G.R. No. L-34636 - Jose R. Oliveros vs. Onofre A. Villaluz, et al. Concurring and Dissenting OpinionJustice Castro & Justice Esguerra Concurring OpinionJustice Fernando & Justice Barredo

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-34636 May 30, 1974

JOSE R. OLIVEROS,petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.

Coronel Law Office for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Hector C. Fule and Solicitor Jose F. Racela, Jr. for respondents.

TEEHANKEE,J.:

In setting respondent court's order of January 26, 1972 convicting petitioner of contempt of court and sentencing him to four months imprisonment and to pay a fine of P300.00 for having assumed office as mayor of Antipolo, Rizal since January 1, 1972 for thenewterm (1972- 1975) to which he had been re-elected on the ground that this was willful disobedience of respondent court's order of September 25, 1971 which suspended him from the same office of mayor of Antipolo, Rizal during his previous term (1968-1971), the Court holds that the challenged order ofJanuary 26, 1972ruling that its suspension order of September 25, 1971 was "still subsisting" and applied to petitioner's new term of office to which he had been re-electedanew(beginning on January 1, 1972) cannot beretroactivelyapplied against petitioner in thecriminalcontempt proceedings.

The suspension order of September 25, 1971 suspending petitioner mayor from office covered only his then current term of office (January 1, 1968 to December 31, 1971) and no other term. Petitioner's reelection to the same office of mayor of Antipolo for a new term (January 1, 1972 to December 31, 1975) despite his pending anti-graft criminal case (by virtue whereof the suspension order was issued against him) was concededly an eventuality and an uncertain and unknownfutureeventnotcontemplated or covered by the suspension order. Hence, he should not be held guilty of having "willfully and deliberately disobeyedthe suspension order" when his act of assumption of office as mayor for a new term after his reelection by the electorate of Antipolo wasnot prohibitednor evencontemplatedin the said suspension order.

On September 25, 1971 after due notice and hearing as ordered by this Court in an earlier case,1respondent court issued its order upholding the validity of the information for violation of section 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act 3019 filed on March 31, 1971 against petitioner as accused2and directing that "the accused Mayor Jose Rentoria Oliveros of Antipolo, Rizal, is hereby ordered SUSPENDED pursuant to section 13, of Republic Act No. 3019, from office within twenty-four hours from receipt of this Order." Petitioner duly complied with the suspension order and ceased to hold office thereafter.

In the general elections of November 8, 1971, however, petitioner ran for re-election and despite the pending criminalanti-graftcharge against him and his suspension from office won re-election and was duly proclaimed mayor-elect of Antipolo, Rizal for anewterm beginning January 1, 1972 and ending December 31, 1975. Pursuant to the mandate of the Election Code of 1971 (Republic Act 6388)3petitioner took his oath of office and entered upon the performance of his duties as re-elected mayor of Antipolo on January 1, 1972.

On January 17, 1972, respondent People through the state prosecutor filed a contempt petition against petitioner, asserting that petitioner's act of "taking over once again the functions of the office of mayor in the face of a suspension order [of September 25, 1971] constitutes grave disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order" and that his assumption of office was "illegal and improper ... deliberately with grave abuse of authority and in open defiance of the order of this Honorable Court."4

Respondent court after hearing rejected Petitioner's answer and pleas that he acted only in obedience to the mandate of the people of Antipolo who re-elected him to anewterm of mayor altogether different and distinct from his previous expired term during which he was ordered suspended and issued its challenged order of January 26, 1972 declaring that "the order of suspension dated September 25, 1971 is still subsisting and that accused is still under suspension" and finding petitioner guilty of contempt of court.

Reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition. The Court thereupon issued its order of February 4, 1972 restraining enforcement and implementation of the challenged order of January 26, 1972 until further orders.

I

The first question presented for determination is whether a criminal offense for violation of Republic Act 3019 committed by an elective officer during one term may be the basis of his suspension in a subsequent term in the event of his re-election to office.

Petitioner concedes that "the power and authority of respondent judge to continue trying the criminal case against petitioner may not in any way be affected by the fact of petitioner's re-election," but contends that "said respondent's power to preventively suspend petitioner under section 13 of Republic Act 3019 became inefficacious upon petitioner's re-election"5arguing that the power of the courts cannot be placed over that of sovereign and supreme people who ordained his return to office.

Petitioner's reliance on the loose language used inPascual vs. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija6that "each term is separate from other terms and that the re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor" is misplaced.

The Court has in subsequent cases made it clear that thePascualruling (which dealt with administrative liability) applies exclusively toadministrativeand not tocriminalliability and sanctions.ℒαwρhi৷Thus, inIngco vs. Sanchez7the Court ruled that there-electionof a public officer for a new term doesnotin any manner wipe out thecriminalliability incurred by him in a previous term.

InLuciano vs. Provincial Governor8the Court stressed that the cases ofPascualandLizaresare authority for the precept that "a re-elected public officer is no longer amenable toadministrativesanctions for acts committed during his former tenure" but that as tocriminalprosecutions, particularly, for violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as in the case at bar, the same are not barred by re-election of the public officer, since,inter alia, one of the penalties attached to the offense is perpetualdisqualificationfrom public office and it "is patently offensive to the objectives and the letter of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act ... that an official may amass wealth thru graft and corrupt practices and thereafter use the same to purchase re-election and thion 13 which reads as follows: . — have been filed against him.

Makasiar, J., concurs.. . . .— against him." (Rep. Act 3019).

Castro, concurring and dissenting:ASTRO2, January 26, 1965, pp. 19-20.., pp. 26-29.., pp. 29-31.., p. 32.., pp. 103-105.. 12, February 9, 1965, p. 211.., pp. 213-214.., pp. 219-220.., p. 221.27 Id., pp. 240-241.30 Id., 29 Id., 28 Id., 34 Id., p. 328.

Fernando, J., concurring :

ESGUERRA, J., concurring and dissenting :BARREDO, J., concurring:

sundesirableremained or causes beyond his control."m can be deemed to apply only to hisadministrativeand not to hiscriminalguilt. As succinctly stated in then Solicitor General (now Associate Justice) Felix Q. Antonio's memorandum for the State, "to hold that petitioner's re-election erased his criminal liability would in effect transfer the determination of the criminal culpability of an erring official from the court to which it was lodged by law into the changing and transient whim and caprice of the electorate. This cannot be so, for while his constituents may condone the misdeed of a corrupt official by returning him back to office, a criminal action initiated against the latter can only be heard and tried by a court of justice, his nefarious act having been committed against the very State whose laws he had sworn to faithfully obey and uphold. A contrary rule would erode the very system upon which our government is based, which is one of laws and not of men."9

Since the criminal prosecution against petitioner-accused is concededly not abated by the fact of his re-election, the pendency of such criminal case under a valid information under Republic Act 3019 may clearly be and supplies the legal basis for his suspension from office in a subsequent term in the event of his re-election by virtue of the provisions of section 13 of the Act.10

II

This brings us to the second and principal question of whether respondent court's suspension order of September 25, 1971 issued during hisexpiredterm as mayor (1968-1971) automatically applied to a new term to which petitioner mayor was re-elected (1972-1975) such as to warrant and justify respondent court's challenged order of January 26, 1972 finding him guilty of contempt of court for having "willfully disobeyed" the said suspension order by assuming on January 1, 1972 the office to which he had been re-elected as ordained by the Election Code under pain of forfeiture of his right thereto.

There could benosuch automatic application or extension of the suspension order of September 25, 1971 to anewterm to which petitioner was re-elected in the 1971 elections. At worst, petitioner cannot be held guilty of willful disobedience of the suspension order for having assumed the office to which he wasreelectedwhen such actcontingentupon his reelection was not even prohibited, much less specified in the suspension order.

From its very terms, the suspension order covered and contemplated only petitioner's thencurrentterm of office to which he was elected (beginning January 1, 1968 andending December 31, 1971) and no other term. As conceded in the dissenting opinion, "he could not have been ordered suspended for his new term because at the time the order was issued there was no absolute certainty that he would run for reelection and been re-elected."11

If petitioner had not run for reelection or if he had lost in his bid for reelection, the suspension order would have lapsed and becomefunctus officioby virtue of theexpirationof his term. He would no longer have any office from which he would remainsuspended, or to which he could bereinstatedin the event of acquittal. If petitioner had run for entirely new office, say the governorship of the province and was duly elected thereto, it could not be contended that the suspension order (from office asmayor) would automatically attach to this entirelynewoffice asgovernorsuch that his assumption of the new office would constitute contempt of court and a willful violation of the suspension order.

The State's argument that the suspension order was not perforce limited to petitioner's term of office (1968-1971) and should be deemed to attach automatically to his new term (1972-1975) althoughnotoriginally covered nor contemplated thereby is anchored on the provision of section 13 of Republic Act 3019 that the suspended officer shall be entitled to "reinstatementand to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receiveduring suspension" in the event of acquittal from the charge. This provision reinforces petitioner's position, that it refers to thecurrentterm of the suspended officer (and not to a future unknown and uncertainnewtermunlesssupplemented by anewsuspension order in the event of re-election) for if his term shall have expired at the time of acquittal, he would obviously be no longer entitled to reinstatement; otherwise, it would lead to the absurd result that a suspended officer, notwithstanding the fact that his term of office has long lapsed and he has been succeeded in office by others would also invoke the provisionsliterallyand claim the right toreinstatementandsalariesandbenefitsupon his acquittal.

Respondent court in its challenged order ofJanuary 26, 1972holding petitioner criminally liable for contempt, correctly stated that the issues before it were whether "(petitioner's) suspension (from the office of mayor of Antipolo, Rizal, under the original order ofSeptember 5, 1971) necessarilyendedalso with theterminationof histermof office onDecember 31, 1971; andwhether or notthe accused (petitioner) isstill under suspension."12

It adversely resolved these issues against petitioner by declaring its "opinion" that its original suspension order of September 25, 1971" isstillsubsisting and that accused isstillundersuspension."13andretroactivelyapplied its opinion and held petitioner guilty of contempt of court for having been of the contrary opinion and for having honestly believed that the suspension order could not, as the Court hereby holds that it didnot, applyautomaticallyto the new term to which he had been re-elected as mayor which wasnot coverednorcontemplatedby the suspension order.

Under these circumstances, respondent court's challenged order was violative of substantive due process and deprived petitioner of the benefit of the doubt to which he is entitled in criminal contempt proceedings in holding that petitioner in having assumed office on January 1, 1972 for the new term as mayor to which he had been re-elected willfully and deliberately disobeyed the suspension order and thereby incurred liability for contempt of court.

First, the court's challenged order ofJanuary 26, 1972ruling that its suspension order of September 25, 1971 was "still subsisting" and applied to petitioner's new term for the office to which he had been electedanew(beginning onJanuary 1, 1972) couldnotberetroactivelyapplied against petitioner in thecriminalcontempt proceedings without violating theex post factoprinciple.

Secondly, the issue at bar,viz, as to whether the suspension order issued under Republic Act 3019 during one termautomaticallyapplies to anewterm to which the suspended official may be re-elected, is one offirst impression. Upon the filing of the petition at bar, the Court issued its order of February 4, 1972 restraining the enforcement of the challenged order of January 26, 1972, due to the newness and importance of the questions presented. There do exist reasonable and logical grounds against such an interpretation ofautomaticapplication of the suspension order to anewterm, as herein discussed, which militate against holding petitioner guilty ofcriminalcontempt. Thus, even if it were assumedarguendothat the suspension order could be automatically applied to the new term, the very existence of strong reasons to the contrary rules out a willful and contumacious disobedience of the order calling for punitive action against petitioner. If the suspension order were at all clear and unambiguous, respondent court would not have needed to declare that its suspension order didnotend with the termination of petitioner's term of office on December 31, 1971 and was "still subsisting"; hence it could not properly hold petitioner guilty of contumacious misconduct fornotunderstanding its extent and of willful disobedience of an order that wasnotclear and unambiguous in the first place and about whose importnoteven the members ofthis Courtare in full agreement.

Thirdly, the Court has consistently held that "(T)he power to punish for contempt should be used sparingly, with caution, deliberation and with due regard to the provisions of the law and the constitutional rights of the individual. Courts should be slow in jailing people for non-compliance with their orders. Only in cases ofclear and contumacious refusal to obey, should said power be exercised"14and the power should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle.15

Here, a strong case for petitioner's beliefin bona fidethat the suspension order of September 25, 1971 was not applicable to thenewterm of office to which he was subsequently re-elected has been made out. Petitioner has reason to complain that the suspension order didnotprohibit him from assuming the office to which he was re-elected — which re-election was concededly an eventually not contemplated or covered by the said order — and hence he should not be held guilty of havingwillfullyanddeliberatelydisobeyedthe suspension order when he performed the act (of assuming office as mayor for anewterm) which wasnotprohibited nor evencontemplatedin the order.

Fourthly, since petitionerdidrun for re-election and was elected to anewterm of office, (January 1, 1972 to December 31, 1975), the proper recourse of the Statewas notto petition the lower court to declare petitioner incontemptof the original suspension order ofSeptember 5, 1971for having assumed the office and entered into the performance of his duties for thenewterm pursuant to his re-election, but to secure asupplementalordersuspendinganewpetitioner from the office of mayor of Antipolo, Rizal, to which he had been re-elected for a new term beginningJanuary 1, 1972, by virtue of the mandatory provisions of section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 requiring his suspension from office during the pendency of the criminal prosecution against him for violation of said Act. This in effect was what the lower court did when it ruled per its challenged order of January 26, 1972 that notwithstanding petitioner's re-election, "the suspension is also deemed to continue during the entire pendency of said case" — although it went beyond its jurisdictional authority and further imposed a 4-month jail sentence and P300.-fine upon petitioner forcriminalcontempt of court.

In fine, then, while the pending criminal prosecution for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 committed by an elective officer during one term may be the basis of his suspension in a subsequent term if he is re-elected to the same office, such suspension must be issuedanewupon a supplementalorder. As held inLuciano,supra, such suspension is mandatory but not self-operative under section 13 of the Act and must be ordered by the court where the criminal case is pending. Here, since the validity of the information was already previously determined and the criminal case is admittedlypendingand has not resulted in acquittal, the court is called upon to issueanewa supplemental order of suspension once it has verified the supplemental event of the accused'sre-electionto office. There having beennosuch supplemental order of suspension issued in the case at bar, save for the challenged order of January 26, 1972 which cannot beretroactivelyheld against petitioner, respondent court's sentence of contempt against petitioner was issued with grave abuse of discretion and must be set aside.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent court's order of January 26, 1972, declaring petitioner "guilty of contempt of court under Rule 71" and sentencing him "to four months imprisonment and to pay a fine of P300.00" is hereby annulled and set aside.

The petition is however dismissed insofar as it prays for annulment of the portion of the order "declaring him to be under suspension until the present and for the entire duration of the pendency of the case against him", such new suspension to take effect upon finality of this judgment.

No pronouncement as to costs.

Zaldivar, Fernandez, Muñoz Palma, and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Antonio, J., took no part.

Footnotes