Philippine Laws Platform

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 10363 September 29, 1915

THE UNITED STATES,plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PASCUALPACIS, ET AL.,defendants-appellants.

F. Boomer for appellants.
Acting Attorney-General Zaragoza for appellee.

CARSON,J.:

An appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance, Fourth Judicial District, convicting the appellants ofa violation of a gambling ordinance of the city of Baguio, rendered on appeal from the court of the justice of the peace of that city.

The right of the appellants to maintain this appeal turnsupon our ruling as to the question raised by them as tothe validity of the ordinance of the violation of which theywere convicted. (U.S.vs.Tamparong, p. 321,ante.)

Counsel for appellants contend that the municipal council of the city of Baguio is not clothed with power to enact an ordinance defining, prohibiting and penalizing gambling by its charter (Act No. 1963), from which, as counselproperly contend, all lawful powers exercised by the council must be derived.

The trial judge was of opinion that the power to enactthe ordinance in question was secured to the city councilof Baguio under subsection(e)of section 32 of the Baguio Incorporation Act (No. 1963), which provides that "all lawsor parts of laws of the Philippine Islands which, prior tothe passage of this Act, were applicable to the territorycomprising the city of Baguio and which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act shall remain in fullforce and effect." The trial judge was of opinion that since the provisions of section 29 of Act No. 1397 (TheTownship Government Act) confer in express termsauthority upon township councils organized under that Actin the Province of Benguet to "prohibit gambling, opium smoking, or the sale of opium for smoking," the powerwith which township councils under that Act are thusexpressly clothed should be held to be conferred upon themunicipal council of the city of Baguio.

We are of opinion, however, that since the express powersconferred in section 29 of the Township Government Act(No. 1397) are conferred only upon townships organizedunder the provisions of that Act, those powers cannotproperly be held to have been conferred upon the municipalcouncil of the city of Baguio, which was incorporated underthe provisions of the Baguio Incorporation Act, and notunder the provisions of the Township Government Act (No. 1397). It is true, as indicated in the opinion of thetrial judge, that the provisions of Act No. 1397 are "partsof laws of the Philippine Islands which," prior to thepassage of the Baguio Incorporation Act, were applicable tothe "territory comprising the city of Baguio," but it will beobserved that they are applicable thereto only in the eventof the organization in that territory of a township underand by virtue of the Township Government Act (No. 1397).

We think, however, that the validity of the ordinance under discussion and the power of the city council of Baguio to enact it must be sustained under the provisions ofsubsection(gg)of section 8 of the Baguio Incorporation Act (No. 1963), as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2106, inwhich the title of the subsection is changed to subsection(ll)of section 8 of Act No. 1963. the provisions of thatsection are as follows (section 8, subsection(ll), Act No .1963, as amended):

The city council shall have power by ordinance orresolution—

(c)To make such further ordinances and regulationsnot repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry intoeffect and discharge the powers and duties conferred bythis charter and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good, order, comfort, andconvenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and forthe protection of property therein; and enforce obediencethereto with such lawful fines or penalties as the city councilmay prescribe under the provisions of subsection(kk)ofthis section.

General grants of police powers of this character in municipal charters are frequently referred to as "the general welfare provisions" of the municipal charter in which theyare found, and the provisions of the above-cited subsection of the charter of the city of Baguio will hereinafter bereferred to as the general welfare provisions of that charter.

It will be seen that very extensive police powers areconferred upon the municipal council of the city of Baguio, and there can be but little ground for discussion as to thepower of the city council to adopt appropriate and reasonable ordinances, defining, prohibiting and penalizing gambling,under the authority of the above-cited general welfare provisions of the Baguio Incorporation Act, unless it appearsthat the ordinance as enacted is repugnant to or inconsistent with some general law of the Philippine Islands.

The principal contention of counsel for the appellants is that the Philippine Legislature having enacted a statute (Act No. 1757) defining, prohibiting and penalizing gambling, the exercise of power by the city council of Baguio to define, prohibit and penalize gambling should be held to be repugnant to or inconsistent with the prior exercise oflike power by the Philippine Legislature.

In the case of United Statesvs.Joson (26 Phil. Rep., 1), we ruled under the authority of many cases cited from thereports of the courts of last resort in the United States, that under anexpressauthority "to provide against the evils of gambling, gambling houses, and disorderly houses ofwhatever sort.... An ordinance adopted in strict accordance with said charter provisions is valid, even thoughthere is a state law existing upon the same subject, regulating the same question." In that case we cited withapproval Mcquillin to the effect that "the general doctrineis supported by the weight of judicial authority that an actmay be made penal offense under the statutes of the state, and further penalties may be imposed for its commission or omission by municipal ordinance." We also quoted withapproval Cooley and Dillon as follows:

"Indeed, an act may be a penal offense under the lawsof the State, and further penalties, under proper legislativeauthority, be imposed for its commission by municipal by- laws (ordinances) and the enforcement of the one wouldnot preclude the enforcement of the other." (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 6th ed., 239.).

Judge Cooley adds that "such is the clear weight ofauthority, though the decisions are not uniform."

Judge Cooley quotes from the opinion in the case ofRogersvs.Jones (1 Wend., N. Y., 238, 261), where it issaid" "But it is said that the by-law (ordinance) of a townor corporation is void, if the legislature have regulated thesubject by law. If the legislature have passed a law regulating certain things in a city, I apprehend the corporations are not thereby restricted from making furtherregulations. Cases of this kind have occurred and neverbeen questioned on that ground;... the legislaturehave imposed a penalty of $1 for servile labor on Sunday .The corporation of the city of New York have passed aby-law imposing the penalty of $5 for the same offense. Asto storing gunpowder in New York, the legislature and thecorporation (of the city of New York) have each imposedthe same penalty. Suit to recover the penalties have beensustained under the corporation law. It is believed thatthe ground has never been taken that there was a conflictwith the State law."

Judge Dillon, in his work on municipal corporations (5thed.), which has long been recognized as a standard, after a lengthy discussion and citation of authorities, fullyrecognizing the conflict which exists, quotes approvingly fromJudge Cooley the following:"Although the decisions are notuniform, the clear weight of authority is that the same actmay constitute an offense both against the State and themunicipal corporation and both may punish it without violating any constitutional principal."

The question here presented, however, is distinguished from that considered in the former case by the fact thatthe Baguio Incorporation Act (No. 1963), unlike the generalstatutes for the organization of municipalities throughoutthe Islands, contains no express grant of power to enact ordinances prohibiting and penalizing gambling; and thatthe city council of Baguio enacted the ordinance in question not under an express grant of authority to define, prohibit, and penalize gambling but under and by virtue of the general police powers conferred upon the city by the above-cited"general welfare provisions."

This question is not without difficulty sa will readily beseen from the far uniform rulings announced in the large array of cases treating of this subject to be found in the reports, many of which are cited in the footnotes, paragraph 895, volume 3, McQuillin on Municipal Corporations,and paragraphs 631, 632, 633, volume 2, Dillon on Municipal Corporations, fifth edition.

We think, however, that the fair and logical conclusion which should be drawn from the decided cases, as well asfrom the general principles which should control in suchcases, is well stated by Dillon, as follows:

. . . There are many acts of such a nature thattheymay, if the legislature has so provided, be an offense against the state at large, and also against the special andlocal government of the municipality. Accordingly, wherean act is prohibited both by statute and by ordinance, itmay constitute two offenses, one against the State and theother against the city or town, and where such is the casea conviction of one may not be pleaded as constituting former jeopardy when the offender is prosecuted for the other,and where such is the case the weight of authority alsoseems to hold that power to enact ordinances with referencethereto may be included in the general powers conferredon cities and towns by statue. (Dillon on MunicipalCorporations, vol. II, 5th ed., 633.)

In our former opinion, United Statesvs.Joson (supra), we said that, under the general doctrine, "an act may bemade a penal offense under the statutes of the state, andfurther penalties may be imposed for its commission oromission by municipal ordinance." Under that decision weheld that the express grant of power to a municipality toenact ordinances prohibiting and penalizing a particular actsufficiently disclosed the legislative intent that notwithstanding the fact that the commission of the act may havebeen made a penal offense against the state at large, itmay, by municipal ordinance, be lawfully denounced andpenalized as an offense against the special and local government of the municipality.

Upon like reasoning, we are of opinion that where the commission or omission of a particular act is, in its nature, such that that its commission or omission within the territoriallimits of a certain municipality constitutes a separate offenseagainst the municipality, or in any case wherein it appearsthat the commission or omission of an act penalized underthe general laws of the state within the territorial limits ofa particular municipality, aggravates the character of theoffense and necessitates or justifies the adoption of additional repressive measures for its suppression by themunicipality, such municipality may adopt ordinancesprescribing additional penalties for the commission or omission of such act under and by virtue of the general police powersconferred upon it by the "general welfare clause" of its charter. Of course, the subject matter of the ordinance must, in such cases, fall within the purview of the general police powers conferred upon the municipality under the"general welfare clause" of its charter; but if it does, themere fact that the commission or omission of the prohibitedact has already been penalized by general statute is notsufficient to negative the legislative intent to empower themunicipality to enact ordinances with reference theretounder the general police powers set forth in the "generalwelfare clause" of the municipal charter. Thus it was said inWoodvs.City of Brooklyn (14 Barb., 425, 426): "Thereare the very best of reasons why cities should be authorizedto impose penalties in addition to those inflicted by thelaws of the State. "Particular acts may be far moreinjurious, while the temptation to commit them may be muchgreater in a crowded city than in the State generally. Theyconsequently require more severe measures for prevention .State laws are, of course, for the general good, and cannotalways answer the peculiar wants of particular localities."

Thus drunkenness, disorderly conduct, smoking of opium and the keeping of opium dens, gambling, and the keeping of gambling dens and the like, are offenses the commission of which within the limits of a thickly settled urbancommunity may well carry with it consequences peculiarlysubversive of the good order and general welfare of such acommunity which would be wholly, or in large part, absentif committed in a sparsely settled community. It wouldseem, therefore, that special repressive measures by themunicipal authorities under a general grant of police powers are justified and ofttimes necessary in dealing with those offenses.

We are aware that the rulings of the courts of last resortin the United States are not altogether consistent in thisregard, but, as pointed out by McQuillin, in par. 889, vol.III: "It is certain that the recent judicial decisions inclineto give a more extensive scope to the police power than theearlier cases. The general welfare idea is expanding rapidly. In its application to urban life it is wide and varied. This generation has witnessed a decided change in the viewsof the courts relating to the construction and practical operation of police ordinances. Greater power is conceded to be vested in the public authorities. Their judgment anddiscretion is more respected. The public welfare in itsbroadest sense has been adopted as the basis of construction. This position is sound, and is certain to aid materiallythe development of better urban conditions."

And to like effect in paragraph 876, volume II: "Thedecisions on this subject are numerous and conflicting. Perhaps on no single topic of municipal corporation law havethere been so many discordant utterances even by the samecourts and the same individual judges. But the bestconsidered cases, especially the more recent ones, have properlyextended the sphere of activity of the municipal corporationin dealing with police offenses. The necessity of thusenlarging municipal jurisdiction is obvious to the carefulstudent of the conditions and needs of the crowded modernurban centers of population. The earlier conceptions ofour courts on this subject are less definite and satisfactory."

We conclude that an ordinance enacted under a generalgrant of police powers, prohibiting and penalizing thecommission of one of these offenses as an offense against thepeace and good order of the municipality, is not necessarilyinconsistent with, or repugnant to a general statute prohibiting and penalizing the commission of the act as an offenseagainst the state.

The appellants inn this case were convicted of a violation of an ordinance of the city of Baguio prohibiting andpenalizing gambling enacted under and by virtue of thepowers conferred by the above-cited subsection (ii) ofsection 8 of the Baguio Incorporation Act. The powers thusconferred in general terms on the municipal council of thecity of Baguio are manifestly wide enough in scope toinclude the enactment of an ordinance prohibiting andpenalizing gambling, unless such ordinance appears to berepugnant to or inconsistent with some general statute. The general purpose and objection of the ordinance, looking asit does to the suppression of gambling in the city of Baguio, is manifestly in harmony with the provisions of the generalstatute prohibiting and penalizing gambling; and from whathas already been said we think it must be held that thereis nothing inherently repugnant in the enactment of anordinance prohibiting and penalizing gambling as an offenseagainst the peace and good order of the city of Baguio, notwithstanding the fact that under the general statute, gambling has been declared to be a penal offense against thepeace and good order of the state.

Appellants having failed to establish their contentions as to the invalidity of the ordinance, their appeal must bedismissed with the costs of this instance against them, underthe rule laid down in the case of United Statesvs.Tamparong (supra). So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Trent, and Araullo, JJ.,concur.