G.R. No. L-10701 - Maria Cano vs. Director of Lands, et al.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-10701 January 16, 1959
MARIA CANO,applicant-appellee,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, EUSTAQUIA GUERRERO, ET AL.,oppositors-appellants.
JOSE FERNANDEZ, ET AL.,oppositors-appellants.
Ramon C. Fernandez for appellants.
Jose B. Dealca for appellee.
REYES, J.B.L.,J.:
In an amended decision dated October 9, 1951, issued in Land Registration Case No. 12, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 2835, the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon decreed the registration of Lots Nos. 1798 and 1799 of the Juban (Sorsogon) Cadastre, under the following terms and conditions:
In view of the foregoing, and it appearing that the notices have been duly published and posted as required by law, and that the title of the applicant to the above-mentioned two parcels of land is registrable in law, it is hereby adjudged and decreed, and with reaffirmation of the order of general default, that the two parcels of land described in plan SWO-24152, known as Lots Nos. 1798 and 1799 of the Cadastral Survey of Juban, with their improvements, be registered in the name of Maria Cano, Filipina, 71 years of age, widow and resident of Juban, province of Sorsogon, with the understanding that Lot No. 1799 shall be subject to the right ofreservation in favor of Eustaquia Guerrero pursuant to Article 891 of the Civil code. After this decision shall have become final for lack of appeal therefrom within the 30-day period from its promulgation, let the corresponding decree issue.
So ordered. (Rec. App. pp. 18-19)
The decision having become final, the decree and the Certificate of Title (No. 0-20) were issued in the name of Maria Cano, subject toreserva troncalin favor of Eustaquia Guerrero. In October 1955, counsel for the reserve (reservatorio) Guerrero filed a motion with the Cadastral Court, alleging the death of the original registered owner andreservista, Maria Cano, on September 8, 1955, and praying that the original Certificate of Title be ordered cancelled and a new one issued in favor of movant Eustaquia Guerrero; and that the Sheriff be ordered to place her in possession of the property. The motion was opposed by Jose and Teotimo Fernandez, sons of thereservistaMaria Cano, who contended that the application and operation of thereserva troncalshould be ventilated in an ordinary contentious proceeding, and that the Registration Court did not have jurisdiction to grant the motion.
In view of the recordedreservain favor of the appellee, as expressly noted in the final decree of registration, the lower court granted the petition for the issuance of a new certificate, for the reason that the death of thereservistavested the ownership of the property in the petitioner as the solereservatorio troncal.
The oppositors, heirs of thereservistaMaria Cano, duly appealed from the order, insisting that the ownership of thereservatoriocan not be decreed in a mere proceeding under sec. 112 of Act 496, but requires a judicial administration proceedings, wherein the rights of appellee, as thereservatorioentitled to the reservable property, are to be declared. In this connection, appellants argue that the reversion in favor of thereservatoriorequires the declaration of the existence of the following facts:
(1) The property was received by a descendant by gratuitous title from an ascendant or from a brother or sister;
(2) Said descendant dies without issue;
(3) The property is inherited by another ascendant by operation of law; and
(4) The existence of relatives within the third degree belonging the line from which said property came. (Appellants' Brief, p. 8)
We find the appeal untenable. The requisites enumerated by appellants have already been declared to exist by the decree of registration wherein the rights of the appellee asreservatario troncalwere expressly recognized:
From the above-quoted agreed stipulation of facts, it is evident that Lot No. 1799 was acquired by the Appellant Maria Cano by inheritance from her deceased daughter, Lourdes Guerrero who, in turn, inherited the same from her father Evaristo Guerrero and, hence, falls squarely under the provisions of Article 891 of the Civil Code; and that each and everyone of the private oppositors are within the third degree of consaguinity of the decedent Evaristo Guerrero, and who belonging to the same line from which the property came.
It appears however, from the agreed stipulation of facts that with the exception of Eustaquia Guerrero, who is the only living daughter of the decedent Evaristo Guerrero, by his former marriage, all the other oppositors are grandchildren of the said Evaristo Guerrero by his former marriages. Eustaquia Guerrero, being the nearest of kin, excludes all the other private oppositors, whose decree of relationship to the decedent is remoter (Article 962, Civil Code; Director of Landsvs. Aguas, 62 Phil., 279). (Rec. App. pp. 16-17)
This decree having become final, all persons (appellees included) are bared thereby from contesting the existence of the constituent elements of thereserva. The only requisites for the passing of the title from thereservistato the appellee are: (1) the death of thereservista; and (2) the fact that thereservatariohas survived thereservista. Both facts are admitted, and their existence is nowhere questioned.
The contention that an intestacy proceeding is still necessary rests upon the assumption that thereservatariowill succeed in, or inherit, thereservable property from thereservista. This is not true. Thereservatariois not thereservista'ssuccessormortis causanor is thereservable property part of thereservista's estate; thereservatarioreceives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant (prepositus), said property merely reverting to the line of origin from which it had temporarily and accidentally strayed during thereservista's lifetime. The authorities are all agreed that there beingreservatariosthat survive thereservista, the latter must be deemed to have enjoined no more than a life interest in thereservable property.
It is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of thereservista, thereservatarionearest to theprepositus(the appellee in this case) becomes, automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable property. As already stated, that property is no part of the estate of thereservista, and does not even answer for the debts of the latter. Hence, its acquisition by thereservatariomay be entered in the property records without necessity of estate proceedings, since the basic requisites therefor appear of record. It is equally well settled that thereservable property can not be transmitted by areservistato her or his own successorsmortis causa,(like appellants herein) so long as areservatariowithin the third degree from the prepositus and belonging to the line whence the property came, is in existence when thereservistadies.
Of course, where the registration decree merely specifies thereservable character of the property, without determining the identity of thereservatario(as in the case of Director of Landsvs. Aguas, 63 Phil., 279) or where severalreservatarios dispute the property among themselves, further proceedings would be unavoidable. But this is not the case. The rights of thereservatariaEustaquia Guerrero have been expressly recognized, and it is nowhere claimed that there are otherreservatarios of equal or nearer degree. It is thus apparent that the heirs of thereservistaare merely endeavoring to prolong their enjoyment of thereservable property to the detriment of the party lawfully entitled thereto.
We find no error in the order appealed from and therefore, the same is affirmed with costs against appellants in both instances. So ordered.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and Endencia JJ.,concur.