G.R. No. 46170 - People of the Philippines vs. Fermin Punto
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 46170 September 20, 1939
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FERMIN PUNTO,defendant-appellant.
Estanislao B. Alinea for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Acting Assistant Attorney Garcia Bautista for appellee.
LAUREL,J.:
The accused was prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Laguna for a violation of article 195 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 235, upon the following information:
Que en o hacia el 12 de octubre de 1937, en el barrio de Sto. Angel del municipio de San Pablo, Provincia de Laguna, Commonwealth de Filipinas, y dentro de la jurisdiccion de este Juzgado, el acusado arriba nombrado, voluntaria, ilegal y criminalmente, a sabiendas y sin motivo legitimo, tenia en su poder y bajo su posesion ycontrolefectos relacionados con el juego de azar denominadojueteng, consistentes en varios papelitos dejueteng, un lapiz y la suma de P0.91 en efectivo, los cuales efectos fueron encontrados por los agentes de la autoridad en poder de dicho acusado quien, de la referida fecha, ya habia sido convicto y condenado de igual infraccion por el Juzgado de Paz de dicho municipio de San Pablo, el 3 de agosto de 1932.
The accused pleaded guilty and was sentenced by the lower court to an indeterminate penalty of from four months ofarresto mayorto two years, eleven months and eleven days ofprision correccional, with the accessories of the law, and to pay the costs. The amount of P0.91 and thejuetengparaphernalia found in the possession of the defendant were declared forfeited to the Government.
The appellant challenges the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 235, amendatory to article 195 of the Revised Penal Code on the ground that the penalty is cruel and unusual (par. 18, sec. 1 art. III). The challenge is trivial. The punishment provided by a wholesome purpose, namely, to effectuate early repression of an evil that, in the opinion of the Legislature, undermines the social, moral, and economic growth of the nation, and is ". . . best calculated to answer the ends of precaution necessary to deter others from the commission of like offenses, . . .." (Jacksonvs.U.S. [C.C.A., Alaska, 1900], 102 Fed., 473, 488).
The penalty for the violation charged isprision correccionalin its medium degree. There being present the aggravating circumstance of plea of guilty, the prescribed penalty should be imposed in its medium period, that it is, from two years, eleven months, and eleven days to three years, six months, and twenty days ofprision correccional. The maximum penalty imposed by the court is, therefore, within the prescribed range.
Pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended, the appellant may be sentenced to a minimum penalty ofprision correccionalin its minimum degree (Peoplevs.Haloot, 37 Off. Gaz., 2901; Peoplevs.Bernardino, 36 Off. Gaz., 1531; Peoplevs.Co Pao, 58 Phil., 545; and others) which, under the circumstances of the case, should also be imposed in its medium period, or from one year, one month, and eleven days to one year, eight months, and twenty days. Hence, the minimum penalty imposed by the trial court is below the proper range and should, therefore, be increased to one year, one month and eleven days ofprision correccional.
As thus modified, the sentence is affirmed in all respects, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion, and Moran JJ.,concur.