G.R. Nos. L-39386 and L-39620-29 - Florentina Nuguid Vda. De Haberer vs. Federico Martinez, et al.
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. L-39386 and L-39620-29 January 29, 1975
FLORENTINA NUGUID VDA. DE HABERER,petitioner,
vs.
FEDERICO MARTINEZ, BALDOMERO MANALO, FAUSTINO BAGALAWIS, FEDERICO STA. TERESA, ANGELITO KING, GREGORIO DEL ROSARIO, LEODOVICO TORRES, LEON SORIANO, SANTIAGO TUMANG, LUIS PASTOR, CRISTINO LIBRAMANTE and THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS,respondents.
TEEHANKEE,J.:
The Court sets aside the appealed resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals dismissing petitioner's appeal from the adverse consolidated decision of the trial court in eleven cases for recovery of possession of real property. The statement of material dates and data given in the Court's opinion shows manifestly that contrary to respondent court's erroneous premises and computation petitioner duly and timely perfected her appeal within the reglementary period and in compliance with the material data rule requiring that the Record on Appeal state "such data as will show that the appeal was perfected on time." When the trial court vacates or sets aside its original decision of dismissal and amendatory order by an order for new trial and after holding the new trial issues a second order of dismissal, the reglementary period for perfection of appeal is counted not on the basis of the original decision of dismissal nor of the amendatory order but commences anew from the second and final order of dismissal.
Petitioner and eleven (11) private respondents are plaintiff-appellant and defendants-appellees, respectively, in an ordinary consolidated appeal1from the adverse consolidated decision rendered be Judge Pedro C. Navarro of the Rizal court of first instance in eleven (11) separate civil cases for recovery of possession of petitioner's duly titled parcel of land in Mandaluyong, Rizal2filed by petitioner against each of said respondents who had allegedly illegally built their houses on her property.
The cases were jointly heard (respondents having filed identical answers to the complaints through one and the same counsel and the issues being identical) and the trial court rendered a consolidated decision.ℒαwρhi৷
Petitioner's voluminous record on appeal was approved without objection on December 23, 1972 by the trial courts3and in due course petitioner submitted to the Court of Appeals the printed record on appeal totalling three hundred and eighty (380) pages and ninety-one (91) separate items of pleadings, motions and orders related to the appealed judgment and amendatory orders.
OnAugust 15, 1974,respondent appellate court through its Sixth Division,4(after a previous motion to dismiss appeal filed by respondents on October 11, 1973 had failed with a Special division of Five4* which after first ordering the dismissal by a split vote, later unanimously ordered reinstatement of the appeal) granted per its extended Resolution of August 15, 1974 a so-called "urgent joint omnibus motion" filed by respondents on April 12, 1974 which merely reiterated the same grounds for dismissal already rejected in effect by the Special Division of Five in an earlier Resolution of April 3, 1974. Respondent court denied reconsideration per its Resolution of September 17, 1974.
Hence, the present petition for review. The Court per its Resolution of December 6, 1974 resolved to treat the petition as a special civil action and respondents' sixty-page comment with annexes as their answer to the petition in order to dispense with the need and expense of filing of briefs and to expedite the disposition of the simple procedural and legal issues involved.
There is no dispute as to the material dates and data of petitioner's perfection of her appeal, as evidenced by the printed Record on Appeal, as may be seen from the followingstatement:
On June 2, 1971, petitioner received copy of the trial court's adverse decision datedMay 26, 1971in favor of respondents,dismissingall the complaints;5
On June 17, 1971, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial of theoriginalDecision of May 26, 1971;6
On July 2, 1971, petitioner received copy of the trial court's Amendatory Order datedJune 21, 1971(partially granting anEx-parteMotion for Clarification and/or Modification of the Decision with Petition for Writ of Execution filed earlier by respondents on June 5, 1971without serviceon petitioner 7) wherein the trial courtsubstantiallymodified its original decision by directing the Rizal Register of Deeds to cancel petitioner's torrens title to the property and to issue new titles in favor of respondents, in addition to its original judgment which merelydismissedthe complaints;8
On July 23, 19719(notJuly 26, 1971 as erroneously stated by respondent appellate court in its decision) petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Amendatory Order of June 21, 1971;
On July 26, 1971, petitioner received copy of the trial court's Orderdated July 17, 1971 grantingher original Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial of June 17, 1971,supra,and setting the case "forreception of newly discovered evidenceon September 23, 1971 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning;"10
OnOctober 5, 1972,petitioner received copy of the trial court'ssecondandfinalAmendatory Orderdated September 15, 1972(after it had reopened the case and received petitioner's newly discovered evidence) wherein the trial court: —
— categorically set aside its original Amendatory Order of June 21, 1971 ordering the cancellation of petitioner's torrens title and the issuance of new titles in respondents' favor; .
— revived or reaffirmed its original decision of May 26, 1971 "insofar as it denies the ejectment of the present occupants of the land" (respondents), which dismissed the complaints;11
On October 12, 1972 (or seven days after service of the second and final Amendatory Order of dismissal of September 15, 1972), petitioner filed a Consolidated Notice of Appeal dated October 7, 1972 and tendered an appeal bond in the sum of P120.00;12
On the next day, October 13, 1972, petitioner paid in cash the prescribed P120.-appeal bond, making of record the official receipt number;13
On November 11, 1972, respondents filed a lengthy "Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Extension to Record on Appeal and Motion for Execution" dated November 7, 1972, praying that petitioner's Motion for Extension of Time to file Record on Appeal datedOctober 10, 1972(such date of petitioner's motion for extension of time is expressly stated in respondents' Opposition) be denied "for lack of merit;"14
On November 29, 1972, petitioner received copy of the trial court's Orderdated November 17, 1972granting petitioner "over the objection of counsel for the defendants ... anextension of thirty days from this datewithin which to submit her record on appeal;"15
OnDecember 15, 1972,or two days before the expiration of theextended deadlineon December 17, 1972, petitioner filed her voluminous Record on Appeal for the approval of the trial court; 16 and .
On December 23, 1972 at the scheduled hearing on the Record on Appeal, the trial court issued its Order of the same date approving the same "there beingno oppositionto the Record on Appeal" and ordering its elevation to the Court of Appeals. 17 As already stated above, the same was thereafter dulyprintedand filed with the appellate court, containing a total of 380 pages and 91 separate items.
Respondent court dismissed the appeal on two grounds: itserroneous premisethat the period for appeal be computed from service on petitioner on July 2, 1971 of thediscardedAmendatory Order of June 21, 1971 instead of from the service on October 5, 1972 of thesecondandfinalorder of dismissal ofSeptember 15, 1972and its equally erroneous ruling that petitioner's Record on Appeal did not comply with the material data rule simply because petitioner's motion for extension of time to file Record on Appeal was not reproduced therein, notwithstanding that respondents' lengthy opposition thereto, and the trial court's order of November 17, 1972 granting petitioner aspecific 30-day extensionof time from said date were reproduced in full therein together with the order of December 23, 1972 approvingwithout oppositionthe same as filedtwo days aheadof the extended deadline, all of which material data appearon the faceof the Record on Appeal, as shown above.
Respondent court's dismissal of the appeal should therefore be set aside, as prayed for in the petition.
1. A mere reading of thestatementof material dates and data shows manifestly that contrary to respondent court's erroneous premises and computation, petitioner duly and timely perfected her appeal within the reglementary period and in compliance with the material data rule that the Record on Appeal state "such data as will show that the appeal was perfected on time."18
The established principle as stated in Rule 37, section 5 is that by the granting of a new trial "theoriginal judgmentshall bevacated,and the action shall stand fortrial de novo."19
Here, the trial court granted new trial for the reception of newly discovered evidence per its Order ofJuly 17, 1971,which therebyvacatedand effectively swept away and rendered without effect (until its issuance of a definitive decision or orderafterthe new trial) its original decision of May 26, 1971 as well as its Amendatory Order of June 21, 1971.
Petitioner's period for appeal therefore commencedonlyfrom and after service onOctober 5, 1972of the trial court's determinativesecondandfinalAmendatory Order ofSeptember 15, 1972.As already shown above, petitioner timely filed her Notice of Appeal and tendered the appeal bondon the 7th day afterreceipt of such final order and filed her Record on Appeal two daysaheadof the extended deadline granted her per the trial court's order of November 17, 1972.
(Respondent court's computation of the period for appeal using thediscardedAmendatory Order of June 21, 1971 as the base Order appealed from and its service onJuly 2, 1971on petitioner as the starting point is therefore patently erroneous. This first Amendatory Order of June 21, 1971 which ordered the cancellation of petitioner's titles in favor of respondents was expresslydiscardedand set aside by the trial court'ssecondandfinalorder of dismissal ofSeptember 15, 1972and was thereby completely wiped away and of no force and effect, such that it could no longer be the object of petitioner's appeal.
(Respondent court came up with the computation that petitioner's notice of appeal filed on the 7th day (October 12, 1972) after service onOctober 5, 1972of thesecondandfinalAmendatory Order ofSeptember 15, 1972(after "tacking 24 days" that petitioner had "used up" when she filed her motion for reconsideration of saiddiscardedAmendatory Order) "was filed one (1) day late, the 30-day period having ended on October 11, 1972." Even usingarguendorespondent court's erroneous premise that suchdiscardedAmendatory Order was the base order appealed from and assuming that the "tacking" principle were applicable, the record shows that it further erredfactuallyin "tacking24 days" since petitioner had only used up 21 days having filed her motion for reconsideration of saiddiscardedorder onJuly 23, 1971(and not on July 26, 1971 as mis-stated by respondent court) and therefore, the notice of appeal was filed not one (1) day lateas wrongly computedby said court but on the 28th day ortwo (2) days aheadof the expiration of the 30-day period.)
2. However, as already shown above, respondent court was in complete error in using the discarded Amendatory Order of June 21, 1971 as the basis for computing the period for appeal, since such amendatory order and the original decision of dismissal were wiped away completely and renderedfunctus oficioby the trial court's order ofJuly 17, 1971granting petitioner anew trialfor the reception of newly discovered evidence.
In the language of the analogous case ofLucas vs. Mariano,20the order of new trial "wiped away completely the previously ordered dismissal of the case" giving rise to "the emergence of a new period for appeal," such that "if after a restudy, the judge deemed it proper to order again a dismissal, thislater dismissalmust be considered as anewly appealableorder and the period for its appeal must be correspondingly computed from the date of its service as prescribed by the rules."
Hence where the trial court dismiss a complaint in a decision or order, then on motion for reconsideration sets it aside and orders a new trial or pre-trial as the case may be, and later acting upon a motion for reconsideration of the second order, again orders the dismissal of the complaint (as inLucas) or issues an amendatory order amending its decision which it vacates and proceeds to the new trial after which it issues asecondandfinalorder expressly discarding the first amendatory order but again ordering the dismissal of the complaint, (as in the case at bar) the 30-day reglementary period for appeal is countednoton the basis of the first order of dismissal nor of the amendatory order but commencesanewfrom thesecondorder of dismissal. The trial court's order setting aside the first order of dismissal or vacating the same with the order for a new trial wiped away and erased completely the previously ordered dismissal of the complaint, giving rise to theemergence of a new period for appealwhich is computed anew from the date of service of thesecond order of dismissal.
3. The second ground cited by respondent court for dismissing the appeal was that "as can be gathered from page 360, Item 89 of the printed record on appeal, plaintiff-appellant had filed a motion for extension of time to file record on appeal. However, this motion was not reproduced in said printed record on appeal. Likewise, there is no such motion in the original (typewritten) record on appeal. There is not even an allegation when it was filed.
Respondent court's statement is only half-correct. As shown in the detailed statement of material dates and data,supra,the Record on Appeal reproduces as Item 89 thereof the lengthy opposition of respondents to petitioner'smotion for extension of timeto file Record on Appeal datedOctober 10, 1972(5 days after service of the second and final dismissal order). The opposition covered about every conceivable ground butnotthat the motion for extension was not timely filed.21
The Record on Appeal further reproduces as Item 90 the trial court's order of November 17, 1972 granting petitioner a "last" and only extension of 30 days from said date for the purpose over the objection of respondents, as well as a last item the trial court's order of approval of the Record on Appeal as filed within the extended deadlinewithoutopposition on respondents' part, despite due notice and hearing.
There was clearly then substantial if not literal compliance with the material data rule, because the Record on Appeal does showon its facethat petitioner didtimelyfile a motion for extension of time to file Record on Appeal which the trial court granted over the adamant objection of respondents and that petitioner did file the voluminous Record on Appeal well within the extended deadline granted her.
The teaching ofBerkenkotter vs. Court of Appeals22is controlling in the case at bar. There, the Court unanimously set aside the appellate court's dismissal of the appeal and held that "petitioner filed his record on appeal within the period of time requested and although no order of approval nor denial of theex-partemotion for extension was issued, the Order of the Court on November 14, 1972, approving the notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal amounts to and should be construed as a ratification or approval of the motion for extension."
Petitioner's position in the case at bar is much stronger for here not only is the fact of the timely filing of her motion for extension implicitly admitted in respondents' opposition as reproduced in the Record on Appeal, but the order of the trial courtgrantingthe 30-day extension and the fact of the filing of the Record on Appealtwo days aheadof the expiration of the extended deadline are likewise reproduced and shownon the faceof the Record on Appeal.
The rationale ofBerkenkotteris fully applicable to the case at bar,mutatis mutandis,as follows:
... What decisively matters is that the motion for extension of time to file the record on appeal is filed before the expiration of the 30-day period prescribed by the rules. InValero v. CA, et al,L-36667, June 29, 1973, this Court, through Mr. Justice Barredo, sustained the petitioner's claim that he appealed on time, considering that the record on appeal was filed within the extended period given to her upon motion filed before the expiration of the reglementary period but approval of which was granted thereafter. It may not be amiss to state here that although there is no vested right in technicalities (Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315), in meritorious cases like the present case a liberal (not literal) interpretation of the rules becomes imperative and Technicalities should not be resorted to inderogation of the intent and purpose of the rules — the proper and just determination of a litigation (Ronquillo vs. Marasigan 5 SCRA 312).
x x x x x x x x x
... The mere absence of a formal order granting the motion for extension of time to file the record on appeal should not be fatal to the petitioner if the record on appeal filed within the requested extension period was approved by the Courta quo.As previously stated, the approval thereof carries with it the approval of the motion for extension and the mere failure of the record on appeal to show such approval should not defeat the right to appeal. No trial Judge in his right mind and who is aware of the serious responsibilities of his office, would approve a record on appeal that was not timely filed. There is every reason, therefore, to apply the principle of substantial justice to the instant case for the following considerations: first, the court is given the discretion to extend the period for filing the record on appeal, notice of appeal and appeal bond, provided the notice for extension of time is filed within the 30-day reglementary period; second, there is every reason to assume that the record on appeal was "filed on time" because it was approved after due hearing by the Court in its Order dated November 14, 1972; and last, but not the least, considering the merits of the case, to dismiss petitioner's appeal would not serve the ends of justice.
4. As indicated in the earlier part of this opinion, supra, 23 the Court has notedmotu propiothat respondents' motion to dismiss appeal had previously failed before a Special Division of Five of respondent court, which by a split 3 to 2 vote first ordered the dismissal of the appeal24"on the sole ground that the appeal bond of (P120.00) was insufficient"25and upon petitioner's motion for reconsiderationunanimouslyset aside the dismissal and ordered reinstatement of all the dismissed appeals upon petitioner's posting an additional amount of P1,200.00 as appeal bond per its resolution ofApril 3, 1974.
While petitioner hasnotraised the question which after all is moot because of this Court's disposition on the merits in her favor, it should be noted that the competence and jurisdiction of respondent court's regular Sixth Division (composed of three members,supra,26; to act on respondents' so-called "urgent joint omnibus motion" of April 12, 1974 (reiteratingthe same grounds for dismissal already earlier rejected in effect by the Special Division of Five) and to order thedismissalof the appeal after the Special Division of Five hadunanimouslyordered itsreinstatementare open to grave doubt — since it is not conducive to the proper administration of justice that a division of three members of respondent court should appear to overrule theunanimousaction of a Special Division of Five.
ACCORDINGLY,judgment is hereby rendered setting aside respondent court's resolutions of August 15, 1974 and September 17, 1974 and reinstating the eleven appealed cases and remanding the same to respondent Court of Appeals for proper proceedings and disposition on the merits. With costs against private respondents. SO ORDERED.
Castro (Chairman), Makasiar, Esguerra and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur.
Footnotes