G.R. No. L-11718 - OCTOBER 1916 - PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE CASE NUMBERCASE TITLE G.R. No. L-11718October 31, 1916 United States vs. Lorenzo Macasaet G.R. No. L-11413October 28, 1916 Faustino Lichauco, et al. vs. Raymundo Soriano G.R. No. L-11439October 28, 1916 United States vs. Eduardo Elicanal G.R. No. L-11728October 28, 1916 Marcelina Cabuñag vs. Vicente Jocson G.R. No. L-10463, 10440October 27, 1916 Rochiram Dharamdas, et al. vs. Gopaldas Haroomall, et al. G.R. No. L-8160October 27, 1916 Marcos dela Cruz vs. Ramon Fabie, et al. G.R. No. L-10596October 27, 1916 Angelo Rojas, et al. vs. Director of Lands, et al. G.R. No. L-11589October 26, 1916 United States vs. Lorenzo Ador Dionisio G.R. No. L-8703October 26, 1916 Nazario Marcelo vs. Clemencia Maniquis, et al. G.R. No. L-10044October 24, 1916 Manila Railroad Company vs. Maria Aguilar, et al. G.R. No. L-10169October 23, 1916 Ruperto Montinola vs. Juan Tuason, et al. G.R. No. L-8883October 20, 1916 Francisca Gonzalez, et al. vs. Joaquin Gonzalez Mondragon G.R. No. L-11451October 19, 1916 United States vs. Domingo Perez, et al. G.R. No. L-10439October 17, 1916 Gan Tiangco vs. Silvino Pabinguit G.R. No. L-11676October 17, 1916 United States vs. Andres Pablo G.R. No. L-11226October 17, 1916 Jose Castillo vs. Eulalio Belisario G.R. No. L-11490October 14, 1916 Alhambra Cigar and Cigarette Mfg. Co. vs. Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas G.R. No. L-11416October 14, 1916 United States vs. Wayne Shoup, et al. G.R. No. L-10622October 12, 1916 Engracio Laurencio vs. Insular Collector of Customs G.R. No. L-11549October 12, 1916 United States vs. Jose Campos Rueda, et al. G.R. No. L-11524October 12, 1916 Government of the Philippine Islands vs. El Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros de Manila G.R. No. L-11512October 11, 1916 United States vs. Binayoh G.R. No. L-11544 and 11545October 11, 1916 United States vs. Daniel I. Sobreviñas G.R. No. L-11813October 6, 1916 United States vs. Higino Santiago The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation, Inc. United States vs. Lorenzo Macasaet Faustino Lichauco, et al. vs. Raymundo Soriano United States vs. Eduardo Elicanal Marcelina Cabuñag vs. Vicente Jocson Rochiram Dharamdas, et al. vs. Gopaldas Haroomall, et al. Marcos dela Cruz vs. Ramon Fabie, et al. Angelo Rojas, et al. vs. Director of Lands, et al. United States vs. Lorenzo Ador Dionisio Nazario Marcelo vs. Clemencia Maniquis, et al. Manila Railroad Company vs. Maria Aguilar, et al. Ruperto Montinola vs. Juan Tuason, et al. Francisca Gonzalez, et al. vs. Joaquin Gonzalez Mondragon United States vs. Domingo Perez, et al. Gan Tiangco vs. Silvino Pabinguit United States vs. Andres Pablo Jose Castillo vs. Eulalio Belisario Alhambra Cigar and Cigarette Mfg. Co. vs. Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas United States vs. Wayne Shoup, et al. Engracio Laurencio vs. Insular Collector of Customs United States vs. Jose Campos Rueda, et al. Government of the Philippine Islands vs. El Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros de Manila United States vs. Binayoh United States vs. Daniel I. Sobreviñas United States vs. Higino Santiago The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation, Inc.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 11718 October 31, 1916
THE UNITED STATES,plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LORENZO MACASAET,defendant-appellant.
Gregorio Catigbac and Claro M. Recto for appellant.
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.
CARSON,J.:
The defendant and appellant was charged in the court below with the crime of homicide. The evidence of record conclusively discloses that at about 7 o'clock on the night of the 10th of April, 1915, the accused was standing just outside a neighbor's house in conversation with a friend, discussing his marriage which was to take place two days later; that without warning one Raymundo Briones approached him from behind and struck him over his shoulders with a cane 1 ½ centimeters thick and 75 centimeters long; that the accused snatched a knife from his pocket, opened it and stabbed his assailant to death; and that the assault upon the accused, which was made from behind, was wholly unexpected.
In addition to the cane with which the deceased struck the accused, he was armed with a heavy whip made of iron wire, 56 centimeters long, 5 centimeters in circumference at the handle, and 2 centimeters in circumference at the end, attached by a string to his left wrist. The motive for the unprovoked assault upon the accused was the feeling of jealousy that had been aroused by his successful suit for the hand of the young woman to whom he was betrothed.
These facts were conclusively established by the evidence of record and are not in dispute.
The accused swore that when he was struck by the deceased he attempted to make his escape, but was pursued by his assailant and that he did not draw his knife until he found it necessary to protect himself against further assault by his pursuer, from whom he was unable to escape .The only eyewitness of the assault, the man with whom the accused was talking when the deceased approached him from behind, testified that when the deceased struck the accused with the cane, it slipped from the assailant's hand and that the accused immediately drew his knife and stabbed his assailant several times. The trial judge refused to believe the account of the incident as given by the accused and, accepting the testimony of the eyewitness, was of opinion that while there was unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased and no provocation for the assault on the part of the accused, there was no "reasonable necessity for the means employed to prevent or repel" the assault. Accordingly the trial judge convicted the accused of the crime of homicide with which he was charged and sentenced him to eight years and one day ofprision mayor, together with the accessory penalties prescribed by law.
The sentence thus imposed was fixed at one degree less than that prescribed for the crime of homicide as defined and penalized in article 404 of the Penal Code, the trial judge being of opinion that the convict was entitled to the benefit of the provisions of article 86 which prescribes that:
A penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, if the deed were not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required for exemption from criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in article eight, provided that the majority thereof be present. The court shall impose the penalty in the degree which may be deemed proper, in view of the number and weight of the conditions of exemption present or lacking.
Subsection 4 of article 8 prescribes that:
ART. 8. The following are exempt from criminal liability:
x x x x x x x x x
4. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur:
(1) Unlawful aggression;
(2) Reasonable necessity for the means employed to prevent or repel it;
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
We are inclined to agree with the trial judge in declining to accept the account of the assault as given by the accused, which bears all the earmarks of an attempt on his part to emphasize the necessity for the means adopted by him to defend himself from his aggressor; but we cannot agree with the trial judge in holding that under all the circumstances of the case as described by the witnesses for the prosecution, the accused should not be held wholly exempt from criminal liability on the ground that he acted in self-defense.
Taken by surprise by a wholly unprovoked assault from behind made by a jealous competitor for the hand of his betrothed, with a cane in one hand and a heavy iron whip attached to the other, in the darkness of the night, and on a public highway, we are not willing to hold that there was no "reasonable necessity for the means employed to prevent or repel" the assault, and that the accused was not justified in defending himself from the assault with his pocketknife, that being the only available weapon at hand. Even admitting that the cane fell from the hand of his assailant as a result of the force of the first blow struck, the assailant still had in his left hand a heavy iron whip, and was presumably in position readily to recover the cane which had slipped from his right hand. It was not merely a question of repelling an assault under circumstances which would not justify the assaulted party in believing that it would be necessary to take his assailant's life in order to defend himself from grave physical injuries .The heavy iron whip held in reserve by the assailant, and the cold-blooded and unprovoked character of the assault may well have led the accused to believe that the deceased intended to do him a grave injury, and by surprising him in the dark, without any arm in his hand, make it impossible for him to defend himself.1awph!l.net
It appears that the accused struck the deceased several blows and it has been suggested that after having inflicted one fatal blow, there was no need to repeat it. Having concluded, however, that under all circumstances the accused was justified in making use of his knife to repel the unprovoked assault as best he could, it would be impossible to say that a second or third blow was unnecessary under all the circumstances of the case, it appearing that the accused instantly and without hesitation inflicted all the wounds at or about the same time.
The judgment convicting and sentencing the defendant and appellant should, therefore, be reversed, with the costs in both instancesde officio; and, on the ground that the accused took the life of the deceased in legitimate self-defense, he should be acquitted and set at liberty forthwith. So ordered.
Torres, Johnson, Moreland, Trent and Araullo, JJ., concur.