G.R. No. 45155 - JULY 1936 - PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE CASE NUMBERCASE TITLE G.R. No. 45155July 31, 1936 Carmen C. Viuda de Ordoveza vs. Honoria Raymundo G.R. No. 44932July 31, 1936 People of the Philippines vs. Tan Gan, et al. G.R. No. 44896July 31, 1936 Rodolfo A. Schneckenburger vs. Manuel V. Moran G.R. No. 44447July 31, 1936 Apolinario Velez vs. Felix Martinez, et al. G.R. No. 44335July 30, 1936 People of the Philippines vs. Jagui Malasugui G.R. No. 45151July 24, 1936 Adolfo O. Ramos vs. Mariano Buyson Lampa, et al. G.R. No. 45176July 22, 1936 Gregoria Payao vs. Juan G. Lesaca G.R. No. 45261July 21, 1936 Sy Yam Bio, et al. vs. Conrado Barrios, et al. G.R. No. 45086July 20, 1936 Serafin Sanson vs. Conrado Barrios, et al. G.R. No. 43940July 20, 1936 People of the Philippines vs. Dalmani, et al. G.R. No. 45081July 15, 1936 Jose A. Angara vs. Electoral Commission, et al. G.R. No. 45132July 14, 1936 Luzon Surety Co., Inc. vs. Marceliano Montemayor The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation, Inc. Carmen C. Viuda de Ordoveza vs. Honoria Raymundo People of the Philippines vs. Tan Gan, et al. Rodolfo A. Schneckenburger vs. Manuel V. Moran Apolinario Velez vs. Felix Martinez, et al. People of the Philippines vs. Jagui Malasugui Adolfo O. Ramos vs. Mariano Buyson Lampa, et al. Gregoria Payao vs. Juan G. Lesaca Sy Yam Bio, et al. vs. Conrado Barrios, et al. Serafin Sanson vs. Conrado Barrios, et al. People of the Philippines vs. Dalmani, et al. Jose A. Angara vs. Electoral Commission, et al. Luzon Surety Co., Inc. vs. Marceliano Montemayor The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation, Inc.

Upon consideration of the second petition of the attorneys for the appellant in case G. R. 44763,Domingo Ordoveza vs. Honoria Raymundo, etc.praying that the resolution of this court of March 31, 1936, dismissing the appeal for failure to file their brief be reconsidered; in view of the reasons given in said petition and the special circumstances of the case, said resolution is hereby set aside and the appeal reinstated; provided, however, that the attorneys for the appellant shall file their printed brief within five days from notice hereof.

23. Motions for extension of time for the filing of briefs must be presented before the expiration of the time mentioned in Rules 21 and 22, or within a time fixed by special order of the court. No more than one extension of time for the filing of briefs shall be allowed, and then only for good and sufficient cause shown, to be demonstrated by affidavit.

24. If the appellant, in any civil case, fails to serve his brief within the time prescribed by these rules the court may, on motion of the appellee and notice to the appellant, or on its own motion, dismiss the bill of exceptions or the appeal.

1. The first contention of the petitioner rests on the theory developed in his argument that upon the failure of the appellant to file her brief within the time prescribed by the rules of the court, her appeal became,ipso facto, dismissed. Consequently, he argues that at the expiration of the period of fifteen days from March 20, 1936, the Court of Appeals lost jurisdiction of the case, and had, therefore, no power to reinstate the appeal. This view finds no support in the rules of this court. Rule 24 above transcribed clearly indicates the contrary view when it says that upon failure of the appellant to file his brief within the period prescribed by the rules, the court "may", on motion of the appellee and notice to the appellant, or its own motion, dismiss the bill of exceptions or the appeal. The use of the word "may" implies that the matter of dismissing the appeal or not rests within the sound discretion of the court, and that failure of the appellant to file his brief within the time prescribed by the rules does not have the effect of dismissing the appeal automatically. Viewed in this light, the period of fifteen days must be counted in the case under consideration not from March 20, 1936, but from March 31, 1936. Having been entered on April 14, 1936, the order reinstating the appeal came within such fifteen-day period.

2. Granted that the Court of Appeals still had jurisdiction of the case when it reinstated the appeal, it seem reasonable to conclude that it also had authority to grant the appellant an additional period of five days within which to file her brief. Rule 23 provides in specific terms that the court may by special order fix a time within which motions for extension of time for the filing of briefs must be presented. It would seem to be within the spirit of this rule to hold that the court may grant either the appellant or appellee an additional time for the filing of his brief even without any previous application therefor. Moreover, as the Supreme Court of the United States has aptly observed, "it is always in the power of the court to suspend its own rules, or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require it." (U. S.vs.Breitling, 20 How., 252; 15 Law. ed., 900, 902.)