G.R. No. L-26358 - Donato Lopez, Jr. vs. Court of First Instance of Manila, et al.

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-26358 June 27, 1975

DONATO LOPEZ, JR.,petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA and GENARO C. BAUTISTA,respondents.

Angel C. Facundo for petitioner.

Laurel, Arguelles, Roxas & Verceles for respondent Genaro C. Bautista.

FERNANDO,J.:

What is assailed in thiscertiorariand prohibition proceeding was the assumption of jurisdiction by respondent Court of First Instance over a suit1involving the presidency of a labor union, the contest being between petitioner Donato Lopez, Jr., who was elected to such position2and private respondent Genaro C. Bautista. Petitioner won the election but could not, however, assume office, as private respondent was able to obtain a preliminary injunctionex partefrom the then Judge Francisco Geronimo.3There was a motion for the lifting of such preliminary injunction4based on the ground of lack of jurisdiction but it was denied.5A motion for reconsideration6with the citation of the statutory provision as well as the pronouncements of this Tribunal to stress the point that it was a matter that should be left to the Court of Industrial Relations met the same fate.7Respondent Court adhered firmly to the view that the matter was clearly within its power, notwithstanding the vigorous plea by petitioner that the competence over disputes involving labor unions by law, as authoritatively interpreted, belongs not to the judiciary but to an administrative agency, the Court of Industrial Relations. Hence, this action forcertiorariand prohibition. As will now be discussed, it is impressed with merit.

We start with Section 17 of the Industrial Peace Act,8the statute applicable to this controversy.9As far back asKapisanan ng mga Manggagawa v. Bugnay,10decided in 1957, this Court, through Justice Montemayor, explicitly declared that under this provision, "questions involving the rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization, fall within the jurisdiction of the CIR."11Phil. Land-Air-Sea Labor Union v. Ortiz,12decided a year later, is even more relevant.ℒαwρhi৷Again, this Court, speaking through the same jurist, reiterated such a view. In this action forcertiorariand prohibition seeking to annul the decision of the then respondent Judge Montano A. Ortiz, it was shown that notwithstanding the fact that there was an intramural dispute between a member and the officers of a labor union, the lower court denied a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed on the authority of the above Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa decision. As succinctly put by Justice Montemayor: "This same question has already been submitted to and decided by this Court, for which reason, we do not deem it necessary to discuss it at length."13He elaborated on the basis of this doctrine thus: "One reason, in our opinion, why cases involving the rights and conditions of membership in a labor union or organization are placed within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations is that said court is in a better position and is more qualified than ordinary courts to determine said cases, dealing as it does with problems of management and labor, the latter represented by labor unions, the activities of such labor organizations and their members, certification elections to determine the labor unions as a bargaining agency to deal and negotiate with the management, ... ."14Then came a 1959 decision which is quite in point,Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Padilla.15This was an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte dismissing plaintiffs' complaint precisely on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.16What was sought in the case, among others, was the ousting of the defendants from their respective positions as officers of the labor union.17It needed only one paragraph for Justice Labrador asponenteto dispose of the contention that the lower court and not the Court of Industrial Relations had jurisdiction. Reference was made to the Industrial Peace Act and it was then noted that "the court vested with jurisdiction to take judicial cognizance of actions involving violations of internal labor organization procedures is the Court of Industrial Relations, [therefore] the lower court correctly dismissed the complaint presented by the plaintiffs."18

Nothing seems to be clearer, therefore, than that the lower court ought to have manifested receptivity to the plea that the question of who was rightfully elected to the presidency of a labor union was one for the then Court of Industrial Relations to decide. Surprisingly, the lower court, acting through three judges one after the other, came to a contrary conclusion. It would appear, therefore, that there is some truth to the observation made about occupants of the bench being reluctant to any diminution of their competence in favor of administrative agencies. It was so even in the United States where for some time the vesting of sole and competence to administrative agencies, at least in its initial stages, subject later to judicial review by an appellate tribunal hardly elicited the enthusiasm of the traditionalists in the legal profession.19At any rate, in that country and even more so in the Philippines, as is exemplified by the new Labor Code,20there is now a greater understanding of the role rightfully played by administrative bodies as official instrumentalities in the enforcement of regulatory statutes. What has just been said, therefore, could explain, but certainly would not justify, the assumption of jurisdiction by the lower court.1äwphï1.ñët

WHEREFORE,the writ ofcertiorariis granted and the order granting the writ of preliminary injunction dated February 3, 1966, as well as the order denying the motion for dissolution and a motion to dismiss filed by petitioner as defendant of February 25, 1966, and the order denying the motion for reconsideration thereof of June 30, 1966 are set aside and declared null and void. The writ of prohibition is likewise granted, perpetually restraining the lower court to take any further action in Civil Case No. 64113, Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Manila, pending therein except for the purpose of dismissing the case. Costs against Genaro C. Bautista.

Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes