLEIof US$120,000 according to the terms and conditions of the Compromise Agreement of May 13, 1964. After hearing, and after theLEI, Cochingyan'sprincipal, had filed its conformity to the same, the court granted the said motion by its order of November 11, 1966. Cochingyan also moved on November 14, 1966 to reconsider the said order, but theLEIon November 24, 1966 andKeyseron November 25, 1966 filed their respective oppositions thereto.

EguiaandMagno,on November 23, 1966, also filed a motion for the enforcement of their respective rights and contracts under the Compromise Agreement of May 13, 1964. On November 24, 1966, theLEI, Cochingyan'sprincipal, filed a manifestation signifying its conformity to this motion.

On December 20, 1966, the counsel of theLEIfiled a motion praying the court that in accordance with the Agreement of February 7, 1964 executed by theLEIandCochingyan,the latter, as attorney-in-fact of the former, must be made to comply with the conditions thereof and pay the dues in favor of the veterans in the amount of more than P112,000, which had been long overdue, from goods already released toCochingyan.

On December 27, 1966, theLEIReceiver, in compliance with the order of December 19, 1966 "to religiously and faithfully implement the Compromise Agreement of May 13, 1964," filed an ex-parte motion, with the conformity of all the parties affected, asking the respondent court that in compliance with its order of December 19, 1966, the Receiver be allowed to submit firm offers on behalf ofPanayfor US$200,000,Keyserfor US$120,000,Eguiafor US$200,000,Magnofor US$134,600,Worldwidefor US$136,000, or a total of US$789,600 which is equivalent to the amount authorized to be procured by theRepacomfor theLEIunder the 9th Reparations Schedule in partial implementation of the allocation of thePVL/LEIfor US$3 million. On January 3, 1967, the court granted the aforesaid motion of the Receiver.

Worldwidefiled also on December 27,1966 an urgent ex-parte motion asking theLEIReceiver to pay to it directly upon the release of each shipment them sum of P0.80 (which includes that due to Torrefranca) per US$1.00, by reason of the fact that until that date,Cochingyanhas failed to pay them their share in the proceeds of the goods pursuant to the Agreement of February 17, 1966. On December28, 1967, the court granted the said motion and ordered theLEIReceiver to pay directly toWorldwideon the date of the release of reparations goods its claim of P85 for every US$1.00.Cochingyandid not move to reconsider this order.

When theLEIReceiver assumed office, he received a letter dated December 21, 1966 from theLEI'slegal counsel, informing the former thatCochingyanhad been negotiating in Tokyo, Japan, for the procurement of reparations goods not ordered by the other parties to the Compromise Agreement of May 13, 1964 to promote his personal business interests; that he did not pay on time the veterans' share corresponding to the goods already released to him; that there were arrears due the veterans; and that other parties who had dues fromCochingyancorresponding to goods already released to him had also been complaining that payments in their favor had not been made, or, if at all made, were paid in postdated checks and in small amounts.

Immediately after the Receiver had qualified as such,Cochingyan,through counsel, filed an urgent ex-parte motion and manifestation dated December 22, 1966 praying therein that the Receiver be ordered to "deliver to the Intervenor (Cochingyan) all said goods upon release thereof to him by the Commission." At the hearing of the aforesaid motion, theLEIReceiver unqualifiedly informed the court andCochingyan'scounsel "that the Receiver is glad to deliver the goods to Intervenor" provided that the taxes due thereon be paid.Cochingyan'scounsel manifested that they were ready to pay the Receiver.

The Chairman of the Board of Directors of theLEI,Col. Cirilo B. Garcia, on January 4, 1967 again informed theLEIReceiver aboutCochingyan'sfailure to comply with the agreements he had signed with the other parties to the case, tabulating in figures the arrears due in favor of the said parties and the veterans, despite the fact thatCochingyanhad already been fully paid P2,900,000 by the buyers of the reparations goods delivered toCochingyanby theRepacom.

On January 6, 1967, theLEIReceiver received another letter from the officers of theLEIinforming him thatCochingyanhad signed proposed contracts with several Japanese suppliers for the procurement of goods through reparations on the basis of allocations allotted to other parties in the Compromise Agreement of May 13, 1964, inspite of the presence of a Receiver appointed to manage the procurement of goods intended for theLEI.

Pursuant to the order of the court dated January 3, 1967 granting theLEIReceiver's motion to submit firm offers for some parties to the Compromise Agreement of May 13, 1964, theLEIReceiver wroteCochingyana letter dated January 10, 1967 requesting the latter to submit firm offers of goods to be procured by him in accordance with existing agreements with other parties in the case in order to hasten the immediate implementation of the veterans' allocations which had already been delayed for almost six years.

However, without waiting for January 28, 1967 when his motions for reconsideration of some orders of the Court and other related motions were to be heard,Cochingyan(hereinafter referred to as the petitioner) filed on January 14, 1967 the instant petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and restraining order, praying that a restraining order be issued enjoining the presiding Judge of Branch VI of the Court of First Instance of Manila (hereinafter referred to as the respondent court or Judge) and the other respondents (e.g., theLEI,Ireneo R. Clapano, Jr. [hereinafter referred to as the respondent Receiver],Keyser, Panay, Magno, Eguia,thePVL, Worldwide, Filipinas,Joaquin So, Torrefranca and theRepacom), their agents, representatives, attorneys-in-fact and other persons acting on their behalf, from enforcing, during the proceedings, the orders of the respondent Judge dated November 2, 1966, November 11, 1966, December 19 and 28, 1966 and January 3, 1967, respectively; that a writ of preliminary injunction issue enjoining the respondents, their agents, attorneys-in-fact, representatives and other persons acting on their behalf from enforcing the above orders; that pending the proceedings. Atty. Mariano L. Mercado be reinstated as theLEIReceiver under the bond filed by him with the respondent court; and that after hearing, the above-enumerated orders be declared null and void.

On January 16, 1966, the petitioner filed a supplemental petition bringing to the attention of this Court and asking to be enjoined, an order of the respondent Judge issued on January 14, 1967 granting a motion of the LEI Receiver praying the courta quoto allow him "to withdraw part of the goods which are perishable and dispose of the same to qualified and interested persons for expenses and maintenance of the corporation under receivership and for the payment of veterans and other parties in these cases of their dues."

This Court, on January 17, 1967, issued a resolution requiring the respondents to file, not later than January 25, 1967, their answer to the petition and supplemental petition for certiorari, and issuing a temporary restraining order effective immediately until further orders from the Court.

On January 25, 1967, the respondents filed their respective, answers, and, on various dates in February and April 1967, their respective memoranda.

On May 16, 1967, the petitioner filed a petition for the withdrawal of his supplemental petition of January 16, 1967, to enable the respondent court to take cognizance of a joint urgent motion dated May 7, 1967 filed with the said court by the parties concerned for the release of the goods which had arrived and were at the customs area or in customs bonded warehouses. Manifestations were filed byFilipinasandRepacomon June 3, 1967, byPanayon June 10, 1967 and by theLEIReceiver on June 13, 1967, all interposing no objection to the petitioner's petition, except that the respondent Receiver moved that he be allowed to participate in the deliberations of the court below regarding the release of the goods involved in the case. ThePVL,through Atty. Lacanienta, filed an opposition on June 5, 1967, and the petitioner filed a reply thereto. Representations were made that further delay in the release of the goods involved would result in mounting storage fees and losses from pilferage and deterioration of the goods, part of which were photographic films and papers which had actually lost their value because of the lapse of their expiry date.

On July 15, 1967, this Court resolved to grant the aforementioned petition for withdrawal of the petitioner's supplemental petition which prayed for the annulment of the order of the respondent Court of January 14, 1967; to lift partially the restraining order of January 17, 1967 insofar as it refers to said order of January 14, 1967; and to deny theLEIReceiver's motion which should be addressed to the sound discretion of the respondent court. By virtue of this Court's resolution, reparations goods worth US$504,170.12 have been duly received and taken away by the petitioner. Thus the reparations goods still in issue in this case are worth US$307,578.67; and the remaining and unimplemented balance of the initial US$1 millionPVL-LEIallocation is $188,251.21.

On November 7, 1967, this Court resolved to refer to Mr. Justice Martin of the Court of Appeals, for investigation, report and recommendation, (a) the charge of bribery against the respondent Judge Cloribel; (b) the charges of contempt against Atty. Clapano, Atty. Patajo and the petitioner; and (c) the complaint for disciplinary action against Atty. Lacanienta. The foregoing charges arose from certain incidents in the case at bar.

On November 13, 1968, theRepacomissued Resolution 243 (68) permanently disqualifying the petitioner from further dealing or transacting with theRepacomrelative to the procurement of reparations goods for the end-users World War II Veterans Enterprises, Inc. (WARVETS), thePVL,theLEI,and the United Disabled Veterans Association of the Philippines (UDVAP) and/or any other end-user for whom/which he may be the attorney-in-fact, or with whom/which he may be connected in any capacity whatsoever, because of his failure to replace the performance bonds issued by the Consolacion Insurance Co., Inc., a bonding company which he admitted to be bankrupt and in the process of liquidation, guaranteeing the payment to theRepacomof the difference between the free market rate of exchange and the old rate of exchange of P2.00 to P1.00 relative to the f.o.b. value of the reparations goods procured for the said end-users, with other performance bonds issued by qualified bonding companies acceptable to theRepacompursuant to Resolution 113 (68), despite having been given notice of the said resolution and sufficient time to comply therewith and notwithstanding the orders dated August 15, 1968 and September 27, 1968 of the respondent court in Civil Cases 54912 and 55250 stopping the release to the petitioner of the reparations goods subject of the said cases unless such requirement on replacement is first complied with — it being the opinion of theRepacomthat his failure to replace the said bonds is a clear proof that he is not financially qualified according to the Reparations Law to have any further dealing or transaction with theRepacom.

On February 14, 1969, theRepacomissued Resolution 43 (69), (a) accepting the proposal of the petitioner to replace the useless and worthless judicial bonds in the aggregate amount of P670,300.20 issued by the Consolacion Insurance Co., Inc., as follows: (1) replacements of as many of the said judicial bonds as shall aggregate P150,000 immediately upon acceptance of the proposal; and (2) replacements of the remainder of the said judicial bonds at the rate of P100,000 per month thereafter until all the said judicial bonds are fully replaced; provided that the said replacement bonds shall be issued by qualified bonding companies acceptable to theRepacomand shall further be subject to the approval by the proper court; and (b) temporarily lifting the permanent disqualification of the petitioner imposed in Resolution 243 (68) dated November 13, 1968, effective upon his filing of the replacement judicial bond and/or bonds in the aggregate amount of P150,000 that is/are in accordance with the foregoing conditions and/or acceptable to theRepacom,provided that any failure of the petitioner to replace any of the remainder of the said useless and worthless judicial bonds in the manner and within the period specified above, and/or comply with the foregoing conditions, shall automatically revoke and render ineffective the said resolution and automatically restore his permanent disqualification imposed by Resolution 243 (68) without need of any further action and/or resolution of theRepacomto that effect.

On March 12, 1969, the petitioner filed with the respondent Court a motion for replacement and substitution of bonds wherein he offered to submit a bond executed by the Traveller's Multi-Indemnity Corporation (Bond No. G-(16) 239/69) in the amount of P150,150.32 to substitute for Bond No. G-8556 - P67,341.30 Bond No. G-8575 - P65,405.34, and Bond No. G-8667 - P16,403.68 all issued by Consolacion Insurance and Surety Co., Inc. However, theRepacomfiled an opposition, dated March 14, 1969, to the said motion of the petitioner, on the grounds (1) that in Civil Case 255-M (11611) of Branch XIV of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, entitled "United Disabled Veterans Association of the Philippines(Reformist Block)v. The Reparations Commission, et al.," an order dated March 11, 1969 was issued enjoining the implementation ofRepacomResolution 43 (69) until further orders from the said court; (2) that because of the said restraining order, the petitioner had no right to propose the substitution and replacement of the bonds because Resolution 43 (69) which was the source of his right or authority had been temporarily rendered ineffective by the said restraining order; and (3) that there was no allegation, much less any showing that the said bonds, assuming they could properly be considered, had been previously found acceptable by theRepacomper the conditions of Resolution 43 (69).

On March 24, 1969, the respondent Receiver filed a motion praying, upon the grounds stated therein, that pending the determination of the questioned order appointing him as theLEIReceiver, and in view of the oppository stand of the petitioner that the Receiver is still restrained to act as such despite this Court's resolution of July 15, 1968, an order be issued categorically authorizing theLEIReceiver to sell the goods now at the piers and different bonded warehouses worth US$307,578.67 and allowing him to fully implement the balance of the US$1 millionPVL-LEIreparations allocation in the amount of $188,251.21, subject in all cases to the approval of the respondent court. The Receiver cited, among others,RepacomResolution 243 (68) dated November 13, 1968 permanently disqualifying the petitioner from any further dealing or transaction with theRepacomrelative to the procurement of reparations goods.

The petitioner, on June 2, 1969, filed his comments and position to the respondent Receiver's motion, dated March 21, 1969, and prayed, upon the grounds stated therein, that the said motion be denied.

On July 28, 1969, the respondent Receiver filed a supplemental motion praying that he be allowed to immediately conduct a detailed inventor and examination of the goods in question in the presence of all the parties and/or their duly authorized representatives, with authority to incur expenses to be later on reimbursed him; that the sale of the goods be by negotiated sale to third persons not parties to the case who are willing and qualified to take the goods as a whole under a "no selective release scheme" and as defined by the rules and regulations of the that theRepacom,that theRepacom,being the owner and consignee of the goods sought to be sold, be ordered to make available to the Receiver all records involving the goods, and extend full cooperation to the Receiver by clearing all the goods after payment of costs and other procurement expenses, from the Customs area and custody, ready for sale, under the supervision of the respondent court.

On September 5, 1970, the petitioner filed his comments on the Receiver's supplemental motion, and a motion to hold the Receiver in contempt of court, praying that the Receiver's motion dated March 21, 1969 and his supplemental motion dated July 25, 1970, among others, be denied and that theLEIReceiver, Atty. Clapano, be severely censured, disciplined and punished for contempt of court. In this particular pleading, the petitioner made the claim that by virtue of this Court's resolution dated July 15, 1968 granting his petition for withdrawal 6f his supplemental petition for certiorari, the reparations goods in question ceased to be the subject of any action pending before this Court.

The respondent Receiver, on September 24, 1970, filed his reply to the petitioner's comment, an answer and opposition to the motion to hold him in contempt, and a counter-petition to punish the petitioner for contempt of court — all embodied in one pleading. It reiterated the respondent Receiver's prayer that his motion dated March 21, 1969 and its supplement, dated July 25, 1970, be granted.

A panoramic appraisal of the facts of this case will show that two primarily involved, to wit:

1. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the writ of certiorari lies if the following requisites concur: (a) that it is directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions; and (b) that such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) that there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Not all the foregoing requisites are present in the case at bar.

There is no gainsaying as to the presence of the first requisite — the respondent court being a tribunal exercising judicial functions, Regarding the second requisite, it is not disputed that the respondent court has jurisdiction over the civil cases in question. It had acquired jurisdiction over the parties-signatories to the Compromise Agreement of May 13, 1964 and the other agreements and the subject-matter thereof. Thus, even assumingarguendothat the respondent Judge committed errors in issuing the questioned orders, they are merely errors of judgment and not errors of jurisdiction. A line must be drawn between errors of judgment and errors of jurisdiction. An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction renders an order or judgment void or voidable. Errors of jurisdiction are reviewable on certiorari; errors of judgment, only by appeal.1Errors of judgment or of procedure, not relating to the court's jurisdiction or amounting to grave abuse of discretion, are not reviewable by certiorari.2Where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or soundness of the decision, not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision or its validity, the same is beyond the province of the special civil action for certiorari.3Indeed, when the court has jurisdiction over the subject-matter, the orders or decisions upon all questions pertaining to the cause are orders or decisions within its jurisdiction, and however irregular or erroneous they may be, they cannot be corrected by certiorari.4Whether or not the respondent Judge abuse his discretion in issuing the said orders, will be discussed later.

The third requisite,i.e.,the absence of appeal or any speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, cannot likewise be said to be present in the instant case. No motions for reconsideration were filed in the case of the orders dated December 28, 1966 and January 3, 1967, respectively. The motions for reconsideration filed in the case of the orders dated November 2, 1966, November 11, 1966 and December 19, 1966, respectively, were not yet resolved before the petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari.

Well settled in this jurisdiction is the rule that before filing a petition for certiorari, the petitioner should first call the attention of the respondent judge and afford him a chance or opportunity to correct his error, if any, in an appropriate motion for reconsideration. An omission to comply with this procedural requirement justifies a denial of the writ of certiorari applied for.5The reason for this rule is that issues, which courts of first instance are bound to decide, should not be taken summarily from them and submitted to an appellate court, without first giving the lower courts an opportunity to dispose of the same with due deliberation.6

To be sure, there are well-defined exceptions to the foregoing rule,e.g., (a) where the question of jurisdiction has been squarely raised, argued before, submitted to, and met and decided by the respondent court; (b) where the questioned order is a patent nullity; and (c) where there is a deprivation of the petitioner's fundamental right to due process.7Not one of these exceptions, however, obtains in the instant case, as will be shown later.

This Court has held, likewise, that where the petitioner filed his petition for certiorari, without waiting for the resolution of his motion for reconsideration in the lower court, the writ cannot be granted. For, if there is an appeal or other adequate remedy, like a motion for reconsideration, which is still pending in the court below, the petition for certiorari should be denied.8

The respondent Judge did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when he issued the questioned orders. Grave abuse of discretion, another requirement in order that the instant petition for certiorari may prosper, "implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words, where the power is exercise in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law."9But the respondent Judge's orders are not claimed to have been motivated by passion and personal hostility They are not despotic or arbitrary but were prompted by justifiable grounds. A perusal of the questioned orders and the circumstances under which they were issued will show that the respondent Judge did not gravely abuse his discretion in issuing them.

Let us take the orders dated November 2, 1966, November 11, 1966, and January 3, 1967, respectively. The first granted the motion ofPanaythat its contract for US$200,000 with theLEIbe implemented by the respondent Receiver. The second allowed the urgent ex-parte motion ofKeyser(filed on November 4, 1966) praying for an order directing the implementation of its contract with theLEIfor US$120,000. The third also sanctioned the ex-parte motion filed by theLEIReceiver asking for authority to submit firm offers on behalf ofPanayfor US$200,000,Keyserfor US$120,000,Eguiafor US$200,000,Magnofor US$134,600, andWorldwidefor US$135,000, or a total of US$789,600 which is equivalent to the amount authorized to be procured by theRepacomfor theLEIunder the 9th Reparations Schedule in partial implementation of the balance of thePVL-LEIallocation of US$3 million.

It must be recalled that under the Compromise Agreement of May 13, 1964 by and between the petitioner, on the one hand, andWorldwide, Eguia, Keyser, Magno, Panayand theLEI,on the other, the latter (except theLEI), in consideration of the various undertakings and other obligations assumed by the former, agreed to defer the enforcement of their respective contracts with theLEIon condition that the said contracts shall be charged and enforced on the additional allocation that would be made available to theLEIand/orPVLin implementation of the balance of the saidPVL-LEIallocation; and that this same agreement was submitted to and simultaneously approved in separate orders both dated June 1, 1964 by Branches VI and I of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case Nos. 54912 and 55250, respectively.

Pursuant to Article 2037 of the Civil Code, "A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority ofres judicata; ..." and this is true even if the compromise is not judicially approved.10Since the above compromise agreement possesses judicial imprimatur,a fortiori,it stands on a similar if not better footing than one which does not carry judicial sanction. The basis, therefore, for the issuance of the orders for the enforcement and implementation of the contracts of sale and/or instructions to theLEIReceiver to implement and enforce the sales agreement, is the abovequoted provision of the Compromise Agreement of May 13, 1964 which has been properly approved by the respondent court. In issuing the said orders, the respondent court only implemented a covenant which had been long agreed and approved by the said court. The petitioner has no cause to complain in the implementation of the rights of other parties to the Compromise Agreement. The parties thereto (except theLEI) had agreed to allow the petitioner to implement the entire US$1 million. This allocation, except for the remaining and unimplemented balance of $188,251.21, had already been exhausted. It is now their turn to implement their contracts. Thus, when theRepacomapproved Resolution 199 (66), theLEInotified the said parties that theRepacomhad already set aside US$789,600, made available under the 9th and 10th year reparations schedule. Knowing that the petitioner had no more allocation to implement except the amount of $188,251.21, the parties filed their motions for implementation ex-parte no notice was given to the petitioner because he was not going to be affected by any ruling on the matter. Indeed. the motions for implementation were not necessary since all that Panay, Keyser, Magno and Eguiahad to do was to exercise their rights under the said Compromise Agreement of May 13, 1964 by making their demand for implementation directly with theLEI.Thus, since the orders partake of the nature of (or are technically) motions for execution based on a compromise agreement which had been judicially approved, the respondent court did not act with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the same. After all, the petitioner himself stated in his petition that the Compromise Agreement of May 13, 1964 isres judicataand is the law between the parties.

Parenthetically, the petitioner's right is also being implemented by theLEIReceiver as could be gleaned from the letter of the latter to the former dared January 10, 1967 requesting the petitioner to submit firm offers of goods to be procured by him in accordance with the existing agreements with other parties.

The petitioner cannot complain that he was not given the right to be heard on the, foregoing motions for implementation because the same were filed ex-parte. Section 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, provides;

It is clear from the abovequoted rule that if the court is satisfied that the adverse party's rights will not be affected, it may act upon a motion even without proof of service thereof on the said adverse party. This particular circumstance obtains here. Since the petitioner is a signatory to the Compromise Agreement of May 13, 1964, the provisions of which are sought to be implemented, he cannot now allege that any of his rights is being violated. Indeed, the petitioner is bound to comply with his obligation to allow the enforcement of the contracts of the other parties concerned, and his opposition to the enforcement of the said contracts as well as his act of questioning the orders allowing the enforcement thereof and authorizing theLEIReceiver to submit firm offers therefor, are gross violations of his obligations and in derogation of the respondents' rights in whose favor the orders were issued. Being himself the wrongdoer, this Court has the authority not only to dismiss his petition but also to grant to the respondents further reliefs just and equitable in the premises.

Where plaintiff in an injunction suit is himself the wrongdoer in first invading the rights of defendant whom he seeks to enjoin, and should therefore be denied all equitable relief on that account, he cannot complain that, instead of dismissing his complaint, as demanded in defendant's answer, the court grants a further relief to defendant by enjoining plaintiff and thus adjudicating all the equities between the parties growing out of the facts alleged or litigated.11

Moreover, during the hearing ofPanay'smotion on October 22, 1966, the respondent court granted the request of the petitioner's counsel that he be given five days to file his opposition to the motion and the court made it clear, and it was agreed in open court, that after the expiration of the said period, the incident would be deemed submitted for resolution. Consequently, the respondent court acted correctly when it resolved the motion after the expiration of the five-day period. And as earlier stated, his motion for reconsideration of the order of November 2, 1966 is still pending because the petitioner came up to this Court on a petition for certiorari before his motion could be resolved.

With reference to the order of November 11, 1966, the petitioner was given ample opportunity to be heard on the propriety of the said order when his motion for reconsideration which he filed on November 14, 1966 was given due course by the respondent court, and which, together with the oppositions thereto filed by theLEIon November 24, 1966 and byKeyseron November 25, 1966, was properly heard and ventilated on November 26, 1966. However, before the respondent court could resolve his motion, the petitioner brought up the instant petition for certiorari.

The petitioner claims thatKeyserhas no more contract to be implemented because under an agreement executed by them on January 8, 1965, the petitioner sold an additional $300,000 worth of photographic supplies toKeyserin consideration of whichKeyserhad in effect agreed to release the petitioner from any obligation under the Compromise Agreement of May 13, 1964 to recognizeKeyser'scontract of $120,000 with theLEI.This is not correct. Paragraph 7 of the contract of January 8, 1965, cited by the petitioner to support his allegation thatKeyserhad revoked its $120,000 contract with theLEI,provides:

A cursory perusal of the above paragraph will show that there is nothing there in which suggests a renunciation byKeyserof its $120,000 contract with theLEI.The contract of January 8, 1965 is an agreement ofKeyserwith the petitioner, and not with theLEI;therefore, it has no application whatsoever to the enforcement of the agreement between theLEIandKeyser.It is clearly misleading to allege that by virtue of the said contract, the agreement between theLEIandKeyseris no longer enforceable.Keyser,therefore, has all the right to have its $120,000 contract with theLEIimplemented. This was the basis of the order of November 11, 1966.

The petitioner claims that he has a right to be heard in any motion which any of the respondents may file by reason of the fact that he is a buyer of the US$4 millionPVL-LEIallocation under his February 7, 1964 contract with theLEI,and that he is an assignee ofFilipinasfor US$4 million of thePVL-LEIallocation. But he overlooks the fact that by reason of Compromise Agreement of May 13, 1964,Eguia, Panay, Magno, WorldwideandKeyseragreed to allow him to buy all the goods procured under Resolution 396 of theRepacomin the, amount of US$1 million, provided their respective contracts of purchase with theLEIwill be implemented against the balance of thePVL-LEIallocation of US$4 million,i.e., the allocation made available in addition to the first US$1 million. Indeed, his Compromise Agreement withFilipinasdated September 30, 1965 takes favorable cognizance of the May 13, 1964 Compromise Agreement with other parties because it provides that it (the agreement with Filipinas) must "be implemented in relation to and harmoniously with the Compromise Agreement between Cochingyan and the other buyer-claimants of PVL/LEI." In fact, when Branch I of the Court of First Instance of Manila approved the Filipinas-Cochingyan contract, it ordered theLEIReceiver —

Finally, the order of January 3, 1967 was issued on motion of theLEIReceiver upon the request of theLEIwhich had to take such legal step, otherwise it could be held liable for damages and could be exposed to lawsuits which the parties-buyers might file against it for specific performance of their clearly established rights, should the Receiver fail to implement their respective contracts. Rather than risk the certainty of incurring expenses and facing court litigations, theLEIsaw the need to write the Receiver to obtain instructions from the court to submit firm offers to satisfy the requirements of the parties-buyers pursuant to the Compromise Agreement of May13, 1964. We likewise fail to see any abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent court in issuing this order.

It is not, however, difficult to imagine why the petitioner is vigorously objecting to the implementation of the contracts of other parties with theLEIon the balance of US$3 million of thePVL-LEIallocation which is now authorized in the sum of $1.5 million, $789,600 of which was already made available under the 9th and 10th year reparations schedule, as aforesaid. In October 1966, he sneaked out of the Philippines, and, without informing the other parties, went to Japan and entered into contracts with various Japanese firms over the amount of US$789,600 for goods other than those thatPanay, Magno, EguiaandKeyserwould want to order. Naturally, if out of the amount of US$789,600, only the sum of US$135,00 (corresponding to the share ofWorldwidewhich the latter assigned to him) will be awarded to him, and the rest toPanay, Keyser, EguiaandMagno,then he would be placed in a very embarrassing position and would lose face with the various Japanese firms with which he unauthorizedly entered into contracts.

Let us now consider the questioned order of December 28, 1966. Pursuant to the Compromise Agreement of February 17, 1966 and the supplement thereto of the same date, the petitioner, for and in consideration of the rights and interests in the reparations goods whichWorldwideand Torrefranca had assigned to him, obligated himself to pay to the latter P0.85 for every US$1.00 of the said goods released to him up to the amount of P600,000. On the first release obtained by the petitioner following the date of execution of the said agreement, he paid what was due toWorldwideand Torrefranca. However, on the subsequent releases of goods, he began proving himself short of expectation in the religious performance of his obligations. He started payingWorldwideway off the period of 30 days from his receipt of the goods, with checks post-dated at that, for a period of from 60 to 120 days. On many occasions, the petitioner, in spite of the demands made on him byWorldwide,refused to pay, and because of such refusal, the latter was compelled to file numerous motions with the respondent court for it to order the petitioner to payWorldwideits legal claim. Thus, upon an ex-parte motion filed byWorldwide,the respondent court issued the questioned order of December 28, 1966.

The petitioner impugns this order on the ground that it is contrary to and in violation of the meaning and intention of the Compromise Agreement of February 17, 1966 which he admits is binding upon the parties andres judicata.But the said compromise agreement and the supplement thereto define the right ofWorldwideand Torrefranca to be paid P0.85 per US$1.00 oil reparations goods released to the petitioner and the obligation to make such payment. Since both paragraphs 1 of the aforementioned two documents alleged by the petitioner to have been violated, do not speak of a right on his part, but on the contrary, define his obligation to pay,ergothere is no violation of the petitioner's right.

He insists, however, that it violates the provision of the compromise agreement granting him a period if 30 days within which to payWorldwideand Torrefranca. We do not agree. The penal clause of the compromise agreement states that:

Since the petitioner has still an unpaid account in favor ofWorldwideand Torrefranca for goods released to him in the first and second weeks of November 1966,Worldwidecould availed itself of the above penalty clause. But it chose to be more liberal and selected the less onerous way of enforcing its rights through an early payment of its claim. If harsher remedies could be made use of byWorldwide,there should be no reason why it cannot resort to a lighter penalty or remedy in order to enforce its rights.

Indeed, the order merely seeks the implementation by theLEIReceiver of an obligation unperformed by the petitioner in favor of a part to which he is obligated to pay. The order was not an amendment to the agreement because the 30-day period within which to make payments includes the day of release of the goods, the day following and up to the end of the said period. Besides, theLEIReceiver had been appointed by the respondent court to protect the interests of the parties by carrying out the provisions of the various compromise agreements that areres judicuta.Surely, there is no more expeditious and effective protection that the Receiver could provide than the earliest delivery of whatever belongs to a party whose interest he is supposed to protect. After all, there is no reason why the portion of the money realized from the goods which by right has to be paid toWorldwideshould be kept in the Receiver's possession for 30 days. If the Receiver had agreed to pay the rightful claim of a party at an earlier date but well within the period for making such payment, this is far from censurable. And the court which authorized such cannot be faulted because it was merely serving the cause of justice.

It isaproposto mention at this juncture that, with respect to the reparations goods that he has already taken away, the petitioner has not yet paid all his monetary obligations to the different veterans organizations and persons and entities who/which are to share in the proceeds of the sale of the goods. Thus, as far back as January 4, 1967, Col. Cirilo B. Garcia, president and chairman of the Board of theLEI,wrote theLEIReceiver, Atty. Clapano (Annex 13, Receiver's Motion dated June 21, 1969, pp. 1124-1126, Vol. III, Rollo) that the petitioner had the following outstanding obligations, to wit:

In fact, the respondent court had repeatedly warned the petitioner to pay his obligations to the other parties in this case, pursuant to the various compromise agreements — to no avail.

As far as theRepacomis concerned, the petitioner does not owe it any amount, except that — as hereafter to be discussed — he is obliged to replace the performance bonds guaranteeing the payment to theRepacomof the difference between the free market rate of exchange and the old rate of exchange of P2.00 to $1.00 in connection with the f.o.b. value of the reparations goods he procured for some end-users.

The petitioner also denounces the order of December 19, 1966 which denied thePVL'smotion for reconsideration on the reinstatement of theLEIreceivership, relieved as receiver Atty. Mariano L. Mercado, and appointed as the newLEIReceiver Atty. Ireneo R. Clapano, Jr. A flashback of the events which preceded the issuance of the said order will show that the petitioner has absolutely no reason to complain.

The respondent court, by virtue of an ex-parte motion of the petitioner, issued on October 14, 1966, an order appointing Atty. Mercado as the newLEIReceiver. Neither the motion for the appointment of Atty. Mercado as theLEIReceiver, nor the order granting the said motion, was made known to the other parties. However, the said parties learned about them, and upon their motions, the respondent court gave all the parties the chance to be heard and present their candidates for the position if they wished, although the court is vested with the sole power to select a receiver. After considering the arguments of all parties whose rights and interests could be affected thereby, the respondent court reconsidered its order of October 14, 1966 by explicitly revoking the appointment of Atty. Mariano L. Mercado and appointing Atty. Clapano as theLEIReceiver in its order of December 19, 1966.

Certainly, there is no logic in the petitioner's assertion that the order of December 19, 1966 should be held null and void while the order of October 14, 1966 should be valid. He cannot accept a court's prerogative to appoint a receiver, on the one hand, and refuse to admit its power to revoke such appointment, on the other. The power of a court vested in it by law to appoint a receiver necessarily carries with it the power to revoke the said appointment. And although the final selection of a receiver is vested solely in a court, it is also proper for a judge to receive advice from parties interested in the trust.12In this case, the respondent court gave opportunity to all the parties to agree on a person who could be qualified as a receiver and is supported by at least a majority, if not by all of the parties. Indeed, except the petitioner, there is no organization or person who openly objects to the continuation of Atty. Clapano as theLEIReceiver. In fact, his appointment, as the order of December 19, 1966 shows, had been made by virtue of the indorsement of the majority of the parties to this case.

Besides, the revocation of the appointment of Atty. Mercado as theLEIReceiver was not without sufficient basis, as shown by the well-reasoned order of the respondent court which states,inter alia:

In fact, during his entire tenure, Atty. Mercado never visited theLEIoffices, nor had he consulted with theLEIofficers to find out how he could best serve the organization he was representing as receiver.

The position ofLEIReceiver should be given to one who is not only physically fit, but as well knows the case, the parties, and the procedure at theRepacom— in the words of the respondent Court, one "who is physically active, with sufficient knowledge and experience." The petitioner himself admits that Atty. Clapano has been trained in the ramifications of reparations business and is familiar with the transactions in connection therewith for about four years, Clapano was the technical assistant to the then Executive Director, now Commissioner Mauricio O. Bas of theRepacom.He was so capable in screening procurement orders and studying the different legal aspects of every transaction involving theRepacomthat Executive Director Bas would not sign any procurement order or other communication unless initialed by him. Verily, the knowledge and experience of Clapano in reparations matters would prove invaluable to theLEIand its buyers.

The petitioner's argument that Clapano is not qualified to perform the duties of theLEIReceiver because he has been his former employee and legal counsel and therefore privy to his trade secrets, deserves scant attention. The petitioner concedes that he had already virtually dismissed Clapano, therefore, their relation as counsel and client no longer exists.

Clapano can no longer acts as the petitioner's counsel in any of his cases even if the former's name has not yet been deleted as counsel of record. It is the petitioner's fault that although he had dismissed Clapano as counsel, he (the petitioner) has not given his written consent for Clapano to withdraw as his counsel. But even this refusal to give his written Consent is of no moment. Having exercised the universally recognized right of a client to terminate the relation between himself and his counsel, which can be done at any time and for any cause, it is absurd for the petitioner to aver that Atty. Clapano must obtain his written consent before the latter can withdraw as his counsel. At any rate, Atty. Clapano has filed a pleading in the court below wherein he disavowed any further connection or relation with the petitioner and denied that he is still the petitioner's 'counsel in any case. Besides, no prejudice was caused to the petitioner's rights because he was being represented by a chief counsel (Atty. Patajo) at that time. Moreover, there is no proof that the respondent Receiver has acquired trade secrets which he is now adversely using against the petitioner. On the contrary, the records show that the respondent Receiver has given his conformity to many motions of the petitioner. Indeed, it is strange that the complaint and opposition against the appointment of Clapano as theLEIReceiver should emanate from the petitioner's corner. It should be the other respondents who would logically express fear and apprehension in the appointment asLEIReceiver of a former counsel of the adverse party, the petitioner. After all, he might side with his former employer.

It is thus clear that petitioner has not made out a cause against the appointment of Clapano as receiver. But while the court below judiciously revoked Mercado's appointment and in his stead appointed Clapano, it would do well for the court, considering the various incidents in the case, to exercise a tighter supervision over the new receiver in order to forestall any charge of unfairness or partiality from any source, always having in mind that a receiver is to be regarded as the arm, officer or representative of the court; that his contracts and liabilities are, in contemplation of law, the contracts and liabilities of the court and that, as a necessary consequence, the receiver is subject to the control and supervision of the court.

The exercise of a close supervision over the present receiver augurs a more advantageous alternative to considering again the appointment of a new one in place of Clapano for this latter course would again entail delay in the disposition of this case and, consequently, delay also in the remittance of the proceeds from the sale of the reparations goods to the "Trust Fund," to the prejudice of the veterans of World War II and their widows and orphans.

2. The second issue posed is whether this Court has lost jurisdiction over the reparations goods now stored at the piers and in different bonded warehouses by virtue of its resolution dated July 15, 1968 granting the petitioner's petition to withdraw his supplemental petition for certiorari, thus supposedly precluding us by implication from taking cognizance of theLEIReceiver's motion and supplemental motion dated March 21, 1969 and July 28, 1970, respectively.

Parenthetically, with respect to the reparations goods still at the piers and in different bonded warehouses, the contracts between the petitioner and the different organizations and persons involved, computed at US$1.00 f.o.b. invoice value, require the petitioner to pay as follows:

By order dated January 14, 1967, the respondent court allowed theLEIReceiver to take partial delivery of the reparations goods and dispose of part of the same for the maintenance and expenses of the corporation (LEI). Thus, the petitioner filed his supplemental petition for certiorari impugning the said order as issued in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. However, the parties to this case apparently came to some sort of an agreement that the petitioner be allowed to take delivery of the goods because on May 16, 1967 he filed a petition to withdraw his supplemental petition for certiorari. By resolution dated July 15, 1968, as above stated, this Court granted the petitioner's petition to withdraw his supplemental petition for certiorari, thereby paving the way for the delivery to the petitioner of the reparations goods presently deposited at the piers and in customs bonded warehouses. However, on November 13, 1968, theRepacom,by Resolution 243 (68) (pp. 1099-1100, Rollo III), permanently disqualified the petitioner from further dealing or transacting with theRepacomrelative to the procurement of reparations goods because of his failure to replace the performance bonds issued by the Consolacion Insurance Co., Inc., a bonding company which he admitted to be bankrupt and in the process of liquidation. This insurance firm posted the performance bonds for the petitioner guaranteeing the payment to theRepacomof the difference between the free market rate of exchange and the old preferred rate of P2.00 to US$1.00 relative to the f.o.b. value of the reparations goods which he procured for the veterans groups.

Petitioner, in order to requalify himself to deal on reparations matters, made various representations with theRepacomto replace the worthless bonds. His request was granted and theRepacomadopted Resolution 43 (69) on February 14, 1969 (Annex 10-a, Receiver's Motion of March 21, 1969, pp. 1116-1117, Rollo III) allowing him to replace periodically the judicial bonds, as follows: P150,000 initial replacement, and P100,000 monthly thereafter until all worthless judicial bonds in the total amount of P670,300.20 issued by the Consolacion Insurance Co., Inc. are fully replaced; and temporarily lifting his disqualification imposed in Resolution 243 (68) dated November 13, 1968. However, since February 14, 1969 up to the present, the petitioner has not replaced the worthless judicial bonds. He alleged that he could not file the replacement bonds because in Civil Case 255-M (11611) of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, entitled "United Disabled Veteran; Association of the Philippines(Reformist Block)v. The Reparations Commission, et al.," a restraining order was issued enjoining theRepacomto act on any of the representations of the petitioner to have his initial P150,000 bond approved. However, the said restraining order was lifted on January 7, 1970, but still the petitioner has failed to comply with theRepacom'srequirement to replace the bonds. Because of this failure to comply with the conditions imposed byRepacomResolution 43 (69), the permanent disqualification imposed on him byRepacomResolution 243 (68) was automatically restored.

The petitioner's financial incapability and incapacity, and his failure to replace the worthless bonds, are the principal grounds why theRepacomrefuses to allow him to requalify. This is aside from theRepacom'sown knowledge, obtained through its own investigations, that the petitioner has been implicated in the falsification of the list of the goods to be imported through reparations as approved by the National Economic Council; likewise, in the complaint of the United Disabled Veterans Association of the Philippines (UDVAP) that goods procured for its use had been pilfered, the petitioner is implicated in the pilferage (Annexes 1, 2, 3 and 3- 1, Receiver's Reply dated September 19, 1970 to petitioner's comments).

In the aforesaidRepacominvestigation, it was disclosed that the list of goods approved by the National Economic Council for importation via reparations cover was substituted with another which included banned items. The list was contained in the second page of a 3-page letter of the Council to theRepacom.The receiving clerk testified in the investigation that petitionerCochingyanhad approached and requested her to stamp a second copy of the letter whichCochingyanhad brought, with the date of receipt similar to the original copy, and that she had overheard petitioner and a certain Mrs. Alcala, who was the clerk's superior, talking about the necessity of using a typewriter and a kind of paper similar to the ones used in the original copy of the letter ("dapat parehong papel, parehong typewriter"). Laborers under the employ of the petitioner executed affidavits pointing to petitioner as the one who directed and supervised them in taking away reparations goods on specified dates from various warehouses; they narrated in detail how they unpacked boxes, loaded their contents in petitioner's waiting car and closed the boxes to make them appear as though they had not been emptied of their contents. A case for theft had been filed with the office of the city fiscal of Manila against petitioner and other persons who appeared to have participated in the pilferage.

The first initial disqualification of the petitioner had something to do with the more than US$500,000 worth of reparations goods which were released to him, through the thenLEIReceiver, Atty. Ramon M. Velayo. The lower court allowed the thenLEIReceiver Velayo to take delivery of the goods and release the same to the petitioner on condition that the latter should file a bond to be approved by the court to insure that the P1.90 difference between the old rate and the free market rate would be paid by the petitioner the moment it would be finally ruled that the rate of exchange should be the free market rate. These bonds posted by the Consolacion Insurance Co., Inc., which have now become worthless, are the same bonds which theRepacomrequired the petitioner to be replaced by other bonds to be issued by qualified bonding companies.

For the reasons above stated, the petitioner is no longer qualified to handle the reparations goods procured for thePVL/LEInow stored at the piers and in different bonded warehouses.

Consequently, on March 21, 1969, theLEIReceiver riled a motion followed by a supplement thereto filed on July 28, 1970, praying this Court (a) to authorize him to sell the reparations goods (how in storage at the piers and in different bonded warehouses) upon the grounds that these goods, because they have been in storage for four or more years, are rapidly deteriorating and depreciating in value and that the Storage fees corresponding to these unreleased reparations goods are mounting from day to day; and (b) to order the full implementation of the balance of the US$1 millionPVL-LEIallocation in the amount of $188,251.21. Acting on theLEIReceiver's two motions, this Court required all the parties to comment thereon. The following respondents have manifested that they have no objection to and are in conformity with the said two motions: theRepacom,thePVL,theLEI, Panay, Keyser, Worldwide, Magno, Eguiaand Torrefranca. Atty. Panfilo Manguera, Chief Legal Counsel, Adviser and Head, Legal Department of theRepacom,made the following manifestation for and in behalf of theRepacom:

On the respondent Receiver's motions of March 21, 1969 and July 28, 1970, theRepacomsposition is that —

It must be noted that it has been and still is the policy of theRepacomthat all reparations goods must be sold and released under a "no selective release scheme" orpakiaoto one person or entity, provided that before actual release is made, the costs and the charges and expenses incident to procurement (i.e., f.o.b. value of costs, back commissions, service fees, freightage and storage charges which theRepacomhas advanced to wareshousemen) are fully paid for in cash directly to theRepacom.Reparations goods intended for veterans are payable in cash, and, until so paid, remain the property of the Government. As aforementioned, the amounts so paid are constituted into the Veterans Trust Fund.

The petitioner's position, however, is that this Court can not act on theLEIReceiver's motions because by virtue of its resolution dated July 15, 1968 granting his petition for withdrawal of his supplemental petition for certiorari, the reparations goods in question ceased to be the subject of any action pending before this Court. We do not subscribe to this argument. When we issued the resolution of July 15, 1968 which should have paved the way for the delivery to the petitioner of the goods kept at the piers and in customs bonded warehouses, he was still legally and fully qualified to take delivery thereof. However, on November 13, 1968, by Resolution 243 (68), theRepacompermanently disqualified him from further dealing or transacting with it relative to the procurement of reparations goods. Upon his application, theRepacom,in Resolution 43 (69) of February 14, 1969, temporarily lifted his permanent disqualification upon the conditions specified in the said resolution, but he failed to comply therewith, causing the automatic restoration of his permanent disqualification. The petitioner cannot now, therefore, take delivery of the reparations goods since he has not taken any steps to lift his permanent disqualification — one of which is an appeal to the Office of the President from the refusal of theRepacomto accept the substitute bonds he had submitted.

Moreover, there is a legal impediment to allowing the petitioner to requalify himself. Under the Reparations Law (Rep. Act 1789, as amended), it is theRepacomwhich specifically defines the qualifications and determines who are qualified to take delivery of the reparations goods, and unless clear abuse is shown in the exercise of such function, courts should not interfere therewith. Indeed, theRepacomis the entity vested by law to "ascertain and verify that the applicant concerned has enough financial resources and capacity to pay" (Sec. 6 [a-1], R.A. 1789 as amended), and "to provide for the care, custody, protection and proper delivery to end-users of all such reparations goods as provided in this Act" (Sec. 6 d,Id.) TheRepacomis likewise the entity vested with authority "To hear and decide all questions and controversies regarding the rules and regulations which it shall issue to carry out the purposes of this Act, its decisions in all such cases being appealable directly to the President" (Sec. 6 h,Id.). Since theRepacomhas disqualified permanently and totally the petitioner from further dealing on reparation matters, and this disqualification has not been appealed by the petitioner to the President, this Court can not extend any relief in the matter of the petitioner's efforts to requalify himself. Besides, since theRepacomis neither a signatory nor a party to any of the various compromise agreement executed by the private parties-buyers, it cannot be compelled to deliver the goods to parties it sees unfit to receive them. It cannot be bound by any stipulation of the various agreements. Consequently, the petitioner cannot therefore assert or claim an absolute right over the goods, as in fact he admits that "his rights did not spring from his dealings with the Reparations Commission but from his dealings with LEI" (Par. 2, page 2, Petitioner's Comments on the Supplemental Manifestation of the Reparations Commission). Thus, unless they are fully paid for in cash (f.o.b. costs of goods and expenses of procurement), the Repacom is the absolute owner of the goods in question, although the same are being procured for thePVL/LEI.

The issuance by this Court of its resolution of July 15, 1968 was implicitly conditioned upon the petitioner's ability and qualification to take delivery of the goods. Being now bereft of such ability and qualification, he cannot avail himself of the said resolution. Consequently, this Court still has jurisdiction over the said goods, and can and will favorably act on theLEIReceiver's motion to sell the same, upon the conditions to be hereinafter set forth, impelled only by the thought that this will best serve public interest and the interests of the widows and orphans for whose benefit the Veterans Trust Fund is sought to be generated, and that no prejudice in any way will result to any of the parties; including the petitioner, because the money to be realized from the sale of the reparations goods will be deposited with a stable and reputable bank. Moreover, we see no legal impediment to this Court ordering the implementation of the remainder of the US$1 million allocation in the amount of US$188,251.21.

Finally, the petitioner vigorously objects to the advance payment made by theRepacomof warehousing fees at the rate of P0.50 per ton per day, alleging that it should be P0.67 per ton per day as agreed upon between him and the Reliance Warehousing & Commercial Co., Inc. as allegedly approved by theRepacom.The facts, however, do not support the petitioner's stand. It appears that when the reparations goods released to the petitioner through the thenLEIReceiver Atty. Velayo and pertaining to the first US$500,000 were about to arrive, the Reliance Warehousing & Commercial Co., Inc. alone, among several warehouses, agreed to give a special rate of storage charge to thePVL-LEIat the rate now claimed by the petitioner, on condition that the next incoming shipments of reparations goods be also stored in the Reliance customs bonded warehouse. There is, however, no clear agreement that the special rate claimed by the petitioner be also made applicable to the goods now stored at the said warehouse. There is no written agreement to this effect. As now contended by the Reliance Warehousing and concurred in by theRepacom,the special rate of warehousing charges then previously given was made applicable only to the goods previously stored and long released. With respect to the goods now at the warehouse, they should be charged at the rate now claimed by the Reliance Warehousing and adopted by theRepacombecause the said rate charge has been approved and fixed by the Bureau of Customs. The petitioner has not presented any written agreement or proved any verbal contract existing between the parties in this case, on the one hand, and the Reliance Warehousing, on the other, that the rate of warehousing charges be as claimed by him. Hence, theRepacomacted correctly when it adopted Resolution 148 (68), dated August 14, 1968 (Annex 5, Receiver's Reply dated September 19, 1970 to petitioner's comments), authorizing the release of the amount of P313, 456.32 in favor of the Reliance Warehousing & Commercial Co., Inc. as warehousing charges, of which the amount of P272,707.43 was released through a General Voucher (Annex 12, Receiver's motion dated March 21, 1969, p. 1123, Rollo III).

ACCORDINGLY, the petition for certiorari is hereby dismissed, with costs against the petitioner.ℒαwρhi৷

Considering all the pleadings relative and relevant to the two above-mentioned motions of the Receiver dated March 21, 1969 and July 28, 1970, respectively, and finding the reasons adduced by the said Receiver in his said two motions, as well as the reasons stated in the manifestations of theRepacom,valid and compelling, this Court hereby creates a Committee to be composed of (a) Receiver Ireneo R. Clapano, Jr., as chairman, (b) a representative to be named without delay by the Reparations Commission, and (c) a representative of the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VI) to be named without delay by the Presiding Judge thereof. This Committee shall, with deliberate speed, and always under the guidance, supervision and control of the Presiding Judge of Branch VI:

All proper and necessary expenses incurred by the Committee in the discharge of its functions and duties by virtue of this decision may, from time to time, he authorized to be paid by the Presiding Judge from the sales proceeds, prior to their being deposited with the Philippine Veterans Bank as herein-before directed.

Thereafter, the Reparations Commission shall file with this Court a verified manifestation itemizing and detailing the charges, taxes and duties that are due to it by virtue of the importation of the reparations goods in question.

It appearing that to require a bond from any of the respondents would be inequitable because none of them are in possession of the goods in question, nor have the power to dispose of them, nor have received any money proceeds by virtue of their importation, the Court will not require the posting of any bond by any of the respondents. The Reparations Commission is hereby authorized to take all proper and necessary steps to effect the full implementation not only of the balance of the US$1 millionPVL-LEIallocation, in the amount of $188,251.21, but also of the balance of the US$3 millionPVL-LEIallocation.

Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz Palma, Concepcion Jr., and Martin JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., concur in the result.

Footnotes