G.R. No. L-2754 - AUGUST 1949 - PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE CASE NUMBERCASE TITLE G.R. No. L-2754August 31, 1949 Fidel Abriol vs. Vicente Homeres G.R. No. L-2480August 31, 1949 Florentino Zafra vda. de Valenzuela, et al. vs. Irene Zafra de Aguilar G.R. No. L-2345August 31, 1949 Segundo Agustin, et al. vs. Manuel de la Fuente G.R. No. L-2262August 31, 1949 Florentina Zafra vda. de Valenzuela vs. Bernabe de Aquino, et al. G.R. No. L-1827August 31, 1949 Alfredo Catolico vs. Irineo Ranjo, et al. G.R. No. L-1358August 31, 1949 Marieta J. Rotea, et al. vs. Levy Hermanos, Inc., et al. G.R. No. L-3226August 30, 1949 Dominador S. Pongos vs. Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc., et al. G.R. No. L-3063August 30, 1949 Macario Quintero, et al. vs. Felix Martinez, et al. G.R. No. L-2894August 30, 1949 Bucra Corporation vs. Higino B. Macadaeg, et al. G.R. No. L-2470August 30, 1949 Vicente Ferrer vs. Lorenzo Llamoso, et al. G.R. No. L-2452August 30, 1949 Lorenzo Llamoso vs. Vicente Ferrer, et al. G.R. No. L-2166August 30, 1949 Estrella Ledesma vs. Eduardo Enriquez G.R. No. L-1625-1626August 30, 1949 People of the Philippines vs. Lorenzo Pineda G.R. No. L-1563August 30, 1949 In re: Jose Go. Jose Go vs. Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines, et al. G.R. No. L-1542August 30, 1949 Jose Cristobal vs. People of the Philippines G.R. No. L-1485August 30, 1949 People of the Philippines vs. Pablo Deslate G.R. No. L-1442August 30, 1949 Miguel R. Mateo vs. Public Service Commission, et al. G.R. No. L-1617August 29, 1949 Panfilo B. Morales, et al. vs. Oscar Ventanilla, et al. G.R. No. L-2372August 26, 1949 International Harvester Company of the Philippines vs. Crisanto Aragon, et al. G.R. No. L-3056August 26, 1949 Antonio Barredo vs. Commissioner on Elections, et al. G.R. No. L-3055August 26, 1949 Leon Ma. Guerrero vs. Commissioner of Customs and the Administrator, et al. G.R. No. L-3054August 26, 1949 Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr. vs. El Tesorero de Filipinas G.R. No. L-2756August 26, 1949 J. Antonio Araneta vs. Eugenio Angeles G.R. No. L-2044August 26, 1949 J. Antonio Araneta vs. Rafael Dinglasan, et al. G.R. No. L-1760August 26, 1949 Maria Molato, et al. vs. Celedonia Arcos, et al. G.R. No. L-2828August 25, 1949 Joaquin Gozun, et al. vs. Republic, et al. G.R. No. L-2766August 25, 1949 Pablo P. Robaton vs. Director of Prisons G.R. No. L-1544August 25, 1949 F.V. Larraga, et al. vs. Eulogia B. Bañez, et al. G.R. No. L-1761August 24, 1949 In re: Jose Leelin. Jose Leelin vs. Republic G.R. No. L-2035August 23, 1949 Angelita V. Villanueva, et al. vs. Director of Posts G.R. No. L-2016August 23, 1949 Testate Estate of Richard Thomas Fitzsimmons. Marcial P. Lichauco, et al. vs. Atlantic Gulf, et al. G.R. No. L-1029August 23, 1949 People of the Philippines vs. Reynaldo L. Ramos G.R. No. L-1648August 17, 1949 Pedro Syquia, et al. vs. Natividad Almeda Lopez, et al. G.R. No. L-3025August 16, 1949 People of the Philippines vs. Ildefonso de Castro, Jr., et al. G.R. No. L-1956August 16, 1949 Letecia H. Caldera, et al. vs. Eusebio Balcueba, et al. G.R. No. L-1892August 16, 1949 Jacinto Notor vs. Ramon Martinez, et al. G.R. No. L-1367August 16, 1949 Intestate Estate Pablo C. Luce. Pio Portea vs. Jacinto Pabellon, et al. G.R. No. L-2062August 11, 1949 Jesus B. Lopez vs. Rafael Dinglasan, et al. G.R. No. L-1935August 11, 1949 People of the Philippines vs. Eladio Balotol G.R. No. L-1438August 11, 1949 Socorro C. vda. de Araneta vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation. G.R. No. L-48346August 9, 1949 Destileria Ayala y Cia., Inc. vs. Liga Nacional Obrera de Filipinas, et al. G.R. No. L-1826August 5, 1949 Jose L. Gomez, et al. vs. Miguela Tabia G.R. No. L-1514August 5, 1949 Bonifacio Villareal vs. People of the Philippines G.R. No. L-1494August 3, 1949 Allison J. Gibbs, et al. vs. Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., et al. G.R. No. L-3059August 2, 1949 Vicente G. Cruz, et al. vs. Placido Ramos, et al. G.R. No. L-1261August 2, 1949 Catalina Osmeña de Valencia, et al. vs. Emilia Rodriguez, et al. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation, Inc. Fidel Abriol vs. Vicente Homeres Florentino Zafra vda. de Valenzuela, et al. vs. Irene Zafra de Aguilar Segundo Agustin, et al. vs. Manuel de la Fuente Florentina Zafra vda. de Valenzuela vs. Bernabe de Aquino, et al. Alfredo Catolico vs. Irineo Ranjo, et al. Marieta J. Rotea, et al. vs. Levy Hermanos, Inc., et al. Dominador S. Pongos vs. Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc., et al. Macario Quintero, et al. vs. Felix Martinez, et al. Bucra Corporation vs. Higino B. Macadaeg, et al. Vicente Ferrer vs. Lorenzo Llamoso, et al. Lorenzo Llamoso vs. Vicente Ferrer, et al. Estrella Ledesma vs. Eduardo Enriquez People of the Philippines vs. Lorenzo Pineda In re: Jose Go. Jose Go vs. Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines, et al. Jose Cristobal vs. People of the Philippines People of the Philippines vs. Pablo Deslate Miguel R. Mateo vs. Public Service Commission, et al. Panfilo B. Morales, et al. vs. Oscar Ventanilla, et al. International Harvester Company of the Philippines vs. Crisanto Aragon, et al. Antonio Barredo vs. Commissioner on Elections, et al. Leon Ma. Guerrero vs. Commissioner of Customs and the Administrator, et al. Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr. vs. El Tesorero de Filipinas J. Antonio Araneta vs. Eugenio Angeles J. Antonio Araneta vs. Rafael Dinglasan, et al. Maria Molato, et al. vs. Celedonia Arcos, et al. Joaquin Gozun, et al. vs. Republic, et al. Pablo P. Robaton vs. Director of Prisons F.V. Larraga, et al. vs. Eulogia B. Bañez, et al. In re: Jose Leelin. Jose Leelin vs. Republic Angelita V. Villanueva, et al. vs. Director of Posts Testate Estate of Richard Thomas Fitzsimmons. Marcial P. Lichauco, et al. vs. Atlantic Gulf, et al. People of the Philippines vs. Reynaldo L. Ramos Pedro Syquia, et al. vs. Natividad Almeda Lopez, et al. People of the Philippines vs. Ildefonso de Castro, Jr., et al. Letecia H. Caldera, et al. vs. Eusebio Balcueba, et al. Jacinto Notor vs. Ramon Martinez, et al. Intestate Estate Pablo C. Luce. Pio Portea vs. Jacinto Pabellon, et al. Jesus B. Lopez vs. Rafael Dinglasan, et al. People of the Philippines vs. Eladio Balotol Socorro C. vda. de Araneta vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation. Destileria Ayala y Cia., Inc. vs. Liga Nacional Obrera de Filipinas, et al. Jose L. Gomez, et al. vs. Miguela Tabia Bonifacio Villareal vs. People of the Philippines Allison J. Gibbs, et al. vs. Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., et al. Vicente G. Cruz, et al. vs. Placido Ramos, et al. Catalina Osmeña de Valencia, et al. vs. Emilia Rodriguez, et al. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation, Inc.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-2754             August 31, 1949

FIDEL ABRIOL,petitioner-appellant,
vs.
VICENTE HOMERES, Provincial Warden of Leyte,respondent-appellee.

Francisco Astilla for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr. and Solicitor Isidro C. Borromeo for appellee.

OZAETA,J.:

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Leyte denying the appellant's petition forhabeas corpus.

In criminal case No. 1472 of the Court of First Instance of Leyte the herein petitioner Fidel Abriol, together with six other persons, was accused of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. After the prosecution had presented its evidence and rested its case, counsel for the defense moved to dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to prove the guilt of the accused. After hearing the arguments for and against the motion for dismissal, the court held the proofs sufficient to convict and denied said motion, whereupon counsel for the defense offered to present evidence for the accused. The provincial fiscal opposed the presentation of evidence by the defense, contending that the present procedural practice and laws precluded the defense in criminal cases from presenting any evidence after it had presented a motion for dismissal with or without reservation and after said motion had been denied, and citing as authority the case ofUnited States vs. De la Cruz, 28 Phil., 279. His Honor Judge S. C. Moscoso sustained the opposition of the provincial fiscal and, without allowing the accused to present evidence in their defense, convicted all of them and sentenced the herein petitioner to suffer seven years of imprisonment and to pay a fine of P2,000.

From that sentence the herein petitioner together with his coaccused appealed to the Court of Appeals. On June 7, 1948, the Court of Appeals, on its own motion and without notice to the appellants as required in section 8 of Rule 120 and inBaradi vs. People, G.R. No. L-2658, dismissed the appeal for failure of the appellants to file their brief within the extension of time granted them.

The present petition forhabeas corpuswas thereafter presented by Fidel Abriol against the provincial warden of Leyte, contending that the sentence entered against him in said criminal case No. 1472 was null and avoid because it had been rendered without due process of law. Judge Rodolfo Baltazar, who heard the petition forhabeas corpus, denied it on the ground that, the judgement of conviction against the petitioner having become final, "this court is entirely devoid of jurisdiction over and power to modify or in any war alter said decision." From that decision of Judge Baltazar the petitioner has appealed to this Court.

1. The refusal of Judge Moscoso to allow the accused-petitioner to present proofs in his defense after the denial of his motion for dismissal was a palpable error which resulted in denying to the said accused the due process of law guaranteed in the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution, it being provided in Article II, section 1 (17), of the Constitution that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf. There is on law nor "procedural practice" under which the accused may ever be denied the right to be heard before being sentenced.

Both the fiscal and Judge Moscoso have misunderstood the ruling of this Court in the case of theUnited States vs. De la Cruz, 28 Phil., 279. In that case the accused-appellant assigned as error the denial by the trial court of the motion for dismissal presented by the defense after the evidence for the prosecution had been closed, although the court heard the evidence for the defense before rendering judgment. In refutation of said assignment of error the Attorney General cited in the case ofUnited States vs. Abaroa, 3 Phil., 116, wherein the following principle was laid down: "After the prosecution rests, the court should not dismiss the case on motion for insufficiency of proof but should require defendant to present evidence in his own behalf." In that connection the Court observed that the ruling in the Abaroa case was handed down in December, 1903, and before the decision in the Kepner case, when the Government was permitted to appeal from dismissals and final judgments in criminal cases. Said the Court:

Now that the Government cannot appeal in criminal cases if the defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy (sec. 2, Rule 118), the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of the evidence after the prosecution has rested terminates the case then and there. But if the motion for dismissal is denied, the court should proceed to hear the evidence for the defense before entering judgment regardless of whether or not the defense had reserved its right of present evidence in the event its motion for dismissal be denied. The reason is that it is the constitutional right of the accused to be heard in his defense before sentence is pronounce on him. Of course if the accused as no evidence to present or expressly waives the right to present it, the court has no alternative but of decide the case upon the evidence presented by the prosecution alone.

In the case ofPeople vs. Moro Mamacol(46 Off. Gaz. [Supp. to No. 1], 341¹) the accused, without reserving the right to present evidence, moved for the dismissal of the case after the prosecution had rested. The court denied the motion and, without allowing the accused to present his evidence, sentenced him to suffer life imprisonment for the crime of murder of which he was accused. On appeal this Court, although finding that the evidence for the prosecution was sufficient for conviction, set aside the judgment and ordered the case remanded to the lower court to allow the accused to present his proofs.

In civil case cases, where either or both of the parties can appeal, the ruling is different from that in criminal cases. If the defendant moves for dismissal on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence after the plaintiff had rested and the court grants the motion, and if n appeal by the plaintiff the judgment is reversed, the case is terminated then and there; that is to say, it is not remanded to the court of origin for the purpose of allowing the defendant to produce evidence in his defense. "The defendant in offering a motion to dismiss in effect elects to stand on the sufficiency of the plaintiff's case." (Moody, Aronso and Co.vs.Hotel Bilboa, 50 Phil., 198; Demetriovs.Lopez, 50 Phil., 45; Arroyovs.Andrea Azur, 43 Off. Gaz., 54.) However, if the court denies the motion to dismiss, it is not precluded from receiving evidence for the defendant, and the plaintiff cannot by mandamus compel it to render judgment without hearing the evidence for the defense. (Cataocovs.Dinglasan, G. R. No. L-2004, May 24, 1949.)

2. The main question to decide is whether the writ ofhabeas corpuslies in a case like the present. The general rule is that the function of a writ ofhabeas corpusin permitting the petitioner to challenge by collateral attack the jurisdiction under which the process or judgment by which he is deprived of his liberty was issued or rendered cannot be distorted by extending the inquiry to mere errors of trial courts acting within their jurisdiction. (25 Am. Hur.,Habeas corpus, sec. 13, p. 152.) This principle, however, has been qualified in the sense that it "is not to be so applied as to destroy constitutional safeguards of human life and liberty." (Johnsonvs.Zerbst, 304 U. S., 458; 82 Law. ed., 1461.)

Appellant relies upon the case ofSchields vs. McMicking, 23 Phil., 526. That case, however, was reversed inMcMicking vs. Schields, 238 Y. S., 99; 59 Law, ed., 1220; 41 Phil., 971. The petitioner Schields was accused of theft in the municipal court of Manila on December 1, 1910. There he was duly arraigned, tried, convicted, and sentenced. He appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila on December 21, 1910. On December 23 he received notice that the case would be heard at ten o'clock a.m. on the 24th. When he was arraigned on the last-mentioned date he asked for time in which to answer the complaint, which request was denied by the court, who ordered the clerk to enter on the record that the petitioner pleaded not guilty to the complaint. Thereupon the petitioner's attorney also asked for time in which to prepare a defense, which petition was also denied by the same court. The petitioner's attorney excepted to this ruling and asked that the exceptions, together with the request of the petitioner which had been denied, be entered on the record. After the trial, during which the accused presented witnesses in his, defense, the Court of First Instance found him guilty and sentenced him to four months and one day ofarresto mayor. In denying the petitioner's request for time in which to prepare his defense, the trial court said:

This court granted the petition forhabeas corpusand ordered the discharge of the petitioner from confinement on the ground that under section 30 of General Orders No. 58 the accused, on demand, had the right to at least two days in which to prepare for trial and that the refusal of the time in which to prepare for trial was equivalent to the refusal of a legal hearing. On appeal by the respondent Director of Prisons to the Supreme Court of the United States, the latter reversed the judgment. Said that court:

It will be noted that in said case the fact that the cause stood for trialon appealfrom the municipal court; that the accused had known for weeks the nature of the charge against him; that he had notice of the hearing, was present in person and represented by counsel, testified in his own behalf, introduced other evidence, and seems to have received an impartial hearing; that there was nothing to show that he needed further time for any proper purpose; and that there was no allegation that he desired to offer additional evidence or suffered substantial injury by being forced into trial — weighed heavily against the pretension of the petitioner that the sentenced entered against him was void for lack of due process of law.

There is no analogy between the facts of that case and those of the present case.

A more pertinent and analogous case is that ofJohnson vs. Zerbst, 304 U. S., 458 Law. ed., 1461. Johnson was indicated by the grand jury for feloniously uttering, passing, and possessing counterfeit Federal Reserve notes. Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty, said that he had no lawyer, and — in response to an inquiry of the court — stated that he was ready for trial. He did not ask for and was not provided with the assistance of counsel. He was tried, convicted and sentenced to four and one-half years of imprisonment. Although the Federal District Court believed that the petitioner was deprived, in the trial court, of his constitutional rights to have the assistance of counsel for his defense, it denied the petition forhabeas corpus, holding that the proceedings "were not sufficient to make the trial void and justify its annulment trial errors or irregularities which could only be corrected on appeal." The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment; but the Supreme Court oncertiorarireversed it. We quote the pertinent portion of itsratio decidendi:

We have already shown that there is no law or precedent which could be invoked to place in doubt the right of the accused to be heard or to present evidence in his defense before being sentenced. On the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution hereinabove cited expressly and clearly guarantee to him that right. Such constitutional right is inviolate. No court of justice under our system of government has the power to deprive him of that right. If the accused does not waive his right to be heard but on the contrary — as in the instant case — invokes that rough, and the court denies it to him, that court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed; it has no power to sentence the accused without hearing him in his defense; and the sentence thus pronounced is void and may be collaterally attacked in ahabeas corpusproceeding.

3. There is no doubt that if the petitioner had prosecuted his appeal to a successful conclusion, the sentence against him would have been set aside and the case would have been rendered to the trial court to allow him to present his proofs, as was done in the case of Peoplevs.Mamacol, supra. We make this observation to show that the petitioner cannot by thishabeas corpusproceeding secure a greater relief that he could have obtained by appeal, and that in any event he is only entitled to the restoration of the right of which he has been unlawfully deprived, namely, the right to present evidence in his defense. Under section 17 of Rule 102, a person who is not set at liberty upon a writ ofhabeas corpusshall not be again imprisoned for the same offense unless by the lawful order or process of a court having jurisdiction of the cause or offense. Although the sentence against the petitioner is void for the reasons hereinabove stated, he may be held under the custody of the law by being detained or admitted to bail until the case against him is finally and lawfully decided. The process against him in criminal case No. 1472 may sand should be resumed from the stage at which it was vitiated by the trial court's denial of his constitutional right to be heard. Up to the point when the prosecution rested, the proceedings were valid and should be resumed from there.

Under the title "Proceedings and Relief" and subtitle "Judgment and Costs" on the subject ofHabeas corpus, American Jurisprudence says: "After the hearing, the court should dispose of the petitioner in such manner as the justice of the case may require; he may be discharged, remanded, or admitted to bail . . . Even though a petitioner is entitled to be relieved of the particular restraint under which he is held, he may, if there is sufficient cause for his detention, be restrained until valid proceedings against him may be taken." (Section 152 and 154.)

Wherefore, in view of the nullity of the sentence under which the petitioner has been committed to imprisonment by the respondent, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the writ prayed for is granted. The respondent shall discharge the petitioner unless within fifteen days from the promulgation of this decision the provincial fiscal of Leyte should move the lower court to reset for trial said criminal case No. 1472 to allow the petitioner to present his evidence and the trial court to decide the case anew. Pending such new trial, the petitioner may be admitted to bail.

It is so ordered, without costs.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Montemayor and Torres, JJ.,concur.

Separate Opinions

REYES,J.,dissenting:

This is a petition forhabeas corpus.

The petitioner was sentenced to prison by the Court of First Instance of Leyte for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. From this sentence he appealed to the Court of Appeals; but the appeal was there dismissed because of his failure to file a brief. And as no steps were taken to have the appeal reinstated, the sentence was in due time declared final. This was on June 22, 1948. Committed prison to serve his sentence, petitioner, on December 3, 1948, filed the present petition forhabeas corpusin the Court of First Instance, and the petition having been denied by that court, the case is now before us on appeal.

The petitioner challenges the validity of the sentence of conviction imposed upon him on the ground that his constitutional right was violated when the lower court, after denying his motion to dismiss for alleged insufficiency of the prosecution's proof, refused to allow him to present his own evidence, holding that his right to do so was waived by his motion for dismissal. It was, of course, error for the trial court to deny him that right, and the error would undoubtedly have been corrected had he prosecuted his appeal to its conclusion. But this he did not do, and the question now is whether notwithstanding what was happened, the correction may still be made throughhabeas corpusproceedings, whose only purpose in law is to determine whether or not a person alleged to be illegally detained is entitled to release. Disregarding the legal purpose of this remedy, the majority of the Court has granted the writ but has denied liberty to the petitioner, remanding the case to the court below for further proceedings. Actually, what the majority has done is to allow the remedy ofhabeas corpusto perform the functions of an appeal that is now dead and can no longer be revived. To this I cannot agree.

No rule is better settled than thathabeas corpusis not a corrective remedy. It cannot be used for correcting errors or irregularities of procedure which are not jurisdictional. (25 Am. Jur., par. 28.) It dose not take the place of an appeal. (Abanillavs.Villas, 56 Phil., 481.) And even if the error sought to be corrected may have the effect of voiding a judgment, so long as the court that rendered that judgement had jurisdiction,habeas corpusmay not be invoked to correct the error. The proper remedy is by appeal orcertiorari.

Thus, in the case ofDomingo vs. Director of Prisons, 44 Off. Gaz., 2201¹, where an attempt was made throughhabeas corpusproceedings to invalidate a judgment of conviction rendered on a plea of guilty when, so it was alleged, no such plea was properly entered by the accused, this Court, through its Chief Justice, said:

In the present case, there is no question that the lower court had jurisdiction to try the case against the petitioner for illegal possessions of firearms and to convict him therefore. The court committed a legal error when it convicted petitioner without allowing him to present his evidence. But the error, though it made the judgment voidable, was only an error in procedure, which could have been corrected by appeal. In fact, petitioner took the steps to have the error so corrected, except that he later abandoned the appeal by not presenting a brief. And though notified on June 9, 1948, of the dismissal of his appeal, he did nothing to have the dismissal reconsidered, and his petition forhabeas corpuswas not filed until December 3, 1948, that is, about six months later, when he had already been serving sentence for sometime. As said by this Court in the case of Domingovs.Director of Prisons, supra, "this passive attitude is an indication of conformity with the proceedings and that the petition (forhabeas corpus) is but an afterthought."

The accused in a criminal case has the undoubted right to present evidence on his behalf. But this right may be waived at any stage of the case, and the waiver may be express or implied. Petitioner in the present case could have insisted on the preservation of that right when he appealed to the Court of Appeals. But since he gave up the appeal and commenced to serve his sentence, the natural interpretation of his attitude is that he no longer cared to have the error corrected and go through further trial, thereby impliedly waiving his right to present evidence if he had any.

The case ofJohnson vs. Zerbst, 304 U. S., 458; 82 Law. ed., 1461, relied on in the majority opinion is hardly applicable to the present case. There the accused was denied his constitutional right to have the assistance of counsel at the trial and the Supreme Court of the United States held that the recognition of that right was a prerequisite to the court's jurisdiction, so that when the right was denied the judgment of conviction was void as having been rendered without jurisdiction. It is obvious that the denial of the error which vitiated the entire proceedings of the trial court and made a new trial inevitable. Annulment of the whole proceedings taken while the accused had no legal counsel was, therefore, proper. In the case at bar, as the majority opinion itself rules, the whole proceedings below did not have to be annulled, so that the case had to be remanded to the trial court for the reception of defendant's evidence. The question of jurisdiction is not at all in issue and seems to have been invoked merely as an excuse to justify recourse tohabeas corpusas a merely for correcting a procedural mistake.

I therefore vote for the dismissal of this petition and the confirmance of the judgment below.

Bengzon and Tuazon, JJ.,concur in the result.

Footnotes

REYES,J.,DISSENTING: