G.R. No. L-21231 - Concordia Laluan, et al. vs. Apolinario Malpaya, et al.

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-21231 July 30, 1975

CONCORDIA LALUAN, et al.,petitioners,
vs.
APOLINARIO MALPAYA, MELECIO TAMBOT, BERNARDINO JASMIN, et al.,respondents.

Primicias, Regino and Macaraeg for petitioners.

Saturnino D. Bautista for respondents.

CASTRO,J.:

In 1950 the Laluans,1the Laguits2and the Sorianos3(hereinafter referred to as the petitioners) filed with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan a complaint against Apolinario Malpaya, Melecio Tambot and Bernardino Jasmin (hereinafter referred to as the respondents) for recovery of ownership and possession of two parcels of land. The petitioners seek a declaration that they are the ownerspro indivisoof

and the ownerspro indivisoof one-half of

They base their claim on their alleged right to inherit, by legal succession, from Marciana Laluan (the respondent Malpaya's wife) who died intestate on July 17, 1948 and without any children.

The first parcel of land they allege as paraphernal property of the late Marciana Laluan. They claim that the respondent Malpaya, taking advantage of the senility of his wife, sold the land to the respondent Tambot, as evidenced by the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property" dated June 26, 1948. The second parcel of land they allege as conjugal property of the spouses Malpaya and Laluan, and charge that the respondent Malpaya, with right to sell only one-half thereof, sold the whole property, four days after the death of his wife, to the respondents Tambot and Jasmin, as evidenced by the "Absolute Deed of Sale" dated July 21, 1948.

The respondents filed their answer,4denying the allegations of the complaint and claiming that the parcels of land belonged to the respondent Malpaya as his exclusive property. The respondents Tambot and Jasmin further aver that the respondent Malpaya had the "perfect legal right" to dispose of the said parcels of land and that they bought the properties in good faith, unaware of any flaw in the title of their vendor.

To expedite the proceedings, the parties entered into a partial stipulation of facts at the hearings of August 31 and October 25, 1950. The petitioners then proceeded to adduce their evidence.

Several postponements of the scheduled hearings followed. Then, at the hearing scheduled on August 1, 1957 neither the respondents nor their counsel appeared, notwithstanding due and proper notice served on them. Nor did they file any motion for postponement. The petitioners thus moved for leave to continue with the presentation of their evidence. This the courta quogranted, allowing the petitioners to adduce their evidence before the clerk of court.

On September 23, 1957 the courta quorendered judgment declaring null and void the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property" dated June 26, 1948 as well the "Absolute Deed of Sale" dated July 21, 1948, except as regards the one-half portion of the land described in the latter document which belonged to the respondent Malpaya. With respect to the parcel of land covered by the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property," the courta quodeclared the petitioners ownerspro indivisoof the entirety thereof and ordered the respondent Tambot not only to deliver the possession of the land to them but also to pay them, by way of damages, the amount of P750 — the value of the crops which the petitioners failed to realize for the last nine years from the land — plus P500 annually from date until possession thereof shall have been delivered to them. With respect to the parcel of land subject of the "Absolute Deed of Sale," the courta quolikewise declared the petitioners ownerspro indivisoof one-half thereof and ordered the respondents Tambot and Jasmin to deliver the possession of the half-portion to the petitioners, as well as to pay them, in damages, the sum of P1,343.75 — the value of the produce which the petitioners failed to realize for the last nine years from the half-portion of the land - plus P687.50 annually from date until possession thereof shall have been delivered to them.

On October 7, 1957 the respondents Tambot and Jasmin filed theirMocion de Reconsideracion.On October 18, 1957 the courta quo,finding the grounds invoked by the respondents in their motion without merit, denied the same.

The respondents then appealed to the Court of Appeals (hereinafter referred to as the respondent Court). On January 31, 1963 the respondent Court rendered judgment setting aside the appealed decision and entered another remanding the case to the courta quofor further proceedings. The respondent Court voided the procedure whereby, at the continuation of the hearing of the case on August 1, 1957, the courta quo,in the absence of the respondents and their counsel, allowed the petitioners to present their evidence before the clerk of court.

In due time, the petitioners, through a motion for reconsideration, asked the respondent Court to re-examine its decision. This motion, however, the respondent Court denied.

In the instant petition for certiorari, the petitioners pray for the reversal of the decision of the respondent Court as well its resolution denying their motion for reconsideration, and ask that judgment be rendered affirmingin totothe decision of the courta quodated September 23, 1957.

The petitioners and the respondents point to what they believe is the sole question for resolution; whether or not the reception by the clerk of court of the petitioners' evidence, in the absence of the respondents and their counsel, constitutes a prejudicial error that vitiated the proceedings.

The petitioners argue that a trial court has authority to designate its clerk of court to receive the evidence of the party present when the other party fails to appear. In receiving evidence, the petitioners continue, the clerk of court merely performs a ministerial task. The ministerial nature of such a task allows the clerk of court to dispense with the procedural steps5prescribed by Rule 33 of the Rules of Court.

The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the courta quoarrogated unto itself the power, otherwise denied it, to designate its clerk of court to receive the petitioners' evidence. No provision of the Rules of Court, according to them, empowers a trial court to authorize its clerk of court to receive the evidence of a party litigant; only when the clerk of court becomes a commissioner, by appointment pursuant to Rule 33, has he the authority to so receive the evidence of a party litigant, and even in such a situation Rule 33 requires the clerk of court to observe the procedural steps therein prescribed.

The provisions of Rule 33 of the Rules of Court invoked by both parties properly relate to the reference by a court of any or all of the issues in a case to a person so commissioned to act or report thereon. These provisions explicitly spell out the rules governing the conduct of the court, the commissioner, and the parties before, during, and after the reference proceedings. Compliance with these rules of conduct becomes imperative only when the court formally orders a reference of the case to a commissioner. Strictly speaking then, the provisions of Rule 33 find no application to the case at bar where the courta quomerely directed the clerk of court to take down the testimony of the witnesses6presented and to mark the documentary evidence7proffered on a date previously set for hearing.

No provision of law or principle of public policy prohibits a court from authorizing its clerk of court to receive the evidence of a party litigant. After all, the reception of evidence by the clerk of court constitutes but a ministerial task — the taking down of the testimony of the witnesses and the marking of the pieces of documentary evidence, if any, adduced by the party present. This task of receiving evidence precludes, on the part of the clerk of court, the exercise of judicial discretion usually called for when the other party who is present objects to questions propounded and to the admission of the documentary evidence proffered.8More importantly, the duty to render judgment on the merits of the case still rests with the judge who is obliged to personally and directly prepare the decision based upon the evidence reported.9

But where the proceedings before the clerk of court and the concomitant result thereof,i.e.,the judgment rendered by the court based on the evidence presented in such limited proceedings, prejudice the substantial rights of the aggrieved party, then there exists sufficient justification to grant the latter complete opportunity to thresh out his case in court.

1. Anent the parcel of land subject of the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property," the courta quo,in its decision dated September 23, 1957, declared it as the paraphernal property of the deceased Marciana Laluan. In so doing, the courta quorelied mainly on the documents — the deed of donationpropter nuptiasand the translation thereof in English — presented by the petitioners before the clerk of court at the hearing on August 1, 1957. However, the respondents contend — and this the respondent court took significant note of in its resolution dated March 30, 1963 — that the land described in the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property" is not any of those set forth in the deed of donation.

The "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property" describes the land subject thereof as follows:

On the other hand, the deed of donationpropter nuptiastreats of three parcels of land in this manner.

The sketch appearing on the deed of donation covers three parcels of land: thefirstparcel, 63 X 52brazas,11bounded on the north by Jacinto Malpaya, on the west by apayas,and on the south and east by Pedro Malpaya; thesecondparcel, 30 X 63brazas,bounded on the north by Tomas Tollao, on the west by Jacinto Laluan, on the south by acolos,and on the east by Pedro Malpaya; and the third parcel, 52 X 23brazas,bounded on the north and west by Pedro Malpaya, on the south by Roman Gramata, and on the east by Eustaquio Marquez. All of these three parcels have stated metes and bounds quite different from those of the land covered by the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property," thelocationtoo of the latter land differs from those of the parcels described in the deed of donation. While the land subject of the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property" lies in Inoman, Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, the parcels included in the deed of donation lie either in Paldit or in Inmatotong, both also in Pozorrubio, Pangasinan. At first sight also appears the marked variance between the respective areas of those parcels described in the deed of donation and the parcel subject of the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property."

Indeed, there arises the possibility that in theinterimof fifty six years from February 15, 1892 (the date of the deed of donationpropter nuptias) to June 26, 1948 (the date of the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property"), the parcels of land contiguous to those described in the deed of donation passed in ownership from one hand to another, or changes in the man-made or natural boundaries used to indicate the confines of the parcels set forth in the said document occurred. This could very well explain the discrepancies between the names of the boundary owners of the piece of land described in the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property" and the names of the adjacent owners of the parcels subject of the deed of donation as well as the absence of any mention of thepayasandcolosin the later "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property." In addition, the variance between the location of the land described in the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property" and those of the parcels set forth in the deed of donation could reasonably be due to the creation of new barrios in the municipality of Pozorrubio Pangasinan, or the alteration of the boundaries of the barrios therein.

However, the apparent difference between the area of the land described in the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property" and the areas of the parcels included in the deed of donationpropter nuptiasshould be fully and properly explained. The record shows that the petitioners neither offered nor attempted to offer any evidence indicating that the land sold by the respondent Malpaya to his co-respondent Tambot corresponds with any of the three parcels described in the deed of donation. The petitioners failed to specify precisely which of the three parcels — its location, area, and contiguous owners — subject of the deed of donation constitutes the very land delimited in the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property."

All these give rise to a grave doubt as to the specific identity of one of the parcels of land in dispute which the courta quoneither noticed nor considered notwithstanding the obvious fact that the location, area and boundaries of the land covered by the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property" do not coincide with those of any of the parcels described in the deed of donationpropter nuptias.

The invariable applicable rule12is to the effect that in order to maintain an action to recover ownership, the person who claims that he has a better right to the property must prove not only his ownership of the property claimed but also the identity thereof. The party who desires to recover must fix the identity of the land he claims.13And where doubt and uncertainty exist as to the identity of the land claimed, a court should resolve the question by recourse to the pleadings and the record as well as to extrinsic evidence, oral or written.

Absent, therefore, any indicium in the record to show and identify with absolute certainty any of the three parcels of land included in the deed of donationpropter nuptiasas the land described in the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property," the prudent course open obviously consists in an investigation by the courta quo,either in the form of a hearing or an ocular inspection, or both, to enable it to know positively the land in litigation. If, indeed, the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property" treats of a piece of land entirely different and distinct from the parcels described in the deed of donationpropter nuptias,and considering that the courta quo,in its decision dated September 23, 1957, relied mainly on the said deed of donation in declaring the land subject of the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property" as the paraphernal property of the late Marciana Laluan and in nullifying the latter document, then there exists sufficient ground to remand the case to the courta quofor a new trial on the matter.

2. Anent the parcel of land subject of the "Absolute Deed of Sale," the courta quo,in its decision dated September 23, 1957, found and declared it as the conjugal property of the spouses Laluan and Malpaya. In so doing, the courta quorelied heavily on the presumption established by article 140714of the Civil Code of 1889 that "[a] 11 the property of the spouses shall be deemed partnership property in the absence of proof that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife."

It needs no emphasis to point out that the courta quocommitted no error in declaring that the parcel of land subject of the "Absolute Deed of Sale" belongs to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Laluan and Malpaya. Indeed, the spouses Laluan and Malpaya acquired the said parcel of land from Eustaquio Marquez "sometime in 1912" or, specifically, during the marriage. Following the rule then that proof of acquisition of the property in dispute during the marriage suffices to render the statutory presumption operative,15it seems clear enough that the parcel covered by the "Absolute Deed of Sale" pertains to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Laluan and Malpaya.

Likewise, the courta quocommitted no error in declaring the "Absolute Deed of Sale" null and void as to the one-half portion of the land described therein which belonged to Laluan, spouse of the respondent Malpaya; in declaring the petitioners the ownerspro indivisoof one-half of the land subject of the said "Absolute Deed of Sale;" and in ordering the respondents Tambot and Jasmin to deliver the possession of the said half-portion to the petitioners. The courta quoalso correctly cited and applied the provisions of articles 95316and 83717of the Civil Code of 1889 which, pursuant to article 226318of the new Civil Code, govern the rights of the petitioners and the respondent Malpaya to the property left by Marciana Laluan who died on July 17, 1948 or before the effectivity of the new code. Consequently, the courta quocorrectly ordered the respondents Tambot and Jasmin to pay to the petitioners, by way of damages, the amount of P1,343.75 which is the value of the produce which the said petitioners failed to realize for nine years from the half-portion of the land subject of the "Absolute Deed of Sale" — plus the sum of P687.50 annually from September 23, 1957 until possession of the said half-portion of land shall have been delivered to them.

ACCORDINGLY,(1) the judgment of the Court of Appeals dated January 31, 1963 and its resolution dated March 30, 1963 are set aside; (2) the judgment of the courta quodated September 23, 1957, insofar as it pertains to the "Absolute Deed of Sale," is hereby affirmed; and (3) the judgment of the courta quoof the same date, insofar as it relates to the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property," is set aside, and the case (civil case 11219) is hereby remanded to the courta quofor a new trial, to the end that the identities of the parcels of land in dispute may be specifically established. At the new trial, it will not be necessary to retake evidence already taken, but the parties shall be afforded opportunity to present such evidence as they may deem relevant to the particular question raised herein. No costs.

Makasiar, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., is on leave.

Footnotes