1971 / Oct

G.R. No. L-20442 - OCTOBER 1971 - PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE CASE NUMBERCASE TITLE G.R. No. L-20442October 4, 1971 Ciriaco Robles vs. Yap Wing Concurring OpinionJustice Fernando, Justice Teehankee, Justice Catro G.R. No. L-21289October 4, 1971 Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration G.R. No. L-22480October 4, 1971 Carlos Moran Sison, et al. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue G.R. No. L-23559October 4, 1971 Aurelio G. Briones vs. Primitivo P. Cammayo, et al. Dissenting OpinionJustice Castro Concurring OpinionJustice Barredo G.R. No. L-26112October 4, 1971 Republic, et al. vs. Jaime De Los Angeles, et al. Concurring OpinionJustice Barredo Dissenting OpinionJustice Teehankee Dissenting OpinionChief Justice Concepcion G.R. No. L-29025October 4, 1971 Moises P. Palisoc, et al. vs. Antonio C. Brillantes, et al. Separate OpinionJustice Reyes, Justice Makalintal G.R. No. L-29352October 4, 1971 Emerito M. Ramos, et al. vs. Central Bank of the Philippines Separate OpinionJustice Fernando, Justice Makalintal & Justice Castro G.R. No. L-30558October 4, 1971 Rice and Corn Administration vs. Mariano Ong Ante, et al. G.R. No. L-32068October 4, 1971 Republic vs. Enrique Medina, et al. Concurring OpinionJustice Castro G.R. No. L-34150October 16, 1971 Arturo M. Tolentino vs. Commission on Elections, et al. Separate OpinionJustice Makalintal Concurring OpinionJustice Reyes J.B.L., Zaldivar, Castro and Makasiar Concurring & Dissenting OpinionJustice Fernando A.M. No. 194-JOctober 22, 1971 Secretary of Justice vs. Abdulwahid A. Bidin G.R. No. L-30610October 22, 1971 People of the Philippines vs. Juan Bartolay, et al. G.R. No. L-30828October 22, 1971 Gregorio B. Moraleja vs. Lorenzo Relova, et al. G.R. Nos. L-34164-79October 25, 1971 Florencio Bernabe vs. Benjamin H. Aquino G.R. No. L-13250October 29, 1971 Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Antonio Campos Rueda G.R. No. L-21325October 29, 1971 People of the Philippines vs. Pableo Dramayo, et al. G.R. No. L-23444October 29, 1971 Philippine Education Co., Inc. vs. Manila Port Service G.R. No. L-24778October 29, 1971 William Lines, Inc. vs. Clariza Mondragon Sañopal G.R. No. L-24861October 29, 1971 St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company vs. United States Lines Company, et al. G.R. No. L-26519October 29, 1971 Carlos Cruz vs. Philippine Association Labor Unions (Paflu) G.R. No. L-26938October 29, 1971 Roman Ozaeta, Jr., et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. Nos. L-27897-98 October 29, 1971 Lorenzo Ignacio, et al. vs. Court of First Instance of Bulacan, et al. G.R. No. L-28722October 29, 1971 Imperial Insurance, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. L-29190 October 29, 1971 People of the Philippines vs. Feliciano Guba G.R. No. L-29570 October 29, 1971 People of the Philippines vs. Enrique Sollano, Jr., et al. G.R. No. L-29666 October 29, 1971 Pfoples Bank and Trust Company vs. Jose Maria Tambunting, et al. G.R. No. L-29805October 29, 1971 Teodoro R. Lerma, Etc. vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, et al. G.R. No. L-30573October 29, 1971 Vicente M. Domingo, et al. vs. Gregorio M. Domingo, et al. G.R. No. L-30772October 29, 1971 Phil. National Railways vs. Felix R. Domingo G.R. No. L-30946 October 29, 1971 Republic vs. Manolo L. Maddela, et al. G.R. No. L-31620 October 29, 1971 Generoso Villanueva Transportation Co., Inc. vs. Hector G. Moya, et al. G.R. No. L-32109October 29, 1971 Republic vs. Bartolome Lim, et al. G.R. No. L-32994October 29, 1971 People of the Philippines vs. Gaudencio Ingco G.R. No. L-33085October 29, 1971 Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. Juan Calma G.R. No. L-33624October 29, 1971 Pivgeth Industries and Development Corporation vs. Jesus De Veyra G.R. No. L-34156 and L-34158October 29, 1971 Alejandro C. Siazon vs. Presiding Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court, 16th Judicial District Davao City, et al. G.R. No. L-34253October 29, 1971 Luz Batioco, et al. vs. Pedro Jl. Bautista, et al. G.R. No. L-26662 October 30, 1971 People of the Philippines vs. Ernesto Kipte, et al. G.R. No. L-34254 October 30, 1971. Jose P. Buenviaje, et al. vs. Benjamin H. Aquino, et al The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation, Inc. Ciriaco Robles vs. Yap Wing Concurring OpinionJustice Fernando, Justice Teehankee, Justice Catro Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration Carlos Moran Sison, et al. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Aurelio G. Briones vs. Primitivo P. Cammayo, et al. Dissenting OpinionJustice Castro Concurring OpinionJustice Barredo Republic, et al. vs. Jaime De Los Angeles, et al. Concurring OpinionJustice Barredo Dissenting OpinionJustice Teehankee Dissenting OpinionChief Justice Concepcion Moises P. Palisoc, et al. vs. Antonio C. Brillantes, et al. Separate OpinionJustice Reyes, Justice Makalintal Emerito M. Ramos, et al. vs. Central Bank of the Philippines Separate OpinionJustice Fernando, Justice Makalintal & Justice Castro Rice and Corn Administration vs. Mariano Ong Ante, et al. Republic vs. Enrique Medina, et al. Concurring OpinionJustice Castro Arturo M. Tolentino vs. Commission on Elections, et al. Separate OpinionJustice Makalintal Concurring OpinionJustice Reyes J.B.L., Zaldivar, Castro and Makasiar Concurring & Dissenting OpinionJustice Fernando Secretary of Justice vs. Abdulwahid A. Bidin People of the Philippines vs. Juan Bartolay, et al. Gregorio B. Moraleja vs. Lorenzo Relova, et al. Florencio Bernabe vs. Benjamin H. Aquino Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Antonio Campos Rueda People of the Philippines vs. Pableo Dramayo, et al. Philippine Education Co., Inc. vs. Manila Port Service William Lines, Inc. vs. Clariza Mondragon Sañopal St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company vs. United States Lines Company, et al. Carlos Cruz vs. Philippine Association Labor Unions (Paflu) Roman Ozaeta, Jr., et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. Lorenzo Ignacio, et al. vs. Court of First Instance of Bulacan, et al. Imperial Insurance, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. People of the Philippines vs. Feliciano Guba People of the Philippines vs. Enrique Sollano, Jr., et al. Pfoples Bank and Trust Company vs. Jose Maria Tambunting, et al. Teodoro R. Lerma, Etc. vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, et al. Vicente M. Domingo, et al. vs. Gregorio M. Domingo, et al. Phil. National Railways vs. Felix R. Domingo Republic vs. Manolo L. Maddela, et al. Generoso Villanueva Transportation Co., Inc. vs. Hector G. Moya, et al. Republic vs. Bartolome Lim, et al. People of the Philippines vs. Gaudencio Ingco Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. Juan Calma Pivgeth Industries and Development Corporation vs. Jesus De Veyra Alejandro C. Siazon vs. Presiding Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court, 16th Judicial District Davao City, et al. Luz Batioco, et al. vs. Pedro Jl. Bautista, et al. People of the Philippines vs. Ernesto Kipte, et al. Jose P. Buenviaje, et al. vs. Benjamin H. Aquino, et al The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation, Inc.

G.R. No. L-20442, October 4, 1971,
♦ Decision,Makalintal, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion,Fernando, Teehankee, Catro [JJ]


Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-20442 October 4, 1971

CIRIACO ROBLES,plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
YAP WING,defendant-appellee.

Gerardo P. Moreno, Jr. for plaintiff-appellant.

Pauline Manongdo for defendant-appellee.


MAKALINTAL,J.:

Appeal informa pauperistaken by the plaintiff from the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated September 12, 1962, dismissing the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

The allegations of the complaint, which for purposes of the motion to dismiss were deemed admitted, are as follows: that the plaintiff was employee by defendant in its contracting business; that on July 6, 1961 at about 1:30 p.m. while plaintiff was dismantling lumber brace in the construction of a bodega which defendant undertook to construct, defendant negligently failed to provide safety measures within the construction premises, as a result of which a piece of lumber fell and hit plaintiff on the head, causing him physical injuries; that immediately thereafter plaintiff was taken to a medical clinic, where he remained unconscious for several hours; that defendant defrayed Plaintiff's medical expenses; that since then plaintiff was unable to work, thereby losing his expected earning at an average of P39.00 a week or a total of P2,340.00, more or less, up to the filing of the complaint; that because of the physical injuries sustained by plaintiff due to defendant's negligence, he suffered mental anguish, anxiety, fright and pain; and that because he was compelled to hire the services of a lawyer he is entitled to recover attorney's fees.

In his answer defendant alleged by way of affirmative defense that plaintiff's claim is one for disability resulting from an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment and thus pertains to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workmen's Compensation Commission. Upon defendant's motion for a preliminary hearing on the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the lower court (which was actually a motion to dismiss) and after plaintiff had filed its opposition thereto, the lower court dismissed plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff moved to reconsider alleging that his claim was for actual damages under Articles 1711 and 1712 of the New Civil Code and not a claim for compensation under Act No. 3428, otherwise known as the Workmen's Compensation Act. The motion to reconsider was denied; hence, this appeal.

The lone issue before us for resolution is whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff's complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Before the enactment of Republic Act No. 772 (amending Act No. 3428), which took effect on June 20, 1952, claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act were cognizable by the regular courts but since then, as provided in Section 46 therefore as amended, "the Workmen's Compensation Commission shall have jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for compensation under the Compensation Act, subject to appeal to the Supreme court ..." In relation to this, Section 5 of the Act provides that "the rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and, remedies accruing to an employee, his personal representation dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code or other laws, because of said injury ..." .

In the case ofManalo vs. Foster Wheeler Corporation, et al.,98 Phil. 856, in sustaining the order of the trial court dismissing an employee's claim for damages against the employer for injuries suffered in an accident which happened in the course of his employment this Court said that "the Legislature evidently deemed it best, in the interest of expediency and uniformity, that all claims of workmen against their employees for damages due to accidents suffered in the course of employment shall be investigated and adjudicated by the Workmen's Compensation Commission subject to the appeal in the law provided." This was reiterated in at least two subsequent cases, namely,Vda. de Mallari vs. National Development Company,G.R. No. L-17914, October 31, 1962; andHudencial vs. S. P. Marcelo & Co., Inc.,G.R. No. L-23969, February 27, 1971.

We are not unmindful of our rulings in the class ofPacaña vs. Cebu Autobus Co.,32 SCRA 442, andValencia vs. Manila Yacht Club, Inc.,G.R. No. L-27346, June 30, 1969. In the Pacaña case the plaintiff had several other money claims such as for separation pay, sick leave pay, vacation leave pay, overtime pay, moral damages and attorney's fees aside from permanent disability compensation benefits. In reversing the trial court's order of dismissal, we held that the plaintiff had the choice of instituting the action in the regular courts under Article 1711 of the Civil Code. We said:

... Of course, the plaintiff thus foregoes the far more expeditious procedures for recovery as provided in the Workmen's Compensation Act, which practically foreclose the employer from controverting the claim upon failure to file a report of disability with notice of controversion (section 45) and the liberal presumptions in favor of the employees, inter alia, that the claim comes within the provision of the Act (section 44). But there may be cases where, as in the case at bar, the plaintiff is constrained to invoke the provision of Article 1711 of the Civil Code and files his suit in the regular courts due to his prosecution of various other money claims, such as separation pay, accrued sick and vacation leave pay, and overtime pay during his employment, which do not fall under the purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

The validity of upholding the lower court's jurisdiction to hear and decide the various claims of plaintiff in the single case filed by him may readily be seen from the tenuous jurisdictional arguments raised by defendant, where it would have the plaintiff shuttle to four different courts and agencies to prosecute his claims, namely, Workmen's Compensation Commission and Social Security Commission for disability compensation benefits and sick leave pay, the Court of Industrial Relations for overtime pay and the Municipal Court for separation pay.Courts do not look with favor on split jurisdiction and piecemeal litigation.... (emphasis supplied) .

It must be noted that in the above case we upheld the jurisdiction of the trial court in view of the plaintiff's various other claims which did not fall under the purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act, and also to avoid multiplicity of suits. Obviously that case does not apply to the one at bar.

Similarly, the Valencia ruling is not applicable here. In that case the only issue was "whether claimant's acceptance from the Social Security System of sickness and disability benefits, which are available to him as a member of the System, precludes further collection from the employer of compensation allowed under the law (Workmen's Compensation Act) for the same sickness or injury." We there said:

... To deny payment of social security benefits because the death or injury or confinement is compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act would be to deprive the employees members of the System of the statutory benefits bought and paid for by them, since they contribute their money to the general common fund out of which benefits are paid. In other words, the benefits provided for in the Workmen's Compensation Act accrues to the employees concerned due to the hazards involved in their employment and is made a burden on the employment itself. However, social security benefits are paid to the System's members, by reason of their membership therein for which they contribute their money to a general common fund.

It may be added that whereas social security benefits are intended to provide insurance or protection against the hazards or risks for which they are established, e.g., disability sickness, old age or death, irrespective of whether they arose from or in the course of the employment or not, the compensation receivable under the Workmen's Compensation law is in the nature of indemnity for the injury or damage suffered by the employee or his dependents on account of the employment.

The Workmen's Compensation Act provides for two exceptions. The first is in section 6, which gives the injured employee the option to claim compensation benefits against his employer under the Act or to sue the third person who caused the injury for damages in the regular courts. The other exception is in Section 42, which refers to small private employers, in which case claims for compensation by reason of accident or injury shall be governed by the provisions of Act No. 1874 or by those of the Civil Code. The instant case does not fall under any of the exceptions.

Appellant contends that his claim is not for compensation under the Workmen's Corporation Law but one for damages under Article 1711 of the New Civil Code. The contention is without merit. Article 1711 provides for the payment by employers of compensation for the death of or injuries to their employees as well as for illness or disease arising out of and in the course of the employment, which provision is essentially the same as that of Section 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The fact that Article 1711 of the Civil Code appears to cover appellant's claim is not decisive of the question: it should still be prosecuted in accordance with the Workmen's Compensation Act by virtue of Section 5 thereof which makes the rights and remedies granted by said Act exclusive, as well as by virtue of Article 2196 of the Civil Code itself, which provides: .

ART. 2196. The rules under this Title are without prejudice to special provisions on damages formulated elsewhere in this Code.Compensation for workmen and other employees in case of death, injury or illness is regulated by special laws ...(emphasis supplied) .

Our Workmen's Compensation Act is patterned after the statutes of Hawaii, New York and Minnesota (Labor Standards and Welfare Legislation by Fernandez and Quiazon, Vol. 2, p. 401). American decisions and authorities are therefore relevant in the interpretation of our local law on the subject, thus:

The Compensation remedy is exclusive of all other remedies for the same injury, if the injury falls within the coverage formula of the act. If it does not, as in the case where occupational diseases are deemed omitted because not within the concept of accidental injury, the compensation act does not disturb any existing remedy. However, if the injury itself comes within the coverage formula, common-law action is barred although the particular element of damage is not compensated for, as in the case of disfigurement in some states, impotency, or pain and suffering. (Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, Vol. 2, p. 135).

The Workmen's Compensation Act supersedes common-law redress in tort and substitutes a strictly statutory formula for paying compensation without regard to the fault of the employer or the contributory negligence or assumption of risk of the employee. (Dudley vs. Victor Lynn Lines, Inc. (N.J.)161 A. (2) 479 (1960) ).

The Workmen's Compensation Act aresui generisand create rights, remedies and procedure which are exclusive; (that) they are in derogation of the common law and are not controlled or affected by our rules of procedure in suits at law or actions in equity, except as provided therein. (Hudson v. Herschback Drilling Co., 46 N.M. 330, 128 P. (2) 1044 (1942) ).

The Workmen's Compensation statute regulates the relation not between the workmen and the world at large, but between the workman and employer. ... As between them the remedies provided therein are exclusive. (Caulfield vs. Elmhurst Contracting Co., — A.D. — 53 N.Y.S. (2) 25 (1945) ).

The Workmen's Compensation Act which gives exclusive rights and remedies, was enacted to exclude common law actions for injury or death caused by accident arising out of and in the course of employment. The legislature intended to leave unimpaired common law right of action for damages for injury or death not so arising; in other words to the extent that the field is not touched by the act, the employee's common law right of action is preserved inviolate. (Griffith v. Raven Red, etc., Coal., — Va. — , 20 S.E. (2) 530, 1. c. 533 (1942) ).

To say that compensation as provided for in Article 1711 of the Civil Code is recoverable by action in the ordinary courts, at the option of the claimant, just because the Workmen's Compensation Act is not expressly invoked is to ignore the fact that the grounds upon which compensation may be claimed are practically identical in both statutes and to ignore likewise the exclusive character of "the rights and remedies granted by this Act" as stated in Section 6 thereof, as well as the provision of Article 2196 of the Civil Code.

The suggestion has been made that there is in this case a claim for moral damages suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the negligence of the defendant and that such damages do not come within the purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act. It should be pointed out first, that the negligence alleged in the complaint consists of the defendant's failure "to provide safety measures within the construction premises," the nature of which negligence is precisely covered by Section 4-A of the same Act, which makes the employer liable to pay additional compensation (of 50%) to the claimant-employee for failure "to install and maintain safety appliances, or take other precautions for the prevention of accident or occupational disease." Secondly, the alleged negligence was not aquasi-delictinasmuch as there was a pre-existing contractual relation of employer and employee between the parties (Art. 2176, Civil Code); and in breaches of contract moral damages may be recovered only where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith (Art. 2220), and neither fraud nor bad faith is alleged in the complaint here. In any event, whether or not such an allegation, in relation to the breach of a contract of employment by the employer, resulting in injury to an employee or laborer, would justify a claim for moral damages and place it within the jurisdiction of ordinary courts is a question which we do not decide in this case, not being the issue involved.

In view of all the foregoing, the order appealed from is affirmed, without costs. Dizon, Zaldivar and Barredo, JJ., concur.