G.R. No. L-2650 - OCTOBER 1950 - PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE CASE NUMBERCASE TITLE G.R. No. L-2650October 27, 1950 Primo Evangelista vs. Hipolito Castillo, et al. G.R. No. L-2024October 27, 1950 in re: Felix de Leon. Asuncion Soriano vs. Joseph P. de Leon, et al. G.R. No. L-2508October 27, 1950 People of the Philippines vs. Mamerto Abner, et al. G.R. No. L-2342October 27, 1950 Silverio Q. Cornejo vs. Manuel B. Calupitan, et al. G.R. No. L-2712October 25, 1950 Saturnino Escoval, et al vs. Lorenzo Ezcoval, et al. G.R. No. L-2608October 23, 1950 Alfonso Rili, et alvs. Ciriaco Chunaco, et al. G.R. No. L-2575October 23, 1950 U.S. Commercial Co. vs. Macario Guevara, et al. G.R. No. L-2268October 20, 1950 Federico Santiago vs. Binalbagan Estate, Inc. G.R. No. L-2779October 18, 1950 Daniel Sanchez, et al vs. Harry Lyons Construction, Inc., et al. G.R. No. L-2097October 16, 1950 Oriental Sawmill vs. Manuel Tambunting, et al. G.R. No. L-2306October 14, 1950 Paciencia Anteojo, et al vs. Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. L-2213October 14, 1950 Espiridion M. Brillo vs.Pedro Buklatan , et al. G.R. No. L-2027October 14, 1950 Testate Eastate Alejandro T. Gonzales. Manuel Gonzales vs. Manuela vda. de Gonzales, et al. G.R. No. L-3972October 13, 1950 Floreña Sales, et al vs. Director of Prisons G.R. No. L-2534October 13, 1950 Lino Gorospe, et al vs. Luciano Millan, et al. G.R. No. L-2659October 12, 1950 in re: Emil Maurice Mary Bacharch. MCDonald Bacharch vs. Sophie Seifert, et al. G.R. No. L-1724October 12, 1950 Nieves vda. de Gonzales de Mondragon vs. Roman Santos, et al. G.R. No. L-3223October 10, 1950 James MCI Henderson, et al vs. Bienvenido A. Tan, et al. G.R. No. L-3032October 10, 1950 Victoria Hidalgo vda. de Carrero, et al vs. Manufacturers Life Insurance Co. G.R. No. L-2691October 10, 1950 Manocub Salazar vs. Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. L-2533October 10, 1950 Maria Pacheco vda. de Yulo, et al vs./ Chua Chuco, et al. G.R. No. L-2332October 4, 1950 Jose R. Cruz, et al vs. Leoncio Lansang G.R. No. L-3027October 3, 1950 Maria L. Hernandez, et al vs. Hilarion Clapis, et al. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation, Inc. Primo Evangelista vs. Hipolito Castillo, et al. in re: Felix de Leon. Asuncion Soriano vs. Joseph P. de Leon, et al. People of the Philippines vs. Mamerto Abner, et al. Silverio Q. Cornejo vs. Manuel B. Calupitan, et al. Saturnino Escoval, et al vs. Lorenzo Ezcoval, et al. Alfonso Rili, et alvs. Ciriaco Chunaco, et al. U.S. Commercial Co. vs. Macario Guevara, et al. Federico Santiago vs. Binalbagan Estate, Inc. Daniel Sanchez, et al vs. Harry Lyons Construction, Inc., et al. Oriental Sawmill vs. Manuel Tambunting, et al. Paciencia Anteojo, et al vs. Court of Appeals, et al. Espiridion M. Brillo vs.Pedro Buklatan , et al. Testate Eastate Alejandro T. Gonzales. Manuel Gonzales vs. Manuela vda. de Gonzales, et al. Floreña Sales, et al vs. Director of Prisons Lino Gorospe, et al vs. Luciano Millan, et al. in re: Emil Maurice Mary Bacharch. MCDonald Bacharch vs. Sophie Seifert, et al. Nieves vda. de Gonzales de Mondragon vs. Roman Santos, et al. James MCI Henderson, et al vs. Bienvenido A. Tan, et al. Victoria Hidalgo vda. de Carrero, et al vs. Manufacturers Life Insurance Co. Manocub Salazar vs. Court of Appeals, et al. Maria Pacheco vda. de Yulo, et al vs./ Chua Chuco, et al. Jose R. Cruz, et al vs. Leoncio Lansang Maria L. Hernandez, et al vs. Hilarion Clapis, et al. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation, Inc.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2650 October 27, 1950
PRIMO EVANGELISTA,petitioner,
vs.
HIPOLITO CASTILLO,respondent.
Ramon Diokno, Numeriano U. Babao and Jose Diokno for petitioner.
Amado G. Salazar for respondent.
TUASON,J.:
This was an election contest for the office of vice-mayor of Mabini, Batangas. The court of first instance declared the contestant the winner by 18 votes over the contestee, the latter appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the appellate court dismissed the appeal on the ground that the trial court's decision was unappealable. We are not requested to review the Court of Appeals' order of dismissal.
In the case ofLucena vs. Tan(G. R. No. L-2296, September 14, 1949, 47 Off. Gaz., 1121; 84 Phil., 548), the court said:
Prima faciethe proposed appeal will involve legal and factual questions.
Now, is that appeal authorized by Law? Section 178 of the present Election Code specifically allows appeal to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals (as the case may be) from decisions of courts of first instance in contests against the election of provincial governors, members of the provincial board, city councilors and mayors. Vice-mayors and municipal councilors are not mentioned.
InTajanlañgit vs. Peñaranda([1917]), 37 Phil., 155), we declared that, in view of the provisions of the Administrative Code, decisions of the courts of first instance in municipal election contests were final and not appealable. The view was premised on the fact that the law directed that all election contests shall be filed with the corresponding court of first instance, which "shall have exclusive and final jurisdiction except as hereinafter provided . . ." and the further fact that while expressly providing for an appeal in contests of elections for provincial governors, the law contained no provision permitting an appeal in contests involving municipal officers.
Such ruling was applied in subsequent cases. (De Guzmanvs.Cuenca, 40 Phil., 203; De la Cruzvs.Revilla and Bustos, 40 Phil., 234; Municipal Council of Las Piñasvs.Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, 40 Phil., 279; Arevalovs.Dalandan, 40 Phil., 475.)
The present Election Code, unlike the law at the time the abovementioned cases were considered, does not contain a provision giving "exclusive and final jurisdiction to courts of first instance". But the difference should be immaterial, because this court only mentioned such final jurisdiction asone of the reasonsfor holding that no appeal existed. There is the other reason which is still good: the law does not provide for appeal in contests for vice-mayor and councilors, although it expressly allows appeals in contests for other positions.
InAguilar and Casapao vs. Navarro(55 Phil., 898), we held there was no appeal to this court from the order of a court of first instance denying a petition for authority to correct the election returns, because section 480 of the Election Law (at the time) enumerating the cases appealable to the Supreme Court, did not include such, controversial matter. We said, "a well-recognized principle of law" is "that an appeal to a higher court may only be taken when the law so provides".
On the other hand, the American authorities seem to be of the opinion that in the absence of statute "no appeal or error proceeding lies from the judgment of a court in an election contest". (18 American Jurisprudence, 384;see also29 Corpus Juris Secundum, 429,et seq.) This is not a denial of equal protection of the laws because the principle applies to all persons similarly situated. And as to due process, this court has held that the right of appeal is statutory and is not a necessary element of due process of law. (U. S.vs.Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218; Duartevs.Dade, 32 Phil., 36.)
We must, therefore, hold that no appeal to this court lies from a decision of the court of first instance in contests for vice-mayor or municipal councilors.
The decision inMarquez vs. Prodigalidad, L-2099 (May 26, 1948), may be deemed an exception to this holding. But herein petitioners do not fall within that exception, because unlike the Marquez case the appealed litigation involves questions of fact, and does not revolve around a question of jurisdiction. Of course it must be understood that those justices who dissented in the Marquez case do not, upon signing this decision, repudiated the views announced in their dissent.
In the case ofMarquez vs. Prodigalidad, referred to inLucena vs. Tan,supra, the court, with Mr. Justice Feria and the writer of this opinion dissenting, made this ruling:
Creemos, por tanto, que el articulo 178 del Codigo Electoral Revisado, al disponer expresamente que son apelables las decisiones de los juzgados de primera instancia "sobre protestas contra la eligibilidad o la eleccion de gobernadores provinciales, vocales de la junta provincial, consejales de ciudad y alcaldes," no ha tenido el proposito de vedar en otras protestas la apelacion al Tribunal Supremo sobre cuestiones puramente de derecho, particularmente sobre custiones de jurisdiccion, o de constitucionalidad de alguna ley, ordenanza, trada u orden ejecutiva.
It will at once be noted from a comparison of the two decisions that inMarquez vs. Prodigalidadonly questions of law were involved while inLucena vs. Tanboth questions of fact and of law, so it was presumed, would be put in issue. It will also be noted that the later case was excluded from the rule laid down in the earlier one because of the presence in the Lucena case of factual controversies. To determine, therefore, which of the two adjudications is to govern the instant appeal, we only have to see whether the case at bar is affected with questions of fact. Briefly, the facts are these:
Primo Evangelista, contestee in the court below, and Hipolito Castillo, contestant, were candidates for vice-mayor of the aforementioned municipality in the general elections held on November 11, 1947. The election returns gave Evangelista 1,283 votes and Castillo, 1,267. Accordingly the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed Evangelista elected with a plurality of sixteen votes over his opponent.
In impugning the election, the protestant alleged frauds, irregularities, and other violations of the Election Law on Precincts 1, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 9. And upon trial the court made these conclusions: "Of the total votes of 1,267 adjudicated to the contestant by the board of canvassers as shown in the election returns for the six precincts in the municipality of Mabini, a total of 5 votes should be deducted; namely, PE,-1, PE-4, HC-9, HC-11, and HC-16, leaving a total of 1,262 votes. On the other hand, of the total votes of 1,286 adjudicated to the contestee by the board of canvassers as shown in the election returns, a total of 39 votes, shall be deducted; namely, 1-P, 1-Q, 1-EE, 4-Q, 4-R, 4-H, 6-D, 7-A, 9-V, one vote illegally cast by Albino Maramot, one excess vote in Precinct No. 4, one excess vote in Precinct No. 6 and the 27 ballots which have been found to have been written by one or two hands; and after deducting these 39 votes from the total votes in favor of the contestee are 1,244. Therefore the contestant has received a plurality of 18 votes over the contestee. Accordingly, the contestant Hipolito Castillo is hereby declared vice-mayor elect of the municipality of Mabini, Batangas."
Roughly, the court below found that some ballots were intentionally marked, some had been prepared by more than one person, and others, which had not been counted in favor of the protestant by the board of canvassers, should, in the opinion of the court, have been so counted. On the other hand, certain ballots credited to the protestee by the board of canvassers and objected to by the protestant were held valid and properly canvassed for the protestee.lawphil.net
That most or all of these findings are essentially findings of fact is so manifested as to obviate discussion. This being so, the controlling doctrine, as far as this case is concerned, is that announced inLucena vs. Tan,supra.
The similarity between the present case and the case just mentioned is implicitly admitted by the protestee's counsel. In the Court of Appeals they suggested that the motion to dismiss the appeal be held in abeyance on the theory "that the question of law raised in the case of Dominador Lucena et al.vs.Hon. Judge Tan, G.R. No. 2296, (1) now pending decision in the Supreme Court, "insinuating that the decision in that case would be decisive of the case at hand.
There was an incident in the Court of First Instance which properly could have been the subject of a special action, or appeal under the Lucena-Tan doctrine. We refer to the dismissal of the protestee's counter-protest which alleged frauds in Precinct No. 2, frauds which, it was averred, redounded to the protestee's detriment and to the protestant's benefit. The court dismissed that counter-protest upon the objection of the protestant, who contended that the counter-protest did not state facts sufficient to confer jurisdiction of the counter-protest on the trial court in the that the counter-protest failed to allege that the counter-protestant had filed a certificate of candidacy for the office in dispute.
But, although this matter is prominently stressed in the brief of the appellant in his appeal bycertiorari, it seems to be a fact that he did not appeal to the Court of Appeals from the order dismissing his counter-protest. He appealed only from that part of the decision pertaining to the adjudication of contested ballots by the court of First Instance on the basis of which the protestant was pronounced the vice-mayor-elect with a plurality of eighteen votes. The clear inference we draw from the pleadings and the briefs before us is that the protestee and appellant was not keenly interested in the recounting of the ballots in Precinct No. 2 and took no steps to challenge the order quashing his counter-protest. Furthermore, there is no showing or allegation that if allowed the counter-protest could by any possibility have changed the result of the decision.
It is our opinion that the decision of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed, with costs against the appellant. It is so ordered.
Moran, Bengzon, C.J., Feria, Paras, Pablo, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.